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SUMMARY
The thesis is an attempt to apply the rule of law to pollution control, the aim being to
discover whether one form of environmental regulation can be regarded as more
constitutionally legitimate than another. The thesis begins with a detailed discussion of the
rule of law. In the first chapter, I suggest that the rule of law cannot simply be 'intuitively
realised', but rather that the values associated with it must be accounted for through
theoretical analysis. Immanent critique is rejected as a theoretical technique in favour of
Dworkin's 'constructive interpretation'. The latter approach yields the rule of law values of
equity, accountability, efficiency, certainty and effectiveness. Future chapters involve the
application of these values to specific modes of pollution control. In chapter two, the
'command-and-control' regulatory systems operated by HMIP, the NRA, local authorities
(air pollution control and waste regulation) and water and sewerage companies are analysed
in terms of rule of law values - except for accountability which is discussed separately and in
much greater depth in chapters 3 to 6. In these four chapters, I begin by examining general
accountability mechanisms before exploring accountability for specific decisions such as the
setting of ambient standards, the setting of emission/process standards and finally,
monitoring and enforcement. Having discussed command-and-control approaches to
pollution control, chapter 7 proceeds to examine market mechanisms of environmental
regulation in terms of the rule of law values. The values are first applied to pollution taxes
and tradeable permits at an abstract level; they are then applied to the existing cost-recovery
charging schemes operated by the various regulatory bodies. Finally, in chapter eight I
attempt to apply the rule of law values to 'market approaches' to pollution control such as
environmental management and audit, green consumerism and investment, government-
industry contracts and civil liability. The conclusion of the thesis then assesses the success
or otherwise of the practical application of the rule of law that has been attempted in
previous chapters. It considers whether one can use the rule of law as a benchmark of
legitimacy to conclude that one form of pollution control is more constitutionally legitimate
than another.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an attempt to apply the rule of law (which, as I hope to show, is part of our
unwritten constitution), to the various mechanisms of pollution control. If it fills any 'gaps'
in the academic literature, they are: first, the lack of any recent theoretical, public law
analysis in environmental law in the UK. The last significant public law studies, centred
around administrative discretion, were carried out in the early 1980s under the auspices of
the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies.' It is perhaps a sign of the times that most
theoretical work on environmental policy and certainly most funded research, appears to be
performed by environmental economists. The second gap is the absence of any attempts to
apply the rule of law at anything other than an abstract leve1. 2 Although theory is
necessarily abstract, it seems to me that it is only useful if it can be applied in real world
settings. If, as has been claimed, theory is like a map, it would appear important to find
some terrain on which to use the map.3
Up until recently, administrative command-and-control 4 regulation was the favoured
method for making firms control their pollution. It is still extremely important, but it seems
likely that regulation will increasingly give way to the market as a means of control. A note
on terminology is needed at this point. I will be using the term 'market approaches' to refer
to non-regulatory means of pollution control which are dependent on market processes and
signals for their operation. 5 These should not be confused with 'market mechanisms' -
which I will be using to describe pollution taxes and tradeable permits. Market approaches
rely on the market in contradistinction to regulation; market mechanisms on the other hand
are a form of regulation which mimics the market and provides many of the benefits (and
l Eg. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement; Richardson et al., Policing Pollution.
2Eg. Harden & Lewis, The Noble Lie.
3Alternatively, one might claim that different theories are like differently scaled maps, so that an 'abstract'
theory is the equivalent of a road atlas of Britain while one like mine is a small scale Ordnance Survey
variety.
41 Command-and-contra is a rather authoritarian sounding term and is only used for want of an alternative.
Its use certainly should not be taken to express any prejudice against this form of regulation. Indeed, it is
likely to remain the bedrock of our system of pollution control for some time to come.
5Market approaches are wider than 'voluntary' approaches, because, as we shall see, there are market-based
accountability mechanisms that pressurise companies into action; and action which results from such
pressure is not strictly voluntary.
2disadvantages) associated with actual markets. 6 If as seems likely, we are going to see an
increase in the use of both forms of market techniques in the near future, 7
 I believe that it is
important to try to chart the constitutionality of such a shift. Will such techniques be
constitutionally illegitimate? Or, on the other hand, might they prove more legitimate than
traditional command-and-control forms? The aim will be to see whether the rule of law can
act as a benchmark of constitutional legitimacy to help us to answer these questions.
Finally, one or two comments need to be made on the scope and structure of the thesis.
First, while the thesis as a whole is an attempt to apply the rule of law to pollution control
mechanisms, it can be read on a number of different levels. Thus, one could for example
read the majority of the thesis without the constitutional framework. The rule of law, I
suggest, is made up of the values of efficiency, equity, certainty, effectiveness and
accountability. Without the rule of law, the thesis becomes simply an application of
administrative values to the various types of pollution control mechanism - there is no
constitutional underpinning of those values. Alternatively, since a substantial part of the
thesis involves the consideration of just one of the rule of law values - accountability -
anyone interested in that alone need only read the beginning of chapter 2 and then chapters
3-6. Secondly, the backbone of the main body of the thesis, the blueprint for its structure, is
formed by command-and-control regulation8 and more specifically by the twin functions of
standard-setting (in relation to both ambient standards and emission/process standards)9
6The title of the thesis was originally going to be 'Environmental Regulation and the Rule of Law' rather
than 'Pollution Control and the Rule of Law'. The difficulty with this title was that - unless 'regulation' is
defined extremely broadly - it did not encompass the non-regulatory market approaches to pollution control.
7In the future we are likely to see policy makers setting the goals they desire and then leaving it to industry
to sort out amongst themselves how to meet these goals. And just as we are likely to see an increased
emphasis on market approaches rather than regulation, we are also likely to see an increasing shift in the
form of regulation which remains - from command-and-control to market mechanisms.
8Regulation has been defined by Kagan as "the control of economic activity by means of direct legal orders"
He states that "Regulation in this sense occurs when businessmen are legally prohibited from practising a
trade without a license or from constructing buildings or processing milk except in accordance with
governmentally prescribed health and safety standards. Typically the detailed specification, enforcement
and application of these rules is entrusted to specialised regulatory agencies, established to concentrate on
control of a particular industry or trade or a particular business practice." (R.A. Kagan, Regulatory Justice,
quoted in Baldwin, Regulating the Airlines, p.3).
9These terms will be examined more closely later in the thesis. Nevertheless, a comment needs to be made
at this point about ambient standards (standards which apply to the receiving environment and which
typically lay down concentrations of particular substances which must not be exceeded in that medium).
Because regulation is the backbone of the thesis, I will be considering only the setting of ambient standards
which are an integral part of the regulatory process. This means that I will not, for example, be examining
the common law of nuisance: while on one view, the reasonableness standard associated with the law of
nuisance could be regarded as an ambient standard (see eg. Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, p.81), it is not
one set by a regulatory body at which other standards (eg. emission standards) are aimed.
3and enforcement under such a system. Although regulation and regulatory schemes often
go beyond these two functions, they are the crucial elements which form the basis for
comparison with other mechanisms of pollution control.
The environmental law content and structure is also worthy of some comment. One of the
biggest problems an environmental lawyer faces is that of setting out the subject in a
coherent shape. Lawyers who come from a common law tradition are generally adept at the
process of categorisation; however, environmental law tests these skills to the limit. How
does one arrange the subject for the purposes of study? Does one categorise according to
the medium (ie. land, air and water), the regulator (ie. the National Rivers Authority, Her
Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, Waste Regulation Authorities etc.), the pollution source
(eg. 'point source' or 'diffuse' source), the type of industry (eg. landfill, manufacturing
industry, agriculture), or the means of pollution control (the market, command-and-control
regulation etc.)? As with cases in the common law, there are many different ways of
categorising and hence many potential overlaps. Although the environmental law content
and shape of my thesis is obviously determined by my argument, the thesis is manifestly
'about' some things and not others. It is for example about pollution control rather than the
broader notion of environmental protection or corporate environmental performance - both
of which would probably also encompass matters such as conservation and landscaping.
While these are of considerable importance, the focus of my thesis is pollution.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that pollution control is the central environmental thread, the
difficulty with categories mentioned above means that different chapters will not always
square-up in terms of subject matter. For example, I consider waste regulation when
looking at command-and-control and market mechanisms of regulation, but the chapter on
market approaches concerns pollution from manufacturing industry. 10 Although this
particular example of dissonance is unintentional and the inevitable result of the historical
development of these subject areas, there are occasions where I purposefully stray beyond
the strict thread of my argument to examine categories in more detail. Thus, if the thesis
has a shifting sands feel to it, this is at times the result of examining a whole category where
a watertight logical structure would have required examination of only some components of
that category. In chapter 5 for example, I examine accountability for operational decisions
which are not related to standard-setting as such - whereas the logic of chapters 5 and 6
would suggest concentrating only on standard-setting and enforcement. Finally, whereas,
10Landfill is an industry, but - in relation to market approaches - while it is possible to consider landfill
sites when looking at civil liability, there is nothing manufactured to which, say, an eco-label might attach.
4for the sake of interest, I thus refer to things which are perhaps not strictly relevant to my
argument, it is also true to say that the things I do cover are often not confined to the
context in which I discuss them. Eco-auditing, for example, may deal with traffic noise
generated by a plant and perhaps also landscaping or wildlife provision. Green investment
may also be broader in scope than just pollution control. However, I am only interested in
them as tools for controlling pollution to air, land or water. The reader will no doubt find
many other examples.
To sum up, the thesis is selective: on an environmental level, it is a study of pollution
caused by waste from production of products by corporations. The following should
therefore be borne in mind: environmental law and policy is not solely concerned with
pollution (but also with conservation, planning etc.); pollution is not caused just by
manufacturing industry (but by agriculture, extractive industries, sewage works, surface
run-off, incineration plants, landfill sites and contaminated land, water extraction etc.);
corporate pollution associated with production does not arise solely from waste (but also
from raw material spillages); and corporations give rise to pollution not just from
production (but also from the use and disposal of the products they create).
The text aims to have kept up to date with the secondary literature until around September
1994. The law is stated as in December 1994. The Environment Bill is obviously likely to
have some impact on the content of the thesis. Unfortunately, it arrived too late for its
implications to be fully discussed, and in any event, given that it has not yet been debated,
such discussion would have been premature. Neverthless, where possible, I have
highlighted points where the Bill may be expected to produce changes, although I would
not claim to have covered all of the possibilities.
The approximate number of words (including footnotes) is 110,000.
CHAPTER 1
Pollution Control and the Rule of Law
This thesis is an attempt to assess the constitutional legitimacy of the English and Welsh
system of pollution control using the rule of law as a benchmark of legitimacy.' The
principles or values which I associate with the rule of law include those of certainty,
efficiency, effectiveness, equity and accountability. The thesis is therefore an empirical
constitutional case-study: having outlined the framework of constitutional values, the
task will be to examine pollution control in terms of these values.
The thesis can be regarded as an exercise in the field of constitutional economics in that
it applies the constitutional principles of the rule of law to an area of the economy -
pollution contro1. 2 The range of values considered distinguishes my stance from that
taken by welfare economics, which necessarily places the value of efficiency before all
others. 3 This chapter begins with a brief discussion of constitutional economics. The
remainder of the chapter examines the concept of the rule of law in detail; if the rule of
law is to form the centre-piece of the argument, its foundations will require close
1 As will become clear, we are concerned with the legitimacy of the means of pollution control - ie.
pollution control programmes, rather than the legitimacy of pollution control agencies themselves
(although the two are obviously related). On the latter, see for example, Baldwin and McCnidden,
Regulation and Public Lmv - who state on p.33: "When there is talk of this or that agency being
legitimate or illegitimate, in the sense that certain values are satisfied or left unsatisfied by agency
action, reference appears to be being made to one or more of five key criteria: Is it supported by
legislative authority? Is it otherwise accountable? Does it carry out its tasks with due process? Is the
body expert? Is it efficient? These five criteria constitute the limited vocabulary of the language of
legitimacy." See further Baldwin, 'Accounting for Discretion' (1990) 10 OJLS 422 - where he states
that one can assess good government by reference to core values of legal mandate, fairness,
accountability, expertise, efficiency, effectiveness and certainty. See also Jones, 'Administrative Law,
Regulation and Legitimacy' (1989) 16(4) Jo of Law & S'oc 410.
2The rule of law has been applied to pollution regulation before, but in the limited context of using rules
to limit discretion - see Richardson et al., Policing Pollution, pp.22-3. When it comes to equity, they
see this as an independent principle of justice rather than one which stems from the rule of law - see
p.98, although cf. p.47.
3Most modern environmental economics (eg. that practised by David Pearce et al.) is a form of welfare
economics. Instead of analysing situations in terms of Pareto optimality or superiority, where efficiency
alone is the guiding norm, constitutional economics looks to the constitutionality of particular practices.
Note that this is not saying that economists - particularly environmental economists - consider only
efficiency when comparing different policy instruments. When comparing command-and-control
approaches to environmental regulation with market mechanisms for example, while environmental
economists usually accord efficiency the most attention, issues of equity, effectiveness and continuous
incentives to innovate are invariably discussed. However, efficiency is necessarily their prime concern
because it is the foundation of welfare economics. Because I am considering a wider range of values,
my approach could also be classed as an exercise in Institutional Economics - see further Duxbury, 'Is
There a Dissenting Tradition in Law and Economics?' (1991) 54 MLR 300, esp. at 304.
6scrutiny. The emphasis on foundations is fundamental: as I hope to demonstrate, the
rule of law and its associated values cannot be 'intuitively realised'; 4
 they must be
accounted for by theoretical analysis. It is my belief that recent attempts to ground the
rule of law theoretically have yielded a narrow set of values because they are rooted in
gesellschaft5 notions. By utilising Dworkinian 'constructive interpretation', 6 I hope to
escape the confines of a gesellschaft model of the rule of law and hence arrive at a fuller
set of constitutional values, appropriate for the modern regulatory state.
1.1 CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
The inventor of this term and its principal modern exponent is Buchanan. The term
'constitutional economics' covers two different strategies. On the one hand, it may mean
applying economic principles to the study of constitutions. 7 On the other, it may involve
the application of constitutional principles to areas of the economy. Hayek and
Buchanan are both proponents of the latter, since they both advocate constitutional
restraints on, in particular, taxation. 8 My study will likewise involve the application of
constitutional principles to an area of the economy: not taxation, but pollution control.
As Buchanan and Hayek are two of the key figures in 'New Right' thought, it is perhaps
not surprising that many consider the search for the constitution "as a set of principles of
legitimate government" to be a reactionary enterprise. 9 However, it is surprising that
those who recognise that written constitutions are double-edged swords - of use to both
Right and Left - do not regard unwritten constitutions in the same light. I hope to dispel
the notion that constitutional economics is necessarily a 'Right-wing' activity.
Of course, that is not to say that Hayek and Buchanan adopt the same approach.
Buchanan is highly critical of Hayek's 'evolutionism' - his insistence that the
spontaneous order of the common law is best - because such an anti-constructivist
4See Lewis, 'Public Law and Legal Theory' in Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and the Common Law, 99 at
p.101, and Harden & Lewis, The Noble Lie, pp.12 and 20 (hereafter, Noble Lie).
5For the meaning of the term and the distinction between gesellschaft and gemeinschaft forms of law,
see Kamenka & Tay, 'Beyond Bourgeois Individualism - The Contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal
Ideology' in Kamenka & Neale (eds.), Feudalism, Capitalism And Beyond. The gesellschaft form of
legal authority is one associated with individual rights-bearers in exchange-based societies.
6Dworkin, Law's Empire.
7See eg. Vaughn, 'Constitutional Economics: Themes and Reflections', in Mackenzie (ed.),
Constitutional Economics, 239 at p.241.
8 See eg. Buchanan, The Power To Tax, and Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. Although Buchanan,
particularly in his early work, also applies economic concepts to constitutional matters.
9A point noted by Harden, 'The Constitution and its Discontents' (1991) 21(4) Br Jo of Pol Science 489
at p.491; Harden and Lewis in The Noble Lie are also engaged in 'constitutional economics', but I do
not mention them in the same breath as Hayek and Buchanan because they would probably not describe
themselves as part of that school.
7stance implies that reform and improvement are not possible. 10 Furthermore, Buchanan
does not share Hayek's views on equality before the law and its implications for taxation.
He notes that taxes do and may legitimately vary between people, and that existing
norms rule out only 'totally arbitrary discrimination' - for example taxing Catholics more
heavily than Protestants. However, although he is not against uniform taxation per se,11
Buchanan is doubtful whether proportional taxation, as advocated by Hayek, is a
necessary requirement of equality before the law:
"How is uniformity or equality to be defined for tax purposes? Should 'equality
before the law' in taxation require equal payments by all persons in the polity? Or
should such equality be interpreted to require that all persons in the jurisdiction confront
equal rates of tax, hence allowing for proportional but not regressive or progressive tax
structures? Hayek's argument to the effect that a proportional tax structure would meet
the requirement for generality whereas a progressive rate structure would not do so
seems to be dangerously arbitrary.“12
So, where Hayek's primary concern is distributional - ensuring that taxation is in
accordance with his version of the rule of law - Buchanan is more concerned with
restraining the total amount of taxation. Again, while Buchanan is not explicitly against
uniform taxation, he does not believe that Hayek's uniformity requirement would
necessarily achieve a reduction in the overall level of taxation.° Buchanan's concern
then, is to develop constitutional mechanisms which will prevent governments from the
inevitable temptation to raise taxes. He does give examples, such as limiting the
frequency with which taxes can be altered, but he does not lay down one single correct
method; all he is suggesting is that fiscal limits are required."
The above discussion of taxation is naturally of no great consequence here per se. The
rationale for its introduction is merely to point out that the same sorts of issues will arise
in applying constitutional analysis to pollution control. The general approach, rather
than the substance of the argument, is significant. However, on closer inspection, it will
be revealed that neither Buchanan nor Hayek are arguing from the actual constitution.15
10 See Freedom in Constitutional Contract, pp. 30-38 and 293; on p.38, Buchanan states that Hayek
"has relatively little to say about criteria for evaluating legislation, which does not emerge from the
invisible hand process."
1 lIbid., p.196.
12Ibid., p.157.
13Ibid., pp.195-6.
"Power To Tax, pp.190-1 and 204.
15Daintith has levelled a similar accusation against The Noble Lie by Harden and Lewis; he claims that
"their baseline for criticism is not the constitution itself but what it ought to be" (Daintith, 'Political
Programmes and The Content of the Constitution' in Finnie, Himsworth and Walker (eds.), Edinburgh
Essays In Public Law, 44 at p.50). Ironically, Brazier has levelled a similar accusation against Daintith
- See Brazier, 'The Non-Legal Constitution: Thoughts On Convention, Practice And Principle' 43(3)
NILQ 262 at p.280 and p.281 n.13 (hereafter Brazier).
8Buchanan does state that he is not relying on the existing US constitution in arguing for
limits on taxation." He also states that the desire for constitutional restraints is a
political matter: 'social democrats' will, he claims, want government regulation to be
unconstrained by constitutions, whereas libertarians (US) or liberals (Europe) will want
governments to be constitutionally restricted." This further supports the fact that he is
not describing the constitution, or even interpreting it; he is merely expressing a hope
that people will agree to change it in the way he desires. Hayek, likewise, does not
regard the rule of law as part of the British constitution. It is perhaps not surprising that
many people believe that Hayek is describing the constitution," because he only
distinguishes the rule of law from the constitution in one place (CL 206).19
Thus, my general approach also differs from that of Buchanan and Hayek in that I am
describing the constitution. Critics will no doubt respond to this in some of the
following ways They may assert that the rule of law is not truly part of the constitution.
They may claim that its content is vague and arbitrary; that it can mean whatever you
want it to mean; that it is all a matter of subjective political preferences. They may also
question how the rule of law is to operate in practice, denying that there are principles
which can strike out government action as unconstitutional. The rest of the chapter
attempts to anticipate some of these possible responses.
1.2 IS THE RULE OF LAW PART OF THE CONSTITUTION?
As I have said, my approach differs from that of Buchanan and Hayek in that I am
describing the constitution. Our unwritten 20 constitution is usually described in terms of
the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional conventions. 21 The
question is whether the rule of law is really part of the constitution, "Or is its proper
place not in the realm of constitutional legality but in the rhetoric of liberal-democratic
values?" 22 I think that if most commentators asked themselves, 'is the rule of law part of
the constitution?' the answer would be 'yes'. I would not disagree if people argued that
16Freedom in Constitutional Contract, p.39 and pp.293-8.
17See Liberty, Market and State, p.256.
18See Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, pp.155 and 159.
°However, he does state that the rule of law could be translated into constitutional principles - The
Constitution of Liberty, pp.205-6. Because I will be referring so often to it, references will be left in the
text and abbreviated to CL.
20As opposed to that part of our constitution which is written - as Dicey noted, many of our individual
'constitutional' rights are not contained in a written constitutional code, but are written down in
disparate judicial decisions and items of legislation.
21 The question of whether conventions should be further sub-divided into conventions proper, usages,
practices etc. will not be dealt with here - on this see eg. Brazier, note 15 ante.
22Jowell, 'The Rule of Law Today', in Jowell & Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution, 3 at p.4.
9it ought not to be regarded as such. The point is that it is typically regarded as
constitutional in nature.
A caveat is needed at this point. I will suggest that for the British, the content of the
rule of law can only realistically be found in Dicey, but that the principles he outlines
need to be updated in the light of modern purposes. I am therefore stating, in effect,
that the principles Dicey outlines represent the rule of law for us and are therefore part
of the constitution, but that they nevertheless require interpretation. This process of
interpretation yields a different set of principles. Naturally, I am not maintaining that my
new principles are the constitution. Nor am I merely saying that they should be part of
the constitution." My new principles are art interpretation of t(\e, constitwion, and an
interpretation lies somewhere between the actual and the merely desirable.
1.3 WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF THE RULE OF LAW?
This is by far the most difficult question to answer and it is one which deserves a frill
exposition. Assuming that there is such a thing as the rule of law, and having concluded
that it is part of the constitution, it may seem easy to say that the rule of law consists of
the values or principles of certainty, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and equity.
However, to pick such values out of the air without any explanantion of their
provenance would be to adopt an 'intuitive realist' approach, as it ignores the essential
presuppositions which underlie such an assertion. 24
 The task of the constitutional
student is therefore to use a theoretical approach which will make these presuppositions
apparent. The following sections will explore some of the approaches which one might
adopt.
1.3.1 Immanent Critique
The theoretical approach adopted by Harden and Lewis in The Noble Lie is that of
'immanent critique' which, quoting Horkheimer, they describe as "the confrontation of
'the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles, in order
23Brazier finds it remarkable not that Harden can claim that there ought to be fundamental principles of
the constitution (which limit the legislative power of Parliament), but that he claims these already exist.
24See Lewis, note 4 ante.
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to criticise the relation between the two and thus transcend them'." 25 Translating this to
their particular project, they state that:
"Our contention is that there are immanent expectations of a system of open and
accountable government which run deep in the British people and that the rhetoric and
claims made for our system of government foster such expectations. Yet these
expectations square ill with the contemporary constitutional and political scene.""
There would appear to be two issues involved here. First, there is the matter of
matching the constitutional claims made by those in power with political reality;
secondly, there is the problem of relating these claims to the concept of the rule of law.
Whilst the second of these issues will concern us for the greater part of this section, it is
worth considering the first issue for a moment.
1.3.1.1 Matching Claims With Reality
My whole thesis is a form of critique: the reality is that the rule of law is not applied in
the realm of environmental policy making. The Noble Lie, likewise, is keen to show that
the idea that we are a society subject to the rule of law is a 'noble lie'. However, that is
very different to saying that the reality does not match the claims made by the state.
Matching claims with reality is potentially immanent critique's greatest problem,
although this is just one way in which immanent critique is presented and other versions
need not share this weakness In this version, then, the first thing to note is that the
critic's interpretation of the claim may not match that offered by the state. 27 So, for
example in the debate on liberty, it is no use opposing claim to reality if my
interpretation includes negative and positive liberty, whereas the state's includes only the
former. 28 Then there is the problem of context. Just because, for example, democracy
is a claim made for the system, it does not follow that workplace democracy is also a
claim. It is therefore misleading to speak of claims made for the system, unless of
course precise claims have been made and are not being met. Benhabib makes a similar
point when she shows that although Marx (particularly in his early work such as 'On the
Jewish Question') advocates critique rather than utopian thinking, his 'socialization of
the universal' in fact appears to be a 'radical negation'. In other words, Marx's project
25Noble Lie, p.10.
261bid., pp.11-12.
27A problem alluded to in The Noble Lie at p.188.
28For the distinction between the two, see Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, and Gray, The Moral
Foundations of Market Institutions.
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involves not the 'fulfillment' of a potential immanent in actuality, but rather a
'transfiguration' or 'transcendence' of actuality.29
Another version of immanent critique might say that one should use the language of the
present system, rather than relying on utopian vocabulary. Insofar as language as a
whole is concerned, this must again be mistaken, because utopian visions necessarily rely
on the language of the current system, and the 'other' can only adequately be defined in
contrast with the existent. What it must mean - and I believe that this is the only
possible avenue for immanent critique - is that rather than describe a grand vision of the
'good' society, the task of the social theorist should be to highlight failings in the current
system; the theorist employs the specific, existing language of the system (liberty,
democracy, equality, accountability etc.) and suggests that such values (or rather his
interpretation of them) are not being met. The idea that such values are actually claims
made by the system, for the area under examination, may be used as a useful rhetorical
device - but one should be aware that it is not as straightforward as that.
Harden and Lewis are confronted with a similar problem in respect of accountability and
openness, in that these values cannot be separated from particular contexts without
affecting other policy goals such as effectiveness and efficiency. 3° That is not to say that
one cannot argue for an increase in accountability and openness generally (while
accepting that precise details will be dependent on context) - but rather that
accountability and openness are not exhaustive of constitutional policy-making
principles. This would almost certainly be the reply of the state to an argument that
such values were 'claims' of the system.
1.3.1.2 Connecting the Values With the Rule of Law
The second problem for Harden and Lewis is that of linking the values of accountability
and openness with the rule of law. Although Loughlin's review of The Noble Lie is
occasionally wide of the mark, 31 his point that immanent critique would appear to
29Benhabib, 'Modernity and the Aporias of Critical Theory' (1981) 49 Telos 39, citing K. Marx, 'On the
Jewish Question'.
39See eg. Jones, note 1 ante at p.412; see also the review article of The Noble Lie by Loughlin,
'Tinkering With The Constitution' (1988) 51 MLR 531 at p.543.
3I See Harden & Lewis, 'The Noble Lie: A Rejoinder' (1988) 52 MLR 812.
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require an historical treatment of the concept of the rule of law is surely a valid one.32
As we saw earlier, Harden and Lewis state the following:
"It is our contention that there are immanent expectations of a system of open and
accountable government which run deep in the British people and that the rhetoric and
claims made for our system of government foster such expectations.""
Openness and accountability are not intuitively realised. They are theoretically
accounted for by tying them to immanent expectations held by the general public.
However, that does not account for the link made between these two values and the rule
of law. As it stands in their analysis, this link seems to have been 'intuited' - where only
an historical examination of the rule of law could provide a grounding for such a link.
Even if they have grounded their link - and there is some evidence that they derive these
values from Dicey - there remain severe limitations to such an approach. Harden and
Lewis state:
"The urgent task for constitutional lawyers then becomes to reconstitute the rule of
law in terms of its institutional expressions, retaining commitment to the underlying
principles which espouse non-arbitrariness, the containment of unaccountable discretion
and the perhaps newer commitment to a decision-making process which is rational."34
The references to the control of discretion and non-arbitrariness can certainly be traced
back to Dicey, although it is not clear where the claim for rational decision-making
procedures originates. Nevertheless, despite this evidence that they derive their
principles from Dicey, the choice of immanent critique as a theoretical tool creates
32Loughlin, op. cit., p.536-7. It will be obvious to anyone who has read the Loughlin review, that my
work incorporates and builds on a number of his criticisms and suggestions - for example his references
to Benhabib. One point which I would not agree with however, is his claim that immanent critique is
employed by the British Idealists and that there are similarities between The Noble Lie and work within
this tradition - Loughlin p.534. A reading of Hobhouse would suggest that rather than comparing the
actual with the ideal, with a view to changing the actual - as with immanent critique - the idealists
perceived the actual as ideal - Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory Of The State, pp.11-23. This does
not seem to be the approach taken in The Noble Lie. Another point of disagreement concerns
Loughlin's claim that immanent critique requires a tracing of the origins of Dicey's formulation of the
rule of law. It may be true that Dicey stems from Coke - and if one was studying Dicey alone it would
be advisable to trace this lineage - but the fact is that Dicey is widely regarded as the exponent of the
classical conception of the rule of law. A genealogical line of inquiry may be useful if it bolsters one's
argument, but Loughlin's excursion into history seems to offer little support for the argument of The
Noble Lie.
33Noble Lie, p.11.
34Ibid., p.72.
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problems for them. The claims of the constitution are, as they recognise, premised on a
gesellschqft model of law:
"The rule of law as an atomistic, gesellschaft system, whatever its achievements and
whatever its residual role in the modern state, has been substantially overtaken by
events. The virtues and principles for which it has stood retain their transcendent
significance but require transformation to deal with the problems of policy planning in
the modern state".35
The only principles which one is able to locate in the classic example of a gesellschaft-
based constitutional model - Dicey's - concern discretion and equality before the law.
The dilemma is that immanent critique requires them to use these principles derived from
gesellschqft forms, even though they then apply these principles within the novel context
of the public sphere. 36 It is novel, because when one thinks of constitutional rights, one
normally thinks of the constitutional rights of individuals. However, in The Noble Lie,
Harden and Lewis' aim was not to argue for individual constitutional rights in the vein of
Charter 88 and recent calls for a Bill of Rights, but for a "reconstitutionalization of the
processes of public policy-making." 37 In other words, while not wanting to detract from
the importance of individual rights against the state, their vision of the rule of law has
more to do with the collective conditions of public life and with "the institutional
conditions for furthering rational public choices." 38 This is a key point, and my project
shares this approach.
Their difficulty is that the old gesellschaft forms do not work in this new public context.
To say, as they do, that "rule of law values need to be freed from gesellschaft
associations" 39 is misleading, because the principles which they claim have 'transcendent'
status have their origin in such forms. The difficulty of using immanent critique in this
context is thus that in comparing constitutional claims against institutional reality, one
must rely on current constitutional claims which derive from outdated, gesellschaft-
based accounts such as Dicey's.
1.3.2 Constructive Interpretation
Harden has recently recast° his theoretical enterprise as a form of Dworkinian
'constructive interpretation'. 41 It is my belief that by developing this approach, one can
351b1d., p.299.
36/bid., pp.288 and 302.
37/bid., p.189; see further pp.13, 55 and 299.
38/bid., pp.55, 72 and 288.
39Ibid., p.309.
°Although there were signs of such an approach in The Noble Lie - see p.188.
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formulate an adequate conception of the rule of law while avoiding some of the pitfalls
associated with immanent critique (such as its seemingly inescapable connection with
gesellschaft forms). In Law's Empire, Dworkin first describes constructive
interpretation of the social practice of courtesy. It is worth quoting him at length here:
"Everyone develops a complex "interpretive" attitude towards the rule of courtesy,
an attitude that has at least two components. The first is the assumption that the
practice of courtesy does not simply exist but has value, that it serves some interest or
purpose or enforces some principle - in short, that it has some point - that can be stated
independently of just describing the rules that make up the practice. The second is the
further assumption that the requirements of courtesy ... are not necessarily or exclusively
what they have always been taken to be but are instead sensitive to its point, so that the
strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or modified or qualified or limited
by that point."42
Dworkin later proceeds to describe constructive interpretation as it applies to law.
Legal interpretation, he believes, can usefullly be divided into three stages - pre-
interpretive, interpretive and finally a post-interpretive or reforming stage. At the pre-
interpretive stage, the rules or standards which make up the practice are identified; the
interpreter then arrives at a justification for the practice in the interpretive stage; the final
stage then consists of adjusting what the practice 'really' requires to fit the justification
given at the interpretive stage. 43 Of course, people do not actually go about the process
of interpretation in this structured, deliberate fashion." However, Dworkin's aim is not
to give a psychological insight into interpretation, but rather to provide a philosophical
account which might help to resolve controversies surrounding particular social
practices:45
The social 'practice' we are concerned with here is the unwritten British constitution and,
more specifically, the rule of law. I hope to show that constructive interpretation offers
a solution to some of the problems I have outlined in relation to immanent critique.
Pace Harden, 46 I believe that constructive interpretation is qualitatively different to
immanent critique. Immanent critique yields a narrow set of values because it works
from gesellschaft notions. Dworkinian 'constructive interpretation', by introducing the
idea of 'purpose' at the interpretive stage, escapes the confines of a gesellschaft model of
the rule of law and thus arrives at a fuller set of constitutional values. These values are,
unlike the gesellschaft ones, of use in the novel, public context of the regulatory state.
41 See Harden, 'The Constitution and Its Discontents', note 9 ante.
42Lam's Empire, p.47.
43/bid., pp.65-6.
441b1d., p.66.
45Ibid., p.67.
46Harden, note 9 ante, p.497.
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1.3.2.1 The Pre-Interpretive Stage - Dicey and the Rule of Law
At the pre-interpretive stage, the rules or standards which make up the practice are
identified. Thus, if one is looking at the principles contained within the rule of law, one
must, I will be suggesting, look at their historical usage by Dicey. There is nowhere else
where one can 'discover' the principles associated with the rule of law. I explain below
why I think this is the case, before moving on to discuss the work of Dicey.
It is worth bearing in mind here the distinction Grant draws between using the
constitution in a descriptive sense and using it in a normative sense. Grant states that
while central-local government relations can be identified as constitutional in the
descriptive sense (what Harden terms the "map of public power"), one cannot describe a
change made in these relations as unconstitutional in the normative sense, because "there
is very little consensus as to what criteria apply in the normative sense of the word"
(what Harden refers to as "principles of legitimate government"). 47 Going back to
Dicey, some have argued that Dicey intended The Law of The Constitution to be
descriptive rather than prescriptive: in drawing on the analytical, positivist method of
Austin, the need to separate fact from value would have been as much of a concern for
Dicey in his study of the constitution as it was for jurists involved in their analysis of
case-law. 48 Others, such as Loughlin, have argued that Dicey can equally be seen as a
conservative normativist - in other words, he wanted to imbue the rule of law with
prescriptive force in order to control what he saw as the socialist advances of state
power. 49 I would be inclined to agree with both views. Dicey's account of sovereignty
and the rule of law was descriptive of existing practices - he applied an empiricist,
analytical method to abstract constitutional principles from historical and political
material." However, although he probably wished his account of sovereignty to remain
descriptive, one might argue that he intended the rule of law to have prescriptive force.
Today, we can look for the rule of law in two ways. First, we can do as Dicey did and
look 'out there' at existing practices in the social world. Whether we would be able to
locate the appropriate target without theory to provide us with a map, let alone sum up
the existing practices in today's complex society as succinctly as Dicey, has to be
doubted. In any event, we would simply, as Grant says, be describing the constitutional
47Grant, 'Central-Local Relations: The Balance of Power', in Jowell and Oliver (eds.), The Changing
Constitution, 247 at pp.253-5; Harden, op. cit..
48McEldowney, 'Dicey in Historical Perspective - A Review Essay', in McAuslan & McEldowney (eds.),
Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 39 at p.57.
°Loughlin, Political Theory and Public Law.
50McEldowney, op. cit., pp.55-6.
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terrain as we saw it. Jumping from the descriptive to the prescriptive would be another
matter. The second, and I believe the only way to 'find' the rule of law, is to treat Dicey
as one's source material. In other words, rather than looking at the 'original' social data
in an empirical analysis, one looks at Dicey as the classic secondary source. Thus, Dicey
is the rule of law. Loughlin refers to him as the codifier of the British Constitution.51
McEldowney notes that "Lawyers are tempted, when brought up in the common law
tradition, to read Dicey as if his book were a constitutional statute and offered
interpretations as binding as once were House of Lords decisions." 52 They may have
been wrong to do this, but in my view, Dicey's account has become so firmly ingrained
that it does now represent our written 'arc of the covenant'. 53
 And whether Dicey
intended the rule of law to be descriptive or prescriptive, generations of the 'interpretive
community' have come to regard it in a prescriptive light.
The rule of law is thus part of our unwritten constitution, along with parliamentary
sovereignty and conventions. While the latter two were and continue to be at least
partially descriptive of our constitutional fabric, the former continues as part of the
triptych because no one has been prepared to excise it or to renew its content to provide
it with contemporary relevance. Renewing simply its descriptive content is, I would
argue, no longer an option; in any event, it has now been irremediably infused with
prescriptive character. Our task then, is to interpret the rule of law in the light of
modern purposes to provide it with a hew and vital prescriptive force.
In the interpretive stage, we must therefore look to Dicey. The rule of law for Dicey is
characterised by three conceptions or principles. Unlike with Hayek, these principles are
said to constitute part of the British constitutional heritage and are not simply political
ideals.54
1) Nulla poena sine lege: nobody should be punishable except for a distinct breach of
the law established by the courts. This means that government should operate through
clear, fixed rules -the rule of law excludes the exercise of wide, arbitrary or discretionary
power by governments. The latter point has often been taken as an authority for saying
that all discretionary power is bad (a mistake which Hayek is close to making) - whereas
it seems likely that Dicey had in mind only the state's position on personal liberties. This
is Wade's conclusion, 55
 and it is supported both by the language which Dicey uses (he
5I Loughlin, op. cit., pp.140, 146 and 153.
52McEldowney, op. cit., p.41.
53A phrase used by, among others. Lewis, in 'Public Law and Legal Theory', note 4 ante, and Brazier,
op. cit..
54See Jennings, The Law And The Constitution, p.54.
55 In his introduction to Dicey's Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution, p.cxxvi.
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talks of powers of 'arrest', 'imprisonment' and 'expulsion') and by the examples he
provides (including Voltaire's imprisonment in the Bastille).
2) Equality before the law: everybody, whether private citizens or public officials,
should be subject to the same law, enforced by the ordinary courts. Dicey had in mind
here the difference between the British system and the French system of 'droit
administratif, where officials were subject to a separate 'official' law. Since Dicey,
equality before the law has been seen as a cornerstone of the rule of law but has been
interpreted in many different ways - Hayek for example was quite against Dicey's
conception, because it forestalled the growth of administrative law (CL 203-4).
3) Constitutional rights are shaped by judicial decisions: individual rights are to be
located in various judicial decisions rather than in a separate code or written
constitution.
It needs stating that the above principles, which for Dicey constitute the rule of law, are
sufficiently broad and malleable to be interpreted to fit most of the ideals of both private
and public law. This is certainly true of (1) and (2) above. Some people have read the
principle in (1) not as nu/la poena sine lege, but as a broader principle of legal certainty.
This has enabled people to claim that the system of precedent in common law upholds
the rule of law because it enshrines the principle of legal certainty. Others have, for
example, said that the principle of legal certainty should act as an effective bar on
administrative discretion. Both of these are quite far removed from the thrust of Dicey's
conception of the rule of law. The point about malleability is perhaps more acute in
relation to (2): while it is clear that Dicey was using equality before the law in the sense
of all citizens coming before the same courts, people since have tended to regard
equality before the law in its many other possible senses as a core feature of the rule of
law.
1.3.2.2 The Interpretive Stage
Having identified Dicey as the locus classicus of the rule of law, and having described
the principles which he believed made up the rule of law, we now need to go about
interpreting them within a coherent theoretical framework, rather than - as evinced in the
previous paragraph - in the unconnected, ad hoc fashion performed by commentators
down the ages. I will be discussing Hayek's view of the rule of law in some depth,
because his is one of the few developed, systematic attempts to interpret the rule of law
using (implicitly) Dicey as the starting point.
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Hayek and the Rule of Law. As we have already noted, the rule of law for Hayek, is
"not a rule of the law, but a rule concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal
doctrine or a political ideal" (CL 205-6). In other words, Hayek does not equate the
rule of law with the constitution. However, in a sense, Hayek is in fact engaged in a
similar enterprise of constructive interpretation, in that he implicitly takes Dicey as his
pre-interpretive starting point, and then interprets the rule of law in the light of the
purpose he ascribes to it of protecting individual liberty. The rule of law values he
establishes at the post-interpretive stage (re-assessing the original Diceyan values in the
light of the ascribed purpose) include those of generality, abstractness, certainty and
equality before the law. Given that such an interpretive process could, in my account,
provide a theoretically sound basis for describing these principles as constitutional, it is
incumbent on me to say why I think Hayek's approach does not work. Otherwise, I
should arguably be using his version of the rule of law as the framework for my
empirical constitutional study of pollution contro1.56
There are numerous problems with Hayek's approach. The first is that the values he has
arrived at for the rule of law cannot be applied in the way he wishes: while Harden and
Lewis are concerned only with developing a new public constitutional discourse, Hayek
wants to reach a unified set of principles that are applicable to both public law (thesis)57
and private law (nomos). 58 He begins with private law (which he likes), considers what
is peculiar and of value to private law, and then examines public law (which he does not
like) to see if it matches up. Some of it must match up because Hayek wants to allow
some state action beyond a libertarian 'nightwatchman' role. Perhaps not surprisingly, he
has problems in applying what are essentially private law values to public law.
However, as we shall see, even where some of the values can be meaningfully applied to
both private and public law, Hayek either fails to apply them to public law or applies
them in a limited and questionable manner. Next, not only are some of his private law
values hard to apply to public law, but the full range of values necessary for a proper
assessment of public law is missing. In other words, Hayek faces much the same
problem as Harden and Lewis had in deriving a publicly-oriented rule of law from
gesellschaft origins. The root of much of this is that Hayek sees the rule of law as
having but one purpose - the protection of individual liberty. If he was prepared to see
560f course, one might say the same of Harden and Lewis in The Noble Lie, but I hope I have already
demonstrated that their their approach is unsuitable.
57 Lmv, Legislation and Liberty (hereafter LLL) book I, pp 124-5 - ie. rules of organisation designed to
achieve particular ends.
58LLL I, pp. 126-7 - ie. niles of just conduct. All common law will be nomos (Hayek classes criminal
law as private law - LLL I, p.132). Although statute law will normally be thesis, it may be codification
of niles of just conduct and therefore nomos.
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it as serving a wider range of purposes, I would suggest that some of the above
problems would disappear. We will now take a closer look at Hayek's theory and
application of the rule of law to see how some of his problems arise.
According to Hayek, the state requires coercive powers to prevent greater coercion by
individuals on each other (CL 21, 144). But Hayek is not a Nozickian libertarian who
would only allow a 'nightwatchman' state (CL 231 and LLL III 41). He would allow the
coercive powers of taxation to provide services which the free market cannot ensure.
What he will not allow is coercive action by the state beyond taxation for the pursuit of
what he terms 'pure service' activities and beyond preventing coercion by private persons
(CL 144, 222). According to Hayek, the rule of law "provides the criterion which
enables us to distinguish between those measures which are and those which are not
compatible with a free system," between pure service activities and coercive measures of
government (CL 222). The rule of law thus provides the criteria which enable one to
determine whether or not a measure is coercive. If state action is incompatible with the
rule of law, it must be rejected - no matter how effective it may be in securing a
particular end. If it is compatible with the rule of law and is, therefore, a pure service
activity, one must proceed to ask whether it is desirable in the sense of weighing its
benefits against its costs (CL 222, 224-5). 59
 Many measures, although not inimical to
freedom, will be rejected as undesirable in this latter sense.
If the rule of law is to enable us to tell whether state action is coercive or fulfilling a
legitimate service, it will be important for us to examine Hayek's conception in more
detail. For Hayek, the rule of law requires first that laws be general and abstract; second
that they be known and certain, and third that there should be equality before the law
(CL 208-210). The Diceyan provenance is obvious.
In order to be general and abstract, laws should be "essentially long-term measures,
referring to yet unknown cases and containing no references to particular persons,
places, or objects" (CL 208, 149-154). However, as Hayek himself notes, "The degree
of this generality or abstractness ranges continuously from the order that tells a man to
do a particular thing here and now to the instruction that, in such and such conditions,
whatever he does will have to satisfy certain requirements" (CL 149). If, as this
suggests, generality and abstraction lie on a continuum, it means that they cannot be
used in a pass/fail manner to disqualify certain public law state actions as contrary to the
rule of law. The only role which these values can play is that of an ideal type (something
59However, this does not mean measuring benefits in the manner done by welfare economists, such as
via contingent valuation methodology (CVM) - see LLL III, p.201, n.35.
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at which Hayek hints in CL pp.149-50); they cannot be used as a normative guide in the
way that Hayek requires of the rule of law. A feature of private law does not translate
into criteria for judging the legitimacy of public law.
That laws be known and certain should not imply that all laws should be statutory and
known by all - the common law yields certainty if, as Hayek does, one follows the
Dworkinian line that there is always a right answer; and while ordinary citizens do not
know the law, it is knowable via lawyers who are able to attempt to predict judicial
decisions in non-hard cases (CL 208, 212). Of interest is the fact that Hayek only
considers certainty and knowledge in relation to the common law; while it is possible to
apply the notions to public, regulatory law, Hayek does not attempt to do so.
In relation to equality before the law, Hayek recognises that the law cannot always treat
everyone the same (he gives the example that only women can be raped - CL 154) - and
that some sort of classification is therefore inevitable. While he admits that "no entirely
satisfactory criterion has been found that would always tell us what kind of classification
is compatible with equality before the law," he denies the principle is meaningless (CL
209). He effectively dismisses the precept of 'treat like cases alike', stating: "To say, as
has so often been said, that the law must not make irrelevant distinctions or that it must
not discriminate between persons for reasons which have no connection with the
purpose of the law is little more than evading the issue" (CL 209). His solution is rather
that both those inside and outside the classified group should acknowledge the
legitimacy of the distinction (CL 154, 209-10). Contrary to Hayek's opinion, I believe
that equality before the law can mean little other than 'treat like cases alike' - particularly
in public law. His solution raises questions as to whether the agreement does actually
have to take place: if it does, this would produce enormous informational and
organisational problems; if it does not, then the idea of agreement is merely a convenient
fiction for a decision taken by a policy maker. Not surprisingly, Hayek does not attempt
to apply his test for this aspect of the rule of law to any practical setting.
The final aspect of Hayek's account of the rule of law which needs to be considered is
discretion. Admittedly, discretion is not mentioned as one of the numbered
requirements of the rule of law (CL 208-210), but it is arguably the chapter as a whole
(ie. CL 205-219) which spells out his interpretation of the rule of law and discretion is a
key part of that chapter. However, on examining that and other chapters, one finds that
Hayek fails to identify precisely how discretion fits in with the rule of law, and that his
account of discretion is at times contradictory or naive. He contradicts himself, because
at one point he states that "The problem of discretionary powers as it directly affects the
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rule of law is not a problem of the limitation of the powers of particular agents of
government but of the limitation of the powers of the government as a whole" (CL 213).
On page 213 of CL, for example, he states that the rule of law excludes any state
discretionary powers which encroach on the private sphere of the citizen. In other
words, he seems to be suggesting that the rule of law is concerned with the question of
whether state action is regarded as legitimate in the first place, rather than the exercise
of discretion by agents carrying out that state action. However, on pages 211 and 217,
he then states that some powers over persons and property (eg. compulsory purchase of
land) are permissible - as long as they are subject to judicial review. This comment on
the need for agency discretion to be subject to various controls including judicial review
is echoed in a number of other places. There is therefore a dual contradiction. First, he
claims that the rule of law excludes any discretionary powers which interfere with the
private sphere of the citizen, but then comes up with an obvious exception such as
compulsory purchase. And secondly, he claims that the rule of law is not concerned
with agency-level discretion, but then states that the rule of law requires such discretion
to be subject to control.
In fact, for someone who initially claims that the rule of law is not concerned with the
limitation of the discretionary powers of administrative agencies, Hayek suggests a
surprisingly wide range of controls. Indeed, some of the controls he suggests prefigure
the work on discretion of K.C. Davis 60 and others. Reconstructing Hayek's argument
slightly, agency discretionary authority can be made compatible with the rule of law in
three ways:
1) By 'confining' discretion through clear rules
"Even the delegation of (this) power to some non-elective authority need not be
contrary to the rule of law, so long as such authority is bound to announce these rules
prior to their application and then can be made to adhere to them."61
2) By 'structuring' discretion through agency policy guidelines
"Though the variety of circumstances in which the authorities may have to act cannot
be foreseen, the manner in which they will have to act, once a certain situation has
arisen, can be made predictable to a high degree."62
60Davis, Discretionaiy Justice.
61 CL 211 and see also 225 and 226; on 'confining' discretion, see Davis, op. cit., p.55.
62 CL 225; on 'stnicturing' discretion, see Davis, pp.97-8.
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3) By 'checking discretion via judicial review
"In acting under the rule of law the administrative agencies will often have to
exercise discretion as the judge exercises discretion in interpreting the law. This,
however, is a discretionary power which can and must be controlled by the possibility of
a review of the substance of the decision by an independent court."63
Where the grant of wide discretionary powers is necessary, because, for example, "the
law cannot always name the particular measures which the authorities may adopt in a
particular situation" (CL 225) - Hayek introduces an idea similar to Nonet and Selznick's
concept of purpose." Just as Nonet and Selznick believed that purpose provided both a
means of criticising current practices and a way of controlling administrative discretion,
so Hayek believed that law could "be so framed as to enable any impartial court to
decide whether the measures adopted were necessary to achieve the general effect aimed
at by the law" (CL 225). In other words, discretion is only effectively controlled if the
courts have the power not just to decide whether an action was intra vires or ultra
vires, but also "whether the substance of the administrative decision was such as the law
demanded" (CL 214)
Hayek's naivety regarding discretion is revealed in his account (quoting Ernst Freund)65
of British factory legislation, which he believes is "by no means conspicuous for the use
of discretionary power" (CL 225). This is certainly not what Carson found, in his classic
study of enforcement discretion under such legislation. 66 Hayek seems to conflate the
relative generality of enabling legislation with the discretionary power of standard-
setting and enforcement under that legislation.
I mentioned at the beginning of this section on discretion that not only was Hayek's
account of discretion at times contradictory or naive, but also that he fails to state how it
fits in with the rule of law. The problem is essentially the same as the one he faced in
relation to generality and abstraction, in that discretion cannot be used in the pass/fail
manner which his use of the rule of law requires. One cannot simply find an instance of
discretion and state that it is contrary to the rule of law and thus coercive and
illegitimate. In any case, discretion is pervasive and necessary in many areas of state
activity which Hayek does not wish to decry as coercive.
63 CL 213 and see also 211, 214 and 225; on 'checking' discretion, see Davis, p.142.
64Nonet & Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law, p.77. For a critique, see
Galligan, Discretionary Powers, pp.100-106.
65Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, p.98.
66Carson, 'Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation'
(1970) 33 MLR 396.
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Having briefly outlined Hayek's version of the rule of law, the next task is to see how he
applies it to distinguish between coercive state actions, which are inimical to individual
liberty, and pure service activities, which are not. Unfortunately, this is something that
Hayek fails to do in any systematic way - not surprisingly given many of my previous
observations. He declares that progressive taxation is in breach of the rule of law
because it is unequal - ie. it fails the 'equality before the law' hurdle. Progressive
taxation is thus coercive and illegitimate. However, he is then prepared simply to
concede that factory and pollution 67 legislation is general and therefore in accordance
with the rule of law. Such legislation is thus a pure service activity and can be regarded
as a legitimate state action if it is expedient (ie. its benefits outweigh its costs). My
point is that, even if one ever could, one can no longer assume that social regulation is in
accordance with the rule of law. Carson's study of factory legislation has, pace Hayek
and Ernst Freund whom Hayek cites, made it clear that the system is heavily reliant on
discretion - at the enforcement level if not in the statutory provisions themselves.
Recent work on environmental regulation has reached similar conclusions." Does the
mere possibility of judicial review of such discretion bring such regulatory programmes
back in line with the rule of law? And what of certainty and equality before the law? If
standards or regulations are changed frequently or discretion is the order of the day,
does this not have implications for legal certainty and thus for the rule of law? If firms
are subject to different requirements as a result of discretion or otherwise, does this
offend against the principles of equality before the law? These are all questions which
Hayek leaves unanswered.
To conclude, Hayek's account of the rule of law runs into a number of difficulties. The
root of many of these is his narrow conception of the purpose of the rule of law, which
he sees as being the protection of individual liberty. The values which this purpose
yields are essentially private law values. 69 Not only are they insufficient for a proper
assessment of public law, but some of them are also difficult to apply to public law.
Even where some of the limited range of values can meaningfully be applied to both
private and public law, Hayek either fails to apply them to public law or applies them in
a limited or questionable manner. Far from applying the rule of law values in a
systematic way to particular state activities, one is left with the impression that Hayek
begins with the conclusion of whether state action is justified and then works backwards
67CL, p.492, n.6.
68 See eg. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement; Richardson et al., Policing Pollution, and Hither,
The Reasonable Arm of the Law.
690ther than the issue of discretion, but then this is not contained within his core definition and it is not
clear exactly what he would have us do with it.
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to find a 'rule of law' peg on which to hang it; this backwards search is usually rather
cursory.
As I have stated, I would argue that the root of many of Hayek's difficulties is the fact
that he sees the rule of law as having but one purpose - the protection of individual
liberty. If he was prepared to see it as serving a wider range of purposes, I would
suggest that some of the above difficulties would disappear. I said earlier that the idea
of purpose is a crucial part of the interpretive stage of Dworkin's constructive
interpretation. As Dworkin notes:
"A participant interpreting a social practice ... proposes value for the practice by
describing some scheme of interests or goals or principles the practice can be taken to
serve or express or exemplify."7°
For Hayek, the purpose of the rule of law is the protection of individual liberty to form a
private sphere where people can create their own life-plan and pursue their own
projects. 71
 It is perhaps no wonder then that he formulates the rule of law primarily in
terms of private law values of generality, abstraction, certainty and equality. However,
as an interpreter of the rule of law, I would suggest that the rule of law in fact serves a
number of different purposes. On the one hand, the individualist side of the rule of law
will remain and its purpose may continue to be the protection of individual liberty. But
on the other hand, there is what might be called a regulatory side to the rule of law.
This side of the rule of law, I would suggest, serves two purposes: first, it fulfils the role
of upholding democracy and democratic goals (which is contrary to Hayek's view that
the democratic control of government has nothing to do with the rule of law - CL 211);
and secondly, it provides the guarantees of an effective economy. 72
 One might ask how
I derive these purposes. The answer would be that they come from my interpretation of
equity and discretion - which can be found in Dicey's classical conception of the rule of
law - and why these are important in the public sphere. I interpret equity as 'treat like
cases alike' and, for firms subject to regulation, this will be important for reasons of
competition. Discretion is a concern in the public sphere because of its potential to
undermine democratic decision-making. 73
 If the protection of democracy and an
effective economy are the purposes of the rule of law, one is then led to consider what
principles might be required by such purposes - hence the principles of accountability,
70Law's Empire, p.52.
71 Hayek, The Road To Serfdom, p.54. Dicey shared a similar view of the purpose of the rule of law -
see Dicey, Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution, pp.196-7. One might question
the extent to which the constitutional safeguards described by either Dicey or Hayek are sufficient to
protect the rights of individuals against the State, but that does not concern us here.
72Hayek was concerned with this - see LLL III, pp.46 and 65.
73Discretion may also have an impact on equity.
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efficiency, effectiveness and certainty which I discuss below in the post-interpretive
stage.
1.3.2.3 The Post-Interpretive Stage
Having reconsidered the purpose of the rule of law away from the protection of
individual liberty (although, as we have seen, the private strand of the rule of law will
not cease to exist), towards regulation, democracy and the playing field of the economy,
one must then come to Dworkin's third stage of interpretation - the post-interpretive or
reforming stage. This involves reconsidering the principles in the light of the new
purposes, and those I would select (see Fig. 1 below) include certainty, efficiency and
equity on the corporate/economy side, and accountability and effectiveness on the
democracy side. Companies need a certain and stable framework within which to
operate; a competitive economy requires a level playing field where all companies are
treated equally and none are allowed, through inequity, to enjoy undue competitive
advantage; a competitive economy also requires efficiency in the sense that regulatory
costs are kept as low as possible. As for the democratic case, the regulatory state is
concerned with the achievement of goals. It is important that these goals should be the
subject of a democratic decision-making process, whether by Parliament or through the
participation of interest groups in a surrogate democratic process. Accountability
ensures that decisions remain rooted in the democratic process by preventing decision-
makers from charting their own private courses. It is also important that these
democratically decided goals are, as far as possible, effectively met. There is, in that
sense, a link between accountability and effectiveness, because an increase in the former
will often lead to an increase in the latter. 74 There is also obviously some overlap
between the corporate/economy values and the liberal individualist approach, because
corporations are 'actors' in the market in the same way as individuals are 'actors' of their
own lives. Certainty and equity are common to both.
74But it is important to distinguish here between agency ineffectiveness (goals not met because of eg.
the discretionary behaviour of field officers) and programme ineffectiveness (where the programme is
ineffective on paper to begin with - eg. with market mechanisms). Accountability will only lead to
increased effectiveness in the former case.
Figure 1
Equity
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Certainty
Accountability
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Having exposed the essentials of the values which go to form the rule of law, we now
need to expand them. Starting with equity, pace Hayek, in the context of the rule of
law, equity can only mean 'treat like cases alike'. However, this precept is not as
straightforward as it might at first sight appear. 75
 It can usefully be divided into three
parts. First, one needs to decide when cases are 'alike' in the sense of being 'like cases1;76
secondly, one needs to decide what the 'treatment' is to be, 77
 and finally one must give
these cases the same treatment ('alike'). Commentators normally refer to the third as
'formal' or 'procedural' justice and distinguish this from the issues of 'substantive' justice
involved in the first two. 78 Alternatively, the third is referred to as the 'concept' of
justice and the other two 'conceptions' of justice.79
An example may help to demonstrate some of the above distinctions. If a black man
commits a crime and is imprisoned for three years and a white man later commits the
same crime and is sentenced to the same period, formal justice is achieved because they
are treated alike. However, there is a separate issue of the substantive fairness of the
cases - if they have both been 'treated' to imprisonment for three years for a parking
offence, then the result is arguably substantively unfair. Substantive fairness is also
involved in assessing what constitutes a like case. If, for example, the black man was
sentenced to five years and the white man three, then ceteris paribus, this is unfair
because, unless one seeks to justify racism, like cases have not been treated alike.
75 See further Galligan, Discretionary Powers, pp.152-161 and the footnotes contained therein.
761n The Concept of Law, Hart speaks of justice that: "There is therefore a certain complexity in the
structure of the idea of justice. We may say that it consists of two parts: a universal or constant feature,
summarized in the precept 'Treat like cases alike' and a shifting or varying criterion used in
determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or different" (p.156).
77See Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law. As Lyons states, we need to go further than deciding when
cases are alike or different, because "It also makes a difference how we treat the cases that fall into the
classes we establish; for example whether we reward good samaritans and punish rapists, or the
contrary. A conception of justice requires not only a way of classifying cases but also guidelines for
their respective treatment" (pp.78-9).
78See eg. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, p.73.
79Ibid..
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The need for justice is most apparent in judicial decisions; the principle of formal justice
is, for example, enshrined in the system of judicial precedent. Dworkin has suggested
that while justice is of crucial importance in this arena, it is not a requirement of
legislative policy-making. 80 While this is true, in that it is obvious that, for example, a
government decision to close Rosyth dockyard does not have to be accompanied by a
decision to close Devonport dockyard - in other words that broad legislative decisions
do not need to follow the principle of justice or equity in this sense - the same cannot be
said of decisions within a system of regulation. These do need to adhere to the
principles of justice. Wherever there is a process involving sequential decision-making
on the basis of rules, then formal justice is required.
Granted that the rule of law requires formal justice, does it require a particular
substantive version of justice? Since the value of equity has been derived from the need
to support competition, it may be that equalising total control costs should be seen as
the ideal for equity. After all, this would produce the most level playing field.
However, equalising total control costs will seldom be a realistic prospect for
informational reasons and in any event, it conflicts with the goal of efficiency which
requires the equalisation of marginal and not total costs. What this means is that while
the equalisation of total control costs might be regarded as the ideal where equity is
concerned, the rule of law will not rule out other substantive versions; these may be less
equitable than the ideal, but so long as they can be justified by reference to some other
appropriate regulatory goal (eg. efficiency), they will still be equitable. Perhaps what
this demonstrates above all, is that the issue of equity is far from clear-cut. There are,
rather, degrees of equity; but the nearer to the ideal of an even distribution of regulatory
costs, the more equitable a programme may be considered to be. Finally, beyond
substantive principles, there remains the question of their practical realisation; as we
shall see in future chapters, formal inequity may arise despite perfectly acceptable
substantive equity criteria, if an appropriate framework (eg. a policy) is not in place to
ensure that these are applied in practice.
One last point which needs to be made on the subject of equity is that our derivation of
equity from equality before the law and the need for competition means that the rule of
law concerns only equity between firms. Needless to say, there are other important
equity considerations such as the distribution of costs between rich and poor and the
allocation of pollution costs between polluter and polluted. Pollution taxes such as a
carbon tax for example, are considered regressive and hence inequitable because the
poor spend a higher proportion of their income on fuel. If such taxes are to be
80Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p.88.
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introduced, alterations to other taxes and social security may be needed to ensure an
equitable result. The allocation of costs between polluter and polluted is the concern of
the 'polluter pays principle' (PPP). This is a very broad equitable principle which
requires the polluter to bear the burden of pollution control rather than letting it fall on
ordinary members of the public. The current cost-recovery charging schemes operated
by our pollution control bodies could, for example, be said to reflect the PPP. Rather
than all regulatory costs being met by the taxpayer via government grants to these
bodies, the levying of charges now ensures that polluters pay for the costs of direct
regulation. While these two important equity considerations will not be assessed as part
of the rule of law, I will be addressing them indirectly where they arise - usually in the
form of a footnote.
Like equity, the value of efficiency may at first sight appear straightforward, but it too
requires interpretation. By efficiency, I mean the 'least-cost' solution, rather than one
based on Pareto efficiency, which would require the appropriate level of ambient quality
to be determined by cost benefit analysis (CBA). 81 Strictly speaking, one perhaps ought
to use the term 'cost-effectiveness' rather than efficiency. At the moment, ambient
quality levels are not decided on the basis of CBA, and efficiency therefore entails
designing a regulatory strategy to achieve these given ambient targets at least cost. Of
course, in principle, efficiency in the context of the rule of law could mean Pareto
efficiency, but it must again be stressed that it is a matter of interpretation; it is my belief
that Pareto efficiency is an unrealisable chimera and that CBA - on which it is predicated
- has damaging implications for other rule of law values such as accountability.
Effectiveness presupposes the achievement of a goal of some type. It does not make
sense to examine effectiveness without addressing the question 'effective at what?' The
answer is 'effectiveness at achieving a given target or goal.' Thus, I take effectiveness to
mean the ability to achieve a goal or target which has been set. In this context, the goal
being considered is an ambient environmental one and the aim is to see the extent to
which different instruments of environmental protection are effective at reaching that
goal. However, one might equally consider other goals such as the ability of different
policy tools to create in firms continuous incentives to innovate, or even the non-rule of
law equity principles mentioned earlier. In this way, effectiveness has the capacity to act
as a broad, residual value which could tackle the accusation that the rule of law values
81 A Pareto optimal state is one from which it is impossible to make one person better off without
making someone else worse off. If benefits outweigh costs, there is a Pareto improvement if those who
gain from the increased benefits actually compensate the losers. In practice this tends not to happen
and thus the Pareto principle was modified by Kaldor and Hicks so that those who gain are potentially
able to compensate the losers. Most textbooks on Welfare Economics deal with this issue.
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fail to capture the range of factors which need to be considered in any assessment of
environmental policy-design.
Certainty is quite straightforward. The use of discretion can create uncertainty, as can
rule-based change. Certainty requires the avoidance of excessive use of discretion and
excessive regulatory change.
Accountability can be either ex ante or ex post. Ex ante accountability - often referred
to as 'participation' - ensures that the public and others have some input into regulatory
decision-making; ex post accountability enables them to hold decision-makers to account
after the event for the practical exercise of their discretion. One important point to note
is that while accountability will often involve the receiving and/or the giving of an
account, the concept is much broader than this and incorporates notions such as a threat
which may be carried out, and even that someone else will do the job instead. The latter
two will often be intertwined. The ability to bring a private prosecution, for example
does not involve an agency giving or receiving an account, but it is an ex post
accountability mechanism - enabling one to hold an agency to account for their
enforcement decisions - because there is that sense of a threat of being seen to do the
agency's job for it.
We have seen then, that Hayek's and Diceys' approaches to the rule of law were
premised on liberal individualism. However, just because the assumptions behind their
principles have been laid to one side and new purposes mooted does not mean that the
principles they espoused are no longer valid. Indeed, I would suggest that the reason
why their principles maintain their currency today is because they are implicitly
applicable to both private and public realms. The point is that their application to the
public realm has remained undeveloped. My aim therefore, has been to continue the
systematic development of rule of law values to the public sphere attempted by Hayek
and then by Harden and Lewis. I hope that I have been able to demonstrate that
immanent critique necessarily involves using only existing principles - which are
premised on a liberal individualist purpose - and applying these to the sphere of public
policy-making. Only by changing theoretical tack and adopting constructive
interpretation can one redefine the purpose of the rule of law and arrive at a fuller set of
constitutional principles which can help shape policy design.
Of course, such a list will not be exhaustive of all the principles and factors which should
be included in policy-making (unless the principle of effectiveness is used as a residual,
catch-all category). Some may doubt the utility of having some constitutional policy-
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making principles and some non-constitutional principles. Why not simply devise a list
of sound principles rather than dress some up in constitutional apparel? The answer to
this is that a dual approach is required by a search for our constitution. I am not arguing
that my approach is more useful than a unitary set of policy-making principles (although
I would also say that I can see no harm in having two separate sets of principles) -
instead, I am arguing that my approach makes the best sense of the rule of law in today's
society.
1.4 AREN'T THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS PRINCIPLES JUST ARBITRARY
AND A MATTER OF SUBJECTIVE PREFERENCE?
While such an accusation would not be a problem for Hayek, because he sees his
analysis as explicitly political, it is not an accusation I can easily ignore. If I was
adopting a typical positivist, 'intuitive realist' approach, then it might be true to say that
the rule of law means whatever you want it to mean s ' and that the values I describe are
simply naked political preferences. 83 However, there are two reasons why this is not
true of my approach. First, the rule of law is something which requires interpretation
and as Dworkin makes clear, interpretation is not simply a matter of preferences. While
constructive interpretation can rightly be seen as an exercise in political theory, like
Hercules (Dworkin's ideal-typical judge)," the interpreter of our constitution cannot be
accused of merely imposing his or her own political preferences. The rule of law
principles are not merely picked from the air: if they are to be brought into play, their 'fit'
within constitutional discourse must be asserted. This we have done by locating them
within the Diceyan heritage. Secondly, as we shall see below, with at least one of the
possible ways in which the rule of law might be operationalised, it acts in a procedural
manner - aiming to shape political action rather than specifying specific, substantive
political outcomes.
1.5 HOW DOES THE RULE OF LAW OPERATE?
If we have decided that the rule of law is part of the constitution and has a prescriptive
quality, the question arises as to how it is to operate and be enforced. The distinction
between the existence of the rule of law as part of our constitution and its practical
82See Ewing, 'Trade Unions and the Constitution: The Impact of the New Conservatives', in Graham
and Prosser (eds.), Waiving The Rules, 135 at p.146. Ewing describes the rule of law as "pregnant with
ambiguity, which means whatever its authors would like;" see also Jennings, note 49 ante, p.60.
83 See eg. Jennings, note 54 ante, p.60; see also Griffith, 'The Political Constitution' (1979) 42 MLR 1 at
p.15, and Harden, note 9 ante, p.492.
"See Dworkin, Law's Empire.
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operation and enforcement is an important one. Some commentators seem to suggest
that because principles are not enforced, the British constitution lacks a normative
component. 85 In contrast, I believe that the rule of law contains such normative
principles, but that it is not effectively operationalised or enforced. I offer some ways in
which this might be done, because it seems to me that this is necessary for it to be seen
as part of constitutional practice. Otherwise, it will continue to be true that the "idea of
the constitution is more important than the constitution itself," 86 with the rule of law apt
"not to be an analysis of the practice of government."87
It is my belief that the rule of law consists of certain fundamental principles which, while
they do not override parliamentary sovereignty, 88 should aim to structure the exercise of
power. I would not disagree with Brazier's insistence that there are no existing
fundamental constitutional principles which do restrain government power, but that
there should be some" - so long as the 'are' and the 'do' are read together. I would
disagree with a statement that said that there are no existing fundamental constitutional
principles tout court In other words, I would disagree if Brazier were to suggest that
there is no such thing as the rule of law, or that it does not consist of fundamental
principles, or that it is not part of our unwritten constitution.
Given that there are existing fundamental normative constitutional principles - albeit
ones which require interpretation, just as case-law requires interpretation - how are they
to be applied? There are various ways in which the rule of law might be used or
operationalised (as opposed to enforced, which will be considered below). First, and
most stringent, one might take each principle separately and if a system of pollution
control failed any one of the principles, it would be judged to be in breach of the rule of
law. This is very much Hayek's approach. Secondly, one might compare a pollution
control system with each of the values in turn and then assess, across the whole range of
values, whether that system was in accordance with the rule of law. Thirdly, one might
85Brazier, op. cit..
86Loughlin, note 49 ante.
86Jennings, note 54 ante, p.60.
88 Cf. Harden. I disagree NN ith Hardens view that the rule of law is one of the constitutional principles
which limit legislative authority. Brazier quite rightly, it seems to me, asks for evidence of Harden's
proposition and states that the claim that there are fundamental constitutional principles, higher up the
hierarchy than conventions, which limit the legislative authority of Parliament itself and which cannot
be altered by judicial decision or by Act of Parliament, is somewhat controversial.
89Brazier, op. cit.. On pp.283-4, he states that fundamental principles might be drawn up and that
these may be able to give "more effective expression" to "aspects of what we know as the rule of law."
Brazier does not say whether he considers the rule of law to be part of the constitution, and if so, what
he thinks it consists of; he refers to it as a 'doctrine' which is vague and elastic (p.284) and 'notoriously
ambiguous' (p.273). However, the logical consequence of his criticisms of Harden would be for Brazier
to deny that the rule of law is part of the constitution.
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use the values to assess whether one system could be said to be more in accordance with
the rule of law than an alternative system. Finally, and this is the least stringent possible
usage, one might merely require that those designing a system of pollution control had
checked the system against each of the values. On this account, the rule of law would
take the form of a policy-design framework and a system of pollution control would
therefore be in accordance with the rule of law if it had been passed through that
framework.
I begin with two theses:
1) The first is that the rule of law can be used in either the first or the second of the
above ways. In other words, that the legitimacy of pollution control instruments can be
assessed using the rule of law values;
2) The second thesis, which is to an extent dependent on the first, is that market
approaches to pollution control and market mechanisms 9° of environmental regulation
represent a more constitutionally legitimate system of pollution control than command-
and-control regulation. This second thesis presupposes that the rule of law can be used
in the third of the above ways.9I
It will be left to the conclusion to see whether these theses and any of their
presuppositions can be proved. If they cannot, we may be left with the final possible
application of the rule of law - the policy-design framework.92
The next issue to address is that of the enforcement of these various uses of the rule of
law. There are two possibilities here. First, they might be enforced by the courts, so
that for example in the first usage, if a policy failed to fillfil one of the rule of law values,
it would be struck out as unconstitutional by the courts; or in the final usage, the policy
would be struck out if the policy-makers had not performed the appropriate procedural
task of passing the policy through the framework. Alternatively, the rule of law, in any
"The distinction between market approaches and market mechanisms will be made clearer in chapters
7-8. For the moment, it is sufficient to point out that market approaches are non-regulatory approaches
to pollution control which make use of the market (such as environmental management and auditing,
green consumerism and green investment) as opposed to market mechanisms such as pollution taxes or
charges and tradeable pollution permits, which are a form of regulation.
91 Whiie I do not include it as a thesis, if the rule of law can be used in the third way listed in the text,
then one might also compare the different command-and-control regimes (HMIP, NRA etc.) to see
whether one could be regarded as more constitutionally legitimate than another.
92 We will only be left with this if not only the first thesis, but the second thesis and its presupposition
are also disproved. If only the second thesis was disproved, the possibility would remain that one could
compare command-and-control regimes under the third application, as in note 91 ante.
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of the above usages, could be enforced as a living, practised principle of institutional
morality. 93 In other words, it would be up to policy-makers themselves to police
compliance with the rule of law 94 - whether that involved ruling out a policy if not in
accordance with a rule of law value, preferring one policy to another if it could be said
to be more in accordance with the relevant principles, or simply making sure that all
policies are weighed-up across the range of rule of law values.
93The rule of law has been variously described as "a principle of institutional morality" (Jowell, note 22
ante, at p.19), and by Dicey as a "code of constitutional morality" (a quote in Brazier, op. cit. - no page
number is given and I have not been able to locate the quote in Dicey) and "the predominance of the
legal spirit" (Dicey, op. cit., p.195).
94See Harden, note 9 ante, at p.502.
CHAPTER 2
Regulation I - Command-and-Control
The aim of the chapters which follow is to see how the rule of law might be applied to
command-and-control regulation, market approaches to pollution control and market
mechanisms of regulation and whether the latter two might be said to be more in
accordance with the rule of law than the former. In other words, can market approaches
and regulatory market mechanisms be described as more constitutionally legitimate than
our traditional regulatory approach?
In order to test whether market approaches and market mechanisms are somehow more
in accordance with constitutional principles, one must consider the extent to which the
present command-and-control regulatory system accords with these principles. In this
chapter, I will therefore be examining the varying types of command-and-control
regulation that exist in Britain under the various regulators with responsibilities for
pollution control, to see how they compare in terms of rule of law values of equity,
accountability, certainty, and efficiency. However, while I will be examining the value
of accountability in great depth, that examination will take place not in this chapter but
in the four that follow. Furthermore, I will not - as I will be doing in relation to the
other values - be exploring the rule of law value of effectiveness for each individual
regulator in turn. I will explain the reasons for this after a brief outline of the various
regulatory systems operated by the different regulators.
Until the new Environment Agency is introduced by the current Environment Bill (which
is likely to be some time in 1996), responsibility for pollution control is divided between
five separate bodies: the National Rivers Authority (NRA) which is in charge of water;
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (I-IMLP) - which, under integrated pollution
control (IPC), controls emissions to all environmental media from the most harmful
'prescribed' processes; local authorities, who are responsible, inter alia, for local
authority air pollution control (APC); waste regulation authorities (WRAs are a specific
division within local authorities), whose key role, for present purposes, is waste
management licensing which includes regulating the final disposal of waste to land; and
The NRA is an independent agency originally established under the
Water Act 1989. It has a wide range of responsibilities in relation to
water, including primary responsibility for water pollution control. The
regulatory system can be split into two functions. First, there is the
setting of water quality objectives. Next, consents (which are licences to
discharge trade or sewage effluent) are granted to firms. The setting of
these consents is guided by the need to ensure that the relevant water
quality objectives are met. The NRA is, by s.84 Water Resources Act
(WRA) 1991, under a duty to ensure that statutory water quality
objectives are, so far as practicable, achieved at all times. As yet, only a
limited number of water quality objectives are on a statutory footing.
Discharging without a consent or in breach of consent are criminal
offences under the WRA 1991.
NRA
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finally, water and sewerage companies, which are responsible for the regulation of trade
effluent discharges to sewer.'
It would take a long time to outline all of the powers and duties of the above bodies
under the various pieces of legislation. Instead, set out below, is an outline of a
selection of those powers and duties which will be of relevance to the discussion in the
chapters that follow. Those wanting more detail should consult the relevant section of
an environmental law textbook.
l Once the environment agency is introduced, the NRA, IMP and WRAs will be merged into one
independent body; trade effluent control and local authority air pollution control will remain where they
are (see The Environment Bill).
HMIP
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HMIP, part of the Department of the Environment, was established in
1987. It has a range of responsibilities, the most significant for present
purposes being the operation of integrated pollution control (IPC) under
Part I of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990. As the word
'integrated' suggests, under integrated pollution control, HMIP are
responsible for emissions from processes prescribed for central control'
across all environmental media - air, land and water. As with all the
other regulatory systems, IPC operates as a prior licensing system.
Here, the licences are called 'authorisations'. Under s.7 EPA 1990,
HMIP are under a duty to ensure that all authorisations for prescribed
processes contain specific conditions requiring the use of BATNEEC
(best available techniques not entailing excessive cost) to prevent the
emission of prescribed substances' or, where that is not practicable by
such means, to reduce the emission of prescribed substances to a
minimum, and to render harmless the emission of any prescribed or other
substances which are released. In addition to BATNEEC, and again
reflecting the integrated nature of their task, BMW must ensure that the
best practicable environmental option (BPEO) is being used. In other
words, where there are emissions to more than one environmental
medium, HMIP must make sure that the balance between the various
media is optimal - so that, for example, emissions to air should not be
reduced if that would simply shift the problem to an unacceptable extent
to water Under s 7, authorisations must also comply with: EC
Directives and international law; any statutory quality standards or
objectives, and any national plan issued by the Secretary of State under
s 3 EPA 1990.
2These are set out in The Environmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and Substances) Regulations
1991 (SI 1991 No.472) as amended.
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Local Authority
APC
The environmental health departments of local authorities are
responsible for the control of air pollution under the Clean Air Act 1993
(the control of visible material such as grit, dust, steam and fumes), for
local authority air pollution control (APC or LAAPC) under Part I of the
EPA 1990 and for the control of statutory nuisances under Part III of
the EPA 1990.
I will be focusing on APC under the EPA 1990. 4 The controls here are
contained in the same part of the EPA 1990 (Part I) as those for HMIP -
the word 'enforcing authority' refers to both HMIP and local authorities.
The APC system will apply to all processes prescribed for local contro1.5
Because the IPC and APC systems are covered by the same sections of
the EPA, such processes will similarly require authorisations which
reflect BATNEEC etc., though not BPEO (since APC covers emissions
to only one medium - air).
WRAs In England, the waste regulation authority (WRA) in non-metropolitan
areas is the county council.	 In Wales it is the district council - as it is for
English metropolitan areas, with the exception of. London, where it is
the borough council; areas where a joint body has been established
(Greater London, Merseyside and Greater Manchester), and areas where
the Secretary of State has used his power under s.31 EPA 1990 to
establish a regional authority (eg. South Yorkshire). The WRA is
responsible both for waste management licensing and for the duty of
care under Part II of the EPA 1990. The waste management licensing
system requires a licence to be held for the deposit, storage, treatment
and disposal of waste. Doing any of these things to waste without a.
licence is a criminal offence. The duty of care mainly involves
administrative steps which must be taken when waste is transferred. I
will be focusing on waste management licensing, and - for the sake of
clarity and because it is perhaps the most visible problem - on the final
deposit of waste to landfill.
41 will not be covering industrial smoke controls and statutory nuisance because they are primarily
reactive means of control (with certain exceptions). To that extent, they are very differerent from APC
and the other systems I am examining, which are all licensing systems.
5See note 2 ante.
Sewerage
Undertakers
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The privatised water and sewerage companies are responsible, inter alia,
for regulating the discharge of trade effluent to sewers, conceding
control to HMIP for those discharges which are subject to IPC. One
therefore has the slightly curious arrangement that a private company is
responsible for public regulation. As with the NRA, regulation is based
on a consent system, the consents here being callled trade effluent
consents. The various powers are contained in the Water Industry Act
(WIA) 1991.
I stated above that I will not be exploring the rule of law value of effectiveness for each
individual regulator in turn, as I will be doing in relation to the other values. Having
briefly outlined the various regulatory systems, I can now explain the reason for this.
The best measure of the effectiveness of the various command-and-control regimes is
probably to see whether ambient quality has improved or declined. A decline in ambient
quality would suggest ineffectiveness. On this basis, one might conclude that command-
and-control regulation of waste storage, treatment and disposal has been ineffective,
because ground and water contamination from landfill and other sites is quite common.
A number of the problems stemmed from weaknesses in the origina eg'es?.aticra, many
of which have been addressed in the EPA 1990 which replaced 4. 7 Whether the new
waste management regime under Part II of the EPA 1990 8 proves to be equally
ineffective remains to be seen.
However, the use of the state of environmental quality as a measure of effectiveness will
not always be straightforward. Regulatory responsibilities often overlap a particular
environmental medium, which makes it difficult to comment on the effectiveness of each
of the regulators in isolation. For example, both the NRA and filsAIP are responsible for
river pollution. If river quality has declined, one cannot easily conclude which of the
two systems of regulation is ineffective. 9 There is a similar overlap between the NRA
and the regulation of trade effluent to sewer: sewage works are still often in breach of
their consents, which may seem to indicate that the NRA is ineffective in enforcement,
but the blame could equally be laid on the regulation of firms' discharges to sewer.
Much the same is true of air pollution: responsibility is divided between HimrP and local
6The Control of Pollution Act (COPA) 1974.
7As will be seen when I come on to them, market mechanisms are generally ineffective in theory and
practice, whilst command-and-control regulation is effective in theory, but can be ineffective in
practice, as it was here. The crucial difference is that one can seek to solve some of the practical
effectiveness failures of command-and-control (eg. here by new legislation in the form of the EPA
1990), whereas a theoretical flaw is more difficult to address.
8Which came into force on 1 May 1994.
9Although one might conclude that our combined system of command-and-control water pollution
regulation is ineffective.
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authorities, and it is difficult to conclude, from any decline in air quality, which of the
respective systems is ineffective.m
Furthermore, having said that the best measure of the effectiveness of the various
command-and-control regimes is to see whether ambient quality has improved or
declined, that will not always be a sure guide. For example, using that measure (and
leaving aside for the moment HMIP's responsibility for water pollution), the NRA's
system of regulation might be seen as ineffective because recent years have seen a
decline in overall river quality." However, some of the reasons for this decline cannot
be blamed on the NRA - drought has, for example, been the cause of some quality
problems." In other words, the blame for a decline in environmental quality cannot
always be laid at the door of ineffective command-and-control regulation. In addition, it
is arguably misleading to consider a particular medium as a whole rather than examining
specific types of pollution within that medium. For example, command-and-control air
pollution regulation has been very effective at tackling some of the problems it set out to
solve such as visible pollution in the form of smogs; its ineffectiveness lies in tackling
invisible air pollution which has caused new problems, such as respiratory difficulties in
humans, acid rain and global warming. Similarly with water pollution - the current
command-and-control system is arguably quite effective at tackling point-source
pollution (ie. factories etc ); its ineffectiveness lies in dealing with pollution from diffuse
sources such as farms, which are one of the biggest causes of poor water quality." It is
also potentially misleading to look at overall quality shifts - with water quality for
example, while the 1990 survey revealed an overall decline, this masks the fact that in
some areas there were significant imrovements while others showed a marked decline.
Is command-and-control within the improvement areas ineffective?
1 °Ibid•, except replace 'water' M ith 'air'.
I I See eg. NRA, 'The Quality of Risers, Canals and Estuaries in England and Wales: Report of the 1990
Survey', 1991. There is however, some doubt as to whether there has been a decline in overall quality -
the appearance of a decline may be due to changes in survey methods over the period. For a good
account of the effectiNeness of US M ater pollution controls, see Yeager, The Limits of Law, pp.243-246.
12 See the NRA report, op. cit.. pp.12 and 45-6.
"See further Ball & Bell. Environmental Law, p.357.
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2.1 NRA REGULATION
2.1.1 Accountability
Discretion exists in setting standards, and in the monitoring and enforcement of these
standards. The numerous ways in which the NRA may be held accountable for the
exercise of these discretions will be examined in chapters 3 - 6.
2.1.2 Efficiency
By efficiency here, I mean the 'least-cost' solution, rather than one based on Pareto
efficiency, which would require the NRA to set emission standards to achieve a level of
ambient quality determined by cost benefit analysis (CBA). Strictly speaking, one ought
to use the term 'cost-effectiveness' rather than efficiency At the moment, ambient
quality levels are not decided on the basis of CBA, and efficiency therefore entails
designing a regulatory strategy to achieve these given ambient targets at least cost. This
section will examine the extent to which NRA regulation does keep overall costs down
to a minimum
To allocate standards efficiently, an agency must take into account both location" and
marginal abatement costs (MACs) 	 With the former, if for example a river is able to
assimilate a substantial amount of waste, it obviously makes sense to consider this when
setting a consent A consent which is stricter than necessary to achieve water quality
will not be the least-cost solution As the Royal Commission noted in their sixteenth
report
"If a unit of effluent has no known effect on wildlife when discharged into a fast-
flowing river but does significant damage when discharged into a sluggish river, then
reductions in effluent at the latter are more 'cost-effective', all other things being equal,
than reductions in the former I
As for marginal cost, if the agency uishes, say, to reduce emissions by 15°0 and there
are two industries, A and B, it will seldom be efficient to make both plants cut back by
14See eg Ackerman et al. Th ( n rtain Sear h f r Emir nmental Qualit y. pp 236-7. and Kolstad
'Uniformity ersus Differentiation in Regulating Externalities' (1987) 14 Jo of Env Economics and
Management 386
15The cost to a firm of reducing its discharge by one more unit of pollution A good explanation of
marginality for the non-economist is gnen in Kern Turner et al , Environmental Econ Anics -An
Elementart Introduction, pp 66-72 and in Tietenberg, Em r mental and Vatural Resource
Economic , pp 21-26. To see ti e importance of marginal analysis in relation to pollution control costs,
see Tietenberg, pp 314-5
16Royal Commission on EI1N ironmentil Pollution. 16th Report, 'Freshwater Quality Cm 1966, 1992,
para 8 6
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15%. This is because MACs differ between firms, so that if, for example A's control
costs are five times that of B's, the lower cost solution will obviously be to make B cut
back more than A." The least-cost solution will be the point where the marginal
abatement costs of the two plants are equalised."
The NRA does vary standards according to location, although they would probably seek
to justify this on scientific rather than efficiency grounds. 19 In other words, they would
say that they differentiate because different rivers have different uses and different
assimilative capacities; they would not say that they do so because to ignore location
would not achieve the least cost arrangement. By taking location into account, the new
agency is very much continuing with the traditional 'British approach' to standard-
setting. This involves setting individualised consents, taking local geographical factors
into account - and lies in contrast to the 'European' system of setting uniform emission
standards irrespective of location. The argument goes that Britain has plenty of fast
flowing rivers and is surrounded by sea, whereas on the Continent rivers often flow
through a number of different countries. While they require uniform standards for
reasons of inter-country fairness, we are not so constrained.
On the other hand, it appears that the other limb of efficiency in this context - differing
MACs - is not systematically considered by the NRA. Indeed, the informational cost to
the NRA of doing so would be enormous. 2 Costs may however be considered on an ad
hoc basis in individual consent negotiations. 21 While such an approach is likely to be too
unsystematic to ensure the lowest cost arrangement, it should lead to a more efficient
system than if costs were not considered at all. Whether it does so will depend on the
way in which costs are taken into account when consents are set. If the NRA consider
abatement costs to be a factor only if imposing certain conditions might result in a
discharger 'going bust', there is a danger that efficiency may actually be undermined.
There are two possible reasons for this. First, it may effectively support inefficient
7This example is based on the one gix en in Baumol & Oates. The Theory of Environmental Policy,
p.164; on pp.165-8 they pros ide formal mathematical proof of these efficiency arguments. For the non-
economist, a clear explanantion of the efficiency athantages of market mechanisms is provided by
Tietenberg, note 15 ante, at pp 314-20.
18See Tretenberg, op. cit , p 315
I9 See Bnttan, The Impact of If ater Pollution Control on Industry: .4 Case Study of Fifty Dischargers,
p.20. It should be borne in mind that all of the books on pollution control in the Oxford socio-legal
studies series N% ere N%ritten before prn ansation of the water industry in 1989. Nevertheless, with water
pollution control, one can probably safely assume that the NRA continue to adopt a similar general
approach to that described in the books in relation to the old regional water authorities (though perhaps
ith a more structured approach in terms of discretion).
20I,  a US context, see Koch & Leone, 'The Clean Water Act: Unexpected Impacts On Industry' (1979)
3 Han, Env LR 84 at pp 108-9.
21/hid.
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companies. Secondly, a firm which has hit hard times may be the least-cost abater and
thus, by not loading a greater proportion of the controls on it, the least-cost result will
be missed. The NRA should be encouraged to publish guidance on how and what costs
should be taken into account in setting consents.
It should also be noted that abatement costs can be considered at the enforcement stage
as well as during standard setting 22 (in fact the two are quite similar in that non-
enforcement effectively sets a new consent)23 . While such an approach is similarly likely
to be too unsystematic to ensure the lowest cost solution, it may lead to a more efficient
system than one in which costs are not considered at all. Again, whether it does so will
depend on what type of costs are taken into account by field officers. One might of
course argue that allocative efficiency should only be considered at the initial standard-
setting stage and that any relevant costs which ought to be considered will be available
for consideration then. The only costs which are likely to be taken into account at the
enforcement stage are those which may not have been apparent at that earlier stage - eg.
the threat of bankruptcy - and are ones which ought to be ignored.
Finally, if, as has been suggested in the US, agencies tend to concentrate their
enforcement efforts on large firms, allowing small firms to continue with their non-
compliance, 24 this may be efficient to the extent that large firms enjoy economies of
scale which are likely to make them lower cost abaters than small firms. If, on the other
hand the converse is true and agencies concentrate their fire on small firms, then
regulation is likely to be inefficient's
22 See Richardson & Ogus, 'The Regulatory Approach To Environmental Control' (1979) 2 Urban Law
& Policy 337 - their research into trade effluent control showed that for large companies, cost would
often play a part in negotiations at the consent setting stage, while for small companies with less
bargaining poNA er, cost might be a factor in enforcement decisions.
23For an example, see Brittan, note 19 ante, at p.17; Brittan also notes that differential enforcement can
be efficient if it takes into account differences in abatement costs (p.67).
24See Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform, pp.277 and 280.
25 Yeager, note 11 ante, at pp.45-6, 292, 311.
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2.1.3 Equity
2.1.3.1 Equity In Setting Standards26
Equity in relation to consents is obviously important from a competition point of view in
that if a firm has a more stringent consent than a direct competitor, it may be placed at a
competitive disadvantage. As standards are gradually tightened to cope either with
growth or increasing public expectations in relation to water quality, the issue of
competition can only become more pronounced, because pollution control costs are
likely to represent an increasingly large proportion of a firm's total costs. One reason for
this is that control costs tend to rise exponentially, so that while it might for example
cost a firm £20,000 to reduce emissions by 90%, cutting them by an extra 5% may cost
the same amount again.
Ideally, from a competition point of view, equity would involve the equalisation of total
control costs across all firms This would be the ultimate level playing field. Of course,
for informational reasons, this ideal cannot be realised, but it is worth mentioning
because it highlights the fact that the more evenly costs are spread out, the more
equitable an arrangement will be. This is an important point to bear in mind in what
follows because many a differentiation can be justified and hence be regarded as
equitable; however, some arrangements (ie. those which spread the costs out more
evenly) will be more equitable than others.
In the old water authorities, 27 field officers were keenly aware of equity among industrial
sectors:
"Field men, however, are constantly reminded that industrialists and farmers work on
a principle of equity: they can readily discover the standards which their competitors
must observe and may complain if they are being handicapped. But the agencies prefer
to avoid complaints wherever possible, and this encourages an administrative inclination
for equity of treatment, even though 'scientific' judgement may dictate otherwise.
Negotiating about standards, especially when there is some disparity between apparently
26See generally Kolstad, note 14 ante; McGarity, 'Media Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit
Balancing Strategies For Health and Environmental Regulation' (1983) 46 Law and Contemporary
Problems 159 at pp.219-220; Leone & Jackson, The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity:
The Case of Water Pollution Controls' in Fromm (ed.)„Ctudies in Public Regulation, 231 at p.264; and
Koch & Leone, note 20 ante, at pp. 104-5.27The regulators of water pollution before privatisation. As was said in note 19 above, one assumes that
the NRA continue with a similar approach, though further empirical research would be needed to
confirm this.
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similar dischargers, though an infrequent event, can be one of the field man's trickiest
tasks."28
The word 'apparently' in the above quote is of course crucial. A firm may look as
though it ought to have the same standard as a competitor, but a field officer will often
be able to point to a differentiating factor. In other words, if equity means 'treat like
cases alike', the most important thing will be to decide when firms are 'alike' in the sense
of being 'like cases'. Setting a firm a different consent to that set for another will not be
inequitable if a field officer can point to a distinguishing feature which means they are
not like cases. This distinguishing feature must be justifiable; there will typically be two
possible justificatory norms here - science and economics.
In setting discharge consents, the NRA differentiates on the basis of the type of
discharger, the control costs facing a firm and location. Differentiating on the basis of
the type of firm is obviously justifiable using either science or economics. In technical
terms, emissions must be expected to differ according to the particular process involved;
a large chemical plant cannot realistically be expected to have the same emissions as a
small engineering plant. Equally, giving all firms the same standard when marginal
pollution control costs may vary widely between different types of process, will not be
efficient. Differentiating on the basis of location can similarly be justified scientifically
(eg. different rivers have different assimilative capacities) or by reference to efficiency (it
is not efficient to grant the same standards to similar firms emitting to rivers with
different assimilative capacities) - although the old water authorities would normally use
the scientific justification. Hawkins quotes a field officer as follows:
"if people perhaps in the same industry are situated in different places in the estuary,
y iknow, if one was to point the finger at the other and say "But you allow him to
discharge such and such and you only let us do this", then we should be able to turn
round and say, "Ah yes, but you're discharging in a different place and the river quality
in this different place needs different treatment."... I think you can only treat them
similarly if all other things are equal, if ther're discharging into the same sort of
watercourse in the same sort of position." 9
Having seen that the NRA approach is equitable in principle because the grounds on
which it differentiates between firms are justifiable, one must then proceed to determine
whether it is equitable in practice. This is where the equity difficulties lie for the NRA.
In relation to costs, not only are they considered on an ad hoc basis, but there are also
no guidelines on what type of costs should be taken into account. Thus while granting
28Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, p.26 - emphasis added.29Ibid.; see also p.31.
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apparently similar firms different standards because they face different control costs is
equitable in principle because it can be justified on efficiency grounds, there will be a
lack of equity in practice because a lack of guidelines means that field officers may be
proceeding on the basis of different, unjustifiable substantive conceptions of justice; in
addition, the ad hoc nature of their considerations is likely to result in inconsistency and
hence an absence of formal justice. The assessment here must be whether the
anticipated efficiency gains outweigh this inequity which is bound to arise in practice.
In relation to the type of industry and location there are other problems which stem from
the fact that the NRA starts with river quality and works backwards, setting consents
with this target in mind. They do not start with industrial categories as HNIIP does with
its guidance notes. For this reason, while the NRA, like the former water authorities,
may be conscious of equity considerations, there must be an element of chance as to
whether equity is actually achieved in practice. It does not take long to see why this
must be so. Similar firms in similar locations within one NRA region may well be given
similar consents But a similar firm in a similar location in a second NRA region will not
necessarily be given a similar consent to that in the first region. In fact, all other things
being equal, while similar firms within regions may be given similar standards, similar
standards may not apply to similar firms between regions. In other words, while equity
may exist within regions, there may be inequity between regions, both in relation to
similar firms and in relation to similar locations.
It is submitted that the NRA are unlikely to achieve national consistency of treatment
without moving, at least in part, from setting standards solely on the basis of the
receiving waters, towards the I-IMIP approach of setting standards on the basis of
industrial categories. This does not mean that the NRA would no longer be able to
individualise consents to take account of location or costs. What it means is that there
would at least be a uniform starting point, from which local agencies could diverge in
order to take local factors into account.
A final mention should be made of the Kinnersley report. The NRA is implementing a
number of the recommendations made in the report by developing a national consent
processing system to replace the existing regional systems." While this system will
ensure national consistency of treatment in the way applications are processed, the point
to make is that it will not achieve equity in the sense described above of a similar starting
point. The form of consents will now be much more uniform, but the substantive
"See NRA, 'Discharge Consent and Compliance: The NRA's Approach to Control of Discharges to
Water', March 1994, para. 6.2.
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conditions contained in those consents will still derive from the particular catchment in
which the discharge is made. In other words, while two similar firms in similar locations
but in different NRA regions may now both be subject to, for example, percentile limits,
the new system will not ensure that they have similar substantive emission standards.
2.1.3.2 Equity In Enforcement
Equity in relation to enforcement will be considered as part of chapter 6 in the section
on judicial review. 31 The issue of enforcement has potentially serious implications for
competition, because some firms could end up facing prosecution and fines more
regularly than others. 32 Perhaps more importantly, the non-enforcement of a consent is
effectively the setting of a less stringent consent - a consent which may be lower than
one held by a competitor. 33 Essentially, as we shall see in chapter 6, if a policy of
selective prosecution operates, equity will suffer unless there is also a policy for
selecting prosecution. Ideally equity requires that this policy be published and be
useable in judicial review proceedings. These points on equity in relation to
enforcement will obviously also be true for di other agencies, so I will not be repeating
them when I consider those agencies below.
2.1.4 Certainty
To be able to plan their business and investment strategies effectively, companies need a
certain, stable framework within which to operate. Uncertainty can arise in two
principal ways. First, unstructured discretionary action (in either standard-setting or
enforcement) on the part of regulators is an obvious source of uncertainty. 34 And
secondly, the formal ability to change consents may create uncertainty and instability.
With the former, uncertainty arises because it is difficult to tell in advance what form
discretionary action might take. With the latter, if consents are changeable in a short
space of time, a company will face considerable difficulties in planning investment.
31	 •	 •
ThlS is purely for the sake of convenience and exposition. It may be wondered what a discussion of
equity is doing in amongst a section on the judicial review of prosecution discretion in a chapter on
accountability for enforcement decsions. The answer is that the issues of equity and accountability in
this area, as in others, are very closely connected (as anyone who has read K.C. Davis will know) and it
saves having to go over the case-law twice.
32See EC 5th Environmental Action Programme, 'Towards Sustainability: A European Community
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development', OJ 1993,
C138/5 at p.81.
33 See Britian, note 19 ante, at pp.27 and 68. On p.68, she gives an example of the metalwork finishing
industry, where different consents and differential enforcement meant that firms in a lax area had won
orders from those in a strict area (a 20% difference in prices is mentioned).
34Besides uncertainty, discretion also gives rise to problems of accountability, effectiveness and equity
and may be a contributor to efficiency or inefficiency - ie. many of the values are closely connected and
altering one (eg. accountability) is likely to have a knock-on effect on the others.
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The solution to the problem of uncertainty caused by discretionary action may be to
confine or structure the discretion via rules or policy guidance so that companies are, to
a large extent, able to predict the way in which the discretion will be exercised. Whether
discretion can or should be effectively channelled in this manner will obviously depend
on the particular regulatory context. We have already seen that there may be equity
grounds for channelling NRA consent-setting discretion via national policy guidelines.
As we shall see in chapter 6, the same may be true of their enforcement discretion. The
value of certainty would also be served by the introduction of such guidelines.
The solution to the uncertainty created by altering consents is to lay down time limits
within which consents cannot be changed, except in definable emergencies and perhaps
on payment of compensation to the affected company. In fact, this type of strategy is
adopted by the Water Resources Act 1991, schedule 10. A consent will normally
contain a period before which the consent cannot be changed without the permission of
the discharger. This period will usually be two years, but cannot be less than than this.35
However, the Secretary of State can direct an alteration within the period if it is
necessary to give effect to an EC or international obligation or for the protection of
human health, flora or fauna, or in consequence of representations or objections made to
him. If such a direction is made within the allotted period on human or ecosystem health
grounds (and only these), then the NRA will be obliged to pay compensation to the
discharger, unless the direction is the result of something which could not reasonably
have been foreseen at the time.
2.2 INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL BY HMIP
2.2.1 Accountability
In many ways, HMIP's discretion is similar to the NRA's in that they too follow the
process of setting standards and then enforcing those standards. Nevertheless, there is a
difference in the structure of decision-making at the standard-setting stage, in that HMIP
inspectors make their decisions within the framework of centralised guidance contained
in the Chief Inspector's guidance notes. 36 Under the NRA scheme, there is no such
centralised guidance. 37 This inevitably means that HMIP inspectors have less discretion
35The Environment Bill looks set to change this period to 4 years.
36See DOE, 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', 1993, paras. 7.1, 7.16 and 7.18.
37Except in relation to the form of consents - see note 30 ante and accompanying text.
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in setting standards than NRA staff, because their discretion has been structured by
central policy. This suggests a greater level of accountability in the HMIP system.38
This structuring of discretion by centralised guidance also has a bearing on equity - as
we saw earlier where I advocated a similar approach for the NRA.
Of course, the degree of accountability and equity achieved in practice will depend on
precisely how inspectors use the Chief Inspector's guidance notes. If, as has been
suggested, 39
 many inspectors simply apply the guidance notes as written, with no
process of individualisation, then accountability and equity may be regarded as
maximised (which may or may not be a good thing, because as we shall see below, this
may mean that other values such as efficiency are compromised). If on the other hand,
as the DOE guide to liPC 4° presupposes, inspectors merely use the notes as a starting
point and do take individual factors into account in applying BATNEEC in the particular
case, then a lesser degree of accountability and equity is likely to be achieved. If the
information in the DOE guide is to be taken at its word, then this latter approach is the
one that ought to be adopted.4'
Again, the other ways in which HMIP may be made accountable for the exercise of their
discretion will be considered in chapters 3 - 6.
2.2.2 Efficiency 42
The first point to make here is that the degree to which efficiency is attained will again
depend on how inspectors use the Chief Inspector's guidance notes. If inspectors use
the notes simply as a starting point and do take individual environmental and economic
factors into account in applying BATNEEC to each case, then at least a degree of
efficiency is likely to be achieved. However, if inspectors simply apply the guidance
38Albeit accountability in a rather limited sense of the %Nord. The accountability is of an internal kind -
there is no question of an account being given to someone outside in this particular instance.
39See Harris, 'Integrated Pollution Control in Practice' [1992] JPEL 611 at p.617. Although Harris
observes that, as the guidance notes age, inspectors are less likely to apply them wholesale.
40See note 36 ante.
4I NB. in particular para. 7.13.42The efficiency of BATNEEC is also considered by Pearce and Brisson, 'BATNEEC: The Economics
of Technology-based Ern ironmental Standards, With a UK Case Illustration' (1993) 9(4) Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 24. However, they concentrate not on whether HMIP might be achieving
the least-cost solution in apply,
 trig BATNEEC, but rather V1 hether BATNEEC reresents a Pareto optimal
le\ el of emissions - ie. a le% el premised on CBA IA here the difference between benefits (reduced
environmental damage) and costs (pollution control costs) is maximised. They conclude that "unless
BATNEEC is deliberate!) chosen on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, it is only by chance that it will
produce emission levels corresponding to the optimum" (pp.29-30). However, this approach obviously
requires acceptance of the principles of CBA, which were called into question in chapter 1. Least-cost
efficiency on the other hand, does not require acceptance of CBA because the ambient target is still set
spoliticallyl - it is simply a matter of try ing to achieve this target at least cost.
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notes to the letter, with no process of individualisation, an efficient system will only
result to the extent that marginal costs to particular industries have been considered by
the Chief Inspector in drawing-up the guidance notes. Again, one assumes that the
material in the DOE guide on the application of BATNEEC is not a dead-letter and that
BATNEEC is applied in the way it suggests.
Beginning with the locational limb of efficiency - to what extent do HIMIP take the local
environmental situation into account? Does BATNEEC mean only that the costs of
BAT must be weighed against environmental protection in some general, abstract
sense, 43 or does the imposition of BAT entail an excessive cost if it is not required for
the purposes of meeting ambient quality objectives?" Only if the latter is the case can
IPC be said to be truly cost-effective in the locational sense. As we will see in chapters
4 and 5, it seems fair to say that this is an issue which has not been hilly resolved. In
principle, dangerous substances should be subject to BAT, unless costs are excessive in
a general sense, because the precautionary principle suggests that environmental quality
standards for these substances should be read as a minimum. Non-dangerous substances
should not be subject to BAT, but should be tied to local quality objectives If BAT is
imposed in relation to these substances, the system will not be least-cost because more is
being spent than is necessary to achieve ambient targets.
As for efficiency in the sense of taking into consideration differing marginal abatement
costs (MACs), the DOE guide sets out how inspectors will be expected to take costs
into account in applying BATNEEC For both new and existing processes BAT is
unlikely to be imposed if costs to a class of industry are considered excessive "in relation
to the nature of the industry 	 For existing processes, it is further stated that the
imposition of BAT must be weighed against the desirability of avoiding excessive costs
for the plant concerned having regard to the economic circumstances of the industrial
sector of v.,hich it is part 46 Within industries, inspectors would appear to be entitled to
take into account variable factors such as configuration, size and other individual
characteristics of the process 47 for both existing and new processes, for existing
43As implied perhaps by the DOE guide's statements that BAT need n t be imposed where the costs of
BAT N%ould be excessise in relati n to "the environmental protection to be achtesed para 7 7) that
for existing processes, the emir nmental situation" should be considered (paras 7 1) - 7 11 , and, for
nes% processes. that "the cost of the best as ailable techniques must be neighed against the
environmental dimage from the process" (para 7 8)
44M implied by the guide s stitement that "local ern ironmental fact rs" sh uld be taken into account
gra 7 1)
DOE guide, op cit . para 7 7
461b,d para 7 10. see also pan 7 11
47/bid, pan 7 1
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processes, they may also consider "the plant's technical characteristics, its rate of
utilisation and length of its remaining life."48
There are various possible interpretations of "the nature of the industry" and, for
exisiting plants "the desirability of not entailing excessive cost for the plant concerned,
having regard to the economic situation of undertakings belonging to the category in
question." First, they may be referring to the financial health of a plant or industry.
While we are explicitly told that this should not be a consideration for new processes,49
it is not mentioned in relation to existing processes, which means it might be taken into
account for them. If the financial health of a company or industry is taken into account
in relation to existing processes, the least-cost solution may not be achieved. There are
two possible reasons for this. First, it may effectively support inefficient companies.
Secondly, a firm which has hit hard times may be the least-cost abater and thus, by not
loading a greater proportion of the controls on it, the least-cost result will be missed.5°
Next, it could for example mean that inspectors should have regard to the potential
effect on the industry's position in world markets; with a carbon tax for example, it is
likely that sectors such as the steel industry will either be fully or partially exempted
because of the effect a unilateral tax would have on their ability to compete
internationally. The introduction of expensive technology, under IPC could easily have
the same impact. This approach is likely to aid the cause of efficiency: if unilateral
action causes trade to be lost, the least-cost solution will not have been reached.
Finally, the above terms could refer to the average MACs of one industry compared
with the burden on others. Arguably, it is only if this latter interpretation was adopted
that the IMP approach could be described as truly efficient. Across industries, it is
most unlikely that HMIP adopt the MAC approach; much more likely is that costs in a
general sense will be compared with the costs to other industries in an unsystematic, ad
hoc manner. To adopt a systematic calculation would present HMIP with considerable
informational difficulties - albeit fewer than if MACs for each and every firm were to be
calculated and compared. Again however, whilst an ad hoc comparison will not lead to
the least-cost solution, it will arguably lead to a more efficient, lower-cost result than if
48Ibid., para. 7.11.
49Ibid., para. 7.8.
"Cf. Richardson et al., Policing Pollution. In relation to the best practicable means (BPM) test used by
the old Alkali Inspectorate in the control of air pollution, they comment that: "The reference to 'what is
not practicable or beyond his means' implies that restraining a polluter when the abatement cost is
beyond his means can never be appropriate. This ignores the fact that it may be socially efficient to
internalise an externality if the damage costs exceed the abatement costs, even where the result is the
closing down of the polluter's enterprise" (p.46). However, it should be noted that they are using
efficency in the Paretian sense, not in the least-cost sense and that their 'damage costs' would be worked
out via CBA.
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costs were not considered at all. As for costs to firms within particular industrial
categories, these will probably be considered on an even more ad hoc basis - they are
likely to be considered by inspectors case-by-case without attempting to relate them to
costs faced by other firms. However, again, while perfect efficiency will not be
achieved, a degree of efficiency is obviously attained by taking into account factors such
as scale, plant configuration and plant-age. It is factors such as these which are the
cause of differing compliance costs among firms in the same industrial category. If
uniform standards were applied in a blanket fashion to all firms in the same category,
one would be far from a least-cost solution.
2.2.3 Equity
Much of what was said about equity in relation to the NRA will apply here. 51 Like the
NRA, HMIP similarly differentiates between firms on the basis of costs, location and
industry category. In order to demonstrate that setting firms different standards is not
inequitable, one needs to point to a particular conception of justice which can be
justified. HMIP can justify differentiation on the basis of industry category, location and
control costs in the ways outlined in relation to the NRA. The efficiency justification for
setting firms facing different control costs different standards can, for example help to
dismiss allegations that IPC is inequitable in applying BATNEEC differently in relation
to old and new plants. New sources are generally made to adhere to stricter standards
sooner than old plants. This is regarded by some as an unfair barrier against new
entrants, and as undesirable because it allows old and dirty technology to continue
polluting. 52 While there is an element of truth in these claims, it would hardly be cost-
effective to make old plants which may be nearing the end of their life clean-up
immediately; even if they are not nearing the end of their life, the control costs to an
existing plant are likely to be much greater than those of a new plant because the former
will either need to make expensive process alterations or install expensive add-on
equipment, while the latter can incorporate pollution control relatively cheaply in the
initial design process. In other words, efficiency here provides a legitimate grounds for
differentiation.
However, there is an obvious and crucial difference between HMIP and the NRA in
relation to the practical realisation of equity, in that with MEP, centralised guidance in
51 NB. the distinction made there between equity in standard-setting and equity in enforcement. The
latter will be dealt with as part of chapter 6.52In a US context, see eg. Ackerman & Stewart, 'Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case
for Market Incentives' (1988) 13 Col Jo of Env Law 171 at p.173. Of course, one could turn it around
to say that if new and old plants are treated alike it will be unfair because the old ones were there first -
see eg. Richardson et al., op. cit., p.105.
the form of the Chief Inspector's guidance notes ensures a starting point of equity for
firms in the same industrial sector. Deviations from this baseline can then be made on
the basis of relevant considerations such as differing costs and geographical conditions.
In other words, with 	 all firms within an industrial sector begin with the same
presumptive standards as set out in the Chief Inspector's guidance notes and
differentiation proceeds from that equal starting point. This is in contrast to the NRA
approach where the starting point is the receiving water and there is no concept of an
equal baseline. The guide on IPC issued by the DOE states the following:
'The inspector determining the case must decide what is BATNEEC in relation to
each application, and translate that decision into conditions to be included in the
authorisation. There must, however, be broad consistency in these decisions, especially
betweeen processes of the same kind. It is important for process operators and the
public that BATNEEC is determined and applied in a transparent, rational and consistent
way. In part this will be achieved by the application of the general guidance in the
paragraphs above. A further important ingredient will be the guidance notes on each
class of process which the Chief Inspector will issue to his inspectors."53
The 'general guidance in the paragraphs above' in the quote relates to the meaning of
BATNEEC supplied in the DOE guide. It is perhaps more likely that inspectors will rely
on similar information in the internal inspectors' manual. Thus, while the Chief
Inspector's guidance notes will assist uniformity by giving an indication of what should
constitute BATNEEC for each process, 54 the manual will do so by ensuring that local
inspectors are following the same steps in applying BATNEEC in each individual case.55
However, while the Chief Inspector's guidance notes ensure a baseline of equity from
which individualisation can take place in accordance with the guidance set out in the
DOE guide and the IPC manual, it might be argued that the guidance on the application
of BATNEEC contained in the latter guides is insufficiently precise to ensure any great
level of consistency. The guidance as to costs and location for example is so vague and
open to such broad interpretation that it is unlikely to produce much consistency
between HMIP regions. Within regions, management structures and possibly more
detailed guidelines are likely to produce consistency of treatment.
Furthermore, while the Chief Inspector's guidance notes may ensure a measure of equity
within industrial sectors, there may be concerns about equity between different
53D0E guide, op. cit., para. 7.13.54Ib1d., para. 7.1.
55 While the NRA lack an equivalent of the Chief Inspector's guidance notes, their national consent
processing guidance mentioned in note 30 ante, is perhaps the equivalent of the DOE guide or the IPC
inspector's manual.
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industries. Imposing BATNEEC may be considered inequitable if some industries have
historically put much more effort into pollution control than others. A very clean
industry may feel unfairly treated if it is made to become even cleaner while a historically
dirty industry is only beginning on the BAT path which the clean industry started on
years earlier. 56 An example of this can be found in the slightly different context of the
national plan for the reduction of acid gas emissions under section 3 EPA 1990. The oil
refinery industry and 'other industry' categories were unhappy with the fact that they
had been given a much larger burden under the plan than the electricity generating
industry, given that they had already done a great deal to reduce their emissions as
against the poor efforts of the power generators." It is difficult to see a way around this
problem, 58 and as we shall see in chapter 7, it is one from which a tax or tradeable
permit system may also suffer.
2.2.4 Certainty
As we saw in relation to the NRA, the prime sources of uncertainty are discretion in the
setting and enforcement of standards and the legal ability to alter these standards. With
the setting of authorisations by HMIP, industry is provided with a degree of certainty by
the IPC guidance notes. As Ball and Bell comment:
"The notes are supposed to provide a coherent context in which decisions can be
made in relation to conditions to be imposed upon authorisations. Thus, all parties to an
authorisation will know of the ground rules. The introduction of an element of certainty
into the system increases both public accountability and also procedural fairness."59
With the enforcement of authorisations, certainty may be increased by the provision of
an enforcement policy. Again, this issue will be explored more fully in chapter 6 on
accountability for enforcement decisions.
As regards the variation of authorisations, HMEP is empowered to vary an authorisation
under section 10 and Part II of Schedule 1 of the EPA 1990. Unlike the NRA and
sewerage undertakers, HMIP has the power to vary the conditions in an authorisation at
any time - indeed, it is under a duty to do so if it considers that the authorisation no
longer reflects BATNEEC within section 7. This duty is reinforced by section 4(9),
which places a duty on the Chief Inspector to keep abreast of developments in pollution
56See Ackerman et al., note 14 ante, at p.248.
57See (1990) 1(3) Utilities Law Rev 120.
580ther than perhaps to allocate each industry a presumptive base-line - what Baumol and Oates call a
"hypothetical 'raw waste load' "(see Baumol and Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy and the
Quality of Life, p.236).
59Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, p.277.
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abatement techniques. In any event, authorisations must be reviewed by HMIP at least
every four years. These provisions obviously have the capacity to inflict considerable
uncertainty on industry, making it very difficult for them to plan ahead. Whether such
uncertainty arises will very much depend on how the powers are used in practice. If
HMIP do enforce BATNEEC in the manner of a permanent revolution, then uncertainty
will abound. If, on the other hand, they tend only to review authorisations every four
years, industry will be provided with a much more certain and stable framework in which
to operate.
2.3 LOCAL AUTHORITY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL (APC)
This system is very similar to the IPC regime and is therefore likely to be similar in terms
of efficiency, certainty and equity to HMIP. The significant points of difference lie in
relation to accountability. 60 To begin with, whereas EIMIP is a part of the DOE and
political accountability will therefore be to Parliament via the minister, APC is subject to
local accountability. The next point to make is that the accountability achieved via
centralised guidance will probabaly be even stronger here than in the case of HMIP.
Local authority officers, like HMIP inspectors, make their decisions within the
framework of centralised guidance, but because the former generally have less expertise
than the latter, they are more likely to apply the guidance notes to the letter. HMIP
inspectors, in contrast, may be expected to use their expertise to individualise
authorisations - using the guidance notes as a starting point rather than applying them in
a blanket fashion. 61 Again, further aspects of accountability will be explored in more
depth in chapters 3 - 6.
2.4 TRADE EFFLUENT CONTROL62
2.4.1 Accountability
Water companies follow a similar line of decision-making to all the other pollution
control agencies. They set trade-effluent consent standards and then have to go about
60And quaere, effectiveness - see the beginning of this chapter.
61 Although, as we saw in note 39 above, there is some doubt as to whether HMIP inspectors do actually
individualise authorisations as opposed to applying the guidance wholesale.
62This is now shared betweeen HMIP (for dangerous, 'red-list' substances) and sewerage undertakers
(for all other discharges). In relation to HMIP control of such discharges, the section on HMIP will
obviously apply.
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enforcing those standards. Richardson et al. report the fact that within the old regional
water authorities which they studied:63
'Most divisions, whatever the precise details of their policy towards consent
conditions, had produced some form of guidelines or rules to govern their application.
The process of consent setting was in fact the main exception to the general absence of
formal internal rules ... Typically, in the well-established divisions, a set of quality
conditions (or limits as they were usually callled) existed for most categories of
discharge. The officers had merely to determine the category, metal-plater or food-
processor for example, and fill in the appropriate limits."64
However, while this will produce some accountability within divisions by structuring the
officers' discretion, it does not produce accountability and consistency on a national
scale, as achieved by centralised guidance of the type used by HM1IF'. Richardson et al.
also note that, in contrast to standard-setting, formal predetermined guidelines were
seldom used in relation to enforcement decisions. Again, accountability mechanisms will
be examined in more detail in the chapters which follow, with enforcement covered in
chapter 6.
2.4.2 Efficiency
Richardson et al. comment that, in setting trade effluent standards, most water authority
divisions tended to be guided by locational efficiency (although they would see it in
technical rather than economic terms)65 , but not by the marginal abatement costs facing
dischargers. Location here obviously cannot refer directly to the assimilative capacity of
the environment because discharges are made to the enclosed environment of the sewer.
What it refers to therefore is the assimilative capacity of the sewage treatment works:
the ability of the sewage works to cope with the trade effluent discharge without
damage to itself and without breaching its own consent limits, thereby causing damage
to the receiving watercourse. 66
 To a great extent, water authority policy depended on
the type of effluent under consideration. If the effluent was one which sewage works
are designed to treat and a sewage works was able to cope with a considerable amount
of waste, then few limits would be placed on dischargers ., 67
 imposing stringent limits in
63 As in note 19 above, one should be aware of the possibility that the Oxford socio-legal study by
Richardson et al. (op. cit.) may no longer reflect existing practice post-privatisation. Indeed, given the
change from a public sector to a commercial culture, one might expect there to be some difference in
approach between the old water authorities described in the Richardson study and the new private
companies.
64Richardson et al., op. cit., pp.95-6.
65/b1d., p.99.
66Hence the 'directly' above.
°Richardson et al., op. cit., pp.99-100. As they note, sewage works are designed to treat the chemical
oxygen demand (COD) and suspended solid content of the effluent.
56
such circumstances would be inefficient because they would be unnecessarily strict for
the purposes of operating a safe, working waste disposal system. If, on the other hand,
the effluent contained toxic substances such as heavy metals, sewage works are not
designed to treat these and thus imposing stringent controls could not be said to be
inefficient. One could not say, as in the previous example, that the sewage works could
cope with more, because they are mostly not designed to cope with them at all.
As for abatement costs, while these were generally not considered by the divisions
studied by Richardson et al., 68 there were circumstances in which they were. For
example, in relation to dangerous substances, those discharging very small volumes
would often be given similar limits to those emitting larger amounts since the abatement
costs per litre were lower for small volumes because manual treatment was possible.69
However, as Richardson et al. argue, if it is the case that large volumes (of dangerous
substances) typically issue from large firms, then the most efficient allocation is likely to
be to impose stricter standards on the larger volume discharger because large firms are
usually the lower cost abaters. 7° Finally, officers would typically set stricter consents for
new dischargers than for existing ones if the sewage works was near capacity. Existing
firms might have their consents tightened slightly, but the greater burden was borne by
the new arrival. This is one of the few occasions when the officers did justify their
action by reference to efficiency, arguing that new arrivals will usually be able to control
emissions at much less cost than existing firms who may have to install expensive bolt-
on equipment or make expensive process modifications.7'
2.4.3 Equity72
Richardson et al. comment that among the old water authorities, there was a clear
preference for similar limits for similar dischargers:
"If ten traders wish to discharge copper to a single works which is capable of
receiving lkg a day, it will be immaterial to the maintenance of overall effluent quality
whether the available capacity is divided equally between the ten or given entirely to
one. For the purposes of rendering the limits acceptable to industry, however, the first
alternative would be deemed clearly preferable. The officers understood the
pp.103-4.
69While this is efficient in the marginal cost sense, it may not, as Richardson et al. argue, be efficient in
the locational or damage cost sense. It assumes that damage costs of dangerous substances are less with
a lower volume; this is not true (pp.101-103) and hence a policy that was efficient in both senses would
set a stricter limit on the small volume discharger in this example.
"Richardson et al., op. cit., pp.54 and 103.
71Ibid., p.104.
72Many of the points made in relation to the NRA and equity will be relevant here. NB. the distinction
made there between equity in standard-setting and equity in enforcement. The latter will be dealt with
as part of chapter 6.
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Confederation of British Industry to favour similar limits for similar traders wherever
possible and they also believed that industry in general disliked the idea of differentiated
limits for firms operating within the same industry because of the alleged opportunities it
gave for unfair competition. In broad terms, therefore, most divisions felt constrained
by the emphasis on acceptability to adopt a policy of uniformity and to impose similar
quality limits for similar traders within their various catchments except insofar as they
could justify to the traders deviation from such a policy. 'Similar traders' in this context
connoted those who discharged effluents of a similar composition."73
Of course there was no uniformity of consent conditions nationally. The question which
must be addressed is whether this lack of uniformity is justifiable and the answer here is
clearly 'yes' - different sewage works have different capacities and trade effluent consent
conditions need to vary to reflect this fact. This justification can be seen in either
technical or economic terms. Claims that this is anti-competitive would probably be met
with the response that a trader is free to choose his location and trade effluent conditions
should be a factor in that choice.74
While the above quote, read alone, might appear to suggest that uniformity was the
norm within catchments, in fact it very much depended on the type of substance being
discharged. 75
 First, particularly in relation to COD, firms were often allowed to
discharge as much as they liked as long as the sewage works could cope. % While this
means that the limits were not uniform, or more accurately, that there often were no
limits, it does not mean that there was a lack of equity - far from it, as each discharger
was equally free to discharge as much as they wished. Next, those discharging
exceptionally high concentrations or volumes of normal, treatable effluent were often
given stricter standards than others. As Richardson et al. note, this would only be
justifiable if such a discharge by itself posed a threat to the capacity of the sewage
works. 77
 If there was no danger, such a policy would arguably be inequitable because
no good justification would be available for differentiation. Uniform quality standards
were the norm for the discharge of dangerous substances. However, some divisions did
individualise consents by varying quality standards according to the volume of toxic
substances discharged, so that exceptionally large volumes might attract a stricter quality
limit and small volumes a lower quality limit than the norm. 78
 Again, this different
treatment may still be equitable if a good enough justification can be given. Locational
efficiency cannot provide such justification because "the discharge of untreatable metals
73Richardson et al., op. cit., pp.97-8.
74Ibid., p.99.
75Hence the final sentence of the quote: " 'Similar traders' in this context connoted those who
discharged effluents of a similar composition."
76Richardson et al., op. cit., p.100.
77/bid., p.101.
78Ibid., pp. 100-101.
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above a certain concentration could be said to impose the same damage costs per litre
whatever the volume of the discharge." 79 However, differentiation of toxic substances
limits according to volume might be justifiable on efficiency grounds if the abatement
costs are lower for the high-volume discharger. 8° If, as Richardson et al. state, large
volumes typically issue from large firms and large firms are typically lower cost
abaters," then differentiated limits will be equitable because dissimilar treatment can be
justified on efficiency grounds.
It is not just the volume and nature of the substance which might lead to a non-uniform
approach. As we noted earlier, new traders tended to be given different consents to
established traders. This non-uniformity will not however be inequitable because, as we
have seen, it can be justified on efficiency grounds.
The next task is to determine whether equity was actually realised in practice. The
answer is that it probably was, because as we saw above when looking briefly at
accountability, most divisions - whatever the substance of their approach towards setting
consent conditions - had produced some type of policy or guidelines to structure the
process. As Richardson et al. state:
"Typically, in the well-established divisions, a set of quality conditions (or limits as
they were usually callled) existed for most categories of discharge. The officers had
merely to determine the category, metal-plater or food-processor for example, and fill in
the appropriate limits."82
The limits set out in the policy would therefore act as an equitable starting point and
individualisation on the grounds listed above might then take place (ie. depending on the
capacity of the sewage works, the volume and nature of the substances discharged, and
whether the discharger was a newcomer). This has much in common with the IIMP
approach and contrasts with that of the NRA, where, even within regions, consent-
setting proceeds from the starting point of the receiving water rather than industrial
categories. Here, the capacity of the sewage works is obviously similarly the starting
point, but that is then divided up into notional limits for particular sectors.
2.4.4 Certainty
The amount of discretion in the setting and enforcement of trade-effluent consents is
arguably greater and less structured than in any other area, which is perhaps to be
791b1d., p.101.
81/b1d., p.103.
821b1d., pp. 95-6.
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expected given the age of the regulatory system in this area" and the quasi-private
nature of trade effluent disposal to sewer. As we saw earlier in the section on
accountability, policy guidance in relation to the settting of consents did exist within
divisions of the old water authorities, but not nationally. Guidance on enforcement was
not supplied in most divisions, which means that firms would be uncertain as to how
enforcement discretion would be exercised.
As for the alteration of trade effluent consents, by section 124 Water Industry Act 1991,
a sewerage undertaker must give the discharger two months notice before making an
alteration. Similar to the NRA, an alteration will only be allowed without the consent of
the discharger if it is two years since the initial grant of the consent or the previous
alteration. Under section 125, it is possible for an alteration to be made within this two
year period, but this will oblige the undertaker to pay compensation to the discharger
unless the variation was the result of circumstances which were not foreseeable when
the consent was granted or last varied. This 'hands-off period and the obligation to pay
compensation for exceptional circumstances which might have been foreseen, provide
dischargers with a stable and certain framework within which to make decisions on
investment in pollution control.
2.5 WASTE MANAGEMENT LICENSING
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I will be focusing here on the final disposal
of waste to landfill sites, although waste management licensing under Part II of the EPA
1990 obviously covers much more than this. I will be examining how waste regulation
authorities (WRAs) can be held accountable for their standard-setting and enforcement
decisions in chapters 4-6. There may be concerns about equity of treatment if some
WRAs are imposing different site-licensing conditions to others on similar sites. Lack of
consistency has been a problem in the past. As the Government's 1990 White Paper,
'This Common Inheritance' stated, "the standards of waste regulation vary
considerably. ,,84
 Proposed remedies were twofold. First, there was to be statutory
guidance: just as HMIP seeks to avoid the problem of inequity by way of the DOE
guide, the manual for inspectors and the various guidance notes, so WRAs will be led
83The Water Industry Act 1991 is only a consolidating Act - in practice, the system dates from the
Public Health (Drainage of Trade Premises) Act 1937, with subsequent amendments.
84Cm 1200, p.195.
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towards consistency by the Waste Management Papers issued by the DOE. 85 Waste
Management Paper No.4, 'Licensing of Waste Facilities' is perhaps the most important
of these as it sets out guidance on matters such as the criteria to be considered in
granting a licence and the conditions to be attached to licences which are granted. The
second remedy involved the creation of regional groupings of WRAs with regular liaison
aimed at bringing about greater consistency in planning, licensing and enforcement. 86 In
relation to certainty, the above measures designed to create greater equity will also have
an impact on discretion, which can be one cause of uncertainty. The other main source
of uncertainty we have been mentioning is the ability to change licences. Section 37
EPA 1990 gives WRAs a much broader power to modify licence conditions than exists
for some other agencies we have looked at. This is probably due to the relatively
unstable and uncertain nature of landfill sites. Although there are, for example, no time
limits within which changes cannot be made and no provisions for compensation, there is
however a restriction in that WRAs cannot make changes which are likely to require
unreasonable expense on the part of the licence holder." This is likely to provide most
site operators with the stability they require.
As for efficiency, while the marginal cost aspect cannot really be applied in this context,
the locational aspect may be relevant. If, as it is argued, the geology of many parts of
the UK make the co-disposa1 88 of wastes possible, then it would arguably be inefficient
to require suitable sites to refuse commercial and industrial waste. If they were made to
do so, this would arguably be inefficient because it would be imposing control stricter
than necessary to maintain environmental quality.89
85Ibid., p.194. Note s.35(8) EPA 1990, which requires WRAs to "have regard to any guidance issued to
them by the Secretary of State with respect to the discharge of their functions in relation to licences."
Quaere the degree to which the words 'have regard to' make such guidance binding.
86Ibid, p.195. The creation of the Environment Agency should lead to even greater consistency.
87s.37(1)(a).
88The mixture of industrial and commercial solid and liquid wastes with biodegradable municipal
waste, the idea being that the two will react to form a harmless end-product. Needless to say this
approach is controversial. For a view in favour, see DOE, `UK Landfill Practice: Co-Disposal - Using
Nature's Techniques to Treat Difficult Waste', 1993.
89The forthcoming EC Landfill Directive appears to ban new co-disposal sites while allowing existing
ones to continue - see 233 ENDS Report (1994) 34.
CHAPTERS 3 -6
The Accountability of Environmental Agencies
An Introduction
This brief introductory section provides background information which is necessary for an
understanding of the structure of chapters 3 - 6 which follow.
To begin with, it will be useful to set out the various types of standard which are found in
environmental law. Emission standards prescribe 'end of pipe' limits which must not be
exceeded. Process standards lay down the type of technology, factory lay-out, manning
requirements, chimney heights etc.. BATNEEC is perhaps the best example of a process
standard, although the DOE guide on IPC emphasises that BATNEEC will often be
expressed as a performance standard. Performance standards are effectively a hybrid of
emission and process standards: the best process is set out, but rather than constrain firms'
choice and flexibility by imposing that process on them, it is simply required that they meet
the emission standard which that process yields.' Emission and process standards should be
distinguished from ambient standards such as air quality standards (AQSs) and statutory
water quality objectives (SWQ0s). 2 Like emission standards, ambient standards will often
lay down concentrations of particular chemicals which must not be exceeded. However,
rather than applying these at the end of a plant's pipe or chimney, ambient standards dictate
that such concentrations should not be exceeded in the receiving environment. An ambient
quality objective may be truly environmental (eg. a river which can support fish; a forest
undamaged by acid rain), or it may be health-based (eg. air quality which does not harm
health). Environmental quality objective can be used in terms of a present quality standard
which must be achieved, or it may be used in terms of a future target - in which case there
will be a date by when the objective must be achieved. An ambient quality standard is a
maximum concentration of one or more substances in a particular medium which must not
be exceeded if the environmental quality objective is to be attained.
'DOE, 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', 1993, para. 7.12.
2AQSs and SWQ0s will be discussed in detail in the chapters which follow.
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There are three principal ways of approaching pollution control. First, one can concentrate
on the means of controlling pollution without tying them directly to the end of
environmental quality. For example, emission or process standards can be set for each
plant. 3 The disadvantage of this approach is that it cannot guarantee a given level of
environmental quality: every plant may be keeping to its emission standard, but together,
they may be causing considerable pollution. Secondly, one can attempt to tie the means
directly to the ambient ends sought. In theory, this involves first deciding upon the desired
ambient environmental quality, and then organising such things as emission standards to try
to attain this ambient goal. The third approach is a hybrid of the first two and involves
setting both an ambient quality standard and setting process/emission - specifically
BATNEEC - standards. This hybrid approach avoids the problem with the first approach
that a given level of environmental quality cannot be guaranteed. It also avoids a potential
problem with the second approach, which is that one may wish to reduce emissions below
the level necessary to achieve the given level of environmental quality. This is achieved by
imposing the ambient environmental quality standard as a minimum and requiring firms to
use BATNEEC to go beyond this. It is, for example, arguably the best approach for
controlling dangerous substances in water. With dangerous substances, it means that a
minimum level of environmental quality is guaranteed and, because one cannot be sure
whether this is a safe level, that firms must aim to achieve below this by employing
BATNEEC.
Historically, our regulatory system of air pollution control has tended to follow the first
approach and our regulatory system of water pollution control the second. 4 However,
while water authorities did use quality objectives as an aid to setting individual standards,
these objectives were relatively flexible and were administrative rather than legal in form.
Recently, we have seen a shift in both air and water pollution regulation towards the use of
formalised, legal quality standards. 5
 From now on, individual emission standards are likely
to be firmly linked to these legal ambient quality standards, 6
 not least because of the
increased possibility of legal challenges, which I will be discussing in chapter 4. While much
of our system of pollution regulation is therefore now based on the second approach,
3These emission or process standards may be of an 'ordinary' type or they may reflect eg. BATNEEC (best
available techniques not entailing excessive cost).
4See Macrory, 'Environmental Law: Shifting Discretions and the New Formalism', in Lomas (ed.),
Frontiers of Environmental Law, 8 at pp.9-10, and Richardson et al., Policing Pollution, pp.52-3.
5These will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.
6Recent Government thinking on air pollution control confirms this - see DOE, 'Improving Air Quality',
1994.
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pollution control under part I of the EPA 1990 adopts the third approach above. Even
though the EPA regime reflects the third approach, the link between the two parts of the
hybrid is far from certain; for the most part, the regulatory authorities have failed to set out
the precise relationship between BATNEEC and environmental quality objectives.
Bearing in mind these general approaches to pollution control, the functions of
environmental regulatory agencies can be split into three: first, the setting of ambient
standards; second, the setting of process/emission standards and third, the enforcement of
those standards so that the ambient targets are achieved. In looking at the accountability of
environmental agencies, I will largely be following this framework. In chapter 4 I will be
examining how agencies are held accountable for their ambient standard-setting decisions;
chapter 5 will explore accountability for process/emission standard-setting decisions; and
chapter 6 will be concerned with accountability for enforcement decisions. However, in the
next chapter, chapter 3, I will first be examining general accountability mechanisms which
cannot be tied to any of these particular agency functions.
CHAPTER 3
The Accountability of Environmental Agencies
I General Accountability
Accountability connotes external pressure of some kind, and may be either ex ante or ex
post. Ex ante accountability involves agencies receiving an account. If this is not required
by law, this is arguably an example of responsibility rather than accountability. Ex ante
accountability is normally considered in the literature under the heading 'participation', and I
will be using the two terms interchangeably. Ex post accountability may mean one of two
things: firstly, there is the narrow sense of being obliged to render an account; next there is
a wider meaning, involving a threat (eg. of bringing a private prosecution) which may be
carried out if the agency's actions are found to have fallen short of a desired goal.
In the chapters which follow, I will primarily be concerned with how agencies may be made
accountable to industry and individuals or environmental organisations' on a direct, 2 day-to-
day and active basis. This is in contrast with more selective, intermittent accountability
mechanisms such as Select Committees and passive mechanisms such as registers - which
are considered briefly in section 3.1 below. It is also in contrast with 'indirect' mechanisms,
which cannot be directly controlled by pressure groups or industry; these are considered in
section 3.2. One could of course, compartmentalise the various mechanisms in a different
way - comparing for example mechanisms which, by-and-large, ensure accountability for
policy (eg. Select Committees and ministerial responsibility), with those which ensure legal
accountability (eg. judicial review), and those which secure financial accountability (eg. the
National Audit Office). Thus, Lord Diplock has commented judicially:
"It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of
officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable
to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to
Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is
I To avoid repetition, I will be using environmental group to include individuals or vice-versa. Where there
is some difference in the position of the two, I will point this out.
21e. an accountability mechanism which can be used directly by such groups - as opposed to an indirect
mechanism which can only be directed by someone else.
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the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do,
and of that the court is the only judge."'
However, for the purposes of this study, the mechansisms I will be spending most time
examining are the ones which enable pressure groups and industry to hold agencies to
account. Most of these are 'legal' in that they are provided for in legislation, but not all
involve the courts, so legal accountability in the sense used by Lord Diplock is not an
entirely appropriate classification for my purposes.
3.1 PASSIVE MECHANISMS AND INTERMITTENT MECHANISMS
The NRA and HMIP are held accountable to Parliament for financial management by the
National Audit Office and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee. 4
 These are intermittent
examinations. Other intermittent accountability mechanisms include the Select Committees
and the issuing of annual reports. Select Committees which consider environmental matters
include the House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment and the environment
sub-committee of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities -
although the latter sub-committee has been disbanded. 5
 The NRA, HMIP and WRAs all
issue annual reports: the NRA is under a duty to arrange for the laying of such reports
before each House of Parliament and to ensure that they are published in a manner
considered appropriate by the Secretary of State; 6
 under section 67 EPA 1990, WRAs are
also under a duty to publish annual reports; HMIP is not placed under a duty to publish a
report - presumably because it is felt that as a division within the DOE, it is sufficiently
accountable. The same cannot be said of local authority air pollution departments, which
are also free from such a duty. If HMIF' or a local authority does issue a report, this should
arguably be regarded as a form of responsibility rather than accountability, as it is not
specifically required by law. One should also mention sewerage undertakers, who, as public
companies, are required to issue annual reports as a matter of company law. However,
3R v IRC, ex p. National Federation of Self:Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617.
4See eg. 'Financial Management and Control in the National Rivers Authority', 23rd Report, Committee of
Public Accounts, HC 216, Session 1991-2; and NAO, 'Control and Monitoring of Pollution: Review of the
Pollution Inspectorate', 1991.
5215 ENDS Report (1992) 26. Only the sub-committee has been disbanded; the HOL Select Committee on
the European Communities remains in existence and is still able to examine European environmental
proposals.
6s.187 Water Resources Act 1991; for details of the NRA's 1991/2 annual report, see
211 ENDS Report (1992) 6.
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these reports are issued for the benefit of shareholders, not the environmentally concerned
public, and the amount of environmental information is limited.7
One of the most significant instruments for accountability is the 'register'. All of the
pollution control bodies are required to keep registers which are open to the public, with
details of applications, consents/licences/authorisations, monitoring data, infringements etc..
Of course, precisely what is required varies according to the agency - and the respective
Acts and corresponding regulations should be consulted for the details. 8 The real exception
is the water and sewerage companies. Under section 196 Water Industry Act 1991, they
are required to maintain registers of trade effluent consents that are open to the public.
They are not, however, required to provide details of any monitoring information. Indeed,
it is a criminal offence under section 206 WIA 1991 for an employee of a sewerage
undertaker to disclose a firm's sampling information. Friends of the Earth launched a
significant campaign on the secrecy of discharges to sewers in 1992. 9 However, the
Environmental Information Regulations 1992 10, which are designed to implement EC
Directive 90/313 on Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment, may be of use
here. Despite being private companies, after the Griffin case, the water services companies
probably are covered by the regulations." However, there remains some doubt as to
whether information on sewers amounts to 'environmental' information as such.
Finally, it is to be hoped that the ability of companies to apply to have certain information
excluded from any of the above registers on the grounds of commercial confidentiality 12 will
not succeed as a cloak to exclude public scrutiny: if such exemptions become commonplace,
the accountability potential of the registers will be severely curtailed. It should also be
noted that, like annual reports, registers are, in themselves, 'passive' accountabilty
mechanisms. However, they are a crucial tool in active mechanisms such as private
prosecutions and judicial review. As we shall see, material entered on the registers should
make these actions more straightforward.
7See eg. 209 ENDS Report (1992) 4.
8Eg. s.20 EPA 1990 and SI 1991 No. 507; s.64 EPA and the Waste Management Licensing Regulations, SI
1994 No. 1056, and circular 11/94; s.190 WRA 1991 and SI 1989 No. 1160.
9 See 'The Secret Polluters' (1992) 16 Earth Matters 10; see further 210 ENDS Report (1992) 4.
1 °SI 1992 No. 3240.
"Griffin and Others v South West Water Services, 236 ENDS Report (1994) 38-9.
12 See eg. s.22 EPA 1990.
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3.2 INDIRECT, DAY-TO-DAY, ACTIVE MECHANISMS
HMIP, the NRA, and perhaps to a lesser degree, sewerage undertakers, are all politically
accountable for their decisions to Parliament via the minister (and Select Committees,
considered above). WRAs and environmental health officers responsible for APC are
locally accountable for their decisions to the elected members on the council. Both are
good examples of indirect (for the most part), ongoing, active accountability mechanisms.
I begin with the doctrine of ministerial responsibility which is in theory central to the
accountability of the former three bodies. The traditional treatment of the doctrine tends to
conflate the supervisory element, with the reactive, accountability par0 3 And yet one does
not necessarily entail the other, since managerial supervision can exist without answerability
to Parliament and vice-versa. The Scott Inquiry into the 'arms to Iraq' affair and recent
controversy over prison management have revealed the weakness if not the fiction of the
supervisory element of ministerial responsibility. The reactive part of ministerial
responsibility may be direct or indirect. The engine of ministerial responsibilty may be set in
gear voluntarily (eg. with a statement to the House), or in reply to a parliamentary question
prompted by the MP's own interest. In other words, neither of these need be in response to
'outside' requests, and ministerial responsibility is indirect. If on the other hand, ministerial
responsibility is set in motion by outside pressure, it takes on something of a 'direct' flavour.
For example, industry or pressure groups can write direct to ministers, or to their MPs (or,
in the case of eg. Friends of the Earth, encourage their members to do so) who may then
write to the minister or table a question in the House. The minister may then provide
information or give reasons for the course of action taken (what Colin Turpin has termed
'explanatory' accountability) and may also undertake to remedy any "errors or defects of
policy or administration, whether by compensating individuals, reversing or modifying
policies or decisions, disciplining civil servants, or altering departmental procedures" (which
he calls 'amendatory' accountability). 14
In practice, the limitations of parliamentary questions (the lack of a requirement to reply to
such questions, the often cursory and obfuscatory nature of replies and the lack of effective
sanctions other than political embarrassment), the yielding of Parliament to parties (a party
with a majority is unlikely to have its policies censured by Parliament), and the extreme
13 See Day and Klein, Accountabilities: Five Public Services, p.33.
14-r,imp— in, 'Ministerial Responsibility: Myth or Reality', in Jowell & Oliver (eds.), The Changing
Constitution, 53 at p.57.
68
rarity of ministerial resignations - mean that reactive ministerial responsibility is, like its
supervisory cousin, an extremely attenuated form of accountability. 15 The final point to
note is that the strength of both elements of ministerial responsibility is likely to be further
eroded by the existence of quangos or non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) as they are
now often called. 16
 Whereas HMIP is a division within the DOE, the NRA is a quango and
sewerage undertakers are privatised companies. With quangos and a fortiori with private
companies exercising public regulatory functions, the supervisory element of ministerial
responsibility is necessarily diminished because they are intended to be independent bodies
operating at arms'-length of government. As a rule the quango is responsible for
operational matters and the minister and the government department remain responsible for
policy. However the lines between the two are seldom clear-cut, which means that the
reactive element of ministerial responsibility may also be weakened because a minister will
often be able, with some justification, to claim that a matter is operational rather than one of
policy.
What then of the machinery of political accountability at local level which will apply in
respect of local authority APC and waste regulation? The important point to note here is
that local government accountability is very different to that of central government. In
central government, civil servants are accountable to ministers who are in turn accountable
to Parliament. In local government, council officers are accountable - not to individual
council members who are in turn accountable to the remaining members - but to all the
elected council members as a corporate body. And the members of this corporate body are
actually involved in government - unlike central government where the minister is part of a
government which is separate from Parliament. The corollary of this is that while in central
government, government accounts to Parliament, in local government, since government
and parliament are effectively one, council members account thereafter to the local
population - by providing access to information, through council meetings, and ultimately,
in elections.
The accountability of council officers to members is predominantly indirect in that officers'
policy decisions and operational actions will be routinely supervised by members of the
council. Nevertheless, it may become more direct if an individual complains to the council
and the council then addresses this complaint to the relevant officers. It may also become
more direct if an individual is present at the meeting of the council or the relevant
15 See further Harden & Lewis, The Noble Lie, and Marshall (ed.), Ministerial Responsibility.
16Quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations.
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committee (as they are entitled) and addresses the complaint to the officers for himself. The
accountability of the council members to the local populace may similarly be indirect or
direct. Most accounting for what they do will be routine, unprompted and of an indirect
nature in council meetings. If direct questions are asked in these meetings then
accountability becomes direct.
Default powers are another good example of an indirect, ongoing, active accountability
mechanism. They are indirect in that industry or environmental groups cannot direct the
complaint themselves. They are ongoing and active in that the Secretary of State can step
in at any time, although their use is likely to be extremely rare. The Secretary of State
obviously does not require default powers in relation to BEMIP because it is part of the
DOE. With the other pollution regulators, which are independent of central government, he
does require such powers. Under section 4 and section 72 EPA 1990, the Secretary of
State may take over from local authority air pollution departments or waste regulation
authorities if he is not satisfied with their performance. If sewerage undertakers are not
fulfilling their statutory functions, the Director General of Water Services or the Secretary
of State possess wide powers ranging from enforcement orders to special administration
orders. The latter enable the Secretary of State or the Director General (with the Secretatry
of State's permission) to apply to the High Court for a direction that the affairs of the
company shall be managed by someone else. 17 There are no default powers as such in
respect of the NRA, but section 5 WRA 1991 gives the Secretary of State wide powers to
give directions to the authority.
Finally, in relation to EC matters, the ability of the Commission to bring proceedings against
a Member State under Article 169 of the Treaty for breaches of Community law provides
another form of indirect, ongoing, active accountability mechanism.
3.3 DIRECT, DAY-TO-DAY, ACTIVE MECHANISMS
Mechanisms which can be relied upon directly by industry or environmental groups (in
varying degrees) as and when necessary, include consultation, call-in powers, appeals,
judicial review, private prosecutions, civil actions, the ombudsmen and finally, such
channels as may exist under the Citizen's Charter initiative. Returning to my earlier
definition of accountability, it is interesting to see how some of these mechanisms fit in.
17Water Industry Act 1991 ss.18-24.
70
What one finds, is a considerable overlap. For example, consultation comes squarely within
one sense of the word accountability in that it involves the agency receiving an account.
Appeals on the other hand involve the final sense, of a threat - the threat here being the
possibility of an appeal (with all the time and cost which that entails) if a company is
unhappy with the original decision; then, if the threat is carried out, appeals also involve the
agency receiving an account (ie. a form of ex post accountability shades into ex ante
accountability) and giving reasons for its decision in the appeal itself. Judicial Review is
another example of a threat: the threat of a judicial review action if companies or pressure
groups are unhappy with their decisions holds agencies to account. Again, if the threat is
realised, accounts will be given and received, and accountability shades into participation.
The same is true of possible negligence actions against the agency itself: the threat of
liability may keep the agency on its toes, and if an action is actually brought, accounts will
be given and received during the process of litigation.18
Private prosecutions and civil actions against polluting companies involve only the final
sense of accountability - a threat which may be carried out if the agency's actions are felt to
have fallen short. Even then, the threat is not that obvious. Whereas appeals or judicial
review actions can be seen as threats because they pose some inconvenience to an agency,
the threat posed by a civil action against a polluter, or by a private prosecution, is less
obvious because they have less of an impact on the agency itself However, private
prosecutions may pose a threat because of the public embarrassment that such actions
produce: if someone brings a private prosecution, the implication is that the agency has
failed, and that the person or group bringing the prosecution are putting things right. If
considerable publicity surrounds such a prosecution, the 'implication' will be specifically
stated and emphasised - as it was in the prosecution of Albright & Wilson by Greenpeace.19
Civil actions against polluters, on the other hand, ought not to reflect badly on the agency,
because such private rights can be enforced despite the existence of, for example, an agency
prosecution. Nevertheless, whether the public always fully appreciate the difference
between criminal and civil actions is open to question, and in any event, someone bringing a
civil action could also publicise that they were doing so because of agency inaction."
18NB. there is some doubt as to whether the various environmental agencies would be held liable in
negligence in respect of their pollution control functions. This subject will be addressed in ch. 5.
19See (1991) 5(3) IMELR 170; the first private prosecution brought for water pollution was Wales v Thames
Water Authority (1987) 1(3) Environmental Law 3.
20For a recent civil action which attracted considerable media attention, see Cook v. South West Water, 207
ENDS Report (1992) 39. The case was reported in the Daily Telegraph of 16 April 1992. One of the
reasons for the media interest was that the poet Ted Hughes was present with the plaintiff in court.
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In the following three chapters, I will be concerned with direct, day-to-day, active
mechanisms which have just been discussed briefly in section 3.3. In chapter 4, I begin by
looking at mechanisms for ensuring accountability for setting ambient standards. Chapter 5
then goes on to consider accountability for standard-setting and other operational duties,21
before I move on to examine accountabilty for enforcement decisions in chapter 6.
2I For the most part, I will be examining standard-setting decisions; however, particularly when looking at
waste regulation authorities, I will also be looking at accountability for other operational duties. This
terminology is used simply for expositional purposes - enforcement could obviously also be classed as an
operational duty.
CHAPTER 4
The Accountability of Environmental Agencies
II Accountability for Setting Ambient Standards
4.1 EX ANTE ACCOUNTABILITY
The approach I am taking in this part of the chapter is rather unusual and requires some
prior explanation. The approach which would probably be expected would be for me
approach ex ante accountability by discussing the various laws which enable people to
participate in the setting of ambient standards - ie. advertising and consultation
requirements, opportunities to attend inquiries and such like. However, while I do
intend to discuss these issues, they will be located within an alternative structure. The
central focus of the section will be on various types of decision-making frameworks; it
will set out a number of ideal-typical methods of deciding upon the appropriate ambient
standard. The reason for doing this is that these methods themselves have very differing
implications for accountability which deserve to be explored.
Thus, in looking at ex ante accountability for the setting of ambient standards, I will first
be considering various model or ideal-typical methods of deciding upon ambient quality.
These will include setting ambient quality using the precautionary principle; setting it at
a critical loads level; setting it using cost-benefit analysis and, finally, deciding it
'discursively'.' The first two might be labelled as the approaches of science, the third
that of economics and the fourth, of politics. I explore the implications which each has
for accountability. I then examine how two different types of environmental quality are
set in practice - air quality and water quality. As yet, there are no ambient quality
standards for land (ie. level of soil quality to which contaminated land ought to be
cleaned up). My conclusion is that degrees of all three models are present in the way in
which standards are actually decided. The extent to which each is present will have an
important bearing on accountability. In discussing the 'politics' or discursive model, I
necessarily cover the types of ex ante accountability mechanism I mentioned earlier - ie.
consultation, rights at inquiries etc..
1 A similar discussion occurs in Ramchandani and Gourlay, 'Alternative Approaches to Setting Effluent
Quality Standards' (1992) 11 JEM 10 and in Kerry Turner et al., Environmental Economics: An
Elementary Introduction, ch.14. However, they do not make the distinction between ambient standards
and effluent (ie. emission) standards; cf. also McGarity, 'Media-Quality, Technology, And Cost-Benefit
Balancing Strategies For Health And Environmental Regulation' (1983) 46 Lmv and Contemporary
Problems 159.
73
A brief caveat is necessary here. It will be obvious to some that the four model
approaches set out above are not exactly replacements because they come from different
points of the decision-making framework: CBA is a tool used by decision-makers; a
discursive approach is not concerned with tools but with who makes the decision; and
the precautionary principle and 'critical loads' approaches represent, as we shall see, the
outcomes of a decision. Nevertheless, I believe there is considerable value in
considering them as alternatives, because they can be seen as models of existing, real-
world positions: the precautionary principle combined with critical loads is essentially a
fairly strong environmentalist approach; CBA represents the favoured approach of
mainstream environmental economists, and discursive decision-making is the approach
of critical theorists and civic republicans.
4.1.1 Critical Loads
The critical loads approach' seeks to avoid ecological damage:
"The environment can accept a certain level of effluent discharge without adverse
biological effects. This is the assimilative capacity of the environment. The
concentration at which damage begins to occur is the Critical Load concentration."3
A critical loads or assimilative capacity approach allows for some human-environment
interaction, but aims for no significant biological damage. This approach recognises that
any human activity is likely to have some impact on biological life, however small this
impact might be. It also recognises that ecosystems are generally in flux, so that is not a
matter of finding the natural level, but rather a level of ecosystem functioning judged by
humans to be healthy. 4
 However, implementing a critical loads approach across the
board would almost certainly come at considerable cost. Paying that price should be a
choice made within a transparent and democratic framework. It should not be imposed
without democratic debate by authoritarian ecological mandarins. 5
 For those with a
concern for the environment, there is a temptation to see a scientific 'is' in the shape of
critical loads, and to transpose this into a policy 'ought'. The apparent legitimacy of
science can too easily become a replacement for democratic legitimacy. 6 An ambient
2An approach endorsed by the Government in relation to the control of acid rain - see This Common
Inheritance - Britain's Environmental Strategy', Cm 1200, 1990, p.144 and This Common
Inheritance: The Second Year Report, Cm 2068, 1992, pp.99-101.
3Ramchandani and Gourlay, op. cit., at p.11.
4See Editorial (1993) 25 1E111.
5 0n ecological mandarins, see Oplitils, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: A Prologue to a Political
Theory of the Steady State.
6For a practical illustration, see Smith & Elliott, 'Hazardous Waste and Technological Risk: The Limits
of Science in Decision-Making' (1992) 2(1) European Env 1. Greens might be accused of
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standard based on critical loads is a result; it should not be confused with the process of
arriving at a result, which is where, one might argue, our attention ought to be focused.
4.1.2 The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle 7 suggests that, where there is uncertainty as to whether
damage will occur, but if it does occur it will be great, then it makes sense to take steps
now to prevent the pollution which would cause that damage. Perhaps the most obvious
application of the principle lies in relation to global warming: scientists are uncertain
about whether increasing CO2 emissions lead to global warming, but should warming
occur, damage will be considerable; it therefore makes sense to proceed as though the
causal connection has been established and thus attempt to limit CO2 emissions as far as
possible.8
Another application can be found with dangerous substances in water. The critical load
approach presumes that we can establish a level of the substance below which damage
will not occur. This is not possible for all substances. With dangerous substances - ie.
those which are toxic, persistent or bio-accumulative, we cannot say with certainty what
is the level of a substance below which long-term damage will not occur. The
precautionary principle states that where we know that a substance is harmful due to its
toxicity, persistence or bio-accumulative nature and where there is uncertainty about the
long-term effects of these substances at even very low levels, the best approach is to
attempt to reduce them as far as possible. With many dangerous substances such as
mercury, we know that they are toxic, persistent and bio-accumulative, but we do not
know what a safe ambient level of these substances might be. In other words, we do not
know what the critical load is - we do not know what is critical in relation to low dose
exposure over time. Applying the precautionary principle would mean reducing
discharges of these substances to the lowest level possible. The ultimate aim of the
principle would therefore be zero discharges and hence zero ambient concentrations
above trace levels. 9 As we shall see, if levels of dangerous substances were decided
inconsistency in their approach to science: on the one hand they present scientific ecological limits as
an uncontroversial basis for policy; on the other hand, they see modern science as the cause of our ills
and wish to emphasise that science is not value-neutral, but rather has numerous moral and social
implications - see Redclift, 'Sustainable Development: Needs, Values, Rights' (1993) 2(1) Env Values 3
at pp.3-4.
7A principle apparently endorsed by the Government - see 'This Common Inheritance', note 2 ante,
p.11.
81As far as possible' is obviously significant: one could take very drastic action to cut CO2 emissions
(eg. banning all fossil-fuel power generation) but this would be to great a cost given the risk (or rather
uncertainty) which faces us. Thus, it can be seen that the precautionary principle requires some form of
cost-benefit balancing.
9 See Gee et al., Beyond Rhetoric: An Economic Framework for Environmental Policy Development in
the 1990's. They state that the precautionary principle (PP) demands ambient standards of no
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using CBA or discursively, it is by no means certain that a target ambient standard of
zero would be chosen.
4.1.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Under cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the appropriate level of ambient environmental
quality would be where the benefits of control outweighed the costs by the greatest
margin. In a 'pure' model, this would be the level 'chosen'.'° However, in the real
world, the level suggested by CBA would be just one input into a political decision made
by agency personnel. In other words, the decision-maker is not bound to choose the
CBA answer. I hope to demonstrate that CBA is flawed on either account.
Costs are relatively easy to quantify because they stem from the cost of technology
which has an actual market price. 11
 Some benefits can be quantified via actual market
prices in the same way as control costs: reduced river pollution, for example, may
produce more revenue from the sale of fishing licences; a reduction in air pollution may
lead to tangible savings in healthcare expenditure or building maintenance. The problem
comes in trying to assess the other benefits which are not associated with real market
transactions. The technique on which economists usually rely to capture these other
benefits is 'contingent valuation methodology' (CVM). This generally involves asking
people how much they would be willing to pay (WTP) (or alternatively, how much they
would need to be compensated) for, say, a reduction in pollution levels. When CBA is
criticised below, it should be borne in mind that criticism is being directed only at CBA
which makes use of CVM. I do not deny the need carefully to weigh the costs of
environmental improvement. In fact, one could quite easily replace the term CBA with
CVM more or less throughout. I have not done so because most of the literature
similarly treats CBA as coterminous with CVM.
pollution' which can be translated into emission standards of zero emissions (p.8). However, their
approach seems to reflect what one might call a strong PP stance - ie. one that does not take the costs
into account; for what one might call a weak PP approach, see the Government's stance in the White
Paper (note 2 ante), which places considerable emphasis on the balancing of costs and benefits.
10 See Ramchandani & Gourlay, note 1 ante.
11 Although the process is far from straightforward - see McGarity, note 1 ante, at pp.181-3.
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CBA has been criticised on ethical, political and methodological grounds. 12 Pearce has
identified three types of objection to economic valuation:
a) "that the exercise of seeking measures of individuals' willingness to pay for
environmental quality is itself somehow flawed;
b) "that the fate of environments should not be determined by human wants at all;
and
c) "that human wants matter, but are not the only source of value. For example,
there exists something called 'intrinsic' value, value 'in' things rather than 'of things."13
Proposition (c) is an ethical objection. However, as Pearce notes, it is not a valid
objection to economic valuation because economists are not claiming that there are no
other values. Contingent valuation deals with economic - ie. preference-based values; it
does not deal with, but neither does it rule out, other values such as intrinsic ones.
Nevertheless, as Pearce points out, while economic and intrinsic values may co-exist,
"(p)ractical issues do of course arise, since someone still has to say what these intrinsic
values are and how they trade-off against other values." 14 I would therefore agree with
Pearce that some of the ethical arguments against CBA often miss the point of what
CBA is trying to achieve and ignore the need to balance human interests with the
environment.
Proposition (b) is an ethical objection against anthropocentrism, which Pearce counters
with the political observation that it "is clearly untenable if there is to be any semblance
of democracy." 15 This is quite true, but as we shall see one might just as easily make the
same political observation about CBA. It too has worrying implications for democracy.
Proposition (a) is a methodological objection. Here, Pearce admits that "there are
indeed technical problems in validating the measures obtained - i.e. in determining
whether they are true values or not", but states that "Proposition (a) is not the dominant
reason behind the objections to valuation." 16 This is not true - methodological
objections are as much at the centre of the debate surrounding CBA as any other class of
objection.
12Young, book review of Valuing the Earth: Six Case Studies, (1992) 1(2) Env Politics 307.
13Pearce, 'Green Economics' (1992) 1(1) Env Values 3 at p.7.
14/bid..
15Ibid..
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Pearce's typology provides a useful entry to the debate. I now intend to discuss some of
the methodological objections (which Pearce claims are secondary), the political
objections (which Pearce fails to mention) and ethical objections (other than the
economic/intrinsic value debate which I think Pearce is correct to dismiss). In the
discussion, one should bear in mind the distinction I made at the beginning of this
section between a 'pure' model and the real world of decision-making. It should be
apparent that the political objections to CBA are premised on a real world scenario.
I will begin by examining what I regard as the flaws in CBA; I will then move on to
consider some of the defenses made for CBA and whether these stand up to scrutiny.
The critique is by no means exhaustive - other people would no doubt choose to
highlight other problems or apparent advantages.
4.1.3.1 Methodological Flaws
One of the major problems with CVM is peoples' unfamiliarity with the resource being
valued and the practice of putting a price on it. People are used to paying for products
like toothpaste and they know from experience how much they are willing to pay for it;
the same cannot be said of clean rivers, or clean air. Another problem is that while
people are asked how much they would be WTP, they will not actually have to pay up.
This means they are free to think up 'wild' prices, unconstrained by their actual income
and without thinking about how this extravagant expenditure might deprive them of
other goods."
Looking at the matter more systemically, there is a similarity between the problems of
CBA and those of economic planning as practised in the former Soviet Union. The
Austrian critique of planning can be applied just as forcefully to CBA. Hayek, for
example, attacked welfare economics (of which CBA is a part) for its utilitarian
foundations," and accused utilitarianism of the same naive constructivism as economic
planning.° Mulberg is one author who has recently examined CBA from an Austrian
angle. 2° However, Mulberg does not argue that CBA is flawed because, like planning,
it suffers inherent calculational and epistemological problems. He argues that "(i)t is
only through trade that values become known" 21 and that if CBA can be used to derive
17See generally, Note, '"Ask a Silly Question ...": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages'
(1992) 105(8) Harv LR 1981.
18 See Law, Legislation and Liberty, volume III, p.201, n.35. Bentham is undoubtedly the grandfather
of CBA - maximizing utilities is the aim of both CBA and utilitarianism.
19See Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, pp.8, 12 and 62-5.
20In his article 'Who Rules the Market? Green Versus Ecosocialist Economic Programmes: a Response
to Eckersley' [1992] Pol Studies 334.
21Ibid., p.338.
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values for the environment without the 'goods' being traded, there is no reason why all
goods cannot be valued in this way. In other words, the market is unnecessary and the
whole economy can be planned. If Mulberg is saying that the logic of CBA leads to
planning, I would agree with him. However, he also seems to be saying that the whole
economy should be planned. 22 Here I disagree. The important point to remember is
that there is a continuum between the market and planning - there is no such thing as a
'free' market and there are various shades of planning. Where we place ourselves on this
continuum should be decided pragmatically on the basis of what works - not on the basis
of dogma and ideology. Pollution regulation is a mild form of planning, but it can help
to achieve the collective goals we desire; the total planning of consumer goods, on the
other hand, has been seen not to work. Mulberg makes the mistake of assuming that
environmental standards or taxes are set to achieve an efficient level of environmental
quality (ie. one where the benefits outweigh the costs), whereas in fact, the level of
environmental quality is usually decided politically and economics is relegated to
working out which of the means (taxes, standards etc.) is most cost-effective. If CBA
were used to set taxes at a Pareto efficient level, Mulberg would have a point about
double standards. As it is, there is no hypocrisy in maintaining pollution regulation in a
predominantly market economy.
4.1.3.2 Political Objections
There are various possible political objections to CBA. Before listing these, one needs
to be clear about different models of agency legitimacy. Without such an understanding,
the political objections to CBA are easily confused - with different discourses talking
past each other. Broadly speaking, there are four different models of administrative
legitimacy. 23 These are of course ideal types which simplify matters to make the picture
clearer - in reality legitimacy is conferred by a mixture of the processes described.24
First, there is the legislative model, or what Stewart calls 'transmission-based justice'.25
In this model, the agency secures legitimacy by way of its connection to the democratic
legitimacy of the legislature. It simply does what the legislature tells it to do. Second,
there is the New Deal inspired 'expertise' model, where agency decision-making is seen
as a technical rather than a political task. Here, the legitimacy of agency decisions rests
upon the legitimacy of science or professional technique, not democracy. 26 Next, there
is the accountability model. This model recognises that the transmission belt is far from
22Ibid., pp.335-6; cf p.340 where he claims the market is necessary.
23 See Jones, 'Administrative Law, Regulation, and Legitimacy' (1989) 16(4) Jo. of Law & Soc 410 at
p.412 et seq..
24Ibid..
25 Sce Stewart, 'The Reformation of American Administrative Law' (1975) 88 Han) LR 1669 at p.1675.
26Ib1d., p.1678.
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perfect, but seeks to keep the holes in the belt to a minimum by requiring accountability
to the courts (via judicial review, to ensure the agency does not step outside its
democratic mandate) and to Parliament (via reports, select committee scrutiny etc.).
The final model is the discursive model. In this model, legitimacy is secured not by
maintaining a connection between the agency and the legislature, but by creating a
'surrogate political process'. 27
 If a representative cross-section of society participates in
making agency decisions, legitimacy is no longer derived solely from the representative
democracy of parliament, but also from the bottom-up via participatory democracy.
The model of agency legitimacy which can most easily be seen at work in Britain is
undoubtedly the accountability model. The legislative transmission belt exists to some
extent, but cannot easily account for the broad delegation of discretion in much statutory
language. The professional expertise model still counts for something but has largely
been discredited because of its undemocratic, authoritarian implications. The discursive
model is only partly descriptive of British practice - we have some consultation, but
decisions are far from being negotiated in a roundtable discussion by all interested
parties.
Under the accountability model, CBA raises problems. While there is some truth in
Helm's statement that CBA provides "a check on the exercise of regulatory
discretion," 28
 the question he does not address is whether the check itself raises greater
accountability problems than the discretion. If environmental benefits are outlined in
word form, the accountable decision maker will be the one who weighs these benefits
with the associated costs. If, on the other hand, environmental factors are included in
numerical form, as economic values, the most important decisions are taken by the
unaccountable analyst - it is the analyst who decides on the appropriate methodology
and this determines the numbers that form the input into the decision that is eventually
reached. Thus, while the ultimate decision is taken by somebody who is accountable,
not by the analyst and while the CBA may only be one of a number of inputs into the
decision making process, CBA is presumably an important input and the issue will to a
certain extent have been pre-determined by the change in the form of the data from
descriptive complexity to numerical simplicity. The discredited 'expertise' model - the
expert now being the analyst rather than the administrator - is in danger of replacing the
accountability model. In reply, one might state that these problems can be overcome by
27 Ibid., p.1670.
28Helm, 'The Assessment: Reforming Environmental Regulation in the UK' (1993) 9(4) Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 1 at p.8. Helm correctly identifies that regulatory discretion is constrained still
further by extension of the role of market mechanisms as policy instruments (ibid.). This is one of the
key points of my thesis, to be developed in future chapters.
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making the decision-maker fully aware of the assumptions and limitations of the
methodology. 29 On this account, no information is hidden from the accountable
decision-maker, no effective power to decide is transferred. However, it must be said
that this represents an extremely optimistic view. First, there is surely a danger that
explanation will not occur. Secondly, one might question the extent to which an
economist can fully explain the intricacies of supply and demand curves, differential
calculus equations and specialist language to a generalist decision-maker with limited
time. 30 The numerical result of the CBA is likely to shine out as a beacon of light in the
darkness of economic jargon.
The concern above is that delegated decisions should be taken by accountable decision-
makers, not by unaccountable experts. The analyst's response to this concern is that if
the decision-maker understands the limitations of CBA, he remains in control. Even if
one is convinced by this response, there is still the issue of the process of ex post
accountability. 31 To hold someone accountable, one must understand the basis for their
decisions. 32 Agencies are accountable to the courts, to parliament (who are in turn
accountable to the public via the ballot box). Agency decisions based on CBA are not
easily comprehensible by generalist courts, politicians or the public and thus CBA also
threatens this form of accountability. 33 The task of explaining the assumptions and
limitations of CBA to this wider audience will be harder to overcome.
In reply to the above criticisms relating to accountability, one might then say that CBA
is still democratic because it counts the 'dollar' votes of consumers in real or simulated
markets. In other words, there is another kind of 'surrogate political process' at work
here. 34 Thus, the effective delegation of some power to the analyst, and the difficulty of
the courts, the legislature and the public reviewing decisions the bases of which they do
not understand, does not threaten accountability because the analyst is merely chanelling
more accountability from below in the form of citizen participation in contingent
valuation questionnaires. The accountability model is seemingly replaced by the
discursive model. There are two points to be made here. First, the market is not
democratic because some people are better off than others - it is not 'one person, one
29 See Rodgers, Jr., 'Benefits, Costs, And Risks: Oversight Of Health And Environmental
Decisionmaking' (1980) 4 Harv Env LR 191 at p.198.
30 See Bennett, 'Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Market, and Political Legitimacy' (1988) 23 UniV of San
Fran LR 23 at p.63.
31 See Green, 'The Risk-Benefit Calculus In Safety Determinations' (1975) 43 Geo Wash LR 791 at
p.806.
321bid.
331bid.
34See text accompanying note 27, ante.
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vote'. Second, participation ought to mean having a voice to state your case, not merely
a voice to name your price.
Related to the second point above, a common criticism of CBA is that it merely
aggregates unquestioned, existing preferences whereas politics should be about reaching
a conclusion based on debate amongst the citizenry. 35 However, it should be noted that
this criticism is not premised on the accountability model of agency legitimacy, but
rather on the discursive, civic republican mode1. 36 Our present regulatory arrangement
is no more truly discursive in its design than CBA.
4.1.3.3 Ethical Objections
One might add that it is not just results which concern environmentalists, but also the
procedure used in reaching them. The medium is the message: approaching the
environment in money terms may encourage the very attitudes which caused its
destruction in the first place. Prices do not elicit reverence - the environment becomes
just another thing that can be bought and sold. Tribe puts it far more eloquently:
"What the environmentalist may not perceive is that, by couching his claim in terms
of human self-interest - by articulating environmental goals wholly in terms of human
needs and preferences - he may be helping to legitimate a system of discourse which so
structures human thought and feeling as to erode, over the long run, the very sense of
obligation which provided the initial impetus for his own protective efforts."37
On the other hand, it has also beeen claimed that putting a price on the environment may
help by horrifying us into action." Being asked to quote a price for some aspect of the
environment may cause some people to become aware of the environment for the first
time - and discomfort at naming a price may spur them into action on its behalf.
35Reich, 'Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay' (1985) 94 Yale LI 1617
at p.1637; Sagoff, The Economy of The Earth, pp. I0-11; Sunstein, 'Interest Groups In American Public
Law' (1985) 38 S'tanf LR 29 at p.32.
36Whereas the second point in the previous paragraph in the text is premised on our present system: our
present system does provide for some voice - but this tends to be sequential consultation rather than a
debate involving all concerned citizens sitting around the same table.
37Tribe, 'Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law' (1974) 83
Yale LI 1315 at p.1330.
38Rose, 'Environmental Faust Succumbs To Temptations Of Economic Mephistopheles, Or, Value by
Any Other Name Is Preference' (1989) 87 Mich LR 1631.
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4.1.3.4 Defences of CBA
1) It can only produce better results than those so far.
An argument often used by proponents of CBA, is that it can only be better for the
environment than what has gone before. 39 Would the road through Twyford Down, for
example, have gone ahead if a full CBA had been carried out? In other words, using
economic valuation is better than leaving the environment unpriced. However, there is
the issue of what in fact 'went before': it may be true to say that conventional CBA is
better than a report which does not consider environmental benefits at all, or which lists
them separately - for example in an environmental impact assessment; but, that is not to
say that it is better than a report which fully integrates non-numeric environmental
benefits into the report.
Then, as Jacobs suggests, the results of CBA may be favourable to the
environmentalists' cause, but on the other hand, they may not. One cannot be sure that
it will only produce better results than those so far:
"Critics of monetary valuation tell environmentalists to beware. These methods may
generate some useful results ... but they can equally easily 'undervalue' what
conservationists regard as important environmental assets. Thus, for example, survey
respondents may not realise a particular habitat's ecological significance, and so place a
low monetary value on it ... In these cases environmentalists might wish to override the
results of the CBA. But if they have accepted the results of similar exercises elsewhere
when it suited them, critics warn, they will find themselves (as it were) without a leg to
stand on."40
2) With CBA, the environment will not be overlooked.
Here, one might accuse environmental economists of a sleight of hand. On the one hand
they state that environmental benefits should be included in the analysis in numerical
form to avoid being overlooked. Campen quotes a congressional committee:
"Whenever some quantification is done - no matter how speculative or limited - the
number tends to get into the public domain and the qualifications tend to be forgotten ...
The number is the thing. 1141
39 See eg. Pearce, 'Toward the Sustainable Economy: Environment and Economics' (1991) 172 The
Royal Bank of Scotland Review 3 at p.6.
"Jacobs, The Green Economy, pp.206-7.
41 Campen, Benefit, Cost, And Beyond: The Political Economy of Benefit-Cost Analysis, p.68.
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Then, on the other hand, they claim that CBA is merely one input into the decision-
making process and that other values will play a part. 42 This is having one's cake and
eating it: if environmental values need to be included in numerical form to avoid being
forgotten, then surely CBA will dominate the other non-numerical inputs? Either CBA
and its numbers take centre stage or they do not.
3) The inability of opponents of CBA to offer an alternative
This supposes that CBA is in place. One could quite easily turn the tables and put
another method in place. If one then said "come up with an alternative," this would
presumably mean an unflawed alternative - which would, on our acount, rule out CBA.
To say that there is no alternative here simply means that proponents of CBA believe
CBA is good and any decision-making framework without CBA is bad. Furthermore,
one might simply state that there is an alternative to CBA - factual complexity. This
complexity should be addressed, not hidden away behind a superficial screen of
numbers."
To conclude, CBA which makes use of contingent valuation has worrying implications
for accountability. CVM is a misconceived enterprise which can only lead to inaccurate
results. Nevertheless, some basic form of cost-benefit balancing will be necessary,
because environmental improvement is not costless. People must be democratically free
to reject that cost if they consider it too great. Decision-makers also need to establish
where money can be spent most effectively, which can only be done by weighing the
costs with the benefits in different areas. However, it seems to me that weighing costs
with benefits can and ought to be a relatively simple matter. One might for example
compare the cost of having a swimmable river with the cost of having one in which fish
flourished and decide that the cost of the former outweighed the benefits. Why go to
the added expense of an army of analysts, when this frames the issue in a manner which
everyone can understand?
4.1.4 Setting Ambient Standards Discursively
This particular approach builds on two traditions which have much in common -
European critical theory (particularly Habermas and his concept of the 'ideal-speech
42Pearce, Economic Values and the Natural World, p.35.
43 See eg. ibid., the preface, n.38.
"This should not be seen as a contradiction to what was said earlier about the ability to understand
decisions made on the basis of CBA: factual complexity is easier for generalists to understand; the
simplicity of CBA is only in the result - understanding how the result was reached is by no means
simple.
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situation'), 45
 and US civic republicanism." It involves setting ambient standards on the
basis of a public consensus reached via undistorted discussion. Legitimacy here is a
participatory democratic legitimacy rather than the legitimacy of science (critical
loads/precautionary principle). Legitimacy is conferred via community consensus; CBA
on the other hand does not involve discussion and consensus by the community - it
merely aggregates existing preferences without testing these through the process of
rational debate. The legitimacy of decisions reached via CBA is therefore open to
question."
There are problems with setting ambient standards on the basis of civic republican
deliberation and consensus." The first is that, from an environmentalist's point of view,
the consensus reached may be a 'bad' one. In other words, the danger with democracy is
that the environmentalist's goal of a clean environment may be compromised:
"Is it not conceivable that the individuals involved in discursive designs would
reflectively and competently choose to downgrade environmental concerns in
comparison with (say) economic prosperity or social integration?""
Reviews of Sagoffs book, The Economy of the Earth have noted that author's tendency
to denigrate working class tastes as against those of the middle classes. 50 They have
also noted that while he supports the idea of deciding environmental goals discursively,
"he repeatedly characterizes deliberation in terms that reveal a systematic disdain for the
45 See eg. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory - Horkheimer to Habermas; see Forester (ed.),Critical
Theory and Public Life, for some practical applications of some of Habennas' ideas; on Habermas'
relevance to public law, see Prosser, 'Towards a Critical Public Law' (1982) 9(1) Jo of Lcrw & S'oc 1; for
discussion of critical theory, Habermas and ecology, see Dryzek, Rational Ecology, ch.15, and
Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach, ch.5.
46See Seidenfeld, 'A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State' (1992) 105 Han,
 LR
1511; Sunstein, 'Beyond the Republican Revival' (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1539 and Michelman, 'Law's
Republic' (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1493.
"Seidenfeld, op. cit., p.1637.
48Both Seidenfeld and Sunstein (op. cit.) make it clear that civic republican deliberation to achieve
consensus is not the same as negotiation (see Seidenfeld p.1529, n.89; Sunstein, p.1549). Perhaps the
best known advocate of negotiation of environmental standards is P. Harter (see 'Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise' (1982) 71 Georgetown LJ 1). Seidenfeld and Sunstein state that
negotiation assumes a trade-off between competing private interests so that a compromise can be
reached. Civic republicanism differs from negotiation in that it "involves an ongoing attempt at
persuasion that has the potential to alter how all participants view the contested subjects of debate." In
other words, the process aims at acceptance rather than compromise. However, Seidenfeld concedes
that it will often not be possible to achieve consensus through deliberation, and that in these
circumstances, compromise will be necessary. Thus, a discursive or civic republican approach would
seem to require deliberation and consensus wherever possible, and negotiation and compromise where
not.
"Dryzek, 'Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Administrative
State' (1992) 3(2) Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 18 at p.38.
"See eg. San Juan, book review of The Economy of The Earth, (1991) 15 Han) Env LR 307 at p.308.
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uneducated or lower classes: 'a pack of yahoos.' " 51 Yet while he is forced by his
commitment to democracy to allow the 'yahoos' to enter the discussion, he blithely
assumes that they will not win.52
While the possibility of downgrading cannot be ruled out (and it is by no means obvious
that this would be instigated by the working class rather than the non-environmentalist,
materialistic middle classes), Dryzek claims that this is unlikely if there is a sufficiently
wide number of interests present and if communication is truly undistorted by ideology
and strategic behaviour. 53
 He also cites Paehlke, who believes that the experience of
democratic participation so far has been on the side of environmental improvement
rather than downgrading.54
Another difficulty with setting ambient standards discursively comes in deciding who
should attend. 55
 At a local level, there is some evidence that public deliberation can be
made to work56
 and because of the small numbers involved, there is no need to limit
attendance. However, while there may be no need to limit attendance, there are many
other issues which need to be addressed such as how representative the participants are
of the local population, how to ensure that discussion is even-handed, how to ensure
non-middle class involvement, and what counts as consensus (majority vote or
unanimity?). 57
 If environmental groups are to attend such fora, there are potentially
further problems of which they select to attend (assuming there are too many for them
to attend them all), whether they should be granted funding to do so and again, their
representativeness. 58
 In practice, environmental groups such as FOE have volunteer
groups at local level which may mean that such problems are less acute.
51Ibid..
53Dryzeck, note 49 ante, p.39.
54Ibid., at p.27, citing Paehlke, 'Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Environmentalism' (1988) 10 Env Ethics
305.
55 Wald, 'Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?' (1985) 10 Col Jo of Env
Law 1 at p.20. It is details like this that many of the more theoretical writings on critical theory and
civic republicanism fail to address. As with proponents of market mechanisms, there is a tendency to
call for something which sounds very attractive at a level of abstraction but which runs into problems
when it comes to moving from theoretical abstraction to practical application (see Mashaw, 'Imagining
The Past, Remembering The Future' (1991) Duke LJ 711 at pp.726-728).
56See eg. Reich, note 35 ante.
"Ibid., pp.20 and 24. Similar issues arise in relation to corporatism - see eg. Craig, Administrative
Law, pp.18-21. Negotiation is effectively corporatism on a smaller scale. On corporatism and public
law, see further, Birkinshaw et al., Government By Moonlight.
58See Stewart, 'Regulation, Innovation, And Administraive Law: A Conceptual Framework' (1981) 69
Cal LR 1256 at pp.1346-7. The discussion of negotiation should be read with care as it is firmly located
within a US context, where it is considered as an antidote to the paralysis that judicial review has
imposed upon the US system of environmental law. As yet, we do not face the same problems, but
negotiation can obviously be seen as a good in itself rather than simply as a cure for regulatory 'disease'.
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Of course, not all ambient standards can be set locally because many pollutants have
regional and transnational effects. Here, the above problems are compounded. 59 Where
ambient standards have to be set at a national, European, or international level, problems
of selection are likely to arise because of the large numbers who might wish to be
involved.60
One final criticism which has been made is that negotiated decisions fail to reflect the
'public interest' because the public interest cannot legitimately be decided by private
agreement between interest groups who are not necessarily representative of the general
public.° However, this is to state a conclusion without questioning the pre-suppositions
which inform that conclusion. The presupposition here is perhaps that the public interest
is best reached by experts. However, if one is not convinced by the expertise model of
the public interest, then it is not clear what choice one is left with other than to have the
public interest decided by potentially non-representative interest groups. The 'public
interest' is not a value-free term and whichever values inform it will be far from
uncontroversial.
The final point to make is that this form of decision-making is extremely unlikely to be
introduced, because it takes power away from the existing decision-makers such as the
agencies and the Secretary of State.62
4.1.5 Air Quality
Air quality standards (AQSs) are set in Brussels on health-based grounds - a human
rather than ecological equivalent of critical loads. The judgment is that, below particular
levels, humans will not suffer damage. There are health protection ambient standards
for levels of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, lead and suspended particulates.° Health
I am considering negotiation in this latter manner, but some of the problems identified by Stewart and
others in the former context are obviously germane to my discussion.
59 See Dryzeck, note 49 ante; on p.37, he describes the question of unrestricted participation at this level
as 'more problematical' than at the local level, 'though not intractable'. Unfortunately, he gives no
indication of how to solve these problems.
"At a national or European level, it is tempting to think that the necessary discussion on ambient
standards could be taken by national parliaments and the European Parliament respectively. After all,
both of these are democratic arenas. However, this cannot be the case, because while there are
inevitably fewer ambient standards to be set at these levels than at the local level, parliaments simply do
not have the time to examine fine details.
61 Funk, 'When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest - EPA's
Woodstove Standards' (1987) 18 Environmental Law 55 at pp.95-6.
62Stewart, note 58 ante, at p.1346.
63EC Directives 80/779, 85/203, 82/884.
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and vegetation standards now also exist in respect of ground level ozone, but these are
guide values rather than mandatory standards."
What of our system of air pollution control designed to reduce acid rain? While the aim
of the Large Combustion Plants Directive 88/609 was to reduce the damage caused by
acid rain, the stucture of the programme was such that emissions were not directly
linked to critical loads under the Directive. All member states were (and still are)
required to reduce their emissions of sulphur dioxide (sox) by 60% by 2003 and nitrous
oxides (nox) by 30% by 1998, beginning from a 1980 baseline. The Economist noted
the Directive's ability to over-regulate - citing the example of Spain, which had to cut
emissions by the same amount as other countries - despite the fact that it produces little
sulphur which falls into neighbouring countries. 65 The recently signed UNECE protocol
is a partial improvement in that it sets individual national targets linked to the
contribution a country's sox emissions make to exceedances of critical loads. However,
as ENDS notes, the protocol will not bring sulphur deposition below critical loads
because this was considered to be too expensive; instead, a 60% 'gap closure' will be the
goal. 66 The UK's individual target is a 50% reduction in SO 2 emissions by 2000, 70%
by 2005 and 80% by 2010. A protocol on nox emissions is expected to follow.
However, in setting national reduction targets for acid pollutants, the protocol is still not
sufficiently focused. Just as the EC Directive tended to under or over-regulate between
nations, so the protocol may still under or over-regulate within the national targets.
By and large then, there is no concept in our system of air pollution control of tieing
emissions directly to ecological critical loads. This is true of AQSs because these are
designed to protect not ecosystems, but human health. There are two senses in which
the statement is true of acid rain policy. First, while policy on acid rain has aimed at
critical loads (ie. reducing acid deposition to non-damaging levels) in a general sense, it
has either failed to secure this aim or this aim is held as a longterm one and the interim
aim is something less than critical loads. The former (and possibly the latter) could be
said of the LCP Directive, the latter of the recently agreed UNECE protocol. Secondly,
not only has the aim of critical loads failed or is absent, but also neither of these policies
are structured in such a way that emissions are tied directly to critical loads. The
national targets set in the LCP Directive are quite unrelated to the effect of a country's
emissions on critical loads of acid deposition; the new UNECE protocol does link a
"Directive 92/72. The Directive has been implemented in the UK via SI 1994 No. 440. See 213
ENDS Report (1992) 34; 230 ENDS Report (1994) 38. A lack of ozone in the upper atmosphere is
thought to contribute to global warming and an increase in skin cancers; the presence of ozone at
ground level causes respiratory problems.
65 The Economist, 4 September 1993, p.18.
66 See 233 ENDS Report (1994) 41 at pp.41-42.
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country's targets to that country's impact on critical loads, but it still sets national
emission targets. For a programme to achieve critical loads, or certainly to achieve them
at a cost effective level, arguably requires plant emissions within countries to be tied to
critical loads.
If EC acid rain policy is not directly linked to critical loads, perhaps our UK policy does
so? The protocol, like the Directive, is likely to be implemented via the national plan°
and BATNEEC within IPC. 68 The national plan certainly does not tie emissions directly
to critical loads. A national plan which reflects even the new protocol targets would still
be a blunt instrument, leading to possible exceedances of critical loads at local level.
The Orimulsion controversy at National Power's power station in Pembroke provides a
good example. National Power admitted that burning the fuel would spread acid rain
over Wales, but argued that it was reducing emissions at other plants in Britain to meet
the overall reductions required by the national plan drawn up to meet the Large
Combustion Plant's Directive.69
With BATNEEC, there is potential for tieing plant emissions directly to critical load
levels, but it is safe to say that there has been little but confusion about the link between
emissions and critical loads. Again, BATNEEC has the potential to under-regulate or
over-regulate. It can under-regulate because all firms may be applying BATNEEC, but
critical loads could still be exceeded. BATNEEC is no guarantee of environmental
quality. However, the EPA 1990 does not simply require BATNEEC - section 7(2)(a)
requires that BATNEEC be used to 'render harmless' any substances which are released,
and the concept of harm could be linked with critical loads. This points towards how
BATNEEC can also over-regulate: imposing BATNEEC may not be necessary if there
is no harm being caused. While HMIP appear to be aware of these issues, they have
done little to clarify the uncertainty surrounding them. In 1993, the ENDS Report
reported an HMIF' consultation paper on BATNEEC and environmental harm, which
suggested that there might be an attempt to "provide a mechanism to relate long-range
environmental damage, such as acid deposition and low-level ozone formation, to
emission controls on the numerous point sources." 70 However, according to ENDS, this
idea was scrapped because HMI' felt it would be too difficult to disentangle the effects
of numerous distant point sources.71
67D0E, 'The United Kingdom's Programme and National Plan for Reducing Emissions of Sulphur
Dioxide and Oxides of Nitrogen from Existing Large Combustion Plants', December 1990.
68EPA 1990, s.7.
69 See chapter 5 for further details.
7°222 ENDS Report (1993) 16 at p.17.
71 231 ENDS Report (1994) 38 at p.39.
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As for public participation - with AQSs, lobbying by national interest groups almost
certainly occurs, 72
 but there are no official mechanisms of public consultation, let alone a
public discursive decision-making process. If AQSs are to continue to be set at an EC
level, an effort must be made to create consultation procedures. 73
 Ideally, AQSs should
be decided upon on the basis of consensus in a discursive forum, but this may be difficult
because of the difficulty of selecting from the large number of potential participants at
this level. On the other hand, one might argue that AQSs should not be set at the EC
level and that the principle of 'subsidiarity' should apply. Under this approach, those
elememts of AQSs which do not have transboundary effects would be decided upon at a
local level. If this was the case, a discursive model would be more feasible, because
selection would be less of a problem. However, while subsidiarity may be a viable
option for matters such as bathing and drinking water, with air quality it would run into
problems of competition within the internal market: local communities might choose
lower standards to protect their local industry or to attract others. However, it would
presumably be possible to decide at a local level whether a stricter standard was
desirable - imposing stricter standards than in Directives is, in limited circumstances,
allowed under Community law.74
There is likewise no public participation in deciding upon the ambient quality to be
aimed for in terms of acid rain. Because of the transboundary implications of acid rain,
local decision-making is inappropriate. Local communities might choose poor quality,
but the effects would be felt by others. However, having ambient quality decided upon
at a national or European level rather than a local level has implications for ex ante
accountability. If, as is the case, acid rain policy must be set at national and EC levels,
there should (on the democratic model) be scope for some public consultation on what
standard of environmental quality is appropriate and how quickly it is to be achieved. A
'rapid' critical loads approach may be thought appropriate by some but too stringent by
many.
72For a discussion of the participation (or rather lack of formalised consultation) of environmental
organisations at EC level, see Kramer, Focus on European Environmental Law, ch. 5 and pp.22-3; for a
practical example of interest group lobbying, see Porter & Butt Philip, 'The Role of Interest Groups in
EU Environmental Policy Formulation: A Case Study of the Draft Packaging Directive' (1993) 3(6)
European Env 16. There are also signs in recent Community policy that the EU is beginning to allow
environmental groups some say in policy appraisal, if not formulation - see eg. the 5th Environmental
Action Programme, 'Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action
in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development', OJ C138 17.5.1993, at pp.29 and 81;
Article 6 of Council Regulation 880/92 on a Community Eco-Label Award Scheme; and a Council
Meeting of 4th May 1993 on 'Industrial Competitiveness and Environmental Protection', Bull.EC 5-
1993, pp.98-100 at p.99.
73Macrory, 'Environmental Law: Shifting Discretions and the New Formalism' in Lomas (ed.),
Frontiers of Environmental Law, pp.20-21.
74See Arts. 130T, 100A(4) and 36 of the Treaty, and the 'Danish Bottles' case (Commission v Denmark
[1989] 54 CMLR 619). For details on these, see Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, pp.62-4.
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Regarding CBA, if the US example is anything to go by, it seems likely that AQSs are
set without reference to costs. In other words, they are 'cost-oblivious'. 75 To quote
Rodgers:
"This decision reflects the value judgment that, at least where some health hazards
are concerned, the public has a right to a minimum level of protection regardless of what
a cost-benefit analysis suggests."76
Empirical research is needed on the extent to which decisions on the ambient goals to
aim for in relation to acid rain have been subject to a technical CBA. The impression
one gets is that an 'intuitive' CBA may have been performed. 77
 With the recent UNECE
protocol on sulphur emissions for example, it was decided that reaching critical loads
within the timeframe set by the agreement would be too expensive.78
4.1.6 Water Quality
Section 82 WRA 1991 empowers the Secretary of State to establish a system of
classifying water quality. This is done by way of regulations. Three sets of regulations
which have been issued reflect the requirements of relevant EC Directives on water
quality - SI's 1989/1148, 1989/2286 and 1991/1597. Other classification regulations
will eventually incorporate a set of Use Classes, with appropriate standards for each
particular use. So far, regulations have been issued in respect of only one use class -
fisheries ecosystem - in the shape of the Surface Waters (River Ecosystem)
(Classification) Regulations 1994. 79 The regulations establish chemical standards for a
75 See Rodgers, note 29 ante, at pp.201-2. There are however signs that CBA may soon be applied to air
quality - one of the research projects reported in the DOE's Environmental Protection Group Research
Newsletter 1994-95 (April 1994) relates to the 'valuation of air quality effects' (B7, p.21).
76Rogers, op. cit., p.202.
77Kerry-Turner et al., note 1 ante, state that "The data to compare costs and benefits do exist, but no
rigorous exercise making the comparison has yet been done." (p.302). However, there are indications
that the EU is moving in the direction of considering the costs and benefits of their proposals - see eg.
the 5th Environmental Action Programme, note 72 ante, at pp.70-71, which states that "although the
value of many environmental assets is difficult to measure in monetary terms and, in the case of
particularly important or rare elements should not be priced in any event, valuations, pricing and
accounting mechanisms have a pivotal role to play in the achievement of sustainable development"
(p.70) and proceeds to advocate the "development of meaningful cost/benefit analysis methodologies
and guidelines in respect of policy measures and actions which impinge on the environment and the
natural resource stock." These thoughts are echoed in more recent Community policy documents such
as 'Industrial Competitiveness and the Protection of the Environment', the subject of a Commission
Communication, a Council Resolution and a Council Meeting - see Bull.EC 11-1992, p.35; OJ 1992,
C331/5; and Bull.EC 5-1993, pp.98-100 respectively. The Commission communication is reported in
and commented on by Barnes, 'Industrial Competitiveness and the Environment: The Need for EU
Policy Integration' (1993) 3(6) European Env 11.
78See text at note 66, ante.
79SI 1994 No. 1057; see further 231 ENDS Report (1994) 36.
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range of classes from FE6 (fish unlikely to be present) to FE1 (high class salmonid and
cyprinid). Future proposed Use Classes may include agricultural abstractions, industrial
abstractions, special ecosystem and watersports.
These regulations then form the basis of statutory water quality objectives (SWQ0s).8°
Under section 83 WRA 1991, the Secretary of State serves a legal notice on the NRA
specifying, for particular stretches of water:
a) one or more of the classifications prescribed under section 82;
b) the date by which compliance should be achieved.
SWQ0s based on two of the above three EC-based classification regulations
(1989/2286 and 1991/1597) have already been set. This was done under section 146 of
the Water Act 1989 in order to avoid the consultation requirements in section 105 (now
section 83 WRA 1991). 81 Following the procedures would have been pointless, as these
SWQ0s were required by EC law and consultation would only have delayed
implementation. SWQ0s for SI 1989 No.1148 are expected to follow soon. It should
also be noted that these initial SWQ0s were to be achieved when set; there was no
future date as in (b) above. As regards use classes, although the Surface Waters (River
Ecosystem) (Classification) Regulations 1994 were brought into force on 10 May 1994,
it will be some time before SWQ0s are actually set on the basis of these regulations.
Unlike with the four EC-based regulations above, target dates will of course be a key
feature of such use classes-based SWQ05. Thus, for example, a date might be set for
turning a river suitable for sustainable cyprinid fishery (FE4) into one suitable for a
sustainable salmonid fishery (FE2).
Do SWQ0s reflect the precautionary principle or critical loads? Beginning with the
dangerous substances element of SWQ0s, these reflect a precautionary approach,
although their form might suggest a critical loads approach. SWQ0s for dangerous
substances take the form of concentrations of the substances in ambient water which
must not be exceeded. This might suggest that the SWQO concentration is the critical
load level, below which damage to the environment will not occur. However, this is
manifestly not the case. SWQ0s represent an interim target. They do not represent a
safe level of such substances in water. One has to look not at the SWQO in isolation but
"See NRA, 'Proposals For Statutory Water Quality Objectives', December 1991; NRA,
'Recommendations For a Scheme of Water Quality Classification For Setting Statutory Water Quality
Objectives', October 1992; DOE, 'River Quality, The Government's Proposals: A Consultation Paper',
December 1992.
8I And see eg. reg. 4 of SI 1989 No. 2286.
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at the Dangerous Substances in Water Directive 76/464 as a whole to see that the policy
espouses a precautionary approach.
The dangerous substances element of SWQ0s, as with AQSs, must be met in all areas.
With the other, non-dangerous substances elements of SWQ0s, when they are
eventually implemented, there is some choice as to whether they will apply to a stretch
of water. What this means is that SWQ0s need not be set at a critical loads level. First,
of course, one has to decide what a critical load level is. Is it where there is no
significant damage to fish? 82 Why only fish? Or is it, as the RCEP states, "water quality
suitable for the survival of salmonid fish and other water biota." 83 The latter approach is
surely the more appropriate, because one would expect a critical loads standard to
support a much broader range of biological life than fish alone. Even if one decides it is
the level required to support high-class fisheries, the SWQO system does not require this
to be met in all areas. The quality standards for fisheries only need to be met if the river
has been designated as such, and not all rivers are designated. Thus, SWQ0s will not
necessarily be set at critical loads level - whatever this is decided to be. Some rivers will
already be achieving this level, but many will not.
What then of public participation? The EC standards components of statutory water
quality objectives (SWQ0s), as with AQSs, are set in Brussels and are not open to
public consultation. There will however be some consultation on the application of
many of these EC standards to local water courses and on the non-EC components of
SWQ0s. Under section 83(4)(a) WRA 1991, the Secretary of State must give notice
setting out his proposal and specifiy a period of not less than three months within which
representations and objections to the proposed SWQO can be made. Section 83(5)
specifies that this 'notice' must be publicised "in such manner as the Secretary of State
considers appropriate for bringing it to the attention of persons likely to be affected by
it," which allows him considerable discretion. However, the Secretary of State is able to
and has bypassed these consultation requirements in relation to dangerous substances.
Under section 84(3)(b), the Secretary of State must then consider any objections he
receives to the advertised proposal. In order to decide on the appropriate SWQO, the
Secretary of State can if he wishes hold a local inquiry under section 213(2)(a) WRA
1991. Having selected the SWQO, it must be placed on the register."
82See Ramchandani and Gourlay, note 1 ante; admittedly, they give this only as an example.
83The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 16th Report, 'Freshwater Quality', 1992,
para. 6.46.
84WRA 1991, s.190(1)(a).
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The point to make about the consultation procedures above is that they are sequential
rather than discursive: each individual or group puts forward its views to the NRA or
the Secretary of State - they do not sit around a table together for discussion. If the
Secretary of State chooses to hold a local inquiry there will more of a discursive forum,
but such a procedure is still a long way from truly discursive decision-making: while
they could conceivably take the form of deliberative roundtable discussions, the
Secretary of State will be the one who makes the final decision; in a deliberative system,
the group's decsision would be final. Thus, while the above arrangements are a marked
improvement on the previous system where water quality objectives were set on an
informal, non-statutory basis without any formal public consultation, one might argue
that the local nature of these decisions would make them suitable for trial runs in fully
discursive decision-making. If this was done, the danger of local communities
democratically deciding to downgrade could be avoided by including a requirement in
the legislation, similar to that placed upon the Secretary of State in section 83 WRA
1991, that SWQ0s can only be set to maintain or improve water quality." In other
words, the US approach of 'non-deterioration' would apply.
Finally, in relation to CBA, historically the authorities have not directly addressed the
costs of achieving the ambient standards set by them. 86 For the future, consultation
papers have stressed the need to balance costs with benefits in the setting of SWQ0s.87
The extent to which CVM will play a part in such CBAs is uncertain, 88 although the
NRA's recent R&D effort into economic valuation of environmental effects suggests its
use is not far away. 89 There appears to have been little NRA research into the
implications that CBA has for consultation procedures in relation to SWQ0s: if the
85Although it should be noted in passing that the current requirement on the Secretary of State to set
SWQ0s to maintain or improve water quality is rather vague. It is argued in Current Law Statutes
Annotated (1991(3) p.57/84) that the wording would not prevent the Secretary of State from
downgrading if this would improve or maintain water quality elsewhere. The NBA has emphasised that
it sees the purpose of the statutory regime as one of maintaining and improving water quality, although
it does not tackle the above issue - see the NRA paper, 'Recommendations For A Scheme Of Water
Quality Classification For Setting Statutory Water Quality Objectives', note 80 ante, para. 3.5.
86Note 83 ante, para. 8.13.
87See eg. paras. 3.18 and 4.7 of 'River Quality, The Government's Proposals: a Consultation Paper', op.
cit.; para. 7.14 of the first NRA consultation paper, 'Proposals For Statutory Water Quality Objectives',
op. cit.; and para. 26, p.6 of the DOE consultation paper entitled 'Draft Regulations: The Surface
Waters (Fisheries Ecosystem) (Classification) Regulations 1993 - Consultation Paper', 1993.
88Para. 7.14 of the first NRA consultation paper is interesting in that it states that the NRA will
consider - among other things - "the benefits, and can they in any way be quantified".
89See eg. NRA, 'Water: Nature's Precious Resource - An Environmentally Sustainable Water Resources
Strategy for England and Wales', March 1994, Appendix 4; see also the DOE's Environmental
Protection Group Research Newsletter 1994-95 (April 1994) which lists a research project on the
'development of a valuation manual for river quality' (B3, p.21). This is also mentioned in DOE,
'Environmental Appraisal in Government Departments', June 1994, p.27 where it is described as a
general assessment manual for assessing the benefits of improved river quality.
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CBA figures are to play a significant role, why bother with public consultation? Perhaps
contingent valuation questionnaires are to become the new way in which the public is
consulted. 9° The extent to which Brussels relies on CBA in devising water quality
standards is unknown. However, a comment by the RCEP in their 16th report on
freshwater quality that EC environmental Directives should be subject to some form of
CBA, suggests that they do not."
4.1.7 Conclusion
I have examined a number of 'ideal typical' ways of arriving at an ambient environmental
quality objective: a precautionary principle and a critical loads approach, setting them
via CBA, and setting them discursively. I then looked at how air quality standards, acid
rain objectives, and statutory water quality objectives are set in practice - examining the
extent to which they approximate these models.
As one would expect, the practice is very different to the models. AQSs are set to
protect human health - not to ensure that ecological critical loads are respected; there is
no official public consultation procedure, and the extent to which CBA is used is
unknown, but they are probably 'cost oblivious'. With the system for controlling acid
rain - critical loads may have been the goal of the LCP Directive, but the targets it set
were not sufficient to achieve them and the structure of the programme was unlikely to
achieve them in any event; with the new UNECE protocol the targets have been set to
achieve a level less than critical loads and the structure remains much the same as that in
the LCP Directive. Although our national system of control could arguably be
structured to achieve critical loads irrespective of the EC approach, there have been no
moves to bring this about. Public consultation on the ambient quality aimed at in acid
rain policy is non-existent at both national and EC levels. The extent to which CBA has
been used in deciding upon the ambient targets is unknown.
The dangerous substances element of SWQ0s reflects the precautionary principle. In
relation to other components, SWQ0s will not necessarily be set at a critical loads level.
Ambient quality standards are set in Brussels with no public consultation procedure.
There will be limited consultation on the application of many of these standards to local
water courses (though not in relation to dangerous substances). It could be argued that
the local nature of these decisions would make them particularly appropriate for pilot
"The NRA and the DOE appear to have little time for R&D which is not scientific or economic
(performed by mainstream environmental economists); if they spent some of their research budgets on
law and political science, they might become more aware of the key political ramifications of a world
organised on the basis of CBA.
91 Note 83 ante, para. 8.14.
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exercises in discursive decision-making. It seems likely that CBA will play a part and
contingent valuation methodology may also be employed. More research is needed on
the extent to which Brussels uses CBA in setting water quality standards.
4.2 EX POST ACCOUNTABILITY
There are a number of means of holding an agency to account for its ambient standard-
setting decisions on an ex post basis. One important, indirect, 92
 ex post accountability
mechanism where EC matters are involved, is the ability of the Commission to bring
Article 169 proceedings against a Member State. 93
 A breach of EC-based SWQ0s
might, for example, attract such proceedings. Direct, ex post accountability mechanisms
may also be available - for example the Ombudsmen or complaints procedures under the
Citizen's Charter initiative. These will be dealt with more fully in chapter 5. Another
direct, ex post accountability mechanism is an action for judicial review under Order 53
of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Judicial review is used to challenge the legality of
administrative action. It is a two stage process: an applicant must first seek leave to
bring an action, which he must do within the appropriate time limit and without
unnecessary delay; 94
 if leave is granted, the applicant may then proceed to a full hearing
of the merits. For conceptual purposes, the substantive hearing can be divided into three
separate parts: first, the applicant must jump the hurdle of locus standi and must
surmount other 'threshold' barriers such as O'Reilly v Macknian 95 and the alternative
remedies rule; 96
 secondly, he must be able to establish one of the grounds of review,97
and thirdly, he must persuade the court, in its discretion, to grant him a remedy.
Remedies which can be granted by a court include: the prerogative orders of certiorari
(quashes an unlawful decision), prohibitions (prohibits an unlawful action), mandamus
92Ie one which cannot be directly mobilised by third parties. However, it is often indirectly mobilised
by third parties since the Commission often takes Art. 169 action having been informed of a breach by
citizens from a Member State.
93Although this holds the agency to account indirectly through the Member State, since the
Commission cannot proceed directly against the agency itself.
94See Order 53, rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and s.31(6) Supreme Court Act 1981. Delay
was one of the reasons why the application brought by the RSPB failed in R v Swale BC', ex p. RSPB
[1991] JPL 39 (despite the fact that the applicants were just within the limitation period). However,
after the recent ECJ ruling in the Enunott case (case C-208/90 Enunott v Minister for Social Welfare
[1991] 3 CMLR 894) national limitation periods must not prevent one from enforcing one's directly
effective Community rights. In other words, where a directly effective Directive was at issue, the
approach taken in Swale would now be in breach of Community law.
95 [ 1982] 3 All ER 1124; ie. is the matter one of private or public law? Only if an issue of public law is
involved can the applicant proceed by way of judicial review.
96The rule which states that an applicant must normally have exhausted any other appropriate remedies
before bringing a review action; this rule will be discussed more fully in chapter 6.
97Eg. as set out by Lord Diplock in CCSU V Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (illegality,
irrationality and procedural irregularity). However, these are very fluid categories.
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(compels the performance of a duty); and the normal remedies of an injunction,
declaration or (in limited circumstances) damages. Like the Ombudsmen and the
Citizen's Charter, judicial review will be examined in detail in chapter 5. However, there
are special features relating to ambient standards which may arise in a review action,
which make it appropriate at least to touch on the subject in this chapter. The best
approach may be to read the section on standing in chapter 5 before reading what
follows, because the discussion below is written on the asumption that the locus hurdle
has been crossed.
4.2.1 Judicial Review and SWQ0s
If a company or an environmental group is unhappy with the SWQ0 which is eventually
set, it may be able to seek judicial review of the decision if it can point to one of the
normal grounds such as procedural impropriety (eg. a failure to consult in accordance
with the statutory requirements, or breach of natural justice) or illegality (eg. a failure to
incorporate relevant EC Directives). Perhaps more interesting, is the question of
whether an individual or an environmental group could bring a judicial review action for
breach of the duty in section 84 WRA 1991 if SWQOs have been breached."
Section 84(1) WRA 1991 (previously section 105 of the Water Act 1989) states that:
"It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State and of the Authority to exercise the
powers conferred on him or it by or under the water pollution provisions of this Act ...
in such manner as ensures, so far as it is practicable by the exercise of those powers to
do so, that the water quality objectives specified for any waters ... are achieved at all
times."
Section 84(2) continues:
"It shall be the duty of the Authority, for the purposes of the carrying out of its
functions under the water pollution provisions of this Act - (a) to monitor the extent of
pollution in controlled waters ..."
The question that must be asked is: why will the switch to putting SWQOs on a
statutory footing and imposing a legal duty to maintain SWQ0s, be important for
98Ba11 & Bell (p.381) state that "a judicial review action could conceivably be brought to ensure the
enforcement of the duty," Current Law Statutes Annotated (1991(3) p.57/85) suggest that review may be
possible but that a court may hold that a more suitable remedy exists under s.5 WRA 1991 which gives
the Secretary of State extensive powers to give directions to the authority (ie. that a review action would
fall foul of the 'alternative remedies' rule). I doubt whether they would take this approach (see the text
at n.56, p.120 post), but in any event, I would argue that review ought to be available if the Secretary of
State has declined to exercise these powers.
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judicial review purposes? The first matter which needs to be addressed is the nature of
statutory water quality objectives. As we saw in the previous section on ex ante
accountability, section 82 of the WRA 1991 empowers the Secretary of State to
establish a system of classifying water quality which is done by way of regulations.
Three sets of classification regulations which have been issued reflect the requirements
of relevant EC Directives on water quality. Other classification regulations will
eventually incorporate a set of Use Classes, with appropriate standards for each
particular use. So far, regulations have been issued in repect of only one use class -
fisheries ecosystem - in the shape of the Surface Waters (River Ecosystem)
(Classification) Regulations 1994.
These classification regulations then form the basis of SWQ0s. Under section 83 WRA
1991, the Secretary of State serves a legal notice on the NRA specifying, for particular
stretches of water:
a) one or more of the classifications prescribed under section 82;
b) the date by which compliance should be achieved.
The only SWQ0s that exist at present reflect the three EC-based classification
regulations. As regards use classes, although the Surface Waters (River Ecosystem)
(Classification) Regulations 1994 have recently been brought into force, it will be some
time before SWQ0s are actually set on the basis of these classification regulations.
How then does this differ from the old system? Under the previous system, rivers were
classified on a non-statutory basis from Class la to Class 4. Each class had an
associated range of standards (river quality standards or RQSs) for biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD), suspended solids, ammonia etc.. Informal water quality objectives, if
they existed, might have stated for example, that a stretch of river currently Class 3
should attain Class 2 status by a given year. Because of their non-statutory form, these
arrangements were not susceptible to public enforcement. In other words, one could
not have gone to court to complain that a river had not achieved its water quality
objective by the given date; nor, for example, could one claim that a designated Class 1
river did not meet the standards associated with Class 1: a non-statutory target would be
unenforceable; and the fact that a river was no longer Class 1 would simply indicate that
it needed reclassifying as Class 2. The Cutts99 case may suggest that to succeed in
challenging the exercise of an authority's powers, one would have to demonstrate not
simply that the river conditions were unsatisfactory, but that no reasonable authority
99 (1990) 4 Env Law 8; 4(2) L1VIELR (1990) 132; full trancript on Lexis.
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could have permitted their conditioni oo This is arguably an impossible task, because
very poor conditions are tolerated in many areas.
In the future however (and indeed at present, bearing in mind that SWQ0s have already
been set in relation to, for example, dangerous substances'° 1 ), stretches of water will
have SWQ0s attached to them, consisting of: a use-related class with associated
standards (whether national or EC-based), levels of dangerous substances which must
not be exceeded and a date by which these must be achieved. Again, it should be
recalled that the dangerous substances part of a SWQ0 will have no date, as the levels
are to be achieved immediately. By themselves (leaving aside for the moment the
question of the enforcement of EC-based provisions), these arrangements would be no
more enforceable than the previous system: if SWQ0s were being breached, the courts
would probably be inclined to see this as part of the NRA's discretion - a discretion to
allow the breach of SWQ0s.
It is here that the duty under section 84 WRA 1991 is important, because by spelling out
a legislative duty that SWQ0s are to be achieved at all times, the assumption must be
that this discretion has been narrowed, if not removed. However, if SWQ0s are
breached, there will still not necessarily be a breach of duty. It will be recalled that the
duty is to ensure that SWQ0s are achieved at all times, 'so far as it is practicable'. If
SWQ0s are breached, this may be due to misguided consent setting or poor
enforcement, or it may be due to factors beyond the NRA's control (eg. a series of freak
accidents). If the breach of the SWQ0s is the NRA's fault, then an action for breach of
the duty in section 84 should lie because the NRA have clearly not done as much as is
practicable. On the other hand, the breach of SWQ0s may not be the NRA's fault: if
there are a number of freak, one-off discharges which lead to a breach of an SWQO at
the end of the year, and the NRA has set consents to leave a large enough 'buffer-zone'
to deal with reasonably foreseeable accidents, then they may have done as much as is
'practicable' within section 84; even prosecuting every breach of consent may not have
prevented the breach of the SWQO. If the NRA are at fault, a court could grant an
order of mandamus, requiring the NRA either to tighten-up the consents to ensure the
SWQO was achieved, or to step up enforcement.
The other crucial point to bear in mind is the time-frame within which compliance with
SWQ0s is to be assessed. It will not simply be a matter of environmental groups being
able to declare a breach on the basis of one sample. In relation to the existing SWQ0s
looSee 4(2) LMELR (1990) 132.
lo1 f3ased on SI 1989 No. 2286.
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based on the EC Dangerous Substances in Water Directive 76/464, one has to look to
Annex I, Directive 86/280 - heading B of which is on "Quality objectives, dates for
compliance therewith and procedure for monitoring compliance with them." Paragraph
3 of heading B states that "Unless otherwise specified under heading B in annex II, all
the concentrations mentioned as quality objectives refer to the arithmetic mean of the
results obtained over a year. " 1 °2 In relation to future SWQ0s, as and when the scheme
comes fully into operation, the NRA consultation paper comments on the duty in section
106 (now section 84 WRA 1991) that it "need(s) to be read together and considered
against the background of sampling and statistical techniques which are the only
practical means of assessing compliance." 1 °3 The consultation paper which accompanied
the draft Surface Water (Fisheries Ecosystem) (Classification) Regulations 1993
similarly notes that:
"The Water Resources Act 1991 requires the NRA, and the relevant Secretary of
State, to use available pollution control powers to ensure, as far as is thereby
practicable, that WQ0s, once set for the purpose of maintaining and improving the
quality of specific river stretches, are achieved there by the date specified in the Notice
setting the WQO. It is therefore important, in establishing a classification and related
assessment procedures, to ensure that WQ0s can be set realistically, such that they are
achievable and that there are clear-cut rules on compliance assessment. II 104
Regulation 3 of the final Surface Waters (River Ecosystem) (Classification) Regulations
1994 states that compliance is to be determined in accordance with the procedures and
methods set out in the NRA document entitled 'Water Quality Objectives: Procedures
Used by the NRA for the Purpose of the Surface Waters (River Ecosystem)
(Classification) Regulations 1994'. 105
 The consultation paper which preceded the 1994
Regulations states that
"Sampling procedures will follow the NRA's laid-down procedures. All sites will be
sampled at a minimum frequency of 12 times per year ... Compliance is to be assessed
only on the basis of full calendar year sets of data. The minimum period for compliance
102Emphasis added.
10314RA , 'Proposals for Statutory Water Quality Objectives', note 80 ante, para. 3.10 at p.13.
104DOE consultation paper on the draft surface waters regulations, note 87 ante, para. 14 at p.3.
105 Annex B of the draft Surface Water (Fisheries Ecosystem) (Classification) Regulations 1993
consultation paper, contains a draft of this NRA document. The final version is available from the
NRA's regional offices. As the consultation paper states, "The manual addresses questions such as
sampling frequency and location, data handling etc. A principal goal is to ensure that the system for
assessing compliance with WQ0s is open and consistent, from one area to another, and over time"
(p.4). The statistical basis for assessing compliance with SWQ0s was previously discussed in
Appendix 4 of the 1992 NRA consultation paper and mentioned in a note at p.27 of the 1992
Government consultation paper - note 80 ante.
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assessment would be one full calendar year, so the first assesment of compliance would
normally be made one year after the WQ0s target date."1°6
Thus, it is clear that environmental groups will only be able to rely on long-term
sampling data. Although obvious, it is also worth mentioning that they will only be able
to rely on official NRA sampling data as recorded on the register. Regulation 3 arguably
precludes them from relying on their own data, as they are able to do with private
prosecutions brought against firms for breaching their discharge consents.
4.2.1.1 Breach of Duty and Community Law
As we have seen, the first round of SWQ0s were designed to implement the EC
Dangerous Substances in Water Directive 76/464. The question is whether the duty in
section 84 WRA 1991, which forms the substance of our national right to waters free of
excessive concentrations of dangerous substances, is sufficiently onerous fully to reflect
any Community right to such unpolluted waters enforceable in national courts. m7 This
question can only be addressed by examining Schiemann J.'s recent decision in R v
Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p. Friends of the Earth. I " While the
decision specifically relates to drinking water rather than pollution, which is what we are
concerned with, it has important ramifications for future pollution-related actions
concerning breach of duty.
Andrew Lees and FOE sought judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to use
his powers under section 19(1)(b) Water Industry Act 1991 to allow Thames Water
Utilities Ltd. and Anglian Water Services Ltd. to supply drinking water with pesticide
levels above the maximum admissible concentrations (MACs) in the Drinking Water
Directive 80/778. Under section 18 WIA 1991, the Secretary of State is under a duty to
issue an enforcement order if conditions have been breached, unless he accepts an
undertaking from the company that they will take the necessary steps to secure
compliance. The Secretary of State accepted such an undertaking from Thames Water
1 ° 6Drall Surface Water (Fisheries Ecosystem) (Classification) Regulations 1993 consultation paper, p.4.
1 °70f course, this assumes first that standing would be granted under our domestic law. On the basis of
Twyford Down or the Greenpeace case decided by Otton J., standing probably would be granted to an
individual or a group with a local connection with the watercourse (see ch.5, p.123 et seq.). Secondly,
it assumes that there is a Community right to such unpolluted waters enforceable in national courts (as
opposed to a Community right enforceable only by the Commission in Art. 169 proceedings). In other
words, it assumes that Community law requires there to be access to national courts to enforce the
Dangerous Substances Directive. As we shall see in ch. 5 (at p.129 et seq.), this is probably not the
case. Given that Community law would appear not to require procedural access to the courts to enforce
the Directive, it may seem pointless to discuss the substance of the right. Nevertheless, I include the
discussion because if as I believe will happen, 'citizen actions' are encouraged as a means of enforcing
all Directives, the nature of the substantive right will become relevant in the future.
108(1994) 5,3,) Water Law 79, case & comment.
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and Anglian Water on 4th October 1991 and hence allowed them to continue to supply
water in breach of EC standards. It was this decision to accept the undertaking which
was challenged by the applicants.
If the water companies were in breach of the standards, and the Secretary of State had
not accepted an undertaking, and had failed to serve an enforcement order, then FOE
would have been able to base their action on breach of the duty in section 18. If on the
other hand the water companies are in breach of the standards on drinking water quality
but the Secretary of State has served an enforcement order or, as here, has accepted an
undertaking, there will be no breach of duty in national law. However, the question
arises whether one's directly effective Community right to wholesome drinking water
requires the substantive ability to bring an action in these circumstances? 109 There are
ECJ cases which have ruled that directly effective Community rights must be effectively
protected."° Most of these cases have related to procedural and remedial rights but it is
arguably even more important that the lack of a substantive right in national law should
not prevent one from protecting one's Community rights. Does the lack of a duty to
maintain standards where an enforcement order has been served or an undertaking
accepted effectively deny one from upholding one's Community rights via an action for
breach of duty?
The answer to the above question depends on whether the directly effective right to
wholesome drinking water enforceable by individuals in national courts is coterminous
with the right to wholesome drinking water protected by the ECJ in Article 169
proceedings brought by the Commission against Member States. What then has the ECJ
decided is the nature of the duty on Member States when implementing directives? In
case C-337/89 Commission v UK, the ECJ decided that the obligation to comply with
MACs in the Drinking Water Directive 80/778 is strict - excuses other than those
provided by the Directive are not permitted. The ECJ declared that a Member State
would be in breach of Community law where MACs had been exceeded, despite the
Member State's claim that it had taken all practicable steps to secure compliance; non-
compliance with MACs would only pass without censure if it came within one of the
109Again, this question assumes both that standing would be granted as a matter of domestic law (which
of course, on the basis of the FOE decision itself, it would be) and that there is a Community right to
enforce the Drinking Water Directive in national courts. As we shall see in chapter 5, p.129 et seq.,
since the Directive is intended to protect human health, there is such a right. Thus, unlike with the
Dangerous Substances Directive, the substance of the right is of current rather than possible future
interest.
loSee cases - C-45/76 Comet B1/ v Produktschap voor ,S'iegenvassen [1976] ECR 2043, C-213/89 R v
Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortaine (1990) ECR 2433, and cases C-6/90 and C-9/90
Francovich v Italian Republic [1992] IRLR 84.
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derogations laid down in the Directive itself. 111
 A similar decision was reached in case
C-56/90 Commission v UK, where it was held that the obligation in Article 4(1) of the
Bathing Water Directive 76/160 was unconditional in nature. 112 If the directly effective
right to wholesome drinking water enforceable by individuals in national courts is
coterminous with this strict right to wholesome drinking water protected by the ECJ in
Article 169 proceedings, then an action for breach of duty should arguably be available
in our national courts even where an enforcement order has been served or an
undertaking accepted by the Secretary of State. If the two rights are not the same, then
no such requirement exists.
In the FOE case, Schiemann J. was seemingly of the opinion that the two rights were
not the same. However, this conclusion was almost inevitable given the argument used
in the applicants' challenge and the accompanying relief they were seeking. The
applicants were arguing that the Secretary of State had erred in law in accepting
undertakings with the aim of securing compliance as soon as practicable rather than as
soon as possible. The remedies sought by the applicants included, inter alia, certiorari
to quash the Secretary of State's decision to accept the undertakings and not to make
any enforcement orders, and mandamus either to compel the Secretary of State to
reconsider the making of enforcement orders or to compel the acceptance of stricter
undertakings from the water companies.
Schiemann J agreed that the duty on the Secretary of State was to achieve compliance
as soon as possible rather than as soon as practicable, but felt that all that was possible
was being done. However, as Water Law has commented, it really looks as though the
Secretary of State was requiring only what was reasonaby practicable, because it would,
in theory have been 'possible' to meet the standards much sooner if considerable
Government funds had been put in. 113 But even if Schiemann J. had agreed with the
applicants that the Secretary of State had erred in law, the question of relief would have
been a difficult one. An order of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to
reconsider making an enforcement order would have been rather pointless: even if he did
serve an enforcement order, this in itself would not have secured compliance on the part
of the water companies An order of mandamus requiring stricter undertakings so that
compliance was truly achieved as soon as possible would, on the other hand, have
required the Government to commit large sums of money If such an order was to be
made, it should arguably have been made by the ECJ Better still, would have been for
the Commission itself to accept undertakings from the UK Government under Article 20
II ! Reported in (1993)JEL 5(2) 273 see further case and comment (1993) 4 Water Law 59 and 61
I I2Reported in (1993) 4 Baler Law 168
I ' ,Note 108 ante, at pp 80-81
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of the Drinking Water Directive, ignoring the fact that the UK was outside the period
within which a request under Article 20 must be submitted. Under Article 20, a Member
State can, in exceptional cases and for geographically defined population groups, submit
a request to the Commission for an extension of the Directive's deadline for compliance.
This request has to propose an action programme with an appropriate timetable for the
improvement of water quality. From the point of view of enforcement of Community
law, it would certainly have made more sense for the Commission to use Article 20 to
keep continuous pressure on the water companies indirectly via the UK Government,
than to gain a one-off Article 169 success and leave the Government free to apply what
it perceives as the correct pressure on the companies.
I stated earlier that Schiemann J. was of the opinion that the right protected by the ECJ
in Article 169 proceedings and the directly effective right enforceable by individuals in
their national courts were not the same but that this conclusion was almost inevitable
given the argument used in the applicants' challenge and the accompanying relief they
were seeking. It would arguably have been more fruitful for the applicants to argue that
the right they enjoyed was a strict one - ie. that the Seccetavy of State Wadi a ci\Ity
achieve compliance tout court, not as soon as possible or as soon as practicable. And
then they might have sought a declaration to the effect that the Secretary of State was in
breach of his Community obligations. In other words, assuming the Community right
enforceable in national courts is of the same order as the right protected in Article 169
proceedings (ie. strict), it ought to be possible for a person to secure a declaration that
the Secretary of State has acted unlawfully. Of course, this approach is not without
problems of its own. First, while the declaratory nature of the relief avoids the problem
of the courts ordering politically controversial action, it would have to be made clear
that the issuing of a declaration here is just that - there should be no expectation that the
government will take immediate action in response, otherwise there would be little
difference between the effect of a declaration and mandamus. Second, the problem
remains of when such declarations should be available? Should they, for example, be
available when the Commission has already instigated or succeeded in Article 169
proceedings? This was raised, but not fully addressed in the FOE case: it was not that
Article 169 proceedings had already culminated in a successful judgment against the UK
in case C-337/89, because that case related to the Drinking Water Directive parameters
on nitrates and lead, rather than the subject of the FOE case - pesticides; however, the
UK currently faces Article 169 proceedings in relation to the standards on pesticides.
There is obviously a need to avoid unnecessary duplication. And should declarations be
available whenever there is a breach of standards? If they were, a long-term breach such
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as in the FOE case itself, could attract a judicial review a day. There would therefore be
arguments for allowing perhaps only one such action.
We return now to the question of whether the duty in section 84 WRA 1991, which
forms the substance of our national right to waters free of excessive concentrations of
dangerous substances, is sufficiently onerous fully to reflect the Community right to such
unpolluted waters enforceable in national courts (assuming that, at some stage in the
future, Community law requires the Directive to be enforceable in national courts). It
will be recalled that the duty is to ensure that SWQ0s are achieved at all times, 'so far as
it is practicable'. If SWQ0s relating to dangerous substances are breached, this may be
due to misguided consent setting or poor enforcement, or it may be due to factors
beyond the NRA's control (eg. a series of freak accidents). If the breach of the SWQ0s
is the NRA's fault, then an action for breach of the duty in section 84 would lie because
the NRA have clearly not done as much as is practicable. If on the other hand, breach of
the SWQO is not the NRA's fault (the freak accidents example), section 84 will not have
been breached because the NRA will have done all that is practicable. However, if the
Community right enforceable by individuals in their national courts is the same as the
right protected by the ECJ in Article 169 proceedings, it can be argued that the lack of a
substantive right to bring an action for breach of duty where the NRA are not at fault is
in breach of Community law because it prevents one from effectively enforcing one's
directly effective right. Again, according to C-337/89 Commission v UK the Article 169
right is a strict one and hence the duty to maintain EC-based SWQ0s is a strict one. On
this basis, one can argue that the duty in section 84 ought to interpreted as a strict one,
leaving out the words 'so far as it is practicable'.
4.2.2 Judicial Review, AQSs and Acid Rain Policy
Beginning briefly with acid rain, if the national plan 114 was not being fulfilled, judicial
review might lie against	 for breach of the duty in section 7 EPA 1990 to comply
with any requirements set out in a national plan made by the Secretary of State. If
critical loads were being breached and these exceedances could be traced back to
emissions from an IPC process (such as a power station), it may be that judicial review
would lie for breach of the section 7 duty to apply BATNEEC to render substances
harmless. The latter possibility will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter on
accountability for emission/process standard-setting.
114Note 67 ante.
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As, mutatis mutandis, with SWQ0s, a review action could conceivably be brought
against the Secretary of State" 5 for breach of the duty to maintain ground level air
quality standards (AQS5). 116 Statutory Instrument 1989 No. 317, which was introduced
by the Secretary of State under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972,
imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that levels of sulphur dioxide,
suspended particulates, nitrogen dioxide and lead do not rise above EC limits.
Regulation 2(1) for example, states that "The Secretary of State shall take any
appropriate measures to ensure that the concentrations of sulphur dioxide and
suspended particulates in the atmosphere do not exceed the limit values given in Annex I
to Council Directive No. 80/779/EEC on air quality limit values and guide values for
sulphur dioxide and suspended particulates." Regulations 4 and 6 speak in a similar vein
about lead and nitrogen dioxide respectively. AQSs now also exist in respect of ground
level ozone," 7 but these are guide values rather than mandatory limits, so there can be
no question of breach of duty for failure to meet them."8
One significant difference from SWQ0s is the nature of the duty. The duty here is
strict; it is not qualified by any words such as 'so far as it is practicable." 9 However, the
basis for assessing compliance is similarly annual. In relation to lead in air for example,
the AQS will be breached if the mean annual concentration exceeds 2 micrograms of
lead per cubic metre. 120 With sulphur dioxide and suspended particulates, 121 and
nitrogen dioxide, 122 the reference period for assessing compliance with the limit values is
also a year.
115 Unlike SWQ0s where the Secretary of State shares the duty with the NRA, the duty is on the
Secretary of State alone here.
DOE, 'Improving Air Quality', 1994, paras. 3.10-3.12, which does not comment on whether and
how AQSs do currently have legal force, but comments on the legal force they ought to have.
117Directive 92/72, implemented in the UK via SI 1994 No. 440.
1!SENDS suggets that the reason for this is that existing international guidelines are breached too often
accross the Community and there is no real hope of reducing concentrations until the end of the century
(213 ENDS Report (1992) 34). However, it should be noted that the regulations do include a duty to
issue public warnings when ozone levels exceed health protection thresholds. If such thresholds were
exceeded and no warning given, a declaration for breach of duty should arguably be available.
119And hence there is no need to consider the EC arguments which were made in relation to SWQ0s.
120Reg. 4 of SI 1989 No.317 and Art. 2(2) of Directive 82/884.
121 Reg. 2 of SI 1989 No.317 and Annex I of Directive 80/779.
122Reg
. 6 of SI 1989 No.317 and Annex I of Directive 85/203.
CHAPTER 5
The Accountability of Environmental Agencies
III Accountability for setting Emission/Process Standards
and Other Operational Duties
Having examined accountability for the setting of ambient standards in the previous
chapter, this chapter will be concerned with accountability for agency decisions on
emission and process standards and other operational duties. It will be recalled that
emission standards prescribe 'end of pipe' limits which must not be exceeded, while
process standards lay down the type of technology, factory lay-out, manning
requirements, chimney heights etc.. 'Operational duties' is a residual category to cover
regulatory activities/duties which cannot be classed as standard-setting as such. The
duty of local authorities to inspect their area for contaminated land under section 61
EPA 1990 would be one example.' This is not a standard-setting decision, but it is an
operational decision for which one might wish to hold the local authority to account.
5.1 EX ANTE ACCOUNTABILITY
The previous chapter on accountability for the setting of ambient standards began by
discussing various decision-making models such as cost-benefit analysis, the
precautionary principle, critical loads and discursive decision-making. A similar analysis
can be applied to the setting of emission/process standards (hereafter 'emission
standards'). While I will begin by doing this briefly, it is important to bear in mind that
this only makes sense if emission standards are not tied to ambient quality objectives,
which is an increasingly rare occurrence, at least in the UK. If emission standards are
tied to ambient objectives then the crucial decisions are taken at the ambient level and
the emission standards are to an extent pre-determined by the ambient target. With this
arrangement, it obviously does not make sense to discuss different decision-making
models for decisions on emission standards: there is little scope for arguing about the
'right' decision-making approach - the only 'right' one is to set the standards so as to
achieve the ambient target.
'Although this section is not actually in force, and indeed now seems likely to be replaced by detailed
provisions on contaminated land in the Environment Bill.
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Bearing the above in mind, there are three possible approaches to setting emission
standards. First, one can decide on the appropriate standard using cost-benefit analysis
(CBA). 2 Second, one can set a standard which reflects the best available technology
(BAT). This would reflect the precautionary principle, because in applying the best
available technology, one is keeping emissions as low as is technically possible. Finally,
a standard can be set discursively or via a process of negotiation. Again, all of these are
ideal-types which have differing implications for accountability.
I merely point out the above as an interesting comparison with the setting of ambient
standards. From here on however, this chapter will take on a very different form to the
chapter on ambient standards. One could proceed to examine how, for example the
NRA, HNIIP and others actually set their emission standards in practice, and whether
they apply BAT, CBA or elements of a discursive model. However, as I mentioned
above, with the NRA for example, their standard-setting decisions are to an extent pre-
determined by the ambient objective. It therefore does not make sense to consider the
use of CBA in setting emission standards. 3 The remainder of this section on ex ante
accountability will therefore be concerned with the ways in which agencies are actually
held to account for their standard-setting decisions - ie. advertising and consultation
rights. I will not, as in the previous chapter, be examining these obliquely through
consideration of the way agencies actually reach their decisions on standards.
5.1.1 Consultation
Agencies may consult interested parties before setting emission or process standards.
This is an example of ex ante accountability in that agencies listen to representations
from such parties. For example, both the NRA and HMIP necessarily consult with
companies before drawing up consents as part of the application process. However, it
should be noted that they do not go out to find the companies - they merely wait for
applications to come in. This is one good reason why thousands of firms have failed to
apply for local authority APC authorisations. 4 Furthermore, where once consents would
have been negotiated with give-and-take on both sides and free technical advice from
inspectors, the new emphasis was supposed to be on a much more detached, formal
relationship. Under the LPC regime for example, HMIP stated that it would be adopting
2 See eg. Pearce and Brisson, BATNEEC: The Economics of Technology-based Environmental
Standards, With a UK Case Illustration' (1993) 9(4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24.
3 Such an analysis might make more sense in relation to HMIP - one could plausibly discuss the extent
to which they use BAT (the precautionary approach) as opposed to CBA (NEEC could be interpreted as
requiring CBA in the technical sense used by economists) and whether they might adopt a discursive
approach. However, even there one is confronted with the relationship of BATNEEC with critical loads
which belongs in the chapter on ambient standards.
4See eg. 209 ENDS Report (1992) 7.
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a much less 'cosy' approach - relying heavily on guidance notes and less on individual
'negotiation' of authorisations. 5 It was developments such as this which led Macrory to
see a trend in environmental regulation away from unstated assumptions, non-statutory
controls and informal relationships towards "a new era of legal formalism." 6 However,
it seems that HMIP has now abandoned this initial "arms' length" approach and the old
style of close partnership with industry has been reintroduced.7
While firms are necessarily consulted as part of the application process, environmental
interests are not consulted as such (which is perhaps not surprising, given the number of
consents dealt with nationwide). Instead, most agencies are required to advertise
applications and take into account replies, which is the next best thing to direct
consultation. Schedule 1 of the EPA 1990 and associated regulations 8 state that the
enforcing authorities 9 must advertise applications for authorisations. Furthermore,
under Schedule 1, paragraph 2(5) EPA 1990, they must then consider any
representations made in response within the period allowed. Of course, without
anything resembling the US 'hard look' doctrine, such a provision lacks teeth, because
the agency will not be required to show how their conclusion has taken objections into
account. m In relation to EPA Part I control, arguably more important than the
consultation requirements associated with individual applications is the issue of
consultation in the drawing-up of the Chief Inspector's guidance notes and the separate
APC guidance notes. After all, these guidance notes are crucial to the setting of
individual authorisations. It is therefore somewhat surprising to find that there are no
formal consultation procedures of any kind attached to them. In addition, the number of
guidance notes is obviously less than the number of individual applications; while
environmental groups will probably lack the resources to become involved in the setting
of thousands of individual authorisations, they are more likely to have the resources to
provide input into the relatively smaller number of guidance notes."
5 See National Audit Office report, 'Control and Monitoring of Pollution: Review of the Pollution
Inspectorate', July 1991; see also The Times, 31 July 1990 which reported complaints by the chemical
industry about their lack of involvement in the drafting of the new IPC guidance notes - cited by
Gibson, 'The Integration of Pollution Control (1991) 18(1) Jo of Law & Soc 18 at p.28.
6Macrory, 'Environmental Law: Shifting Discretions and the New Formalsim' in Lomas (ed.), Frontiers
Of Environmental Law, 8 at p.16.
7See 223 ENDS Report (1993) 9, and 224 ENDS Report (1993) 7.
8The Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and Registers) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991 No.
507).
9HMIP or local authorities.
100n the 'hard look' doctrine, see Harden and Lewis, The Noble Lie, pp.272-8.
"On a similar issue in a US context, see Yeager, The Limits ofLaw, pp.200-202. Yeager states that US
environmental groups have typically been able to participate (albeit infrequently) at the Federal level in
water pollution control 'rulemaking' proceedings (ie. setting the regulations), but have been constrained
by resources from participating in 'adjudicatory' proceedings (court-like challenges to individual
discharge permits) and other permit modification processes.
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Advertising and consultation requirements also apply to applications made to the NRA,
although the application does not need to be advertised if the NRA considers that the
discharger in question will have 'no appreciable effect' on the waters into which the
discharge will be made.° This obviously affords them considerable discretion, but it is
not absolute, because the courts would almost certainly intervene by way of judicial
review if a decision was perverse. The NRA must then consider any written
representations made to it within 6 weeks of advertising. Applications for trade effluent
consents do not need to be publicised. This is probably because sewers are viewed as
private property rather than the public 'environment'. Nevertheless, secrecy is
unnecessary and can only encourage public suspicion. There are no advertising
requirements for waste management licence applications. All that is required is that
licence applications are referred to the NRA and the Health and Safety Executive, and
that application details are included on the register.° However, it should be borne in
mind that public consultation for waste disposal is carried out at the planning stage.
5.2 EX POST ACCOUNTABILITY
While this chapter will be concerned largely with agency accountability for the setting of
emission/process standards, this section on ex post accountability will begin by looking
at the Ombudsmen and the Citizen's Charter initiative - both of which may also act as
accountability mechanisms for the setting of ambient standards (examined in the
previous chapter) and enforcement decisions (examined in chapter 6) .
5.2.1 Ombudsmen14
Both the NRA in respect of non-flood defence matters 15 and HMIP as part of the DOE
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.
12 See WRA 1991, sch. 10, para. 1(4). The phrase is defined in DOE Circular 17/84; while circulars are
not binding on the courts, they will, unless a court provides an alteniative definition, guide agencies in
the exercise of their discretion. It has been suggested that up to 90% of applications may, relying on
this provision, have escaped advertising, which obviously reduces the potential for public involvement
in standard-setting (see Howarth, 'Water Pollution: Improving the Legal Controls' (1989) 1 JEL 33-5
and Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, p.22). NB. that the NRA's advertising and consultation
requirements look set to be changed under the Environment Bill.
13 s.36 EPA 1990; see also the Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No. 1056) and
the accompanying DOE circular 11/94.
14See further Thompson, Textbook on Constitutional and Administrative Law, pp.327-339, and Lewis
& Birkinshaw, When Citizens Complain.
I5The Water Act 1989, sch. 1, para.11. Paras. 11 and 12 of this schedule would appear still to be in
force - there are no similar provisions in the WRA or WIA 1991.
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Local authorities 16
 and the NRA in respect of flood defence and land drainage matters,"
may be investigated by the Local Commissioner for Administration. Water and
Sewerage companies, in relation to trade effluent consents, are not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commissioners. Complaints by members of the public in respect of
these functions go instead to the Customer Service Committees set up by the Director
General of Water Services (OFWAT).
The Commissioners only have the power to deal with a problem if a person has suffered
injustice as a result of maladministration; they do not have the power to tackle matters
raising issues of legality which are more suited to judicial review. Their remit is thus to
discover whether the particular body has acted according to reasonable standards of
administrative behaviour, not whether a body has acted unlawfully. Nevertheless, the
line between the two is often a thin one and perusal of, for example, the Local
Commissioners' annual reports provides evidence of this: one report, for example,
reveals that the Commissioner dealt with a complaint about a failure to enforce planning
conditions on an owner of a quarry and to collect sufficient evidence for a successful
enforcement action," this could easily have been classed as unlawful behaviour to be
dealt with via judicial review.
Apart from the fact that they are still not very well known among members of the public,
most commentators would accept that the Commissioners provide a valuable, easily
accessible avenue for redressing grievances about routine errors of administration.°
Given the way they have been used in planning matters, they could be of considerable
significance in relation to pollution where other avenues of redress are unavailable or
expensive. Thus, Thompson reports that:
"Some rejected complaints will concern the merits of a decision. In planning, for
example, it is recognised that a large number of complaints about planning permission
are made by neighbours who do not think that consent should have been given. The
planning appeals system does not provide for appeal against the grant of permission, or
for appeal by such third parties, and so a complaint to the (Local Commissioner) is a
surrogate appeal. Yet there may well have been some maladministration in the
processing of the planning decision. The (Local Commissioners) have repeatedly held
that a failure to consult neighbours about planning applications, even where this is not
required by legislation, amounts to maladministration and that injustice is the sense of
grievance at the loss of opportunity to give one's view."20
161n respect of both air pollution functions and waste regulation functions.
"The Water Act 1989, sch. 1, para. 12.
18Local Commissioners' annual report 1991-2, 891B/1560, cited in Thompson, note 14 ante, at p.332.
19 See further Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, p.30.
200p. cit., p.336.
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As we shall see, much the same is true of appeals from pollution control decisions.
There would thus appear to be no reason why - assuming maladministration can be
established - the Commisioners should not provide a similar surrogate appeals process
from these decisions.
5.2.2 The Citizen's Charter21
The Citizen's Charter is a ten year Government programme the aim of which is to raise
the standard of public services and make them more responsive to the 'consumers' of
those services. 22 Different, individual charters exist in each public service area, but
broadly speaking, they all seek to set out the standards of service the public can expect
and to provide effective complaints mechanisms and redress if these standards are not
met. Various charter documents relating to the environment were issued in the period
1991-93. The DOE for example published a citizen's charter guide to the environment
entitled 'Green Rights and Responsibilities' in 1991. 23 In 1993, the Central and Local
Government Forum issued a model local environment charter 24 and a charter guide to
development control was published by the National Planning Forum of the DOE.25
However this material is far from well known, even amongst environmental lawyers.
One reason for this may be that these initial charter documents do little more than point
citizens towards existing legislative rights. They do not, as for example with the
Patient's Charter, set out standards unique to the charter and provide avenues of redress
if these standards are not met. One could say that this is to be expected, given that the
relationship between citizens and environmental authorities is typically not the direct
consumerist one which prevails in many other charter areas such as the Patient's Charter
or the Passenger's Charter. There is of course a direct consumer relationship in relation
to drinking water, but a charter there would arguably only duplicate the existing lines of
accountability. 26 However, despite this general absence of a corporate-consumer nexus,
both HMIP and the NRA have recently published charters which do set out distinct
21 5ee further Barron & Scott, 'The Citizen's Charter Programme' (1992) 55 MLR 526, and Drewry,
'Mr Major's Charter: Empowering the Customer' [1993] Public Law 248.
22 5ee 'The Citizen's Charter', Cm 1599, 1991, and 'The Citizen's Charter Second Report: 1994', Cm
2540, 1994.
23D0E, 'Green Rights and Responsibilities: A Citizen's Guide to the Environment', 1991.
24D0E, 'Your Council and the Environment: The Model Local Environment Charter', 1993.
25D0E, 'A Charter Guide - Development Control', 1993.
26Under s.6 Water Act 1989, the Director General of Water Services is obliged to establish and
maintain Customer Service Committees to represent the interests of customers and to deal with their
complaints. The main functions of the Conmittees are set out in s.27. Pre-privatisation, these
functions would have been performed by the Local Commissioner for Administration. If a complaint is
made under s.20 or s.162, the complaint must go to the DG, not the Committees. See also the Water
Supply and Sewerage Services (Customer Service Standards) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989 No.1159 as
amended by SI 1989 No.1383). The Customer Service Committees are themselves overseen by the DG.
See generally (1991) 2(2) Water Law 62-3 and (1990) 1(2) Water Law 47.
112
standards and complaints procedures. 27
 The HM1P charter for example states that:
"Anyone who reports a pollution problem or makes a complaint is kept up to date with
the investigation and informed within 15 working days of its outcome." 28 Other
standards set include the answering of telephone enquiries within 15 seconds, a response
to complaints within 5 working days, an acknowledgement of comments on applications
for authorisations within 5 days, and a letter within 15 days informing those who have
made comments of the outcome of the application. The NRA charter is more explicitly
consumerist in its language, but sets out similar standards to IIMIP. 'Customers' are
stated to include not only those who pay directly for specific services (eg. abstractors,
those with discharge consents, anglers and boaters), but also those who "receive
services paid for indirectly through government grants and taxation. This group
includes the general public and many representative groups and businesses that form a
part of our community. Conservationists, water sports enthusiasts and farmers are just
some examples. We also regard government at local, national and European level as our
customers." Customer standards the NRA aims to meet include:the answering of
telephone inquiries immediately where possible and written inquiries within 10 days; the
answering of telephone calls within 15 seconds; a response to complaints within 5 days;
the placing of sample results on the register within 60 days; and the attendance at
pollution emergencies 29 within 2 hours of being reported, or 4 hours outside normal
office hours. The public is encouraged to report such incidents through the provision of
a freephone, emergency hotline which is included in the booklet and which has been
widely advertised on, for example, the backs of buses.
5.2.3 Call-In Powers
The ability of the Secretary of State to call-in applications, as in planning law, is both an
indirect, day-to-day, active accountability mechanism and a weak direct one. It is the
former because the Secretary of State can call-in an application of his own accord. It is
the latter because third parties can also request a call-in. With NRA consents, under
paragraph 3 of Schedule 10 WRA 1991, the NRA must serve notice of the proposal to
grant consent on everyone who made representations or objections and must tell them of
their ability to request (within 21 days) the Secretary of State to exercise his power to
direct the authority to 'transmit' the application for him to determine. The NRA are
obliged to wait until the Secretary of State has decided on the request before they issue
27NRA, 'NRA Customer Charter: Our Statement of Service Standards', January 1994; 	 'Pollution
Prevention: Our Common Concern - A Code For the 1990's', March 1994.
um p.17.
29The main text refers to pollution 'incidents', while the appendix entitled 'Further Information 5'
refers to emergencies. The problem is that neither of these are defined: would they turn out to a minor
incident within 4 hours outside office hours?
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a consent. 3° If the Secretary of State does decide to call in the application, he is then
empowered under paragraph 4 to hold a local inquiry or to allow the applicant and the
Authority an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by someone appointed by
him. There must be a hearing of some kind if the applicant or the Authority request one.
Under paragraph 4(6), if the Secretary of State chooses a hearing, he must afford - to
anyone who made representations or objections to him - the opportunity of appearing
before and being heard by the person appointed to chair the hearing. 3 ' As we shall see,
this is in contrast to appeals, where the Secretary of State is under no such duty. If he
chooses an inquiry and these are modelled on public local inquiries in planning law, it is
at the discretion of the inspector whether third parties are allowed to appear.
The limitation of this 'transmission' procedure is that it is up to the Secretary of State
whether or not he calls in an application. Further details of the procedure are contained
in SI 1989 No. 1151. The Secretary of State possesses similar call-in powers in relation
to IPC authorisations, under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1 EPA 1990. However, unlike
the NRA position, there are no provisions for objectors to request such a call-in -
although there would appear to be nothing to stop them doing so. In any event, the
Secretary of State is only likely to make use of his call-in powers in particularly sensitive
or important cases. Where he does make use of this power, he cannot decide the issue
himself but must give directions to the enforcing authority.32
5.2.4 Appeals
The right to bring an appeal is an obvious means of holding an agency to account for its
decisions: if someone is unhappy with a decision, an appeal provides a relatively simple,
cheap and effective accountability mechanism. The extent to which agencies are held to
account by appeals will depend on a number of factors including who can bring appeals
(as we shall see, this accountability mechanism is only directly available for the company
affected; third parties have very limited rights in relation to appeals); on what grounds
they can appeal (if a decision on a certain matter is not appealable, the agency obviously
30Under the deregulation initiative, the DOE made proposals to change this so that the NRA would
simply have to notify an objector that a consent had been issued. The objector would still be able to
request a call-in by the Secretary of State, but as ENDS notes, he "might often find himself faced with a
decision whether to call-in an application after it has been determined - and it would not be surpising to
find him more reluctant to intervene at this late stage." Not surprisingly, ENDS concludes that
"whatever the practical outcome of the proposed change, it clearly amounts to a reduction in the explicit
scope for public participation in the discharge consent procedure." (226 ENDS Report (1993) 31 at
pp.32-3). These proposals have been taken up in the Environment Bill.
31 The Environment Bill may also affect this right of public participation if the application is called in
and an inquiry is held: if a person has already made representations, he may be unable to attend the
hearing. Whether this will be the case will depend on the precise content of regulations to be drawn up
by the Secretary of State.
32EPA 1990, sch. 1, para. 3(5).
114
cannot be held to account for it by that means); what control and input the appellant and
others have in terms of procedure; and finally, the decision the person deciding the
appeal is empowered to make.
Thus, if a company is refused a consent/authorisation/licence or is unhappy with
conditions imposed and informal negotiations have not yielded any results, it may
proceed to seek a formal appeal (which may however, as we shall see, be informally
structured). In the case of consents issued by the NRA, the appeals procedure is set out
in section 91 WRA 1991 and in regulations. 33 The NRA has received a number of
appeals - many sewerage undertakers for example have lodged appeals about a 'fish kill'
condition which has been included by the NRA in their discharge consents.34
Trade effluent consent appeals lie to the Director General of Water Services (OFWAT)
under sections 122 (if a consent is refused, if the discharger is unhappy with the
conditions imposed, or if there is a deemed refusal because the undertaker has not made
a decision on the notice of application within 2 months) and 126 WIA 1991 (for
variations). 35 The appeal is basically a rehearing and the Director General has much the
same powers as the undertaker to reject, impose conditions etc.. Dischargers have a
further right of appeal on a point of law to the High Court under section 137. This
specific right is unique to trade effluent consents.
For IPC authorisations issued by I-1MIP and for air pollution authorisations issued by
local authorities, appeals are covered by sections 15 and 22(5) EPA 1990. The main
grounds of appeal are set out in section 15, which states that anyone who has been
refused an authorisation or a variation of an authorisation, or whose authorisation has
been revoked, or who is aggrieved by conditions attached to an authorisation, or who
has been served with a variation, enforcement or prohibition notice, may appeal against
the decision to the Secretary of State (except where the decision implements a direction
of his). Section 22(5) deals with appeals concerning commercial confidentiality. The
Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and Registers) Regulations 1991 (SI
1991 No. 507) (as amended) provide the detailed blueprint of the authorisation appeals
procedure. IPC appeals have come in thick and fast. The first tranche were on the basis
of commercial confidentiality under section 22(5) EPA 1990, but by the end of 1992
appeals against the conditions imposed in authorisations had come in. According to
33The Control of Pollution (Consents for Discharges etc.) (Secretary of State's Functions) Regulations
1989 (SI 1989 No. 1151).
34See (1993) 4(2) Water Law 57.
35 See further, OFWAT, 'Trade Effluent Appeals', information note 21; and OFWAT news release 16/93
of 2 June 1993.
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ENDS, the complaints included: inconsistent treatment, excessive costs, and the danger
of stringent but unclear conditions leading to private prosecutions for any breach,
irrespective of HMIP's prosecution policy.36
Section 43 of the EPA provides for appeals to the Secretary of State from licensing
decisions of WRAs. The grounds of appeal are much broader than under the former
COPA 1974 regime. Section 66(5) gives an applicant a right of appeal from a decision
that information is not commercially confidential. The Waste Management Licensing
Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No. 1056), issued under section 43(8) and DOE circular
11/94, provide further details of the appeals procedure.
What then of the rights of the public in such appeals? Can parties other than the
affected company use the appeals procedures to hold agencies to account for their
standard-setting decisions? In planning law, an appeal lies from a decision to refuse
planning permission, but not from a decision granting planning permission - which
means in practice that developers can appeal, but environmental organisations or local
interest groups cannot. The only way the latter can directly challenge the decision is by
way of judicial review. However, though third parties are unable to initiate planning
appeal proceedings, they do have some rights to make representations, both under the
written representations procedure and at hearings.
The position is similar in the field of pollution control: companies can appeal, objecting
individuals and pressure groups cannot. Nevertheless, while third parties cannot
instigate appeals, they may sometimes have certain rights once an appeal has been
launched by a company. These rights enable them to exert some influence. With NRA
appeals under section 91 WRA 1991, the appellant or the Authority can request a
hearing and if they do so, the Secretary of State must either order a local inquiry or
afford the appellant and the Authority an opportunity of appearing before and being
heard by a person appointed by him. 37 If the Secretary of State chooses a local inquiry,
sections 215 WRA 1991 and 250 Local Government Act 1972 will apply. Assuming
that the inquiry is modelled on local planning inquiries, it will be at the discretion of the
inspector as to whether third parties can appear. 38 If he chooses a hearing, the
regulations mention only the appellant and the Authority. In any event, the Authority is
required to serve notice of an appeal against the refusal of a consent on anyone who
made representations about the application, stating that further representations may be
made to the Secretary of State. When the Secretary of State reaches his decision, he
36213 ENDS Report (1992) 18.
37 S1 1989 No. 1151, reg. 7(9).
38 S1 1992 No. 2039, reg. 11.
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issues directions to the NRA. Any reports, the contents of the directions and reasons
for the decision do not have to be published; all that is required is that the register
should contain a statement to the effect that the Secretary of State has issued a direction
under paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 12 Water Act 1989 (now section 91(5) WRA 1991).
With appeals from HMIP, under SI 1991 No. 507, a company can elect either a written
representations approach or a hearing, but the enforcing authority must consent for the
written procedure to apply. With the written procedure, the Secretary of State disposes
of the appeal on the basis of written representations, and the relevant enforcing authority
must submit any third party representations to him. A useful summary of the written
procedure is provided in the recent DOE guide to IPC. 39 If either party, or the
Secretary of State chooses a hearing, it is at the discretion of the person hearing the
appeal whether this is heard in public. The original DOE guide to IPC stated that "The
hearing, or part of the hearing, shall take place in public unless the appeals inspector
otherwise orders on the application of either party (normally this would be because he
was satisfied that commercial confidentiality would otherwise be prejudicially
affected)." 4° If it is to be held wholly or partly in public, the date, time and location of
the hearing must be publicised in advance in the local press. Third parties may be
allowed to speak at the hearing at the discretion of the appeals inspector, but permission
must not be unreasonably withheld. Appeals may be structured informally in the shape
of a round table discussion, or may be more formal and court-like; again this is at the
discretion of the appeals inspector, but the original DOE guide suggested that a more
formal procedure would be appropriate for complex or controversial appeals. The more
recent DOE guide states that the "procedure at a hearing is left to the appeal inspector,
but he will be concerned to ensure that interested parties who wish to give evidence
have a fair opportunity to do so." Obviously, the openness of a hearing, the ability to
be heard and the format of the hearing will all have an important bearing on
accountability to third party interests. With reference to the hearing's structure, Ball and
Bell have commented:
"Presumably, where issues are likely to be of great consequence to members of the
public, there needs to be some element of the adversarial approach to ensure that there is
adequate accountability. Otherwise, public confidence in an appeals system, which to
the untrained eye and ear would appear to be a meeting of highly trained, highly
specialised people discussing hypothetical problems around a table, would be seriously
undermined. "42
39D0E, 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', 1993, p.26.
400Id guide - DOE, 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', 1990, p.36.
41 Note 39 ante, para. 12.6, p.21.
42Ba1l & Bell, Environmental Law, p.284.
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One might question whether the untrained public are likely to come to appeals, and if
they do, whether they would be any the less confused by an adversarial treatment of the
same subject matter. However assuming they mean that specialist groups (such as FOE
and Greenpeace) will be better served by an adversarial approach, they are undoubtedly
correct. This is because with cross-examination and the ability to call evidence and
witnesses, such groups have effective control over information and will not be 'shut out',
which might be a danger in round-table discussions. However there is no inherent
reason why a round table discussion should be exclusionary and one could no doubt
think of safeguards to ensure that it did not occur. In any event, one should also
recognise, as Ball and Bell do, that an adversarial approach should be used sparingly.
This is because one could argue that the advantages to environmental groups of an
adversarial format are offset by disadvantages, particularly delay.
If a written representation procedure is used, the Secretary of State will determine the
appeal directly. If there is a hearing of some kind, the appeals inspector will provide the
Secretary of State with a report stating his conclusions and recommendations. In
making his decision, the Secretary of State must take this report into account, although
he is not obliged to follow the inspector's recommendations. Under regulation 14(2)(b)
of SI 1991 No. 507, the Secretary of State must furnish a copy of the appeal to anyone
who made representations to him or at the hearing, if one was held. Regulation 15(j)
then states that the register must contain details of any appeal under section 15 EPA
1990, including "any written notification of the Secretary of State's determination of
such an appeal and any report accompanying any such written notification." This
provides greater rights to third parties than does the NRA procedure.
With waste management licence appeals, circular 11/94 states that it is expected that
appeals will usually follow the written representations procedure unless the appellant or
the WRA request a hearing. If a hearing is held, it is up to the person hearing the appeal
whether the hearing is held in public or in private. All commercial confidentiality
appeals will be held in private unless the appellant requests otherwise (which seems
unlikely). If the appeal is held in public, it is at the discretion of the person appointed to
conduct the appeal as to whether third parties may be heard. Where there is a hearing,
the person hearing the appeal may be given the power to determine the appeal, which is
unique to this area; otherwise, the Secretary of State will make the decision taking into
account the report sent to him. Subject to the commercial confidentiality provisions of
section 66 EPA 1990, the WRA must put a copy of the inspector's report and/or a
written copy of the Secretary of State's decision and reasons on the register.
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With trade effluent consent appeals, there is no provision at all for public involvement,
except that details of the appeal must be placed on the register. This absence of any
provision for public participation is a regrettable state of affairs for which there appears
to be no logical reason, except perhaps that the public do not have an interest in the
closed environment of sewers as they do in the environment proper.
5.2.5 Tort
In theory at least, civil actions in tort may be used to hold an environmental agency
accountable for its actions. In Scott-Whitehead v National Coal Boarc143 for example, a
farmer sued the regional water authority in negligence for the damage to his crops
arising from their failure to warn him of the polluted nature of the water he was
abstracting. However, although the action there was successful, recent cases have
shown a reluctance to impose liability on public bodies," and therefore one cannot be
certain that the NRA or other agencies would now be held liable in similar
circumstances. 45 In any event, only firms and not environmental groups, are likely to
have suffered damage, which is necessary for an action in negligence.
5.2.6 JUDICIAL REVIEW
An aggrieved party may be able to hold the agency to account by way of an action for
judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Judicial review is
used to challenge the legality of administrative action. Review is only concerned with
the lawfulness of decisions taken; unlike appeal, it is not supposed to be a rehearing of
the merits of the case. Use of judicial review in the environmental field has been very
limited. The Public Law Project reports the following figures for applications for leave
in environmental (non-planning) cases:46
1987 - 15
1988 - 11
1989 - 21
1991 (Jan-March) - 3
As Sunkin et al. note, the small number of applications to an extent runs contrary to
expectation given the amount of legislative activity and public controversy on
environmental matters over these years Their suggestion is that the low figures may be
( l987) 53 P&CR 263 Noted an Ball & Bell at pp.160 and 395
44Eg_ Hurph.w Brentsiood DC11990] 2 All ER 908.
45See Ball & Bell, p 395
46Sunkin et al.. Judicial Reim% in Per5pectia e. An Investigation of Trend in the Use and Operation of
the Judicial Res iess Proc dure in England and Wales, 1993 No figures are gmell for 19)0
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due to lack of funding or expert legal advice, or a perception that the process is over-
formal and burdensome. 47 Furthermore, the above figures represent only applications
for leave; the number of applications which proceed beyond the leave stage to a full
substantive hearing is likely to be up to 60% lower." Of course, the number of cases
actually reported will be much lower still.
What else might explain the limited use of judicial review in environmental cases?49
There are a number of reasons why companies may not have not brought review actions.
Perhaps the most obvious is that, as we have seen, they will typically have a right of
appeal. This is likely to be much cheaper and quicker than a review action, and in any
event, as we shall see below, companies may have no other choice than to appeal first.
Another reason why we may not have seen many environmental review actions lies in
Galanter's well-known observations about 'one-shot' and 'repeat' players. As Stewart
states, Galanter's thesis is that one-shot players are more likely to litigate than repeat
players. 5° Stewart then claims that in the US environmental context, Galanter is turned
on his head, since at the Federal level, industry and environmental groups are repeat
players but tend to litigate, while co-operation is more prevalent at a local level, \Nhexe
those involved are one-shot or 'few-shot' players. While this may be true when
contrasting standard-setting (federal) with planning matters (local), it does not hold
when comparing standard-setting with enforcement. Setting standards is an infrequent
affair relative to enforcement, which is more of a continuous activity: with the former,
the game may take place every few years when standards are revised; with the latter, the
game is repeated more frequently. Indeed, Stewart implicitly recognises this in one of
his footnotes, where he states that co-operation is needed more for enforcement - which
occurs at state level - than for federal standard-setting. 5 ' It is this that points to the
difference between the US and England and Wales: in the US, standard-setting
47Ibid., p.8.
48Ibid., p.54.
°According to Stewart ('The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative
Regulation' [1985] Wisconsin LR 655), an increase in the use of uniform standards (such as
BATNEEC) as opposed to individualised standards (eg. NRA consents) ought if anything, to lead to a
rise in the number of judicial review actions brought by firms. This is because particularised standards
tend to produce a 'divide and rule' situation and each producer is likely to prefer the relatively low
transaction costs of co-operation to the high costs of review (pp.670-1). Uniform standards on the other
hand supposedly encourage industry solidarity (assuming there is a pre-existing trade-association of
some kind - if not, free rider problems may mean that uniform standards make no impact on the
incidence of judicial review, because, as with individualised standards, transaction costs for an
individual producer are likely to be too great - p.672). However, while this may lead to an increase in
judicial review, it is perhaps just as likely to make negotiation more prevalent, since collective action
will decrease the already low transaction costs of co-operation as well as those associated with judicial
review (p.672).
"Stewart, ibid..
51Ibid., p.671, n.57.
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invariably takes place at the federal level, while enforcement is handled by the states; in
the UK, both functions are performed by the same authority. The US position may thus
be categorised as one of `few-shots' at the Federal level and repeat players at the state
level - with litigation more likely with the former than with the latter. In the UK on the
other hand, litigation is less likely in respect of both functions because a company must
proceed from a 'few-shot' game to a 'many shots' game with the same opponent.52
As I stated in the previous chapter," judicial review is a two stage process: an applicant
must first seek leave to bring an action, which he must do within the appropriate time
limit and without unnecessary delay; if leave is granted, the applicant may then proceed
to a full hearing of the merits. For conceptual purposes, the substantive hearing can be
divided into three separate parts: first, the applicant must jump the hurdle of locus standi
and must surmount other 'threshold' barriers such as O'Reilly v Mackman" and the
alternative remedies rule; secondly, he must be able to establish one of the grounds of
review, and thirdly, he must persuade the court, in its discretion, to grant him a remedy.
5.2.6.1 Alternative Remedies55
The alternative remedies rule states that an applicant should normally exhaust all other
remedies which are equally convenient, beneficial and appropriate before bringing an
action for judicial review. If he has not done so, the court may refuse to allow the
challenge to proceed. This rule should pose few difficulties for environmental interests.
One might seek to argue that default powers provide such applicants with a suitable
alternative remedy. However, since default powers are not open to individual citizens,
they are not equally convenient, beneficial and appropriate.56
Companies challenging the conditions in their own consents or authorisations may, in
contrast, come into conflict with the rule on the exhaustion of alternative remedies. As
we have seen, companies (but not environmental groups) can appeal against agency
standard-setting decisions and so far, they have opted for this route rather than judicial
review. 57 The question is whether a company could bring a judicial review action
52Stewart also mentions the possibility of being 'punished' at the enforcement level for bringing a
challenge at another level - ibid., pp.662-3.
53At p.95.
54 [1982] 3 All ER 1124.
55 See generally, Lewis, 'The Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies in Administrative Law' (1992) 51
CLJ 138
56See Waite, 'Criminal and Administrative Sanctions in English Environmental Law' 1 LMELR 38
and 74 at pp.77-8.
57See 213 ENDS Report (1992) 18; some industry groups, such as the chipboard industry, have
'contemplated' judicial review of HMIP's sector guidelines - see Mayer, 'New tougher regulations cause
shock and confusion in Britain', The Independent, 10 September 1991, p.13.
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without first going through the appeals procedure. This question has recently been
answered in the negative in the Leigh Environmental case. Until that case, it was
generally assumed that the question of whether a court would require the exhaustion of
alternative remedies before allowing a review action, would depend on the category of
the complaint and its uniqueness; legal questions, it was thought, would stand a greater
chance of leapfrogging the appeals procedure than factual disputes; 58 and the first line of
cases concerning the interpretation of a new statutory scheme would normally be
allowed to go straight to review. 59 The Leigh case, which involved the interpretation of
a new statutory scheme - the EPA 1990 - may simply be an exception to this general
rule. Leigh Environmental Limited brought a review action against HMLP because it
objected to the conditions attached to authorisations on its incineration plants."
According to ENDS, at the leave stage, MacPherson J. ruled that HMIP's decision was
not amenable to judicial review. The EPA 1990 had provided for appeals to be made to
the Secretary of State and the dispute should therefore be pursued via that route.° It is
unclear from ENDS whether judicial review would then become available once the
appeals route had been exhausted, but one assumes that this would be the case.
5.2.6.2 Standing
Companies challenging the conditions in their own or other companies' 62 consents or
authorisations are unlikely to have a problem in surmounting the hurdle on standing.
The position of third parties such as individuals and environmental groups is more
complicated. This section will largely be concerned with these third party challenges.
A clutch of recent rulings of the High Court in judicial review actions brought by
environmental pressure groups in R v Inspectorate of Pollution and another, ex p.
Greenpeace Ltd, 63 R v S'ecretaty of State for the Environment, ex p. Greenpeace Ltd64
and R v S'ecretaly of State for the Environment, ex p. Friends of the Earth, 65 has once
more brought into sharp focus the issue of standing in Order 53 proceedings brought to
contest the legality of decisions in the field of environmental law. Why should the law
allow one applicant to bring judicial review proceedings and not another? Such a
58R v Birmingham City Council, ex p. Ferrero Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 530.
In a different statutory context, see R v Huntingdon District Council, ex p. Cowan
[1984] 1 All ER 58. See further Lewis, note 55 ante.
60See 225 ENDS Report (1993) 12.
61 226 ENDS Report (1993) 44.
620n the basis of R v AG, ex p. ICI [1987] 1 CMLR 72. The applicants had standing to review the basis
on which petroleum tax was assessed for competitor companies.
63 11 9 94 ] 4 All ER 329; see also 225 ENDS Report (1993) 42.
994j 4 All ER 352; see also 230 ENDS Report (1994) 43.
65R v Secretary
 of State for the Environment, ex p. Friends of the Earth Ltd and Another, The Times, 4
April 1994; see also 231 ENDS Report (1994) 46.
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question goes to the very heart of the type of administrative law we have. Should the
need to keep public authorities within their lawful bounds be put centre stage, with the
result that the courts assume an activist role in striking down instances of administrative
illegality whenever and wherever they are found, regardless of the identity of the
challenger - as in the 'citizen action' model of standing? 66 Or, alternatively, should the
primary focus of the limited resources of the courts be on identifying and remedying the
infringement of individuals' legal rights, 67
 leaving the resolution of cases where no such
rights have been infringed to Parliament, participatory procedures and, where
appropriate, to ex post accountability mechanisms like the Parliamentary and Local
Commissioners for Administration, and those which exist under the Citizen's Charter
initiatives?
Twenty years after it was published, Stewart's article 'The Reformation of American
Administrative Law' 68 remains a highly influential discussion of how administrative law
should regulate who is allowed to come before the court. Whilst the slightly modified
version of Stewart's classification presented below may not be without its problems, it
nevertheless remains a useful device because it enables one to identify the range of
litigants who come before the courts and the interests they possess. Stewart's scheme
divides litigants into:
1. Sole	 - someone representing his/her own interest
applicants69
2. Class
	 - someone representing him/herself and
applicants
	 others who share the same interest
3. Associational	 - an organisation representing
applicants
	 its members' interests
4. Surrogate	 - someone/organisation representing
applicants
	 the interests of others
66See further Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, ch. 12.
67Eg. Vining, Legal Identity.
68 Stewart, 'The Reformation of American Administrative Law' [1975] 88 Han, LR 1667 at pp.1734-
1747.
69 Stewart uses the word 'plaintiff; in an English context, the appropriate word is 'applicant'.
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Each of 1 - 4 above will claim to possess an interest or interests in the litigated matter
which will fall into one or more of the three categories below:70
A. Material
interests
B. Ideological
interests
C. A general interest
in law enforcement
- economic and locarn health interests
- including moral and religious principles
(eg. the interests of future generations and animals;
aesthetic, recreational, cultural and historical concerns)72
It is my belief that public law should go beyond the protection of legal rights to ensure
legality and good standards of administration. For this reason, rights of standing should
be drawn as broadly as possible to allow challenges by any class of litigant, upholding
any class of interest. 73
 The only restriction I would make is that a sole applicant should
be denied standing if there is a group which appears better placed to bring an action.
Even then, standing should be granted if the group has been approached and is unwilling
to become involved. Again, the reason for this restriction is a concern with the
protection of legality: if a group is better able in terms of skills and resources to bring a
challenge, then it is likely that legality will be more effectively and efficiently protected.
The domestic case-law discussed below reveals a much narrower, restrictive approach to
standing. While recent cases have moved towards the view that groups may be better
placed to bring actions than individuals, the courts typically grant standing only to those
with, in Stewart's framework, material interests.
5.2.6.2.1 Current National Law on Standing
In the 1980s, surrogate 74
 and associational 75
 applicants were often able to challenge
administrative decisions, although it is important to note that these groups were typically
seeking to protect economic, material interests. Then came the Rose Theatre 76 case,
where a company - formed to protect the site of the Rose Theatre - sought judicial
review of the Secretary of State's decision not to schedule the site under the Ancient
66It should be recognised that the categories of interests will at times overlap.
7I The local nature of the health interest is stressed because it helps to explain recent English case law.
Stewart simply talks of economic and physical well-being.
72 Again, I differ from Stewart in specifically identifying some of the types of ideological interest.
73 Although, given that legality and enforcement of the law are the central reasons for wide rights of
standing, all interests might be regarded as law enforcement interests.
74Eg. R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p. CPA G, The Times, 8 August 1985.
75Eg. Covent Garden Community Association v Greater London Council [1981] JPL 183; R v Stroud
District Council, ex p. Goodenough (1982) 43 P & CR 59 and R v Hammersmith & Fulham London
Borough Councils, ex p. People before Profit (1983) 45 P & CR 364.
76R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p. Rose Theatre Trust Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 504.
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Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979. Using Stewart's typology, the case
involved an associational applicant asserting an ideological interest (cultural/historical).
Schiemann J. provided two principal grounds for denying standing in the case. In
Stewart's terms, the fact that the company was attempting to uphold an ideological
interest rather than a material interest counted against them; and secondly, the fact that
they were associational plaintiffs gave them no greater claim to standing than the claim
they had as sole plaintiffs. In Schiemann's own terms, he claimed that because the
challenger could not show that he had a greater right than any other citizen of the
country to have the decision on whether to schedule taken lawfully, he would lack
sufficient interest. He then remarked that the company could have no greater right to
standing, qua company, than the individual members which formed it. Since the
individuals lacked standing, it followed that the company lacked standing.
The first of Schiemann J.'s reasons above has been criticised for adopting a narrow
approach to standing (namely requiring the infringement of private rights) which allows
government illegality to go unpunished. 77 It also sits uncomfortably alongside the
judge's remark elsewhere that "a direct financial or legal interest is not required."78
More importantly, it states as a conclusion that which requires to be justified - viz., why
it is that absence of a greater right than the general public should deny standing. The
unstated assumption which informs the reasoning is surely that a restrictive approach to
standing is more appropriate. Schiemann J.'s second ground for denying standing has
been criticised by Pitt-Payne who argues (in a pre-figuring of ex p. Greenpeace,79
considered below), that a group should be regarded as having a greater claim to standing
than its individual members because the fact that they have come together in a group
means that they have a serious interest, 80 and the range of expertise covered by the
group is likely to be much wider than that of any one member.81
Later cases offered rather more hope to environmental groups than the Rose Theatre
decision. In ex p. Beehee, 82 the British Herpetological Society (an associational
applicant) had locus solidi to challenge a planning permission concerning part of
Canford Heath, because it had been closely connected with the site for some time, it had
a financial input into the site (ie. an economic, material interest) and it was named on the
77 See further Geddes, 'Locus Standi and EEC Environmental Measures' (1992) 4(1)JEL 29.
78Note 76 ante, at p.520.
79Note 63 ante.
"Although of course the reverse may be true - ie. it takes less effort to get involved as part of a group
than it does to proceed as an individual.
81 Pitt-Payne, 'Standing in Judicial Review Proceedings', in Supperstone & Goudie (eds.), Judicial
Review, 327 at p.339.
82R v Poole Borough Council, ex p. Beebee [1991] JPL 643.
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planning permission. The ideological interest of the World Wide Fund For Nature
(WWF) (promotion of animal welfare) on the other hand was not a sufficient interest,
although in the event, consent was given for it to be joined as an applicant after leave
had been granted.
Other cases granted environmental interests standing, seemingly without question -
although none of the groups was successful on the merits. So, for example, in ex p.
Roberts83 the RSPCA (a surrogate/ideological applicant), a body called Compassion in
World Farming (an associational/ideological applicant) and Peter Roberts, the Director
of CIWF (a sole/ideological applicant), had standing to challenge the decision of the
Minister to grant licences for the export of live sheep to France. This is perhaps one of
the few examples where standing has been granted to an exclusively ideological interest
(the promotion of animal welfare). In the Twyford Down case," two parish councils
(associationaUideological" interests) and three private individuals (sole/ideological
applicants) sought judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision to allow the
building of a motorway through Twyford Down, near Winchester. 86 Whether or not the
applicants had standing as a matter of national law" was not questioned by McCullough
J. - standing was assumed to exist. 88 The fact that standing was granted to an
ideological interest here can perhaps be explained by the local flavour of that interest.
83R v MAFF, ex p. Roberts 119911 1 (MLR 555.
8 4 Twyford Parish Council v Secretary of State for Transport (1992) 4(2) JEL 273; the case was actually
decided on 26 October 1990.
85Aesthetic/recreational.
86For details of the protest NN, hich the scheme attracted, see The Battle of Camelot', The Guardian, 15
December 1992.
87The same could not be said of standing and Community law: because the applicants had not suffered
any substantial prejudice, McCullough J. was inclined to hold that they lacked the requisite standing in
relation to environmental Directives. This is a somewhat questionable interpretation of Community law
on access to the courts which I consider later in the section. As Macrory notes, a factor (lack of
prejudice) which normally relates to the court's discretion to deny a remedy under national law, was
treated as McCullough J. as a test for standing in relation to Community law - case note at note 84 ante,
at p.304, n.18.
88As it appears to have been in the unsuccessful challenge of the Oxleas Nine to the East London River
Crossing (an application by sole plaintiffs in respect of a local, ideological interest). For details on this
case and a discussion of access to environmental justice by individuals, see Grosz, 'When we can't see
the wood for the fees', The Guardian, 2 March 1993 (and see also (1992) 2(4) LMELR 48). In the
event, Oxleas Wood was eventually reprieved by a Government decision to reroute the road. The
decision and Grosz's article are significant in that they rest on the premise that environmental groups
would not have had locus standi to seek review in these roads cases because of the lack of a local
connection; it is on this basis that Grosz argues that individuals must not be dissuaded from such
actions (as they were in the M 11 case) by the prospect of huge legal fees and a bill for the opponents'
costs. Environmental groups are obviously better able to absorb such costs, although there are equally
valid arguments for not awarding costs against them either.
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A similar unquestioning approach to standing can be seen in R v Swale BC and Medway
Ports Authority ex p. the RSPB89 - the RSPB being an associational applicant with an
ideological interest in the welfare of birdlife, but with the distinguishing feature that they
had a public law legitimate expectation arising from a previous promise of
consultation. 9° In R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p. Friends of the
Earth Ltd and Another," standing was addressed, but only in passing, since it was not
contested by the Government. Andrew Lees 92
 and FOE were granted standing to
challenge the decision of the Secretary of State to accept undertakings from water
companies rather than serve enforcement orders. 93
 The FOE case may be explained as
having allowed standing to an associational applicant (FOE) and a sole applicant
(Andrew Lees)" both with the same material interest (a local health interest in the
quality of drinking water).
A recent case which lends more explicit support to environmental and other pressure
groups is the review action brought by Greenpeace (associational applicant) of HMIP's
decision to allow testing at the Thorp reprocessing plant without a consultation stage.95
Otton J. held that standing was primarily a matter of discretion for the courts. 96 In
exercising that discretion, it would be appropriate to take into account the nature of the
applicant and the extent of the applicant's interest in the issues raised, the remedy they
sought to achieve and the nature of the relief sought. Taking these factors into account,
he rejected British Nuclear Fuels' (BNFL)97 argument that Greenpeace should not have
legal standing. Greenpeace was described as an entirely responsible and respected body
with a genuine concern for the environment, which would therefore have a legitimate
interest in the environmental consequences of BNFL's activities at Sellafield. The fact
that it had been a consultee during the consultation processes lent further weight to its
case. He also considered it significant that 2,500 Greenpeace supporters came from the
Cumbria region; it would, he said, be to ignore the blindingly obvious for the court to
disregard their concern about the threat to health posed by the plant (ie. a local material
interest in health).
89R v Swale Borough Council and Medway Ports Authority, ex p. the RSPB [1991] JPL 39.
"Ward, 'The Right to an Effective Remedy in European Community Law and Environmental
Protection: A Case Study of United Kingdom Judicial Decisions Concerning the Environmental
Assessment Directive' (1993) 5(2) JEL 221 at pp.232-3.
91 Note 65 ante.
92F0E's former campaigns director.
93Discussed earlier in ch. 4.
"Thames Water Company being the supplier of water to Andrew Lees' North London Home.
95Note 63 ante.
96For a similar approach, see the Canadian case of Findlay v Minister of Finance [1986] 2 SCR 607;
see also Woolf, 'Judicial Review: A Possible Programme for Reform' [1992] Public Law 221.
9713NFL appeared as a party interested - the Government did not contest Greenpeace's standing.
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However, this insistence upon locally affected persons could prove problematic.
Consider, for example, the case of a nuclear power plant in a very remote area of
Scotland with few inhabitants, let alone Greenpeace supporters. With nuclear power,
the Chernobyl disaster surely demonstrates that health concerns cannot be limited
geographically. To take another example, if the challenge related to a plan to build a
large construction project in such an area, would it really be valid to deny the concern
which many non-inhabitants would feel for the preservation of our wilderness areas? In
insisting on a local connection, Otton J.'s judgment is arguably too much of an echo of
the aforementioned Beebee case. Another troubling aspect of his judgment comes with
the reasons he gives for distinguishing the present case from Rose Theatre. First, he
states that the Rose Theatre Company had been formed for the exclusive purposes of
saving the Theatre, whereas, as he has already told us, Greenpeace are an established
group. However, it is not clear why the longevity of a group should be conclusive as to
the genuineness of the interest. Secondly, he comments that in Rose Theatre no
individual member could show any personal interest in the outcome (ie. material
interest). Again, this leaves unaddressed the question of why a material interest is seen
as a prerequisite for standing. Ex parte Greenpeace thus appears to be yet another
example of the courts hiding behind more or less arbitrary 'legal' requirements whilst
avoiding the task of questioning the assumptions which underlie those requirements.
A further reason for allowing standing was Greenpeace's obvious expertise: an individual
would find it difficult to bring such an action and would almost certainly mount a less
well informed challenge which might waste the court's time; Greenpeace on the other
hand, with its experience in environmental matters and its access to scientific and
technological expertise was able to mount a carefully selected and focused challenge
which could only benefit the court in its duty to secure justice between the parties. The
implications of this could be very interesting - suggesting as it does, not only that, pace
Schiemann J. in Rose Theatre, associational (and, quaere, surrogate plaintiffs) groups
may have a greater right to standing than their individual members, but also that sole
plaintiffs should be denied standing where a pressure group is better able to bring the
action. 98 Otton J. also commented that the nature of the remedy sought would have a
bearing on whether standing would be granted: the fact that the relief sought by
Greenpeace was certiorari rather than mandamus went in their favour. 99 Finally, he
ordered Greenpeace to pay HMO's costs throughout, but BNFL's costs in full only up
until the hearing and two-thirds of their costs for the hearing itself This partial denial of
BNFL's costs may have been meant to demonstrate that Greenpeace, contrary to
98See the argument in the text, at notes 73-74 ante.
99See further R v Felixstowe JJ. ex p. Leigh [1987] QB 582, R v IRC ex p. National Federation of Self-
Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617.
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BNFL's view, did have a valid point to make and were not simply vexatious busybodies.
This is something that becomes more noticeable in the case below.
Another promising recent case for environmental groups is the judicial review brought
by Greenpeace and Lancashire County Council (associational applicant) of the decision
of the Secretaries of State for the Environment and Agriculture to grant the final go-
ahead to Thorp. 100 The fact that Greenpeace had a strong interest in bringing the case
was reflected in the fact that, despite losing the action, Potts J. did not order them to pay
their opponents' costs. m
 Nevertheless, apart from the costs point, the case does not
really carry us much further than the previous Greenpeace case; because the issues in
the cases were more or less the same, one would hardly have expected Potts J. to depart
significantly on standing from the reasoning of Otton J..
What then can be concluded from an examination of the cases? It seems that the
overriding factor in the grant of standing is the type of interest at stake: on the one hand,
courts will normally grant standing to material interests (ie. economic and local health
interests); on the other, they will usually deny standing to ideological interests i02 and
health interests unless they can point to a local concern with the sitefissue .m
 or some
link with the authorities in connection with that site. 104 In principle, the type of
applicant is a less significant factor in the granting of standing, although it seems that a
group applicant will be required to demonstrate longevity. The Greenpeace (Otton J.)
case may also be evidence of a change in this regard - insofar as it appears to favour
group over sole applicants.
As an advocate of broad rights of standing, I believe that the above cases demonstrate
an unduly restrictive approach which should be abandoned to allow challenges by
ideological and non-local health interests - whether by groups (regardless of longevity)
or individuals - and regardless of geographical or consultative links. I would not,
however, advocate the abolition of the statutory standing requirement tout court. There
may indeed be good practical reasons, in a broad theory of standing, for denying access
to the courts. One such example - which I mentioned near the beginning of this section
and which seems to have found favour with the courts - may be where an individual
looNote 64 ante.
o Although they did have to pay their own costs - estimated to be less than £100,000.
1 02Ex p. Roberts being an exception, although it is not strictly an environmental case.
1 03Eg. Twyford Down (ideological interest - local concern); Greenpeace (Otton J.) (health interest -
local members); FOE (health interest - local water).
to4Eg . ex p. RSPB (ideological interest - promise of consultation giving rise to legitimate expectation;
Beebee (BHS - ideological/material interest - named on the planning permission; Greenpeace (Otton J.)
(ideological/material interest - prior consultee).
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seeks review where a pressure group is better placed to bring the action. This may
provide grounds for denying standing, at least provisionally, until it can be ascertained
whether the group is prepared to take up the action. If it is not, a concern with the
correction of illegality dictates that the individual should then be granted standing.
5.2.6.2.2 Standing and Community law
Having examined standing in domestic law, one needs to examine what Community
law'" has to say on access (and by implication standing) to national courts to enforce
environmental Directives. The doctrine of direct effect in relation to Directives is of
crucial importance here. A Directive is said to be directly effective if it creates rights
and obligations which can be enforced in national courts.'" In theory, a Directive could
be directly effective 'horizontally' or 'vertically' - its rights and obligations could be
enforced in national courts against private individuals or state bodies. However, the
ECJ has ruled that Directives are only directly effective vertically against the state or
emanations of the state; m7 they do not have direct effects horizontally against other
private bodies or individuals.'" Despite this, it has been argued that the ECJ has
introduced horizontal effect lo through the back door via the doctrine of 'sympathetic
interpretation'. 110 However, I will be concentrating on vertical direct effect because the
material on sympathetic interpretation has no bearing on the question of standing in
judicial review actions brought against public bodies, which is our current concern.111
Since Directives are only directly effective vertically, we can now say that a directly
effective Directive creates rights and obligations which can be enforced in national
courts against state bodies. The doctrine of the supremacy of Community law further
means that not only can the Directive be enforced in national courts against state bodies,
105 In this section, specifically ECJ case-law.
106 Steiner, Textbook on EC Lcnv, p.26.
107Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. What counts as the state or an emanation of
the state will therefore be crucial. In case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas [1990] 3 All ER 897, the ECJ
ruled that a Directil e could be enforced against British Gas - at the time a nationalised undertaking.
The court stated that: "A body, NN hatever its legal form, which has been made responsible pursuant to a
measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service under the control of the state, and had for
that purpose special powers beyond those which resulted from the normal rules applicable in relations
between individuals, is included among the bodies against which the provisions of a Directive capable
of having direct effect might be relied upon" (para. 20). In the recent case of Griffin and Others v South
West Water Sen,ices Ltd, 236 ENDS Report (1994) 38 - the High Court held, applying Foster, that a
privatised water company is an emanation of the state under EC law.
108Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton & South West Hampshire HA [1986] 2 All ER 584.
109Albeit 'indirect' rather than 'direct' horizontal effect, in that the Directive is read indirectly through
the interpretation of the domestic legislation and not directly.
11 °Steiner, op cit., p.40.
1 11-Although the doctrine of sympathetic interpretation may come into play vertically in the substance of
a review action against a public body - see eg. the FOE case, note 65 ante.
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but that these courts must, in applying the Directive, ignore any conflicting provisions of
national law. A necessary condition for direct effect is that the provisions of the
Directive be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional. 112 If they are not, the national
courts will obviously have trouble enforcing them. However, while the satisfaction of
these requirements is necessary for a Directive to be directly effective, they are by no
means sufficient. All of the environmental Directives considered below contain
provisions which are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional and yet I suggest that
the ECJ would probably rule that some are not directly effective.113
What relevance does the doctrine of direct effect have for standing? The answer is that,
in theory at least, narrow national laws on standing may have to give way where an
environmental Directive is at issue if the ECJ has ruled that the Directive is directly
effective." 4 If the Directive is directly effective, it must be enforceable by third parties
against the state in their national courts; restrictive laws on standing obviously prevent a
Directive from being thus enforceable. In other words, if an applicant finds it difficult to
make a case for standing on the basis of domestic law, 115 he may be able to argue that,
as in Factortame, Community law (on access to national courts) should take priority
over national laws (on standing) in order to protect directly effective Community rights
contained in the Directive. 116
 However, at present, the ECJ's jurisprudence on the issue
of access to national courts is not particularly clear. As we shall see, the approach I
suggest they might adopt is not much broader than that of our domestic rules on
standing, and thus Community law is likely to be of little use to an applicant.
The approach which I suggest the ECJ are likely to take is that only Directives which are
intended to protect personal rights' 17, or possibly rights to human health, are directly
effective and must be enforceable by citizens in national courts. In other words, where
these Directives are concerned, national rules on standing must not present a barrier.
1 I2The requirements for direct effect laid down in eg. case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53.
113For example, the relevant provisions of the Dangerous Substances in Water Directive 76/464 and the
Groundwater Directive 80 68 are clear, precise and unconditional, but may not be directly effective - see
Kramer, 'The Implementation of Community Environmental Directives Within Member States: Some
Implications of the Direct Effect Doctrine' (1991) 3 JEL 39 at pp.42-3.
114Geddes, note 77 ante, at p.37.
1150f course in recent cases brought in the UK courts involving Community environmental Directives
(eg. ex p. FOE, Txford Doun), standing has been granted under domestic law and there was therefore
no need to argue that Community law required access to be granted.
116Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame [1990] ECR 2433. The case
concerned not standing but the availability of interim relief against the Crown. UK national law which
did not allow such relief was overturned in order to protect the directly effective rights contained in the
relevant EC laws.
117Eg. The Environmental Assessment Directive 85/337 which specifically grants personal rights to the
'public concerned'. The economic interests of companies count as personal or individual rights, as most
of the cases considered below in the text make clear.
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They are likely to rule that other Directives which are intended only to protect nature
are not intended to be enforceable in national courts, and thus national rules on standing
which denied access to the courts to enforce these Directives would not be contrary to
Community law. 118 While this is likely to be the approach the ECJ would adopt, as with
our domestic law on standing, I believe that a broader approach on access to the courts
would be preferable so that illegality does not go unchecked (in the EC context this may
be expressed as a concern with the effective enforcement of EC law). It is my belief that
all citizens should be able to enforce, as against the state, all environmental Directives
that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional" 9
 and that national laws on standing
should not prevent them from doing so.
The only European Court case specifically to address the issue of access to national
courts to enforce Directives is the non-environmental, Rewe case. 120 In his opinion,
Advocate General m
 Capotorti distinguishes between persons with personal rights under
Community law and persons who merely have an interest in the application of the law.
Those with personal rights under a Directive can invoke it in national courts; those who
have only an interest in the enforcement of that same Di-Teo:we cannot.inN o\ce..ktYli
Thus, AG Capotorti emphasises the difference between importers, who have a personal
right (economic interest) under the Common Customs Tariff; and traders, who merely
have an interest in seeing customs duties enforced because imported goods compete
with goods produced at home. 123 If the ECJ were to follow this opinion, the only
directly effective environmental Directives would be those which are intended to protect
personal rights 124
 Those intended to protect human health 125 and those intended only to
118 1n other words, if a Directive specifically grants personal rights, or you have an economic interest
under the Directive, or the Directive is intended to protect human health, standing must not be a
barrier. If none of these apply, Community law does not require access to national courts.
119 If a Directive does not satisfy these requirements (eg. it is unclear and imprecise), it will be difficult
for a national court to determine the substance of the right and hence enforce it.
120Case 158/80 [1981] ECR 1805.
121 The opinions given by the Advocate General are not as persuasive as the judgment of the Court, but
they nevertheless carry considerable weight.
122Note 120 ante, para. 6 at p.1850. Capotorti states that "Any other view would entail allowing a kind
of azione popolare [civil action serving as a test case on a matter affecting public interests] on the basis
of directly applicable Community provisions."
1230f course, in one sense, the traders have an economic, material interest because they will suffer
financially. It is however less direct. Also of note is that Capotorti's approach could be used to explain
the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p. Equal Opportunities
Commission [1993] 1 All ER 1022. The woman who alleged discrimination had a personal right under
the relevant Directive, while the EOC were denied standing because they merely had an interest in the
enforcement of European law. The EOC were granted standing when the case went on appeal to the
House of Lords - [1994] 2 WLR 409; however standing was arguably required here as a matter of
national law (s. 53(1) Sex Discrimination Act 1975); on the basis of AG Capotorti's opinion in Rewe
the EOC would not have been able to argue for standing as a matter of Community law.
124See note 117 ante.
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protect the environment would not be directly effective and thus restrictive national rules
on standing could remain in place for them.
The Rewe case appears to be the only one directly on the issue of access to national
courts to enforce Directives. Nevertheless, one might argue that comments made by
Advocates General and by the Court in a number of Article 169 cases brought by the
Commission against Germany - while they concern the ability to enforce Directives in
national courts through national legislation (or rather the inability to enforce Community
rights when a Directive has been implemented via administrative means rather than
legislative means) - are illustrative of how the ECJ might approach access to national
courts to enforce environmental Directives directly.
Thus, the ratio u6 of these Article 169 cases concerns the need to have Directives
implemented by proper, legislative means rather than by administrative means such as
circulars: only if Directives are implemented into national law in a manner that is
sufficiently binding, specific, clear and precise, can rights be created that are enforceable
in national courts. In case C-361/88 for example, the Court states in relation to the limit
values laid down in Article 2 of Directive 80/779 on air quality, "that whenever the
exceeding of the limit values could endanger human health, the persons concerned must
be in a position to rely on mandatory rules in order to be able to assert their rights."
They ruled that Germany was in breach of Community law because it could not be
claimed "that individuals are in a position to know with certainty the full extent of their
rights in order to rely on them, where appropriate, before the national courts." 127 They
would only be able to do this if the Directive had been implemented by legislative means.
However, the cases also contain some significant °biter dicta on who might enjoy these
rights. And while the cases only deal with access to national courts to enforce rights
contained in national legislation - it is suggested that they provide our best guide as to
how the ECJ might approach the issue of the direct effect of environmental Directives.
The most restrictive approach can be found in the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs
in Commission v Germany, case C-58/89. 128 He argues that only those with personal
rights under Directives 75/440 and 79/869 on Surface Water for Drinking (ie. water
undertakings with economic interests) have a right to enforce them in national courts.
Despite the fact that the Directives are stated to be intended for the protection of human
125From a common-sense point of view, this might be classifiable as a personal right. However, none of
the cases refer to it as such.
126 Although, as the ECJ lacks a doctrine of binding precedent, the distinction between the ratio
deCidendi and obiter dicta is not of much significance.
127Commission v Germany [1991] I ECR 2567, para. 16, p.2601.
128Commission v Germany [1991] I ECR 4983.
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health (this intention is stated in the preamble of the Directives), AG Jacobs thinks that it
is going too far to suggest that "the national measures must be such as to confer rights
on third parties to challenge inadequate compliance or implementation. It is true that the
public at large, as well as ecologists and environmental pressure groups, have a general
interest in water quality, and indeed in the respect for Community law. It does not
however automatically follow that enforceable rights must be made available to them in
the national courts." 129 Not only is this the most restrictive approach, it is also different
to all of the other pronouncements below in that it deals directly with access to the
courts.
In other cases, the issue of access is tackled rather more indirectly. In cases C-361/88
and C-58/89, the ECJ ruled that where an environmental Directive is intended to protect
human health, it should be implemented in national law via legislative rather than
administrative means so that people are able to find out what their rights are,'" and -
because of the mandatory nature of legislation - so that they can rely on them in national
courts. In case C-361/88, the Court states that since the limit values laid down in
Article 2 of Directive 80/779 on air quality are imposed "in order to protect human
health in particular,"the implication is "that whenever the exceeding of the limit values
could endanger human health, the persons concerned must be in a position to rely on
mandatory rules in order to be able to assert their rights." 131 They held that Germany
was in breach of Community law because it could not be claimed "that individuals are in
a position to know with certainty the full extent of their rights in order to rely on them,
where appropriate, before the national courts or that those whose activities are liable to
give rise to nuisances are adequately informed of the extent of their obligations "132
Similarly, in case C-58/89, the Court held that since Directives 75/440 and 79/869 on
Surface Water for Drinking are intended to protect human health, it implies that
"whenever non-compliance with the measures required by the directives in question
129Ibtd , at p 5008. Many %sill recall that one of the requirements of Francovich liability is that the
Directive concerned must confer nghts on individuals. In relation to Francovich liability, AG Jacobs.
in a recent case (C-237 90 Canuntssion v Germany unreported, but noted by Holder & Elssorthy (1994)
31(1) CUL Rev 123) has stated that the Drinking Water Directise 80/778 does confer rights on
individuals other than ssater undertakers (Holder and Elworthy, p 132) Unless this statement is limited
to Francotich habilit) cases, this would of course represent a change of heart by AG Jacobs Hosseser
one assumes that AG Jacobs would not extend his comments on nghts in liability cases to rights
associated with the enforcement of regulation For analysis of the implications of Francovich for
environmental law. see Holder and Elssorthy,,, and Sottisen & BON is, 'Enforcement of EC Ens ironmental
Lass and the Implications of the Francos, ich Judgement' (1992) 3 Water Lau 84_
130Legislation is more easily accessible
"'Commission v Germany. note 127 ante, at para. 16, p.2601
132/bid. para. 20. p26 2
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might endanger the health of persons, those concerned should be able to rely on
mandatory rules in order to enforce their rights."33
What of Directives which are not intended to protect human health, such as the
Groundwater Directive 80/68 and the Dangerous Substances in Water Directive 76/464?
(The preambles in both of these Directives do not state that they are intended to protect
human health). 134 The judgment in case C-131/88 135 states that the Groundwater
Directive 80/68 must be implemented in a clear and precise manner so that those who
enjoy individual rights under the Directive - ie. companies concerned with the substances
referred to in the Directive - can ascertain their rights and, where appropriate, rely upon
them before national courts. 136 While the judgment is silent on the position of ordinary
citizens, the implication of the cases discussed in the previous paragraph is that, since
the Groundwater Directive is not intended to protect human health, it would not be
necessary for individuals to be in a position to know with certainty the extent of their
rights in order to rely on them. However, it is worth noting the opinion of Advocate
General Van Gerven in the case. Despite the fact that the Directive is not intended to
protect human health, he states that proper implementation is important for third parties
as well as those who enjoy personal rights under the Directive: "Clear and precise
implementation of the directive's provisions may also be important for third parties (for
instance environmental groups or neighbourhood residents) seeking to have the
prohibitions and restrictions contained in the directive enforced as against the authorities
or other individuals."37
The ECJ might choose from a similar range of approaches in deciding on the direct
effect of environmental Directives. First, they could rule, following AG Capotorti in
Rewe and the logic of AG Jacobs in case C-58/89 that only those with a personal interest
in a Directive should be entitled to enforce it in national courts irrespective of national
laws on standing. Secondly, they could follow the logic of cases C-361/88, C-59/89 and
C-58/89 and enable not only those with a personal right, but also - where the Directive
is intended to protect human health - ordinary citizens, to enforce their rights in national
courts. This, it is submitted, is the approach which the ECJ would probably adopt.
However, it will be thought by many that even this slightly broader approach is unduly
133 Note 128 ante, para. 14, p.5023. It added that a further reason for establishing the limits in a
bindi ng form is to enable the operators of surface water sampling points to know exactly what their
obligations are.
134Desp i te this, there is a sense in which both Directives are intended to protect human health, albeit
indirectly.
135Connnission v Germany [1991] I ECR 825.
136,Ibid., para. 7 of the judgment, p.867.
para. 7 of his opinion, p.850.
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restrictive given the recent concern about the enforcement of Community law. The
Commission is undoubtedly over-stretched for the purposes of Article 169
proceedings,'" and the House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities, among others, has come out in favour of allowing 'citizen actions' as an
effective, alternative means of ensuring compliance with Community environmental
law.' 39
 One way of meeting this concern about the enforcement of Community law,
would be to follow the logic of AG Van Gerven's approach in case C-131/88 and allow
all citizens to enforce, as against the state, all environmental Directives - whether
intended to protect human health or not - that are sufficiently clear, precise and
unconditional, and to ensure that national laws on standing do not prevent them from
doing so.
The Draft Directive on Access to Environmental Justice. In fact, access to national
courts in environmental cases may soon depend not on domestic or ECJ case-law, but
on a Directive on the subject. Under the recent Council draft proposal for a Directive
on access to environmental justice 14° environmental groups (but not individuals)14'
would simply look to the Directive on access to justice to provide their justification for
standing. The Directive would cover access to justice in all cases, not just those which
involve an environmental Directive. And the rights of access are drawn extremely
broadly, so that litigants with any class of interest, whether it be economic, health-based,
or ideological, would be able to bring actions in their national courts.
Thus, citizen actions - the apotheosis of a liberal, expansive approach to standing - may
soon be upon us, not through the common law, but via the statutory reach of the EC.
Of course, individuals - and groups if they cannot bring themselves within the terms of
the Directive - will need to fall back on national law on standing or ECJ decisions. Even
then, the introduction of the Directive may lead to a general revision of our laws on
1380n Art. 169 proceedings in respect of environmental Directives and some of the problems associated
with the procedure, see Macrory, 'The Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical
Issues' (1992) 29 C.A41, Rev 347.
139H0L Select Committee on the European Communities, 9th Report, 'Implementation and
Enforcement of Environmental Legislation', I-IL 53, session 1991-2, p.45; see also I-IL debates, 21
January 1993 (reported in 216 ENDS Report (1993) 26), and Geddes, note 77 ante, at p.39.
'(Unpublished.
141 The thinking behind this may be the same as that given for favouring groups over individual
applicants in the Greenpeace case discussed earlier. While the draft Directive reflects a concern set out
in the 5th Environmental Action Programme ('Towards Sustainability: A European Community
Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development', OJ
1993, C138/5) to improve access to justice in environmental law, it differs in that 'Towards
Sustainability' stresses the role of individuals and groups. In ch. 9, at p.82, it states that "Individuals
and public interest groups should have practicable access to the courts in order to ensure that their
legitimate interests are protected and that prescribed environmental measures are effectively enforced
and illegal practices stopped" (emphasis added).
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standing, so that there would be no difference between those who could and those who
could not bring themselves within the Directive's terms, and no difference in standing
between environmental cases and other cases.
5.2.6.3 Grounds of Review
The next matter to be considered is the grounds of review. However, before
proceeding, it must be noted that there have been very few reported judicial review
cases concerning pollution contro1. 142
 The following section is therefore something of a
crystal ball. One of the problems with doing 'anticipatory' law rather than commenting
on decided cases is that one lacks a designated framework within which to operate.
There are essentially three possible approaches that might be taken here: first, one could
write a complete guide to the grounds of judicial review, commenting on how, for
example, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety 143
 may arise in actions
reviewing the standard-setting decisions of environmental agencies; 144
 secondly, one
could comment on the few decided cases there are in the area of environmental law;
thirdly, rather than using the grounds of judicial review as one's framework, one could
structure the discussion around the statutes. I will largely be adopting the third
approach - examining how various provisions of the EPA 1990 and the WRA 1991 may
give rise to judicial review," 5
 although I will be adopting the second approach where
there have been cases on a particular statutory provision. To a great extent, the section
is an attempt to react to statements made on judicial review of these provisions that have
been made by commentators,"6
 and it is this that provides the section's structure. In the
context of examining specific provisions, the ground of review will usually be breach of
statutory duty, which - if one wishes to bring it within Lord Diplock's categorisation in
142Five significant reported cases to date include: ex p. FOE (note 65 ante); Greenpeace v NRA (note
145 post); the Leigh Environmental case (see the text at notes 60-61 ante); Cutts v Southern Water
Authority (note 150 post); and AG's Ref (No. 2 of 1988) [1990] JEL 80. The Leigh case rather proves
the point I make in the text - that crystal ball gazing is difficult here - it would have been hard to
foresee the exact ground of the Leigh challenge. The same could be said of the Cutts case and the AG's
Ref.
143The three grounds set out by Lord Diplock in CCSU V Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
144Adopting this approach, one might examine eg. : i) natural justice - if for example an environmental
group are involved in an appeal and can point to some sort of bias on the part of the Inspector, they
could bring a review action to have the decision quashed (in a planning context see eg. Simmons v
Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] JPL 253); ii) illegality - if for example HMIP sought to
apply BATNEEC to a non-prescribed process, this would clearly be ultra vires and the company
concerned would be able to seek review to have the decision quashed. This sort of approach is largely
the one taken by Murdie in Environmental Law and Citizen Action, at pp.88-93, and by Ball & Bell,
Environmental Law, pp.25-26.
145It is partly for this reason that this whole section is entitled 'Accountability for standard-setting and
other operational decisions' - not all of the provisions I examine which may attract review are
concerned with standard-setting per se.
146See eg. Macrory. note 161 post; Purdue, Harris. and Gibson, note 187 post; and Lomas, note 251
post.
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the CCS(P 47 case - would come under illegality. It must be stressed that I am not
attempting to provide a definitive or comprehensive account of judicial review of
environmental agencies. It is my selection and others would no doubt choose to
highlight different issues.
5.2.6.4 Judicial Review of the NRA148
There have been two cases involving judicial review of public authority water pollution
control functions. One was the case brought by Greenpeace against the NRA over an
Albright & Wilson plant. 149
 The other was a case brought before the privatisation of the
water industry, by a private individual, Mr Cutts, against Southern Water Authority and
another. 150
The Cutts case centred around the problems which fish farming poses to our water
courses. There are two problems associated with fish farming: first, it involves
considerable water abstraction which can lead to low flows which render impassable the
natural or artificial channels through which migrating fish gain access to their breeding
grounds in upper waters; second, when this abstracted water is returned to the river, it
often contains highly polluting excreta and chemicals, and escaped fish. Wild fish are
threatened either because the excretal pollution kills off the flora and fauna on which
they depend, or because the voracious farmed fish eat most of it, or, more
controversially, because the farmed fish breed with the wild fish and destroy the homing
instincts which lead the wild fish back to their breeding grounds. Mr Cutts - a riparian
owner described by the court as an 'enthusiast', but with little legal knowledge 151
 - was
concerned about the effect which a rainbow trout fish-farm was having on salmon in his
local river. He did not feel that the local water authorities - the bodies responsible for
pollution control at that time - were doing enough to combat the problem. He therefore
sought judicial review to try to force them into action.
147Note 143, ante.
1480r, in relation to certain NRA functions, the Secretary of State.
149Greenpeace v NRA, 200 ENDS Report (1991) 4; 201 ENDS Report (1991) 9; 203 ENDS Report
(1991)5; 206 ENDS Report (1992) 10.
150 Cutts v Sothern Water Authority (1990) 4 Env Law 8 (CA); (1990) 4(2) LIVELR 132; full transcript
on Lexis.
151Mr Cutts was represented by counsel in one of the original applications, but due to some fairly
fundamental misunderstandings, counsel was dismissed. He represented himself on appeal. In his
judgment, Mustill L.J. referred to the relevant principles of judicial review, commenting that: "They are
so well-established that in an ordinary Crown Office case they would be taken for granted. I restate
then here partly because they are too often ignored by applicants and there advisers, and partly because
it is plain that Mr Cutts has not grasped them and might be inclined on some future occasion to waste
his own and the public' time and money on applications which are bound to fail" (Lexis).
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In the only particularised version of his original applications, Mr Cutts was seeking an
order of mandamus compelling various water authorities to perform their duties under
the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Acts of 1923 and 1975 in relation to pollution from
fish farms. The trial judge dismissed the applications on the grounds that the authorities
had not transgressed the law and that Mr Cutts had alternative remedies available to him
in the shape of private prosecution of offenders (ie. the fish farmers) and a local inquiry
under section 108 Water Resources Act 1963. On appeal, Mr Cutts gave further
particulars of the orders he wished the court to make by way of mandamus. Mustill U.
placed considerable weight on Lord Brightman's judgment in Pulhofer v Hillingdon152,
which adopted a deferential stance in relation to homelessness decisions made by
housing authorities. Mustill U. stated that review would only lie if the authority had
failed to address the question at all, had taken into account irrelevant considerations or
failed to take into account relevant considerations, or had acted in a Wednesbury
unreasonable fashion (ie. making a decision which no other reasonable authority could
have made). The judgment was divided into two sections - one section dealt with
salmon passes, the other with pollution. On both issues, Mustill U. stated that none of
the above grounds had been made out. First, the authorities arguably lacked the. 7.0‘13tTS
to take the action sought by Mr Cutts. Second, even if the authorities did have the
powers and could in theory bring a prosecution (under sections 12 and 13 of the 1975
Act in respect of salmon passes and section 32(1) COPA 1974 in respect of the
pollution), the court would not order them to do so because they had not failed to
consider the problem, they had not omitted to consider relevant factors and they had not
made a decision which could be characterised as absurd. Finally, Mr Cutts had other
avenues available to him - both political and in the shape of statutory mechanisms such
as a local enquiry under section 120 Water Act 1989. Some of Mustill L.T.'s concluding
comments are perhaps of even greater interest, for the evidence they reveal of the court's
general stance in this category of review case - a stance which could be adopted in
future review actions involving pollution control authorities. The stance is decidedly
'hands-off. He states that the court is not a:
"managerial overseer of the performance of the Authorities of their stautory duties
and powers ... the court deploys neither the time nor the technical qualifications and
experience to perform any such function, in relation to thousands of persons and bodies
who every day are performing tasks on the boundary between public and private life.
Much more importantly, however, the court ought not to attempt such an enterprise.
The electors have chosen Parliament, and the Queen in Parliament has appointed the
public bodies, allocated their tasks, and provided whatever powers and resources it has
considered necessary to carry them out. The courts must respect this choice. The
individual judge might in the particular case think that legislation, or the policy, or the
152Pulhofer v Hillingdon LBC (1986) AC 484 particularly at p.518.
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deployment of means could profitably have taken a different form. Or he might suspect
that the chosen body could have performed its functions with more skill and energy.
Even if he did form these opinions it would not matter, for it is the persons and bodies
put in place by Parliament, not the courts, who are there to run the country. Through
the developing jurisdiction of judicial review the courts perform an essential service,
protecting the citizen from injustice and misuse of powers, but the benefits will be
compromised if the court allows itself to be drawn into performing functions which
properly belong elsewhere."53
Thus, at face value, the Cutts case - a Court of Appeal decision and therefore of some
precedential weight - is not exactly full of promise for those arguing for judicial review
of the decisions and actions of pollution control authorities. Nevertheless, examination
of the detail reveals a less gloomy picture. The authorities appear to have lacked the
powers to deal with the problems identified by Mr Cutts and the court was unwilling to
review the prosecutorial discretion of the authorities. However, in future cases, the
NRA and other bodies may have the power to tackle a problem and the courts may be
prepared to review decisions not to prosecute (this latter point will be addressed in the
next chapter). The 'hands-off stance which Mustill Li. appears to advocate cannot be
taken as a blueprint for all future cases. Furthermore, Cutts is a highly peculiar case.
Not only does it involve the review of pre-privatisation pollution control authorities, it
also involves extremely complex subject matter which was not presented to the court in
the best light.
Greenpeace v NRA did not proceed beyond the leave stage. Greenpeace decided not to
pursue the leave because there were signs that Albright & Wilson were cleaning up their
act and that the NRA had stepped up its monitoring of the plant and were due to tighten
the consent. As Sarah Burton, Greenpeace's solicitor, stated in a letter to Environment
Law Brief, for those reasons, they "took the view that the threat of these proceedings
had in fact achieved virtually all that the Court itself could have ordered had we pursued
the matter and we did not consider this to be a responsible use of our supporters'
money." 154 They had to pay the NRA's costs up to that date, but these were not as great
as some parties made out. I55 ENDS therefore overstates matters when it says that
Greenpeace were dealt a "bloody nose." 156 The case raises a number of interesting
points. First, it is not entirely clear from the reports the precise grounds of review upon
which Greenpeace were relying, although they appear to have been breach of the duty in
section 106 Water Act 1989 and a failure to monitor properly. I57 Some reports suggest
153Lexis.
154(1992) 3(7) Env Law Brief61.
1551bid..
156206 ENDS Report (1992) 10.
157200 ENDS Report (1991) pp.4-6.
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that failure to prosecute was also a ground, 158
 which is not surprising given that
Greenpeace felt compelled to bring a private prosecution. Whether it formed a part of
their case or not, the legal position on judicial review of the discretion to prosecute was
perhaps uncertain at the time. 159
 The second interesting point about the case is that it
illustrates that pressure groups use judicial review for their own purposes (eg. publicity),
and not to create precedents and answer questions which academic lawyers would like
to see answered (eg. whether they might have successfully reviewed the NRA's decision
not to prosecute).160
However, it is worth considering whether Greenpeace's challenge on the basis of section
106 might have succeeded. Section 84(1) WRA 1991 (previously section 105 Water
Act 1989) states that:
"It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State and of the Authority to exercise the
powers conferred on him or it by or under the water pollution provisions of this Act ...
in such manner as ensures, so far as it is practicable by the exercise of those powers to
do so, that the water quality objectives specified for any waters ... are achieved at all
times."
Section 84(2) (previously section 106 Water Act 1989) continues:
"It shall be the duty of the Authority, for the purposes of the carrying out of its
functions under the water pollution provisions of this Act - (a) to monitor the extent of
pollution in controlled waters ..."
Richard Macrory has suggested that:
"Direct enforcement of the duty by means of judicial review may not prove easy, but
individual control decisions such as the setting or revision of discharge consents may
prove more susceptible to appeal or legal challenge by both industry and third parties on
the grounds that they do not reflect the requirements of the general duty: 1,161
I would agree that the advent of ambient statutory water quality objectives (SWQ0s)
under section 83 Water Resources Act 1991, coupled with the duty imposed on the
158(1991) 3(6) LMELR 202.
159It is hopefully clearer now that such powers are reviewable - see my article in the Criminal Law
Review [1993] 739 and chapter 6 here.
160See further Feldman, 'Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory in Comparative
Perspective' (1992) 55 MLR 44 at p.46; see also Harlow and Rawlings, Pressure Through Law, for a
historical account of the use of judicial review by pressure groups.
161 Macrory, 'The Privatization and Regulation of the Water Industry' (1990) 53 MLR 78 at p.85. The
issue of the match between consents and SWQ0s is separate from the issue of breach of SWQ0s which
was dealt with in chapter 4.
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NRA and the Secretary of State in section 84, should make it possible for environmental
organisations to bring judicial review actions where consent standards are insufficiently
strict to ensure that water quality objectives are met. 162 With such challlenges, it could
be argued that if, based on a recognised modelling system, the consented standards
would necessarily lead to a breach of SWQ0s on paper (or computer), then the NRA
will be in breach of their section 84 duty. 163
 A court could then grant an order of
mandamus, requiring the NRA to tighten-up the consents to ensure the SWQ0 was
achieved, at least 'on paper'.
Challenges by companies on the basis that their standards are unnecessarily strict in
relation to SWQ0s, are likely to prove more difficult.'" To begin with, it would
appear perfectly legitimate for the NRA to leave a 'buffer zone' to cope with freak
discharges and new entrants. Even if a company was able to establish that the buffer
zone was excessive, if there were several other dischargers in the area, the company
would have to share out any reduction with these others. Even then, the question is not
exactly straightforward. To a great extent, the matter will turn on the type of substances
that a company is emitting Discharges to water from non-prescribed processes are
controlled by the NRA, discharges from prescribed processes by IIMIP. FINIIP will be
considered in the next section, because the introduction of BATNEEC complicates
matters. The NRA thus has direct control over discharges to water from non-prescribed
processes, which might emit any of the following substances:
a) 'red list' substances (the UK 'red list' contains all the substances on the EEC 'black
list' (List I) and some 'grey list' (List II) substances from Directive 76/464 - the
Dangerous Substances in Water directive).
162Cf the consenation duty on the NRA in s.16 WRA 1991. This would be much more difficult to
enforce by way of judicial review than the s.84 duty because it is so general. The s.84 duty, in contrast,
requires something very specific - the achievement of SWQ0s. Where duties are couched in very
general terms and leave considerable discretion to the authorities, the courts will be very reluctant to
grant remedies to enforce those duties in judicial review actions - see Wade, Administrative Law,
pp.614-5; cf Cane. 'Ultra Vires Breach of Statutory Duty' [1981] Public Law 11.
163EN en if the breach of SWQ0s was nothing to do with consented emissions, environmental groups
could, if any IPC firms discharging to water were present, bring a review action for breach of the duty
in s.7(2)(c) EPA 1990 to include conditions in an authorisation which ensure compliance and
achievement of any quality objective prescribed by the Secretary of State. The authorities would then,
as a result of s.7(2)(c), seemingly be obliged to load the responsibility for meeting SWQ0s onto the IPC
processes, irrespective of their treatment of non-IPC dischargers and irrespective of the fact that non-
consented discharges (eg. diffuse, agricultural rim-off) were the main cause of the breach of SWQ0s.
164Macrory note 161 ante. One assumes that this is what Macrory has in mind. It seems unlikely that
industry would go to the length of checking whether competitors' emissions were contributing to a
breach of SWQ0s. Of course, if a company is claiming that its consent is too strict given the SWQO,
the ground of review is rather problematic. It could be breach of duty, but that assumes that the s.84
duty can be read negatively - ie. as a duty to tie emissions to SWQ0s and nothing else. Alternatively,
the ground could be failing to consider a relevant consideration, or improper purpose.
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b) non- red list substances which are however EC list II substances;
c) non- red list, non- list II substances.
The chances of a company mounting a successful challenge - that its consent conditions
are overly stringent for the purposes of meeting the SWQO - should depend on which of
the above substances it is emitting.
If the challenge related to one of the 'red list' substances in (a) above, these are mostly
toxic, bioaccumulable or persistent and need to be systematically controlled over the
long-term - not just for their short-term impact on the environment. Water quality
standards for these substances do not ensure a safe level of bioaccumulation or
persistence. Nobody can be entirely sure what a 'safe' level of dangerous substances in
water is; such substances, even in minute concentrations, may pose a long-term threat.
Hence the need for a 'precautionary' approach:
"Setting safe environmental quality standards may be difficult for some substances -
we do not yet know enough about the properties of some of the most dangerous
substances, and the potential long-term risks they pose to the environment and to man,
to set quality standards with complete confidence ... because of uncertainty about the
effects of these substances, the precautionary principle would sugest that we should take
measures to minimise inputs to the environment from point and diffuse sources so far as
is practicable."65
This precautionary approach is enshrined in Directive 76/464, which makes it clear that
the aim is to minimise the input of List I substances; this aim was emphasised in the
DOE circular on the implementation of Directive 76/464:
"Nor should the control of discharges be relaxed simply because the appropriate
quality objective is easily met; in applying the EQO approach, competent authorities
should always consider the quality standard set to achieve a particular quality objective
as a minimum to be achieved, and aim for a quality objective as well within that standard
as possible. H166
165DOE, 'Inputs of Dangerous Substances To Water: Proposals For A Unified S)stem Of Control', July
1988, para. 17, pp.7-8.
166D0E Circular 7/89, 'Water And The Environment', p.6.
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If it is emitting a substance as in (b) above, its challenge may also fail, because Directive
76/464 and DOE Circular 7/89 make it clear that pollution by list II substances must be
reduced. The Circular states:
"Having identified the appropriate quality standard, competent authorities should
determine discharge emission standards (ie. consent conditions) for individual discharges
so that the receiving water quality is maintained as far below the quality standard as
practicable."167
If on the other hand, the emission relates to a substance of the type in (c) above, the
company should stand more chance of success. However, it would still have to
demonstrate that the 'buffer zone' is unreasonably large for the purposes of allowing new
entrants and for coping with 'freak' discharges. This will not be an easy task.
5.2.6.5 Judicial Review of HMIP and Local Authorities (APC)168
Some challenges are likely to be centred around the core concept of [PC and APC -
BATNEEC. While review may lie against both TIVIIP (LPC) and Joca) authorkies
(APC), for the sake of convenience, I will be referring only to HMIP. References to
HiMIP in this section should therefore be taken to include local authorities unless
otherwise stated. HMIP are, by section 7 EPA 1990, under a duty to require prescribed
processes to use the best available techniques not entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC)
to: prevent, reduce, or render harmless the release of any prescribed substances; to
render harmless the release of any non-prescribed substances; to comply with any quality
objectives (eg. SWQ0s or AQSs); and to comply with any requirements specified by the
Secretary of State for the purposes of meeting EC or international environmental
obligations, or for the purposes of a national plan made under section 3(5).
There are obviously myriad ways in which a review action based around section 7 may
arise. If, for example, HMIP attempted to impose BATNEEC on a non-prescribed
process, this would clearly be ultra vires. However, for the most part I will be
concentrating on the core concept of BATNEEC itself
Before doing so, it is worth mentioning an interesting review possibility raised by
subsection (2)(a) of section 7. When looking at judicial review of the NRA earlier, it
was suggested that a review action might be available to an environmental group
unhappy with a consent granted to a discharger, if it could establish that the consent
1671bid., p.14.
168Both may be subject to review in respect of decisions on air pollution; HMIP also for water pollution
where prescribed processes are concerned. In certain circumstances, besides HMIP and local
authoritites, the Secretary of State may also be subject to review.
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would inevitably lead to a breach of the SWQO. In a footnote, 169 it was further noted
that even if the breach of the SWQO was nothing to do with consented emissions,
environmental groups could, if any IPC firms discharging to water were present, bring a
review action against HMIP for breach of the duty in s.7(2)(c) EPA 1990 to include
conditions in an authorisation which ensure compliance and achievement of any quality
objective prescribed by the Secretary of State. Under s.7(2)(c), the authorities would
seemingly be obliged to load the responsibility for meeting SWQ0s onto the [PC
processes, irrespective of their treatment of non-IPC dischargers and irrespective of the
fact that non-consented discharges (eg. diffuse, agricultural run-off) were the main cause
of the breach of SWQ0s. The same may be true in relation to AQSs and emissions to
air. If AQSs have been or seem likely to be breached, environmental groups could
arguably bring a review action against the enforcing authorities for breach of the duty in
s.7(2)(c) to include such conditions in authorisations such that quality standards or
objectives prescribed by the Secretary of State are achieved. As the law stands,
industrial processes subject to Part I EPA control must be set authorisations strict
enough that AQSs are met. Subsection (2)(c) is not constrained by any limitation such
as NEEC in BATNEEC. This may not be fair, as the transport sector t's t'ust as, ifant
more, responsible for any breaches in AQSs,( 7° but unSess The Saw is Onanged or unless
other means are found to address the problem, the enforcing authorities would appear to
be under a duty to achieve AQSs in this manner.
Moving on to arguably the core concept of section 7 - BATNEEC - companies and
pressure groups"' may seek to argue either that HMIP has erred in law"2 in its
interpretation of BATNEEC, or that a factual error occurred in determining the
authorisation. Or they might claim that although the facts and calculations are correct,
and the law correctly stated, FIMIF' have mis-applied the relevant law to the relevant
facts. For example, it might be claimed that while HMW's cost calculations are accurate
and their interpretation of 'NEEC' valid, their assessment that the costs are not excessive
is mistaken. This may then indicate that the test or interpretation they are actually using
is not the one they claim to be using, in which case a question of law is involved.
I69Note 163 ante.
"See DOE, 'Improving Air Quality', 1994, eg. paras. 4.23 and 5.3.
17I See further Purdue, 'Integrated Pollution Control in the Environmental Protection Act 1990: A
Coming of Age of Environmental Law?' (1991) 54 MLR 534. At p.541, Purdue notes that a private
prosecution cannnot be brought against a company complying with the conditions laid down by HMIP,
even if a third party thinks those conditions are in breach of the BATNEEC principle. He states that it
may, however "be open to a pressure group or other interested party to bring an action for judicial
review to have the specific condition quashed or declared invalid."
I72Bearing in mind the previous paragraph where it can be seen that s.7 imposes a duty on HMIP to
require BATNEEC, the ground of review would arguably be breach of duty. However, the question of
whether the duty has been breached can only be answered by considering whether eg. an error of law
has occurred.
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However, the better view is that of Emery and Smythe, who state that the application of
law to facts is a question of fact and degree and ought only to be overturned on
Wednesbury unreasonable grounds. 173 In fact, the two may not be so very different,
because if one is led to believe that a different test to the one stated is being used, the
decision under the stated test is also likely to be Wednesbury unreasonable in relation to
that test.
The law on error of law and the law on mistake of fact" 4 is, historically, rather
confused." 5 Basically, with both areas there are two extreme approaches and the law
has veered between these. Both extremes have a sound constitutional basis. On the one
hand, the courts can allow mistakes of law and fact to pass unchallenged and
unchallengeable. The constitutional justification for this would be that this is what
Parliament impliedly intended."6 Following Pepper v Hart 177 , if a minister, in the
course of debates on a Bill, has made it clear that the body concerned is to be the final
arbiter of a matter, then this would lend further justification to non-intervention on the
basis of the intention of Parliament. 178 On the other hand, the courts can choose
vigorously to defend the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. On this
view, the executive creates law via Parliament, but the courts aye theye to interpret it. to
allow the executive to be the final arbiter of the meaning of a statutory term would
destroy the principle of the separation of powers.
With mistakes of fact, the courts can adopt either an expansive approach to judicial
review or a limited approach:
1) Under an expansive approach, the courts would adopt the view that decisions
based upon mistaken facts are examples of injustice which they should remedy;"9
2) Under a limited approach, the judgment would be that a discretionary power to
make decisions includes the power to make decisions based on factual error.'"
173Emery & Smythe, Judicial Review, pp.95-7 and pp.108-127.
174Not the same as 'jurisdictional mistake of fact' - see Jones, 'Mistake of Fact in Administrative Law'
[1990] Public Lmv 507; there are very few cases involving jurisdictional fact.
175However, a reasonable account of jurisdiction is given by Craig, Administrative Law, ch. 9.
176Although the courts seem to have no qualms about intervening when Parliamentary intention
expressly provides for non-intervention in the form of ouster clauses - see eg. Anisminic v Foreign
Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
177[1994] 1 All ER 42.
178 See further Oliver, 'Pepper v Hart: A Suitable Case for Reference to Hansard?' [1993] Public Law 5
at pp.12-13. Oliver and others (See for example Baker, 'Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary
Intention' (1993) 52 CLJ 353) have questioned Pepper v Hart's constitutional integrity on the grounds
that the intention of one person (the minister) cannot represent the intention of the whole of Parliament.
179 See Jones, note 174 ante, at p.512.
180ibid.
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In practice, Jones suggests, the courts adopt a mid-path between these two extremes.
For example, they might hold that the mistake of fact must be 'material' - in the sense
that a different decision would have been made without 4; 181 or they might only
challenge a mistake of fact if it is Wednesbury unreasonable. 182 As Jones notes, 183 the
'material' approach will lead to the courts intervening more frequently, because there
may be many material mistakes which are not perverse in the Wednesbury sense. The
recent case of R v ITC, ex p. TS'W Broadcasting Ltd' 84 contains seemingly conflicting
opinions on the matter: Lord Templeman expressed a view similar to that in (2) above -
that to interfere would involve the court substituting its views for those of the ITC; Lord
Goff, on the other hand, adopted something akin to the 'material' approach. Lord Goffs
approach is to be preferred, because to quash a decision founded upon error is not to
substitute one's own view, but rather to correct a mistake. In any event, mistake of fact
is seldom likely to be an issue in the determination of pollution authorisations. This is
because, in cases like the ITC case - the only way to resolve the effect of the mistake
would have been to take the franchise away from the 'winner' and start the process all
over again - which would have involved considerable expense, delay and uncertainty.
No such problems arise with discharge authorisations, because correcting the mistake is
a relatively simple operation: correcting the error will be less costly for HMLP than
defending a judicial review action.
With questions of law, the courts have recently followed the logic of the Anisminic185
case and decided that all errors of law are jurisdictional. 186 In other words, a body
cannot misdirect itself as to the law and not then be subject to judicial review.
Previously, it was possible to have a non-jurisdictional error of law - errors of law made
by a body would not be reviewed as long as those errors were made within their
jurisdiction. Now that the courts have decided that all errors of law are reviewable, they
are free to intervene with decisions when they wish to do so. However, there will be
occasions when they do not wish to intervene with what, on the face of it, is an error of
law. Of course, if they think there has been no error, the court will have no problems.
If they think there has been an error, there will be two approaches available to them:
first, they can decide, as in ex p. Page, that it is simply not an area which is amenable to
judicial review on the grounds of error of law; second, they can classify the question as
1S Jason v Secretary of State for the Environment and Bromsgrove District Council [1984] JPL 332 at
333 - see Jones, note 174 ante, at p.515.
182See Lord Brightman in Pulhofer v Hillingdon LBC [1986] AC 484 at p.518 - see Jones, note 174
ante, at p.516.
183Jones, note 174 ante, at p.518.
184The Times, 7 February 1992 (noted by Jones, 'Judicial Review Of The Independent Television
Commission' [1992] Public Law 372).
185Note 176 ante.
186See R v Hull University l'isitor, ex p. Page [1992] 3 WLR 1112 at p.1123.
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one of fact and degree rather than one of law. This classification is likely to be made on
an ex post facto basis - having decided not to intervene, they will label the question as
one of fact - rather than on the basis of pre-existing principle. So what will the position
be in relation to HMIP and BATNEEC? It is difficult to predict which approach the
courts would adopt.'" On the one hand, our courts have traditionally adopted a non-
interventionist stance in relation to regulatory agencies, which would point towards
leaving the meaining of BATNEEC for BMW to decide. They may also feel ill-
equipped to tackle the complex ecological and economic questions raised by an
interpretation of BATNEEC. 188 On the other hand, the courts may be inclined to
intervene to provide companies with some certainty in an area of confusion. HMLP
would appear to have done little to lift the burden of this uncertainty; it may well be that
the courts would feel duty bound to step in to remedy this. In addition, the shadow of
Pepper v Hart looms large again at this point because counsel may argue that a conflict
between IIMIP's interpretation and that put forward by the Minister in Parliament
should lead the court to intervene to uphold the will of Parliament. The requirements of
Pepper v Hart are that the words should be ambiguous or obscure, that the material
relied upon must consist of statements made by the Minister or other promoter of the
Bill and finally that those statements should be clear.' 89 There is no problem with the
first requirement here - BATNEEC is certainly obscure. As for the second, one
significant discussion of BATNEEC does take place at the committee stage,'" but most
of the talking is done by Bryan Gould rather than David Trippier, the Minister
promoting the Environmental Protection Bill. On the final requirement, scrutiny of
Hansard does not reveal much in this particular case, although the Minister does make it
clear that BATNEEC is supposed to be stricter than the old best practicable means
187Most of the articles on IPC assume that BATNEEC will be interpreted by the courts. Gibson states
that "Since BATNEEC is embodied in the legal requirements for authorisations, its interpretation
should in theory be a matter for the courts" (p.25). Harris states that "It is inevitable, however, that the
courts will play a major part in refining the definition(s) of BATNEEC" (p.622). Purdue comments that
"It is likely that that the court would only interfere where there was clear evidence that the specific
condition did not in fact achieve BATNEEC, or that the authority had erred in law in its interpretation
of that term" (p.541). (Gibson, note 5 ante; Harris, 'Integrated Pollution Control In Practice' [1992]
JPEL 611; Purdue, note 171 ante).
188See eg. Cutts, note 150 ante. This may indicate a need for a specialist environmental court - see eg.
Woolf, 'Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?' (1992) 4 JEL 1; Carnwath, 'Environmental
Enforcement - The Need for a Specialist Court' [1992] JPEL 799, and McAuslan, 'The Role of Courts
and Other Judicial Type Bodies in Environmental Management' (1991) 3 JEL 195. For a similar
argument in the US, see Trubatch, 'Informed Judicial Decision-making; A Suggestion for a Judicial
Office for Understanding Science and Technology' (1985) 10 Col Jo of Env Law 255.
189For the application of Pepper v Hart in a different environmental context (conservation - s.28 of the
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) - see (1993) 4 Water Lam 88.
190HC Standing Committee H, 30 January 1990. In the Lords, it NI as declared that a draft of the first
DOE guide which was referred to as giving the Government's general interpretation of BATNEEC, had
been placed in the Library (HL Debates cols. 767-8, 26 April 1990). Whether, following Pepper v Hart,
this therefore makes the draft of the first DOE guide conclusive as to the interpretation of BATNEEC,
is open to question.
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(BPM) standard and that standards must be met irrespective of financial difficulties
facing a particular firm. 191 The relevance of the latter will become obvious as the
discussion proceeds.
5.2.6.5.1 A 'I-lands-off Stance by the Courts
If the courts adopt a 'hands-off approach, we need to scrutinise closely HMIP's current
interpretation of BATNEEC. It will be important to do so because an applicant may be
able to demonstrate that the Inspectorate has failed to stick to its own policy. They
could then claim either that they had a legitimate expectation that this would be
followed, 192 or that the Inspectorate had failed to take account of a relevant
consideration. What we will see below, is that HMIP interpretation of the NEEC
element of BATNEEC in particular, is confused and rather limited.
HMIP's current interpretation of BATNEEC can be gleaned from two sources. 193 The
first is the non-statutory guidance to the 'public' on the meaning of BATNEEC
contained in the DOE booklet 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', which
has recently been updated (1993). 'Best' is taken to mean the most effective in
preventing, minimising, or rendering harmless polluting emissions. However, there may
be more than one set of 'best' techniques because various techniques may achieve
comparable effectiveness. 'Available' is taken to mean procurable in the sense that a
technique is generally accessible. This does not imply that it should be in general use,
and techniques from abroad or from a monopoly supplier count as available.
'Techniques' are defined in section 7(10) EPA 1990 and as well as the technology
employed in a process, the term refers to the number, qualifications, training and
supervision of workers and the design, construction, lay-out and maintenance of the
buildings in which the process is carried on. The guide provides a further, slight gloss to
this definition.
As for 'not entailing excessive cost' (NEEC), the guide states that its meaning will vary
depending on whether it is applied to new processes or existing processes. However,
for both new and old processes, BAT need not be imposed where the costs would be
1911bid., cols. 202, 206 and 214. Thus, if it was clear that HMIP had taken into account a particular
firm's financial position, one could use Pepper v Hart to argue that the courts should intervene to secure
the intention of Parliament.
192See eg. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337.
193 As Jones (Jones, 'Regulatory Policy and Rule-Making' (1991) 20(2) Anglo-American LR 131) and
others have stated, in studying regulation, "there appears to be a growing recognition that there is a
need to study the law of regulators as well as the law and regulators" (p.131) because "an examination
of an agency's own rules and standards can reveal more information about the regulatory process than a
reading of the statutory provisions" (p.133).
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excessive in relation to the nature of the industry and the level of environmental
protection to be achieved.
For new processes, the guide states that it is expected that BAT and BATNEEC will be
synonymous, but the cost of BAT must be weighed against the environmental damage
caused by the process and "the greater the environmental damage, the greater the costs
of BAT that can be required before costs are considered excessive." 194 If BATNEEC is
not sufficient to prevent serious harm, an application can be refused. Finally, the
concern is with what costs in general are excessive; costs to a particular firm and the
effects on its profitability should not be considered. For existing processes, the guidance
is much less clear. We are not told much about the relationship between cost and
environmental benefit beyond the initial statement in the previous paragraph about both
new and old processes. It is worth noting the absence of any reference to profitability of
particular firms and the presence of the statement that, in considering whether to impose
BATNEEC, account should be taken of "the desirability of not entailing excessive costs
for the plant concerned, having regard in particular to the economic situation of
undertakings belonging to the category in question." 195 An initial consultation paver
suggests that it was the government's intention that for existing plants, HMIP could take
into account the financial and trading circumstance of the individual plant i96
 - as does a
National Audit Office report 197 The other significant difference between existing and
new processes is that, with the former, their rate of utilization and the length of their
remaining life will also be taken into account.
Another, arguably more important source of guidance on HMIP's interpretation of
NEEC, is the IPC Manual - an internal (but, at least for some sections, publicly
available) HMIP document used by inspectors in determining applications. The manual
contains the following on NEEC:
"It is not sufficient to describe excessive costs in absolute terms without reference to
the cost of the product. The applicant must be able to demonstrate that the increased
cost of the product produced by the best available technique is grossly disproportionate
to any environmental benefit likely to accrue from that method of production. The extra
cost must represent a significant fraction of the cost of the finished product."198
194Para. 7.8.
195Para. 7.11, emphasis added.
196See DOE, note 165 ante, p.15.
191NAO, note 5 ante, para. 3.10.
19 8I-IMIP, IPC Manual, 1991, para. 3.2.
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The manual states that this should be the approach where an applicant has selected a
process that is not the best practicable environmental option (BPEO). In this situation,
the applicant must demonstrate, by comparing the cost of the product using his preferred
option with the cost using BATNEEC, that BPEO would involve excessive cost. What
is not clear, is whether this approach will apply to all applications, or only those where
BPEO is at issue. 199
 Furthermore, as Pearce and Brisson have noted, the extract is
rather ambiguous because it seems to advocate both what I will be referring to later as a
'corporate burden' approach and an 'environmental benefit' approach, 200 without
considering how the two interrelate. Also problematic is the statement in the passage
that the cost of BAT should make up a 'significant fraction' of the cost of the finished
product to be considered excessive: nowhere in the manual are we told what would
represent a significant fraction 201
The manual provides further guidance on the balance between cost and environmental
benefit. It states that in deciding BATNEEC for preventing and minimising the release
of prescribed substances, inspectors should take no account of the "absolute value of
any local environmental effects of the releases. For new processes the same standards
should apply to all like processes whatever their location.“ 202 However, when it comes
to rendering releases harmless, the manual states that local environmental factors will be
relevant in deciding what is BATNEEC. For example, it says that "a release of a
harmful substance to a large river would require a less stringent standard than a release
to a small river because of the dilution available in the large river." 203 I will argue below
that this is wrong, at least where dangerous substances are concerned.
5.2.6.5.2 An Interventionist Stance by the Courts
If the courts204 decide to intervene to provide their own interpretation of BATNEEC,
one needs to be aware of the possible interpretations they could offer. In relation to the
BAT element of BATNEEC, it is suggested that the courts are unlikely to intervene
because the current interpretations are relatively uncontroversial. Even if the courts do
199 1n one sense of course, anything that is not BAT is not the BPEO.
noSee text at note 206, post.
201 Pearce & Brisson, note 2 ante, p.33.
2021PC Manual, para. 3.4.2.
2°3Ibid..
204And this might include the European Court of Justice: in relation to air pollution, BATNEEC is a
term used in Art. 13 of the Air Framework Directive 84/360, though 'T' there refers to 'technology'
rather than the wider 'techniques' in our national legislation. If our courts decided to intervene, they
might - in a case involving emissions to air covered by the Directive - decide to refer the matter to the
ECJ under Art. 177 of the Treaty. Alternatively, the matter could come to the attention of the ECJ if a
complaint was made to the Commission and they decided to launch Art. 169 proceedings. See 188
ENDS Report (1990) 3 at p.4.
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decide to interpret BAT themselves, the range of possible interpretations has been fairly
well explored. The reader should refer back to the previous section for details. In this
section then, I will be examining the NEEC element of BATNEEC, which is potentially
much more controversial and which has received little in the way of detailed analysis. In
looking to the range of possible interpretations of NEEC, it will be instructive to refer to
US law, where similar provisions have been interpreted by the courts in judicial review
actions. 205
As regards 'excessive cost' within NEEC, the question is excessive in relation to what?
Pearce and Brisson have usefully suggested that there are two different approaches that
seem to be taken: first, there is what they call the 'corporate burden' concept, where
cost is balanced against the effect on company costs or profits; secondly, there is what
they call the 'national burden' concept, where the cost of BAT is compared to the
environmental benefit derived. 206
 I will be adopting this distinction, only using different
terminology: I will be contrasting 'corporate burden' interpretations of BATNEEC with
'environmental benefit' approaches; the term 'national burden' is, I believe, potentially
confusing since it could conceivably refer to 'corporate burden' at a national level.
I) Environmental Benefit
1) Cost could be measured against an absolute environmental benefit. For example:
if BAT will reduce emissions by 99% at a cost of £100,000, whereas a lesser technology
will reduce emissions by 97% at a cost of 15,000 - BAT may be considered excessive.
2) Cost could be measured against a local environmental benefit. This could
comprise two different approaches:
a) In the first, it might be argued that a cost is excessive if it is not required for the
purposes of securing an environmental quality objective such as a SWQO, an AQS, or a
critical load level of acid deposition in relation to acid rain.
205The fact that US courts have reviewed the meanings of similar provisions in US environmental
legislation does not of course mean that our courts will adopt a similarly interventionist stance.
Historically, the US has had a much greater distrust of its regulatory agencies, and the courts are
effectively regulators in their own right. Not only do we have a more trusting attitude towards our
regulators (rightly or wrongly), our judges lack the expertise in economics and science which, certainly
as regards the former, US administrative law judges possess. To a certain extent, this no doubt reflects
the maturity and prominence of environmental law in the US. It may also be an argument for
introducing a specialist environmental court in this country.
206Note 2 ante, p.32.
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If for example the stringency of the standard is not required for the purposes of meeting
the SWQO (the SWQO would still be achieved if the company was granted a much less
strict authorisation), could a company argue that this does not reflect BATNEEC? It is
clear, under sections 7(2)(c) and 28(3)(a) EPA 1990 that a company cannot claim that
any measure is excessive if it is necessary for the purposes of securing SWQ0s. But
that is not our concern here; we are now considering whether something like the
converse is true - ie. whether a measure is excessive if it is not required to achieve
SWQ0s. Section 28(3) goes on to state that the NRA may lay down appropriate
conditions which the enforcing authority must include, 207
 but that the latter may impose
more onerous conditions "if it appears appropriate to do so." This confirms that HMIP
can impose BATNEEC conditions under section 7 that are stricter than those required
for the purposes of meeting SWQ0s. 208
 This is certainly the Government's view: in the
IPC guide, it states that "HMIP may set additional or tighter conditions over releases to
water, if for example higher standards are available under BATNEEC than those
required by the NRA to safeguard water quality objectives."209
Nevertheless, I would suggest that it may be legitimate to regard a cost as excessive
within BATNEEC if it is not required for the purpose of meeting the SWQO - but only
if the control cost relates to non-dangerous substances. As we saw earlier when looking
at the NRA, the 'red list' substances are mostly toxic, bioaccumulable or persistent and
need to be systematically controlled over the long-term - not just for their short-term
impact on the environment. SWQ0s for these substances do not ensure a safe level of
bioaccumulation or persistence. Nobody can be entirely sure what a 'safe' level of
dangerous substances in water is; such substances, even in minute concentrations, may
pose a long-term threat. Hence the need for the 'precautionary' approach enshrined in
Directive 76/464, which makes it clear that the aim is to minimise the input of List I
substances.
What however, is the position regarding the emission of non-prescribed (ie. non- red
list) substances? 21 ° Section 7(2)(a)(i) states that BATNEEC must be used to prevent,
2071n fact, the NRA routinely uses this power where there are emissions to water from a prescribed
process.
208But although setting a standard stricter than that required to achieve SWQ0s will not automatically
amount to an excessive cost, that is not to say that HMIP can simply impose a higher standard than the
NRA simpliciter; they can only do so if this would not involve an excessive cost.
209D0E guide, para. 13.2.
210There are two possible scenarios in which such emissions might occur: first, a prescribed process
might not be emitting any prescribed substance to water, only non-prescribed ones (however, it is worth
noting that, in that case, it must be emitting a prescribed substance to either air or land, or it will not be
subject to HMIP control at all - see reg. 4, The Environmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and
Substances) Regulations 1991, SI 1991 No. 472); secondly, a prescribed process might be emitting both
prescribed and non-prescribed substances to water.
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reduce and render harmless the release of prescribed substances. It is clear from what
we have said above that merely achieving the SWQO for a prescribed substance will not
achieve harmlessness. 2 " Section 7(2)(a)(ii) EPA 1990 requires only that BATNEEC be
used to 'render harmless' all non-prescribed substances. The claim would therefore be,
that as long as SWQ0s are achieved, the BATNEEC requirement is satisfied in this
case, because SWQ0s for non-prescribed substances do represent ambient levels which
are harmless to the environment. 212 This means that BATNEEC need not be imposed to
reduce these emissions further, or - looking at it the other way around - that conditions
should be relaxed because the SWQO is being met easily. To answer this claim, we
have to go back to my earlier observations on judicial review of the NRA by industry.
As there, the answer here will depend on the type of non-prescribed (ie. non-red-list)
substance being emitted: if it is a list II substance, the claim ought in many cases to fail
because many of the list II substances are extremely dangerous; if it is a relatively
harmless list II substance or a non-list II substance, the grounds for tying 'NEEC' to
SWQ0s are stronger.
Having considered water pollution, what about air pollution? Might a firm claim that an
emission standard was excessive within BATNEEC if it is not necessary for the
purposes of achieving the AQS associated with that substance (if indeed, given the
limited number of AQSs, one existed)? The answer here is far from straightforward and
raises complicated issues about the distribution of control costs between the industrial,
domestic and automotive sectors213 of the economy. As with SWQ0s, it will obviously
depend on issues such as the size of the buffer zone, and the presence of other industries
emitting similar substances. Here the matter is complicated further by the fact that other
sectors (such as the automotive sector) might claim an equal entitlement to any
regulatory reductions.
Acid rain policy raises further issues concerning the link between BATNEEC and
environmental quality objectives. Might, for example, one of the electricity generating
companies claim that the cost of installing BAT (eg. flue gas desulphurisation equipment
- FGD) is excessive if it is not needed for the purposes of achieving their share of the
national plan, or critical loads? The answer to the former ought to be no, and to the
latter (critical loads) possibly yes. To see why, we need to explore the background in
more detail.
2 " The subsection does not of course require that all prescribed substances must be rendered harmless if
their emission cannot be prevented or reduced. If that were possible, why worry about preventing or
reducing? All it can mean is that all attempts which do not entail excessive costs should be made to
render the release harmless.
2 I 2ENDS, Dangerous Substances in Water: A Practical Guide, p.21.
213 1e
 
emissions from cars, lorries etc..
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The Large Combustion Plants Directive requires the UK to achieve a 60% reduction in
sulphur dioxide emissions by the year 2003 and a 30% cut in emissions of nitrogen
oxides by 1998, beginning from a 1980 baseline. 214
 These gases have been identified as
the prime causes of acid rain. In order to implement this Directive, the Secretary of
State used his power under section 3 EPA 1990 to set a national plan for the progressive
reduction of sox and nox (as they are known in the trade). 215 This plan contains
emission quotas on sox and nox for the power station, oil refinery and 'other industry'
sectors. The amounts in the quota which each sector is entitled to emit will be gradually
tightened each year. Within the electricity generating industry, there are sub-quotas for
each generator. Across all sectors, there are also quotas for individual plants. The
electricity generators (and them alone) are able to make use of a 'bubble' concept. This
allows them to exceed an individual plant emission quota as long as this is offset by a
decrease in a plant of theirs elsewhere, such that they do not exceed their overall
corporate sub-quota. However, since mid-1993 there is not only a plant limit under the
national plan, but also an HMIP limit for sox and nox (which has nothing to do with
BATNEEC). As ENDS notes, "the result may be perplexing to the uninitiated"
because "each power station already has an emission ceiling allocated to it under a
national plan. "216 The purpose of these second limits is to provide maxima beyond
which trade-offs with other plants cannot occur, with fiN/LIP granting low limits to
environmentally sensitive plants and limits up to 50% beyond those in the national plan
for plants in non-sensitive areas:
"The difference between the two ceilings is that if one of the generators wants to
operate a particular station so intensively that it will exceed its specific emission
allocation under the national plan, it is free to do so provided any emission in excess of
its annual allocation is offset by lower emissions at other plants if this is necessary to
keep the company's overall emissions within its total allocation for the year. In contrast,
the ceilings set by HMIP are fixed."2"
Under section 7 EPA 1990, LPC authorisations must comply with the national plan.
Section 7 EPA also requires HMIP to impose BATNEEC in every authorisation. This is
214The recently agreed UNECE protocol will replace the uniform targets set by the Directive in respect
of sulphur emissions with individual national targets to reflect acid damage more closely. The UK's
target is to reduce SO2 emissions by 50% by 2000, 70% by 2005 and 80% by 2010. A UNECE
agreement on nox emissions will follow shortly. The form of implementation of the protocols within
the UK is unlikely to change much from that for the EC Directives described below.
215DOE, 'The United Kingdom's Programme and National Plan for Reducing Emissions of Sulphur
Dioxide and Oxides of Nitrogen from Existing Large Combustion Plants', December 1990.
216219 ENDS Report (1993) 15 at p.16.
217/bid..
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similarly a requirement of Community law - Article 13 of the Air Framework Directive
84/360 states that BATNEEC must be used in the control of air pollution.
The above laws were put to the test when both National Power and PowerGen applied
to burn Orimulsion (a Venezuelan, bitumen-based fuel with a high sulphur content) at a
number of their under-used oil-fired power stations. The questions were whether they
should be required to fit FGD equipment and whether the installation should be
immediate. In relation to National Power, the answer to the second question was
relatively straightforward: if FGD was required, it would have to be fitted immediately
because the switch from oil to Orimulsion was a 'substantial change' within section 11
of the EPA 1990, which meant that HMIP were perfectly within their rights to demand
that the plant should have FGD installed. 2 " For PowerGen's plants at Richborough in
Kent and Ince in Cheshire, FGD would not have to be fitted immediately, because they
had obtained permission to burn Orimulsion before the EPA 1990 came into force.219
This meant that there was no 'substantial change' under the Act.
As for the first question, National Power claimed that all that was required was for them
to remain within their SO2 quota under the national plan, which they could do without
fitting FGD. 22° To impose BAT (FGD) when not required for the purposes of meeting
their quota would, they claimed, be to impose an excessive cost. However, this fails to
account for section 7 EPA 1990 which requires BATNEEC to be used to 'render
harmless' the release of any prescribed substances (of which, in relation to air, SO 2 is
one). 221
 The plan and BATNEEC must both be satisfied - they are not alternatives.
Thus, with National Power's proposal to burn Orimulsion at its Pembroke plant, there
was evidence that the high sulphur dioxide emissions stemming from the high-sulphur
fuel would add to the existing breaches of critical loads of acid deposition across much
of mid-Wales. In other words, the sulphur emissions from the plant would certainly not
be rendered harmless.
Neverthless, the position might be different if a company could show that one of its
plant's emissions were within its company bubble and would not affect the
environmental quality objective of critical loads. In these circumstances, it might be
appropriate for HMIP to decide that the imposition of BAT (eg. FGD) would be
excessive in relation to the environmental quality objective to be achieved. This raises
—
21gSee further 201 ENDS Report (1991) 7 at p.8.
219/bid..
220jba..
2 2 I 5ee sch. 4 of the En% ironmental Protection (Prescribed Processes and Substances)(Amendinent)
Regulations 1992 (SI 1992 No. 614)
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some interesting possibilities in relation to existing authorisations. PowerGen's plants at
Richborough and Ince have been granted authorisations to burn Orimulsion and while,
as existing plants, they have been given time to do so, they have been ordered to install
sulphur abatement equipment by 1998.222 If, as HMIP seems to believe, Richborough
poses little if any threat to critical loads, 223
 then PowerGen would surely have grounds
for arguing that the cost of installing FGD is excessive within BATNEEC - ie. that the
cost of BAT is an excessive cost because it is not necessary for the purposes of
achieving its national quota or for achieving the environmental quality objective (albeit a
non-legal, informal one) of critical loads. It seems that PowerGen are considering an
abatement system based on lime injection which is cheaper than FGD but which may not
meet new plant standards. 224
 If HMIP try to insist on FGD, they could face a challenge
in the courts.
How then does the approach in the HMIP internal manual (discussed in the previous
section on a 'hands-off approach by the courts), square with all of this? It will be
recalled that it appears to suggest that if prevention or minimisation of prescribed
substances is not possible, then the particular BATNEEC for rendering substances
harmless may vary according to local environmental circumstances. In relation to air,
where substances such as SO2
 are prescribed, this makes perfect sense and would fit in
with the critical loads point made above. In relation to water, as we have seen, this may
be sensible where non-dangerous substances are concerned, but it is not recommended
as an interpretation of BATNEEC for dangerous substances.
b) The second approach to local environmental quality would insist on measuring the
benefit of varying ambient conditions which different technologies might produce; this is
what economists generally mean by cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 225 So, for example, if
technology X cost £50,000 but produced an ambient environmental quality the value of
which was put at £10,000, the cost would outweigh the benefit. In the US case of
Portland Cement Association v Ruckelshcms 226, the court rejected the local CBA
approach, partly because of the time which such an analysis would take and partly
because of "the difficulty, if not impossibility, of quantifying the benefit to ambient air
conditions." 227
 Attempts have been made to ascertain economically 'efficient' effluent
222223 ENDS Report (1993) 10.
2231bid..
224 Mid..
225ThiS is the approach advocated by Pearce and Brisson, note 2 ante.
226(1975) 486 F.2d 375.
2 2Vbid at p.387; see also Appalachian Power Co. v Train (1976) 545 F.2d 1351 at p.1361.
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standards. 228 However, it is one thing to compare abatement costs with benefits derived
from contingent valuation methods (eg. asking people how much they are prepared to
pay for a river with fish as opposed to one without) where only one firm is emitting non-
prescribed substances; it is quite another matter to suggest that benefit figures for each
firm could be assessed where a number of firms are emitting toxic, persistent and
bioaccumulative substances. David Pearce himself admits that while there is an
extensive literature on economic valuation of environmental damage, "much of it has not
been aimed at the kinds of questions that are relevant to finding a damage per unit of
pollutant. Moreover, the extent to which damage estimates, when they are obtained,
can be transferred to other contexts is not known.”229
3) Cost-benefit may involve balancing the cost of BAT with the environmental
benefit, but should cost be calculated on an incremental basis? In other words, should
the agency consider each additional increment of treatment control, from bare minimum
to zero-emissions level? In Weyerhaeuser v Cos11e230, the court rejected this, stating
that "cost need not be balanced against benefits with pinpoint precision." All that was
required was a 'net' cost-benefit balancing.
II) Corporate Burden
I) The cost of BAT must be weighed against the cost of the finished product.
Reference to cost of the product here could refer to product price or to production
cost. 231 As Pearce and Brisson note, the distinction between price and production cost
is important. installing pollution-control equipment may have a marked effect on
production costs and yet not be reflected in the final product prices because the
company may be forced to sell at prices which do not cover production costs in order to
maintain market share 232 According to Pearce and Brisson, the only meaningful
measure is that of production costs or profitability.233
Assuming that whether BAT is imposed does depend on the proportion it forms of
overall production costs, then, according to Pearce and Brisson, there ought to be some
assessment of the effect of BAT on socially 'acceptable' rates of return to capital 234 As
2285ee eg. Ramchandani and Gourlay, 'Alternathe Approaches to Setting Effluent Quality Standards'
(1992) 11 1E11 10.
2 29pearce & Brisson, note 2 ante, at p.38.
230 Weyerhaeuser Co. v Costle (1978) 590 F.2d 1011 at p.1047
23tpearce and Bnsson, note 2 ante, at p.32.
23211nd..
233Ibrd.
234Jba., at p.32.
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they note, "If BAT forces rates of return below the socially acceptable level, then the
cost of BAT can be said to be 'excessive'." 235
 The difficulty comes in trying to define
what constitutes a socially acceptable rate of return.236
2) The cost of BAT must be weighed as a proportion of the final product cost but the
effect of any cost increase on competition with 'substitute' industries should also be
considered. In other words, in BATNEEC, is 'excessive' an absolute, or should it be
considered in relation to other industries? Thus, in Portland, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had considered that the extra costs of control equipment to
the cement industry "could be passed on without substantially affecting competition with
construction substitutes such as steel, asphalt and aluminium ... " 237 What about
excessive when compared to standards imposed on completely unrelated industries? In
Portland, the court stated that the EPA was not required to justify different standards in
different industries.238
3) The cost of imposing BAT is excessive given the effect this will have on
international competitiveness. This is a similar issue to (2) above but concerns the same
industry abroad rather than 'substitute' industries at home.
4) Is an excessive cost one that would close a particular firm down? In
Weyerhaeuser, the court cited Senator Muskie's remarks from the Legislative History,
that Congress did not envisage imposing on the EPA any requirement to consider the
economic impact of controls on any individual plants in a single community. 239 In the
original DOE guide on IPC, this issue was not addressed. In the updated, 1993 version,
it is rejected for new processes, but as we have seen, it may be that for existing
processes, costs to the particular plant will be considered.
III) Further Considerations Cutting Across Both the Above Approaches
1) Must costs be weighed against benefits for each plant, or only for a class or
category of industry ?
 If the IPC sector guidance notes issued by the Chief Inspector
form the sole basis of most authorisations, the latter would appear to be current
practice. 240
 The National Audit Office report confirms that this was indeed the DOE's
236Ibid., at pp 32-3.
237Note 226 ante, at p.388
238/brd., at pp.389-390.
239Note 230 ante, at p.I045, n.52.
240Harris (note 187 ante, at p 617) suggests that, in the early stages at least, the notes are likely to be
applied i%holesale. Houever, the older the notes become, the less likely this skill be. Of course, some of
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intention. 241
 That is to say that costs will be compared with benefits when drawing up
each guidance note, and it will be up to an individual firm to present its own cost-benefit
analysis to show that it should be granted a variance from the standards in the guidance
note. 242 Broadly speaking, this is the position adopted in the US.243
2) How do all the considerations fit together? For example, in the US, under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 244
 section 304(b)(1)(B), in deciding on the 'best
practicable control technology currently achievable' (BPCTCA), the EPA must:
a) compare control costs with effluent reduction benefits
b) take into account other factors such as the age of the equipment, the process
employed, engineering aspects, energy requirements etc..
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v Costle the court held that the EPA must weigh costs and benefits
separately - in the form of a 'limited balancing test', but that the 'other factors' can be
considered in any fashion/structure that the EPA sees fit. 245 At this point, it is probably
worth making a few comments about the US system of water pollution control. Section
30 1(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (as amended) autiumists
the EPA to set effluent standards for new point sources. For existing sources, there was
a two stage programme: all sources had to apply the 'best practicable control technology
currently available' (BPCTCA) by July 1977 and, in the second stage, they had to
achieve the 'best available technology economically achievable' (BATEA) by July 1983.
Needless to say, the 1972 aims were never realised. The FWPCA was amended in 1977
and 1987 to reduce the stringency of the programme. 246
 The danger with comparative
law is that one will look at a different system without paying sufficient attention to the
specific statutory context. Thus here, when thinking of BATNEEC, one might be
inclined to look at the interpretation the US courts have given to the similarly worded
BATEA, rather than BPCTCA - simply because the first three letters of the acronym are
more alike. However, this would be a mistake because we do not have a two stage
approach. BATEA requires a movement towards zero pollution, and because it is more
a counsel of perfection, the variance provisions are more flexible - for example,
economic viability will be a legitimate factor in determining BATEA but, as we saw in
(4) earlier, not for BPCTCA.
the notes are now quite old, IA hich means that individualisation - weighing costs and benefits for each
plant - may now be taking place in some cases.
24I NA0 report, note 5 ante, para. 3.9.
242 See Harris, note 187 ante, at p.617.
243E1 Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Train (1977) 51 L.Ed. 2d 204.
244A5 amended, most importantly for our purposes, in 1972; it was amended again in 1977, since when
it as been called the Clean Water Act.
245Note 230 ante, at pp. 1045-1046.
246See further Goldfarb, Water Law; and Yeager, The Limits of Law.
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5.2.6.6 Judicial Review of Waste Regulation Authorities
With WRAs, it is perhaps more difficult to suggest possible avenues for review of their
decisions on licensing conditions (the waste management licence being the equivalent to
the NRA consent or HNIIP/local authority authorisation). Part II of the EPA 1990
introducing the waste management licensing system has now been brought into force,247
but unlike with the WRA 1991 and EPA 1990 Part I, there are not many obvious
features of the legislation which are likely to attract review. In fact, the waste field has
already seen one review action - based not on the new legislation but on the old, and
based not on breach of duty, which is the ground of challenge we have largely been
focusing on, but on improper purpose. 248 In AG's Ref (No. 2 of 1988), 249
 the Court of
Appeal ruled that a decision to impose a condition requiring a waste disposal site to be
operated in such a way as to avoid a nuisance was taken for an improper purpose.250
As for cases based on breach of duty, one obvious duty would have been the duty placed
on Waste Regulation Authorities by section 61 EPA 1990 to inspect their area for
contaminated land. Under subsection (7), if they find such land, they are then under a
duty to clean it up so as to avoid pollution or harm to human health. 251 However, the
section was never brought into force and the issue of contaminated land has now been
tackled anew in the Environment Bill. Another section which may attract review is the
duty in section 42. Under this section, WRAs are placed under a duty to take the
necessary steps to ensure that operators do not cause pollution, harm to human health or
a nuisance and to ensure that all the conditions of the licence are complied with.
Another is the 'fit and proper person' provision of sections 36(3) and 74; similar
provisions in relation to waste carriers have already been the subject of a controversial
appeal to the Secretary of State.252
247The Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Commencement No. 15) Order 1994 (SI 1994 No. 1096)
and The Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No. 1056).
248011 improper purpose, see eg. Westminster Corporation v London and Northwestern Railway Co
[1905] AC 426 and R v ILEA ex p. Westminster City Council [1986] 1 WLR 28. The case could equally
have been decided on the ground that the authority had taken into account an irrelevant consideration.
249119901 2 JEL 80.
250As Ball & Bell note, it is not clear whether the case would be decided the same way under s.35(3)
EPA 1990 as opposed to COPA 1974. On the one hand, the purposes of the EPA 1990 are broader than
COPA in that they include the protection of the whole environment and not just water; on the other
hand, it could still be argued that nuisance is to be dealt with via the statutory nuisance provisions of the
EPA rather than by imposing specific conditions in licences on avoiding nuisances (Ball & Bell,
Environmental Law, p.327).
251 0wen Lomas observed that it "can only be a matter of time before an environmental group, having
unsuccessfully pressed a WRA to investigate and clean up a clearly contaminated site, takes proceedings
by way of judicial review to compel the authority to comply with its statutory duties" ('Environmental
Liability: Nightmare of the Nineties?' (1992) Sol Jo 1160 at p.1161).
252217 ENDS Report (1993) 13.
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5.2.6.7 Judicial Review of Water and Sewerage Companies
One of the issues which arises here is whether one can bring a judicial review action
against sewerage undertakers relating to their decisions on trade effluent consents.
After all, review is only available if an issue of public law is involved, and, following
privatisation, sewerage undertakers are private companies. However, using either test
for determining whether a public law issue is involved - the source of the power253
 or
the nature of the function 254
 - it seems clear that review would be available: the source
of the undertakers' power is statutory and they are exercising a public function.255
253R v Statutory Committee of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, ex p. Pharmaceutical
Society of Great Britain [1981] 1 WLR 886.
254R v Panel on Take-overs and Alergers, ex p. Datafin [1987] QB 815.
255A view reinforced by the decision in Griffin and Others v South West Water Services Ltd, 236 ENDS
Report (1994) 38.
CHAPTER 6
The Accountability of Environmental Agencies
IV Accountability For Enforcing Emission/Process
Standards
6.1 TORT'
Tort actions such as negligence, nuisance and trespass, provide a mechanism for holding
agencies to account for their enforcement decisions, because if an agency decides not to
prosecute, plaintiffs are still entitled to bring a civil claim against the polluter. However,
it will not normally be possible for environmental groups to make use of civil actions to
protect the environment, because there is typically a requirement that a plaintiff has a
proprietary interest or has suffered damage. Environmental groups will seldom fall into
this category. The draft EC Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste2
would have introduced a specifically 'environmental right', enabling groups to bring
actions despite the absence of any interference with their private rights. While this draft
has not been implemented, both the EC 5th Environmental Action Programme 3 and the
recent EC green paper on environmental liability' stress the role of environmental
groups in environmental law. When the EC finally introduces legislation on
environmental liability, it is thus quite likely that 'environmental rights' will play a part.
6.2 PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS
Private prosecutions present a mechanism for holding agencies to account for their
enforcement decisions, in that if an agency decides not to prosecute, individuals or
environmental organisations can step in and bring an action themselves. They are, in
K.C. Davis' terms, a kind of check on its enforcement discretion. 5
 Statute allows for
private prosecutions in some areas of environmental law but in others the right to bring a
private prosecution is either circumscribed or non-existent. Thus, under section 211
WIA 1991, private prosecutions for breaches of trade effluent consents can only be
l Actions in tort will also be discussed in relation to corporate accountability in chapter 8.
2 COM (89) 282.
3 'Towards Sustainability: A European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the
environment and sustainable development', OJ 1993, C138/5, ch. 9.
4European Commission Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47.
5Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry.
163
brought by a 'person aggrieved', a sewerage undertaker or with the written consent of
the Attorney-General. The statute does not make it clear quite who will count as a
'person aggrieved' in this context. It cannot mean just anyone, or this would render
obsolete the need for third parties to have the consent of the Attorney-General. By
analogy with the law on statutory nuisance, where a similar provision exists (section 82
EPA 1990), it is suggested that a person aggrieved refers to someone who has suffered
damage as a result of a breach of consent (eg. another factory or a person suffering
personal injury through an explosion). However, it seems much more likely that they
would bring a civil action for damages rather than a prosecution. Private prosecutions
are not available in respect of breaches of drinking water standards - only the Secretary
of State or the DPP can bring prosecutions.
One of the problems with private prosecutions is that they skew even-handed justice.
This is because private prosecutions are not guided by the agency's prosecution policy (if
it has one), which seeks to impose uniformity and fairness. However, that disadvantage
must be weighed against the advantages of increased accountability which such
prosecutions bring.
The existence of public registers should aid the cause of those bringing private
prosecutions: the registers contain actual company performance alongside the standards
set out in that company's consent, enabling citizens to take action where the register
suggests some irregularity. The exception here is trade eflluent consents: details of
samples taken do not have to be placed on the register - indeed, it is a criminal offence
under section 206(7) WIA 1991 for an employee of a sewerage undertaker to provide
such information. In any event, as has been seen, private prosecution is somewhat
limited.
While registers look like an unqualified 'good', they are not without their problems.
Research has shown that ordinary individuals are unlikely to make effective use of the
registers. 6 It has also been suggested that in practice, only fairly large interest groups
such as angling clubs and pressure groups like Friends of the Earth, will be able to afford
the cost of bringing private prosecutions - and even they will not find the process a
simple one. 7 Some of the largest obstacles relate to the nature of samples that can be
used as evidence in a prosecution. The first issue is whether samples have to be taken
6 See Burton, 'Access to Environmental Information - The UK Experience of Water Registers' (1989)
1(2) JEL 192.
7 Ibid.. This prediction has proved to be accurate - Greenpeace v Albright & Wilson, note 8 post, is one
of the few private prosecutions to have been brought; another is Wales v Thames Water Authority
(1987) 1(3) Env Law 3.
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only at official sampling points which may be inaccessible. In Greenpeace v Albright &
Wilson, 8 Greenpeace took their (tripartite) sample at the end of the pipe rather than the
offical sampling point which was within the site. The company argued that this was
unfair because a reaction might occur leading to a technical breach at the pipe's end, and
that the official sampling point was more indicative of compliance. 9 The magistrates
rejected this argument, finding for Greenpeace. However, as has been noted, a decision
made by the magistrates is not binding on themselves or on higher courts, so the case
has no precedential value. 1 ° It would therefore be open to a later court to reach a
contrary conclusion. If, in a future case, a higher court did rule that samples can only be
taken from the official sampling point, and as in the Greenpeace case, lawful access to
the official sampling point is impossible for non-NRA staff, a pressure group would have
to rely on information in the registers, or risk trespassing on the discharger's land. If the
latter course is taken, the evidence may be excluded under section 78 Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as improperly obtained, although in police cases the courts
will, in their discretion, usually allow such evidence. Besides the issue of taking samples
at the official sampling point, there is then the question of whether they can rely on a
single sample or whether they have to take a more expensive and time-consuming
tripartite sample. NRA v Harcros Timber and Building Supplies" establishes that NRA
samples must be tripartite to be admissible - whether the sample is of effluent or river
water.' 2 However the wording of section 209 WRA 1991 refers to samples taken 'on
behalf of the Authority', so private prosecutions may be able to rely on non-tripartite
samples. In Greenpeace v Albright & Wilson, this was not an issue because the sample
was tripartite.
If a pressure group is unable to gain access to the sampling point, it will have to rely on
the information on the register. 13
 There are two problems which will confront it here.
First, the NRA tends not to put sampling data on the register if it is considering a
prosecution." This will have no adverse effect if the NRA does eventually decide to
prosecute, but if it chooses not to, there may be a considerable delay before the
information becomes availabe to third party interests. Secondly, for reasons of economy
8(1991) 2(9) ELB 107 and (1991) 2(10) ELB 119.
9See further (1991) 3(6) LMELR 202 and (1992) 4(1) LMELR 23-4.
10See 203 ENDS Report (1991) 5, which suggests that pressure from other chemical companies not
wishing a binding precedent to be established may have led A&W to drop its appeal by way of case
stated from the magistrates.
1 'First instance decision reported in The Times, 2 April 1992, (1992) 3(6) ELB 73, and (1992) 3 Water
Law 71; The NRA's appeal was dismissed - [1993] Crim LR 221 (DC).
12This requirement for tripartite samples will be abolished if the Environment Bill is passed - see 239
ENDS Report (1994) 19.
13As was the case in Wales v Thames Water Authority, note 7 ante, where the prosecution was
successful.
14See (1991) 2(9) ELB 104.
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and strategy, most NRA samples which appear on the register are not tripartite." It is
not clear whether these samples could be relied upon by private prosecutors."
Although the explicit wording of section 209 points against them being admissible as
evidence in private prosecutions, this seems strange given that non-tripartite samples
collected by the group itself are admissible.
6.3 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS
The alternative to bringing a private prosecution is to seek judicial review of the
authority's enforcement decision. This will not fall foul of the alternative remedies rule
mentioned in chapter 6, because private prosecutions cannot be regarded as an equally
convenient, beneficial and appropriate remedy for checking an agency's enforcement
discretion. Judicial review is undoubtedly a stronger accountability mechanism and
provides a stronger check than a private prosecution, because it has the potential to get
the authority to do what you want it to do, rather than, as with the private prosecutions,
having to do it yourself. Judicial review may relate to enforcement of either [PC or APC
authorisations, NRA consents or WRA waste management licences. 17 Again, trade
effluent consents raise special problems. Since private prosecutions are likely to be rare,
judicial review in theory provides an important means of holding sewerage undertakers
to account for their enforcement decisions. However, two points need to be made.
First, because sampling information is not held on the register, it will, in practice, be
impossible to tell whether consents are being properly enforced, unless the
Environmental Information Regulations 1992 (SI 1992 No.3240) can be used to secure
access to that information." Section 206(2)(c) does provide that no offence is
committed under section 206(7) where the information is disclosed for the purposes of
judicial review, but that is far from saying that the undertaker is required to provide the
information. Second, individuals and environmental groups are arguably less likely to be
concerned about the enforcement of trade effluent consents than with what is allowed in
the consents themselves. They are much more likely to be concerned about the
enforcement of sewage works' consents - the final exit point of discharges to sewers.
For these reasons, sewerage undertakers will not be included in the discussion below.
15The register must indicate whether a sample is tripartite.
16See (1991) 2(10) ELB 119; cf. Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, p.386.
As with private prosecutions, the existence of public registers held by these bodies should aid the
cause of those bringing judicial review actions because the register should make it clear what action has
or has not been taken.
18For whether the Regulations could be used to this effect, see the section on the registers in chapter 3.
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The enforcement decision under scrutiny may consist of a decision to prosecute or a
decision not to prosecute. Environmental groups are likely to seek review of decisions
not to prosecute; some firms may feel that uneven enforcement is putting them at a
competitive disadvantage and likewise mount a challenge on the grounds that the agency
has failed to prosecute. Most firms however, if they bring a review action, are likely to
be challenging a decision to prosecute themselves.
There is a growing body of case law on judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. This
case law covers decisions not to prosecute as well as decisions to prosecute. It includes
bodies ranging from the police and the CPS to the Bar Council and the Inland Revenue.
There are no cases involving judicial review of the prosecution decisions of an
environmental prosecuting body, but the only way to determine what approach the
courts might take if such a case was brought, is to look at the existing cases, which are
predominantly of the more traditional criminal justice type.
One point to bear in mind is that most enforcement bodies have recourse to formal°
enforcement powers besides prosecution. The police for example often issue cautions
rather than prosecute. The NRA has a hierarchy of enforcement procedures including: a
proposed 'action warning'; 20 a warning letter, where the offence need not be admitted; a
caution letter, where the offence must be admitted; and finally, prosecution. 21 In
Scotland, the Forth River Purification Board have a similar system of graded warning
notices leading up to referral to the Procurator Fiscal for prosecution. 22 Some
environmental agencies have access to a much wider range of statutory enforcement
tools besides prosecution. For example, under the EPA Part I, HMIP and local
authorities have the power to serve enforcement notices, 23 prohibition notices,24
19As opposed to informal steps such as advice, persuasion etc.. Formal steps need not necessarily be
statutory.
20A concept discussed in NRA, 'Discharge Consent and Compliance Policy: A Blueprint for the Future',
July 1990, at p.40 (The 'Kinnersley Report' - reported in 186 ENDS Report (1990) 24 - ENDS likens
them to HSE enforcement notices). They are also mentioned in the NRA's response to the public
consultation, September 1991, at p.11 and in the glossary of key terms where they are confusingly
defined as a "Warning given to discharger of deteriorating performance which requires explanation and
appropriate corrective action, but not the substituting for formal legal action." It would appear that they
are most likely to be used as an enforcement tool where there has been no breach of consent, but where
there has been a deterioration in effluent quality over time which may eventually result in a breach. In
such circumstances, prosecution is not possible but it may be desirable for the NRA to give a warning
requiring preventative action to be taken.
21 See the NRA's response, ibid..
22 5ee the Forth River Purification Board, 'Control of Pollution Act 1974: Scheme of Charges under s.53
- Enforcement Policy', January 1992.
23 s.13 EPA 1990.
24s.14 EPA 1990. The prohibition notice is not intended for routine use on firms which have breached
their consents - it will nonnally only be used as a emergency measure to shut firms down in order to
prevent the aggravation of a serious pollution incident caused by somebody else.
167
variation notices and revocation notices." The temptation then, is to view only
prosecution as enforcement, but not all these alternatives. This is a mistake: it is
important to remember that enforcement covers a much wider set of techniques than just
prosecution, and therefore that non-prosecution is not necessarily non-enforcement.
The fact that there is a wider set of formal enforcement tools available has implications
for what is discussed below. In the first paragraph of this section, I said that we are
concerned with decisions to prosecute and decisions not to prosecute. While this is true,
an awareness of these other enforcement tools makes it possible to delve further. Thus,
where an environmental group wishes to challenge a decision not to prosecute, the
agency may have served an enforcement order; by implication, the group would consider
this tool inappropriate. A company on the other hand may wish to challenge a decision
to prosecute, arguing that it should instead have been served with an enforcement order.
To say that we are examining judicial review of the discretion to prosecute may lead one
to conclude that judicial review of the decision to serve an enforcement order would not
be available. This is not the case.
6.3.1 The Story So Far
In Blackburn, 26 the court established that they could review a police policy not to
prosecute, but they held, in effect, that the policy would have to be Wednesbuty27
unreasonable (in the sense that no other reasonable prosecuting authority would have
adopted it) for an order of mandamus to be granted. In Blackburn (No. 3), 28 Lord
Denning - on the face of it providing an account of Blackburn - appeared to go much
further. This wider obiter dictum from Lord Denning implied that a court would review
an individual decision not to enforce the law. In other words, they might impugn the
decision itself and not just a policy. 29 So, for example, in Blackburn the court said that
it would review a policy of not prosecuting thefts of goods worth less than £.100;
following Lord Denning's dictum in Blackburn (No. 3), a court might also review an
individual decision not to prosecute a theft case.
R v General Council of the Bar, ex p. PercivaP° implicitly confirmed Lord Denning's
approach in Blackburn (No. 3), rejecting the submission of Counsel for the Bar, who
had argued for a narrow reading of Blackburn. Furthermore, Percival established that
25ss. 10 and 12 EPA 1990 respectively. According to the Act's short title, these are not enforcement
powers as such - enforcement powers commence at section 13.
26R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn [1968] 1 All ER 763.
27Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbuly Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.
28R v Commissioner Of Police Of The Metropolis, ex p. Blackburn (No. 3) [1973] 1 QB 241.
291 am indebted to Osborne for this view of Blackburn (No. 3) - see 'Judicial Review Of Prosecutors'
Discretion: The Ascent To Full Reviewability' (1992) 43(2) NILQ 178 at p.179.
3°[1990] 3 All ER 137.
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review was not limited to the police: any prosecuting authority's decision not to
prosecute was reviewable - but the scope of review would vary according to the powers,
functions and procedures of the particular body and the way in which proceedings had
been conducted. This has been confirmed in more recent cases, where it has been
suggested that it may be easier to obtain review against 'other bodies' than it is against
the police or, now, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 3 ' Having decided that the
discretion not to prosecute was reviewable, the court in Percival proceeded to inquire
whether the Professional Complaints Committee's (PCC) decision to prefer lesser
charges than those desired by the applicant was unreasonable or procedurally improper.
They found that the PCC had acted in accordance with the rules, and had not acted
unreasonably because there was room for different views on the seriousness of the
charge a person should face.
In ex p. L,32 it was held that a decision to prosecute a juvenile was reviewable, but only
if the decision was made regardless of, or clearly contrary to, established policy
guidelines. This should be distinguished from the Blackburn case: in Blackburn, the
court considered a policy of not prosecuting certain cases; in ex p. L, the court was
concerned with a decision to prosecute a juvenile which ignored or ran contrary to
settled policy. In ex p. L, Watkins U. considered that a successful challenge by a
juvenile would be rare because an applicant would find it hard to demonstrate that a
decision had been made in disregard or contrary to settled policy; judicial review of
decisions to prosecute adults was, he thought, unlikely to be available. There are some
comments to be made on ex p. L. First, in ex p. Mead, 33 Stuart-Smith U. suggested that
it was not that review of decisions to prosecute adults would be unavailable - it was
simply that successful review was unlikely. This, it is submitted, is the correct view.
However, the reason Stuart-Smith U. gives for the difference in the chances of success
between adults and juveniles, is that while there is a policy regarding juveniles (to
caution rather than prosecute wherever possible), there is no such CPS policy in the case
of adults. This is not strictly true as the cautioning guidelines which applied at the time
applied to both groups. Second, while a successful challenge on the ground that policy
has been ignored or breached may be rare in CPS cases,34
 it is submitted that this ground
may be of considerable use in actions against environmental prosecutorial authorities
31 Watkins L.J. in R v Chief Constable of the Kent Constabulary, ex p. L and R v DPP, ex p. B [1993] 1
All ER 756 at p.768 (the applications were joined - I will henceforth refer to the case as ex p. L, except
where material); see also Stuart-Smith U. in R v Inland Revenue Commissioner, ex p. Mead [1993] 1
All ER 772 at p.780.
32Note 31 ante.
33Note 31 ante.
34But see R v DPP, ex p. C, The Times, 7 March 1994, discussed below.
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such as the NRA. This possibility will be explored later, after closer scrutiny of the
decision in ex p. Mead and ex p. C35.
6.3.2 Ex p. Mead36
The applicants were charged with fraud together with their accountant, who was also
charged with offences involving six other clients. The Inland Revenue had decided not
to prosecute those six and exacted civil penalties instead. The applicants challenged the
Revenue's decision to prosecute them on the ground that they should have compared
their cases with those of the other six, to see whether their cases were more serious.
They did not challenge the Revenue's policy of selective prosecution.
The court had to consider whether a decision to prosecute an adult was reviewable and,
if it was, on what grounds review would lie. Beginning with the former, Popplewell J.
thought that decisions to prosecute adults should not be reviewable because once the
decision to prosecute is taken, the criminal courts are seized with jurisdiction to prevent
proceedings which amount to an abuse of process. Although unstated, Popplewell J.
presumably considered the position of juveniles to be different because the whole point
is to keep them away from the criminal courts. Decisions not to prosecute adults on the
other hand should be reviewable because there is no other way to challenge them.
Stuart-Smith U. took a contrary view, arguing that abuse of process may not always
provide an effective alternative remedy because there may be matters which can only be
redressed by judicial review. If a gap exists, an applicant ought to be able to make use
of it. One such gap, I would suggest, will be where the prosecuting body has acted
contrary to its prosecution policy; it is hard to see how this might be dealt with via abuse
of process.
6.3.2.1 Fairness
Having decided that a decision to prosecute an adult was in principle, reviewable,
Stuart-Smith U. went on to consider the grounds on which the applicants were seeking
review. He held that there was no principle which required the Revenue to compare the
applicants' cases with those of the other six taxpayers to ensure that the former were
indeed more serious and hence more worthy of prosecution. Fairness did not require
such a comparative exercise because it would be impracticable: there was no logical
reason why the comparison should stop with the other six, but if it went further, the
Revenue would have the impossible task of comparing hundreds of cases extending over
35.Ibid..
36Note 31 ante.
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different time-scales. All fairness required was that each case was considered on its
merits to see whether the criteria in the Revenue's prosecution policy (set out in the
Keith Report)37 were satisfied.
The case thus upholds a common-sense interpretation of fairness. Fairness in the sense
of actually comparing like cases with like would be unworkable. Rather, fairness
requires that each case be treated alike in the sense of being judged by reference to the
same criteria or policy for determining whether a prosecution should be brought. While
Stuart-Smith U. did not question the validity of a policy of selective prosecution, he did
state that a prosecuting authority should consider any existing guidelines as to when
prosecution might be appropriate in a particular case. In other words, while not
questioning the policy of selective prosecution, he did stress that any decision should be
in accordance with the policy for selecting prosecution. For the applicants to have
succeeded, rather than saying: "You should have compared our cases with those of the
other six - and only if ours were more serious than theirs should we have been
prosecuted and not them" - they would have had to say: "Your prosecution policy says
you will only bring a prosecution if X, Y and Z are satisfied. We do not match these
criteria and therefore we should not have been prosecuted." Presumably, they were
unable to do this, which is why they argued for the other, remarkable reading of fairness.
Relying on Blackburn, they might also have succeeded if they had shown that the
prosecution policy was Wednesbug unresaonable. However, as Stuart-Smith U. noted,
they were unlikely to establish that a policy approved by the Keith Committee (chaired
by Lord Keith) was irrational.
6.3.3 Ex p. C38
In ex p. C, a wife, Mrs C, sought judicial review of the DPP's decision not to prosecute
her husband for buggery under section 12 Sexual Offences Act 1956. The application
for review was successful because the prosecutor had failed to have regard to the
criteria in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Kennedy J. stated that a court could review
a decision not to prosecute if the decision was guided by an unlawful policy or if the
decision was not in accordance with established policy, or if the decision was perverse.
The case is significant for two reasons. First, it is the first case where an applicant
seeking judicial review of a prosecutorial decision has succeeded on the merits. Second,
37Report of Committee on Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments, Cmnd. 8822, 1983; see
further, Uglow, 'Defrauding the Public Purse: Prosecuting in Social Security, Revenue and Excise
Cases' [1984] Crim LR 128.
38Note 34 ante.
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it establishes that applicants can seek review of decisions not to prosecute contrary to an
established policy as well as decisions to prosecute made in this way.
6.3.4 The Position Now
1) The courts will review a policy of non-prosecution - Blackburn.
2) The courts will review an individual decision not to prosecute - Blackburn
(No. 3), ex p. Percival.
3) The courts will review a decision to prefer a less serious charge than that
considered appropriate by an applicant - ex p. Percival.
4) The courts will review a decision to prosecute a juvenile made in disregard of or
contrary to a settled policy - ex p. L.
5) The courts will review a decision to prosecute an adult - ex p. Mead.
6) The courts will review a decision not to prosecute which failed to take into
account provisions of the enforcement policy - ex p. C.
As we have already seen, number (1) will be reviewable on Wednesbuty grounds.
Numbers (2), (3),(5) and (6) are reviewable either on Wednesbury grounds or on the
basis that there was a legitimate expectation that a policy (as in (4) ) would be followed,
or that in ignoring the policy, the body had failed to take into account a relevant
consideration. A decision to prosecute a juvenile, as in number (4), would presumably
also be reviewable on Wednesbury grounds. Finally, all of the above will be reviewable
on the grounds of improper purpose or bad faith, although one might argue that
decisions to prosecute adults made in bad faith or for improper purposes could be dealt
with by the abuse of process jurisdiction.
The important point to note is that successful review on Wednesbuty grounds is likely to
be extremely rare, whereas pointing to a failure to follow a policy is much more easily
done. Evidence of this is provided by ex p. C - the only successful review action of a
prosecutorial decision - which involved a failure to follow a policy. It should come as
no surprise that the only successful application was based on a failure to follow a policy
rather than on Wednesbury unreasonableness. It is quite obvious that, for example, a
decision that someone should face a lesser charge than that desired by the applicant will
seldom surmount the Wednesbuty hurdle, because there are many legitimate views on
these matters and the courts will be wary of substituting their own judgement for that of
the body concerned. 39
 Where there is a policy on the other hand, the issue before the
courts is much more clear-cut: either the decision was contrary to the policy or it was
not.
39As in ex p. Percival and R v DPP, ex p. Langlands-Pearse [1991] COD 92; cf: Raymond v Attorney-
General [1982] 1 QB 839; cf. also R v Liverpool Stipendiary Magistrate ex p. Ellison [1990] RTR 220 -
an abuse of process case where the magistrate was reluctant to interfere with the prosecutor's decision to
prefer a less serious charge; review by the accused of the magistrate's decision was unsuccessful.
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6.3.5 Applying the Case-Law to Environmental Agencies
It seems then, that successful review of a body's prosecutorial decision will be much
more likely if the applicant can establish a failure to follow the enforcement policy. But
for there to be a chance of successfully reviewing a body's enforcement decision on the
ground that they have ignored or acted contrary to their prosecution policy, three
conditions must be satisfied: a policy must obviously exist, it must be open and some of
the provisions must be sufficiently detailed. I begin by examining whether these
conditions do exist in relation to the NRA, HMIP, local authority environmental health
departments and Waste Regulation Authorities. I then go on to consider whether bodies
should adopt a policy of selective prosecution, and if so whether they should adopt
detailed prosecution policies and whether such policies should always be open and
useable in review actions.
6.3.5.1 Do the Bodies Have Prosecution Policies and Are They Open?
If there is no prosecution policy, or if its details cannot be discovered, a review action
cannot be based on a failure to follow the policy. In ex p. Mead, the Revenue did have
an open enforcement policy in the shape of the Keith Report. While the 1983 Keith
Report does not contain current tax figures which attract prosecution, one assumes from
Stuart-Smith LJ.'s discussion of the facts that the applicants did have official access to
those figures. The NRA does have a prosecution policy, but decided not to make it fully
public because it was "concerned that general disclosure of the policy could encourage
defendants to challenge its decisions to prosecute on the grounds that a particular
pollution incident fell outside the relevant category." 4° In fact, much of the policy has
since 'leaked' into academic writing so that it probably is now generally disclosed.41
However, whether someone could mount a challenge based on a policy which has not
been officially published or disclosed is doubtful. In this case, one might argue that the
Environmental Information Regulations 1992 require official disclosure by the NRA.42
4°189 ENDS Report (1990) 28.
41 See eg. Jewell, 'Agricultural Water Pollution Issues And NRA Enforcement Policy' (1991) 4(3)
LIVIELR 110. At p.110, n.1, Jewell claims that the NRA Guidance Note on Enforcement and
Prosecution "is a public document despite its internal circulation." However, my correspondence with
the NRA states that the Guidance Note is not a public document and has not been officially published.
The NRA has now published a bare summary of its enforcement policy in its Citizen's Charter guide -
`NRA Customer Charter: Our Statement of Service Standards' (1994) at pp.10-11. Some further points
are covered in NRA, 'Water Pollution Incidents in England and Wales - 1990', 1992, Appendix A, and
in NRA, 'Discharge Consents and Compliance: The NRA's Approach to Control of Discharges to
Water', March 1994, pp.57-8.
42 SI 1992 No. 3240 - the Regulations are designed to implement EC Directive 90/313 on the Freedom
of Access to Information on the Environment. A test case on the scope of the Environmental
Information Directive has recently been launched by the Omagh People Against Goldmining - see The
Guardian, 25 May 1994.
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The NRA might seek to rely on regulation 4(3)(d) which states that information need
not be provided if disclosure would "increase the likelihood of damage to the
environment affecting anything to which the information relates." However, as I hope to
demonstrate shortly, the full disclosure of the policy is unlikely to lead to such damage.
The position of the English water pollution regulator can be contrasted with the Forth
River Purification Board in Scotland, who do have a public enforcement policy.43
I-IMIP does not have a fully public enforcement policy. Guidance on the use of
enforcement and prohibition notices is contained in the internal HMIP manual and is
available to the public; however, HMIP's policy on prosecution, which is in the same
internal manual, is not available to the public." Although judicial review based on a
failure to follow prosecution guidelines will therefore be difficult if not impossible
(unless the Environmental Information Regulations can be used to gain access to the
guidelines), it may nevertheless be possible to review decisions to (or not to) issue
enforcement or prohibition notices on the basis that they do not follow the policy as
stated in the manual. It has not proved possible to survey all local authority
environmental health departments to see whether they have enforcement policies in
relation to APC. However, Leeds City Council for example, do not have a policy
specific to APC. As for WRAs, again it has not proved possible to survey every WRA,
but West Yorkshire WRA do have a prosecution policy contained within their internal,
non-public, staff manual.
6.3.5.2 Are the Provisions Sufficiently Detailed to be of Use to Individuals in Review
Proceedings?
Assuming the material is indeed available, are the provisions sufficiently detailed? With
the Inland Revenue's policy one could point to a tax figure and say: "My sum was
smaller than that, so I ought not to have been prosecuted"; the onus would then be on
the Revenue to point to another criteria in the policy to justify prosecution. In ex p. B,45
Watkins U. stated that the applicant might have successfully challenged the decision to
prosecute her if she could have shown that there had been a lack of inquiry into her
circumstances, previous offences etc., as required by the then applicable 1983 Attorney-
General's Criteria for Prosecution. In the event, the evidence showed that her
circumstances had been properly investigated.
43Note 22 ante.
44The prosecution policy is contained in section 10 of HMIP's internal manual.
45Note 31 ante.
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The NRA policy sets out appropriate enforcement action to be taken according,
predominantly, to the effect that the pollution has had on the receiving water course.
The policy sets out three categories of pollution incident: major, significant or minor.46
A major incident will for example, require the presence of the following factors:
potential or actual persistent effect on water quality or aquatic life; closure of a potable
water, industrial or agricultural abstraction point; extensive fish kill (more than 50);
excessive or repeated breaches of consent conditions; extensive remedial measures
needed; major effect on amenity. The factors involved in significant incidents are
similarly detailed and those for minor incidents rather less so. 47 The policy then states
that a major incident will normally attract prosecution." With significant pollution or
where consents are breached, the action taken may be a warning letter or prosecution.
A table sets out which of these two courses of action will be appropriate: prosecution
will, for example, be preferred to a letter where the polluter has a history of non-
compliance, or where there is a significant breach of consent. With minor incidents, a
warning letter will normally be sent if the discharger is identifiable."
A recent NRA report makes some additions to the above. 50 It states that the action to
be taken in any case will depend on the severity of the impact and the reason for non-
compliance. While the above internal policy deals primarily with the former (severity of
the impact), the report (which is public) deals with the latter (reasons for non-
compliance). It states that there are two basic reasons for non-compliance: either the
treatment plant is inadequate or the operation and management of the plant is deficient.
While it states that a case may include both, the report deals with them one at a time.
Where treatment plant is inadequate for the purposes of achieving compliance, the NRA
will not normally prosecute if the discharger has an existing programme of remedial
works already agreed with the NRA pending completion, assuming that: the breach is
not the result of poor management or factors unconnected with the remedial work; and
every effort is being made to comply; and the breach is not too serious. The last of
these will presumably be decided by reference to the internal policy described earlier.
Other than this, it is not entirely clear how the two policies fit together. If there is a
serious incident, it will clearly typically attract prosecution. However, what if a
46These pollution incident categories (but not the enforcement action associated with each one) are set
out in appendix A of NRA, 'Water Pollution Incidents in England and Wales - 1990', note 41 ante.
47See further Jewell, note 41 ante.
'In 1990, there was no sign that this was the case: while 70% of industrial major incidents were
prosecuted, this figure went down to 50% for major farm incidents and 21% for major incidents caused
by sewage works - see NRA, 'Water Pollution Incidents in England and Wales - 1990', note 41 ante,
Table 11, pp.31-2.
°Jewell, note 41 ante.
5°NRA, 'Discharge Consents and Compliance: The NRA's Approach to Control of Discharges to
Water', March 1994, pp.57-8.
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discharger has an agreed set of remedial works in hand but has a history of non-
compliance or there is a significant breach of consent? The earlier policy points towards
prosecution, while the one being described here points against it.5'
If the discharger does not have a planned improvement programme in place at the time
of the breach, he will be notified that continued non-compliance will attract prosecution,
but that he may submit an action plan proposing how he intends to meet the consent. If
he does submit such a plan which the NRA accepts and keeps to that plan, then subject
to the qualifications mentioned above in relation to pre-existing remedial works, the
NRA will not prosecute. If the breach of consent detected by routine sampling is caused
by management failure rather than plant inadequacy, the action taken by the NRA will
depend on the structure of the consent. If the consent contains absolute limits, the
discharger will be sent a letter asking for an explanation and warning that the next
sample will be tripartite which, if found non-compliant, may lead to prosecution.
Whether or not prosecution does follow such a non-compliant tripartite sample will
depend on a number of factors including the severity of the impact and the attitude of
the discharger to improving the management of the treatment plant. If, on the other
hand, compliance has to be assessed by reference to a look-up table (ie. in relation to a
water company, but not a private, sewage treatment works), where a sample fails the
look-up table limit, the discharger will be warned of the exceedance and asked for an
explanation. If the NRA believes that it is unlikely to be a one-off occurrence, routine
sampling will be replaced by tripartite sampling until such time as compliance is routinely
restored or sufficient samples have been taken to enable prosecution to take place (with
look-up tables, compliance is usually assessed over a period of at least 12 months, which
means that at least 12 months of sampling data will be needed).
Assuming that the full, internal, impact-based NRA policy was made officially available,
with a water pollution incident a company could thus point to the effect on the receiving
water and say: "Our discharge did not have that effect;" an environmental group might
say "The effect of that discharge warranted prosecution", or "There was a breach of
consent and a history of non-compliance which indicates prosecution." 52 With the
'reasons for non-compliance' policy contained in the recent report, it would presumably
51 While it may not be clear how the policies are to interact, they are not incompatible as such because
the new report does say that the NRA will not "normally" prosecute where remedial works are
underway.
52It is worth recalling the Greenpeace v NRA case (discussed in the previous ch.) at this point. On the
facts of the case, it is unlikely that Greenpeace would have been able to point to the policy in this way,
because the effect on the receiving water of the breach of consent was temporary and negligible (see
(1991) LAJELR 3(6) 202). The effect of the consent itself was of course considerable, but that is
separate from the issue of enforcement.
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be open to a discharger not given, for example, the appropriate warning or opportunity
to present an action plan, to bring a review action.
The Forth River Purification Board's policy, although public, is not as detailed as the
NRA's. It states that an occasional exceedance of consent with no detrimental effect on
the watercourse can be tolerated. Consistent marginal breach, even if there is no
detrimental effect, will attract an enforcement programme." Significant deviation from
consent conditions and discharges causing pollution will be the subject of an
enforcement programme. A significant discharge is one equal to or greater than 100%
of the limit. Pollution is defined broadly as causing harm to the flora, fauna or beneficial
uses of the receiving water. Despite the fact that it is not as detailed as the NRA policy,
that is not to say it could not be relied upon in review proceedings - it would presumably
be possible to bring an action if the Board referred a case straight for prosecution where
a one-off, minor breach of consent did not cause any pollution. With HMIP, the manual
contains fairly detailed policies on the use of enforcement and prohibition notices which
could be raised in review actions. 54
 With other bodies, such as WRAs and local
authority environmental health departments, there are either no policies, or the policies
are not public, which means that it is not possible to assess whether the provisions are
sufficiently detailed.
6.3.5.3 Should Bodies Adopt a Policy of Selective Prosecution?
There are two basic styles of enforcement strategy: adversarial and co-operative. UK
pollution control agencies have always tended to adopt the latter approach: bargaining
'in the shadow of the law' is the norm," strict legalism very much the exception."
However, while the co-operative approach may secure a quasi-contractual legitimacy as
between regulator and regulated, it can undermine equity as well as any sense of
legitimacy or accountability to the wider beneficiaries of environmental legislation. The
enforcement technique which is employed is integrally linked with the type of
enforcement style adopted. Prosecution will play a central part in an adversarial
approach, while a co-operative approach will tend to favour discussion, compromise and
warnings - regarding prosecution as a last resort. An extreme example of the adversarial
approach would involve an agency prosecuting for each and every breach of a consent,
however small. In other words, an extreme adversarial approach would not involve
531e. a series of warning notices culminating in a possible referral to the Procurator Fiscal for
prosecution.
54HMIP internal manual, section 8, pp.5-8 and Appendix 1.
55Macauley, 'Non-contractual Relations in Business' (1963) 28 American Sociological Rev 55.
56See eg. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement, and Richardson et al., Policing Pollution.
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selective prosecution. A policy of selective prosecution will necessarily involve
something of the co-operative approach.
An extreme adversarial approach would solve the problem of equity and accountabilty to
third party interests and it is perhaps for this reason that such an approach is often
advocated by environmentalists. Their view would be that even if there is a small breach
of a consent, this should be prosecuted. However, such an approach would involve
enormous costs associated with bringing so many prosecutions. Selective prosecution
has the distinct advantage of saving valuable resources. Despite this potential for
resource savings, many environmentalists disagree with a policy of selective prosecution.
Why is this?
They may argue that a policy of not prosecuting even minor breaches would remove any
deterrent effect: if all crimes are prosecuted, deterrence is maximal; if there is a policy of
selective prosecution, there may be a reduced deterrence to the extent that people can
perceive a pattern in the offences which are not prosecuted. In other words, with
selective prosecution, there may be a trade-off between resource-savings and deterrence.
This is a trade-off which environmentalists are presumably not prepared to countenance.
But would their worries about deterrence be justified? First, if the breach of consent is
minor and a one-off, deterrence is unlikely to be threatened if the breach is not
prosecuted, because it is extremely unlikely that all dischargers will rush to emit slightly
more than their consent allowed just once. It would hardly be worth it in financial
terms. If on the other hand, the breach is minor and continuous - non-prosecution may
tempt firms to save money through non-compliance. 57 If they knew they would be
prosecuted, they would arguably be less tempted towards non-compliance. However, it
is not as though firms are given carte blanche to avoid compliance: if they breach their
consent over a period of time, they know that they will attract other enforcement tools
such as persuasion and warnings. Some firms may well take advantage of the leeway
they are given, but one must weigh the disadvantage of a relatively small amount of
pollution which this may bring, against the benefit of considerable time and cost savings
in avoiding prosecution. Furthermore, it is arguably more important to be guided by the
goal in sight rather than blindly follow a path which one believes will lead you to that
goal. If the goal is that of reducing pollution, one could argue that prosecuting in every
case, far from reducing pollution, would increase it. There would be a risk that many
firms - prosecuted when they felt they were doing all that they could - would adopt a
confrontational attitude towards the regulator in the future and make no attempt to go
571n practice the NBA tend not to prosecute such offences. To this extent, their policy does not fully
reflect the reality of practice - it will be recalled that the policy suggests that a breach of consent along
with a history of non-compliance will attract prosecution.
178
beyond the minimum required of them. Experience suggests that having firms 'on your
side' may help to achieve better results in the long run.
If environmentalists are not worried about selective prosecution for reasons of
deterrence, they may seek to argue that non-prosecution of even minor breaches is
contrary to the 'polluter pays' principle (PPP). If a firm is successfully prosecuted, the
imposition of a fine ensures that the polluter, to some extent, pays for the pollution he
has caused; if on the other hand the agency merely issues a warning while the firm
undertakes to do what it can to prevent a recurrence (ie. a co-operative approach), the
PPP may appear to have been violated. However, this assumes that a breach of consent
will always give rise to pollution, which is manifestly not the case. Minor breaches will
often have a negligible effect on the receiving environmental medium and hence non-
prosecution of minor breaches is not necessarily contrary to the PPP. However, they
will be on stronger ground when a breach does give rise to pollution of some kind and
rather than prosecute, a warning is given. This does appear to be contrary to the PPP.
The answer to this problem may lie in the introduction of a tax - so that the polluter pays
something (but not as much as a fine) whenever a polluting breach of consent occurs.58
This recognises the economic inefficiency of prosecuting in every case while still
maintaining the essential principle of the 'polluter pays'. This tax must be distinguished
from a pollution tax, under which firms pay for emissions within their consents.
Pollution taxes will be discussed in the next chapter.
Finally, environmentalists may object to the non-prosecution of even minor breaches,
not for reasons of deterrence or for moral reasons concerning the PPP, but because they
believe that such breaches deserve to be punished. Their view would be that a breach of
regulatory law is criminal and that crimes should be punished without fear or favour
across all types and degrees of offence and class of offender. 59 While there is much in
this, the problem with such a punitive rationale is that punishment comes at a price - that
price here being the diversion of resources from the task of monitoring and enforcing
serious pollution offences. In a world where resources are far from infinite, such trade-
offs need to be carefully considered.
"See eg. Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness,
pp.52 and 56, where the similar concept of a 'civil' fine is discussed. Alternatively, the effective use of
clean-up powers where pollution has occurred, and recovery of the cost of clean-up from the polluter
(see eg. s.161 WRA 1991) would fulfill the PPP. A possible difficulty with that approach is that in
relatively minor pollution cases, there may be little which can be cleaned-up as such.
59This view is the opposite to that which seems to be held by most enforcement officers. As Richardson
et al. note in Policing Pollution, trade effluent officers tend to view a minor breach as non-criminal
(pp. 137-8). However, just because this reason for non-prosecution is questionable, it does not mean that
there are not other valid reasons for non-prosecution (such as cost).
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6.3.5.4 Should Bodies Adopt Prosecution Policies?
An extreme example of the adversarial approach would involve an agency prosecuting
for each and every breach of a consent, however small. As we have seen, this would
solve the problem of equity and accountabilty to third party interests, but would involve
enormous costs associated with bringing so many prosecutions. While it makes sense
not to prosecute all offences for resource and other reasons, a policy of selective
prosecution gives rise to problems of inconsistent decison-making (and hence
unfairness)60
 and lack of accountability to third parties. One way of ensuring consistent
decision-making and accountability 61 is to structure prosecutorial discretion by way of a
policy on prosecution. 62 In other words, for the sake of fairness and accountability, a
policy of selective prosecution should be accompanied by a policyfor selecting
prosecution.
However, if the respective advantages of a policy of selective prosecution and a policy
for selecting prosecution are cost on the one hand and fairness and accountability on the
other, what are the possible disadvantages? The principal one is a reduction in
deterrence: if all crimes are prosecuted, deterrence is maximal; as we have seen, if there
is a policy of selective prosecution, there may be a reduced deterrence to the extent that
people can perceive a pattern in the offences which are not prosecuted. If, for reasons
of fairness and accountability, an internal policy for selecting prosecution is introduced,
deterrence may then be further reduced because much more of a pattern will become
discernible. In other words, with selective prosecution, there may be a trade-off
between resources and deterrence; with a prosecution policy there may be a further
trade-off between fairness/accountability and deterrence. However, as we shall see in
the next section, not all bodies have to make this sacrifice.
6.3.5.5 Should Policies Be Open and Should One Be Able to Rely on Them in Review
Proceedings?
In the previous section, we noted that the existence of an internal enforcement policy
may involve a trade-off between an increase in fairness/accountability and a decrease in
deterrence. If the policy is made open, there may be a further trade-off between
fairness/accountability and deterrence. By adopting an open policy, you increase
fairness by allowing people to see that they have been treated fairly and increase
"See Davis, note 5 ante, pp.90 and 168-70.
61 Albeit of a rather limited, internal kind. The enforcement discretion of officers is in theory structured
by the policy, but the officer is not obliged to account externally for the exercise of his discretion either
informally or formally in review proceedings.
620n structuring discretion, see Davis, note 5 ante, p.97. If all offences were prosecuted, a prosecution
policy would obviously be unnecessary.
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accountability by enabling them to make informal complaints to the agency, drawing
attention to inconsistencies with policy. 63 However, in making the policy public, you
also allow everyone to see the pattern of what is prosecuted. This may further decrease
deterrence, leading to an increase in offences, because people will be able to see what
they can 'get away with'. Allowing policies to be relied upon in review proceedings
might make matters worse still, because if a policy is open but review is not allowed,
there is always the chance that the prosecuting body might ignore the policy and decide
to prosecute. This uncertainty may serve as a deterrent. If, on the other hand, review is
allowed, this deterrent is removed because one can take formal action if the body ignore
the policy.
However, while the above arguments about impunity and deterrence are probably
apposite in the traditional criminal justice field, they will not always apply to
environmental prosecuting authorities. By and large, these bodies can create detailed,
open policies and have courts scrutinise these in review proceedings without fear of
inviting offending. An example of a traditional criminal justice case may help to
illustrate the point here. Let us say there is an open policy that the theft of goods under
£5 will not be prosecuted, or that speeding will not be prosecuted unless the speed limit
has been exceeded by more than 20 mph. Many people will be tempted to thieve and
speed within these thresholds. If review based on the policy was also allowed, then if a
person who had stolen such a good or who had exceeded the speed limit by only 17 mph
was prosecuted, they would, prima facie, be able to have the decision to prosecute
quashed. Compare this with the NRA. In relation to the NRA policy, many firms would
not be able to tell what effect an increase in their emissions might have on the receiving
waters; even if they could calculate it, it is extremely unlikely that dischargers would
rush to emit up to the threshold which attracts prosecution just once (recalling that, in
the policy, a continuous breach is a valid criterion for prosecution) 64 . It would hardly be
worth it in financial terms. In other words, the practical consequences of drawing-up
enforcement policies and publicising them or allowing them to be used in review actions
are very different for environmental agencies such as the NRA than they are for the
police/CPS.
To conclude, if prosecution is selective, like cases will not be treated alike without a
policy to act as a yardstick in each case. Ideally, fairness requires that this policy for
selection is rational, visible, and of practical use to third parties. Without a sufficiently
63 See Ashworth, 'The 'Public Interest' Element in Prosecutions' [1987] ('rim LR 595 at p.605.
64It will be recalled that, with continuous, minor breaches of consents, the NRA for example, tends not
to prosecute (see note 57 ante). However, what is being argued here is that the policy itself does not
invite non-compliance because the policy indicates that prosecution is a possibility.
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detailed, open policy, one cannot be sure that fairness exists. If it is unenforceable by
third parties, one might see unfairness, but be powerless to take formal action against it.
The other value besides fairness which is served by allowing review based on failure to
follow a prosecution policy, is accountability. Having a policy and making it open both
provide a measure of accountability, but for that accountability to be of a worthwhile,
active sort, review based on the policy is arguably required. For environmental
prosecuting bodies, a requirement that they adopt detailed, open policies which can be
relied upon in review actions should pose few problems.
6.4 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MONITORING DECISIONS
Enforcement really consists of two logically separate activities - monitoring, and follow-
up enforcement action (where monitoring reveals breaches in consents etc.). In the
previous section, I have been concentrating on the latter. However, judicial review of an
environmental body's monitoring arrangements is clearly also possible. The grounds on
which review may lie are likely to closely mirror those in the previous section. Review
will obviously be available if the body has acted in bad faith or for improper purposes.
However, where an environmental group feels that the monitoring is unduly lax,65
review may be more difficult. It will be very difficult to establish that the authority has
acted in a Wednesbury unreasonable manner, because the court will be especially wary
of interfering in such an obviously scientific area. Successful review will be much more
likely if an environmental group can point to a monitoring policy which sets out
monitoring frequencies etc.. If monitoring is not being carried out in accordance with
this policy, then review may be available on the ground that there is a legitimate
expectation that the policy would be followed or that the authority has failed to take into
account a relevant consideration. Of course, if the group disagrees with the policy itself,
it will be back to the difficult task of establishing that it is Wednesbury unreasonable. In
England, only HMIP appears to have published a monitoring policy. 66 Similar public
monitoring policies should arguably be required of the NRA, 67 WRAs68 and local
authority environmental health departments in relation to APC.69
65 As in Greenpeace v NRA, note 52 ante.
66See 200 ENDS Report (1991) 28; in Scotland, the Forth River Purification Board have a monitoring
policy - see their docunient 'Schemes of Charges Under Section 53 of the Control of Pollution Act
1974', January 1992.
67Judging by recommendation 19 of the Kinnersley Report (note 20 ante), the NRA does have, or was
due to have, a policy on sampling frequencies.
68E1P35 suggests that there is to be centralised guidance on standards of site inspection and monitoring
frequencies for WRAs - see 230 ENDS Report (1994) 33.
69Especially, according to ENDS, as local authorities "appear to be adopting widely diverging
inspection practices" - see 230 ENDS Report (1994) 33.
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6.5 CONCLUSION
We have seen that civil actions, private prosecutions and judicial review can all help to
keep environmental agencies accountable for their enforcement decisions. Judicial
review is, without doubt, potentially the most significant of the three. It cannot be long
before an environmental group again seeks review of an enforcement decision.
However, if they are forced to establish that a decision is Wednesbuty unreasonable, it
will be an uphill task. Accountability and fairness would be much better served if the
courts not only allow review, but require agencies to publish their enforcement policies
and allow applications where there has been a failure to follow these policies.
CHAPTER 7
Regulation II - Market Mechanisms
Market mechanisms cannot be equated with 'market forces' (although they do of course
make use of market forces) as it is these, uncoordinated forces which help to produce many
of the problems in the first place.' By market mechanisms, I mean not the non-regulatory
market approaches which I will be examining in the next chapter, but mechanisms which are
centred on market principles and which are directed by a regulator to achieve specific
regulatory goals. 2 The important point to note then is that market mechanisms are
regulation - they are simply a different form of regulation to command-and-control. At
present, we have mainly command-and-control regulation as described in the previous
chapters, with only some limited market mechanisms. 3 However, both the Government4
and the EC 5 have promised an increased emphasis on the use of economic instruments, 6 so
we should expect to see them playing a greater role in the future.
The values which go to form the rule of law are those of accountability, equity, certainty,
efficiency and effectiveness, in this chapter, 1 will be examining how these rule of law
values might be applied to market mechansisms. There are two principal types of market
mechanism which I want to consider: pollution taxes (also known as charges, effluent fees
1 Jacobs, The Green Economy, p.24.
2This distinction between 'market mechanisms' (regulatory) and 'market approaches' (non-regulatory) is my
terminology - the distinction is not often drawn by others who tend to use the term 'market mechanisms' or
'economic instruments' to include both strategies.
3Eg. NRA, 'The NRA Scheme of Charges in Respect of Applications and Consents for Discharges to
Controlled Waters'. I will be discussing this and other schemes later in the chapter.
4See 'This Common Inheritance', Cm 1200, 1990, Annex A; 'This Common Inheritance - The Second
Year Report', Cm 2068, 1992, pp.33-5, 101, 112, 115. The DOE has similarly been actively investigating
the use of market mechanisms - see eg. DOE, 'Making Markets Work for the Environment', 1993. See
also the DOE environmental economics research series reports: London Economics, 'The Potential Role of
Market Mechanisms in the Control of Acid Rain',1992; Coopers & Lybrand, 'Landfill Costs and Prices:
Correcting Possible Market Distortions', 1993; and CSERGE, Warren Spring & El- . l'EL, 'Externalities from
Landfill and Incineration', 1993.
5See the EC 5th Environmental Action Programme, 'Towards Sustainability: A European Community
Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development'
COM(92)23 final, OJ 1993, C138/5, ch. 7.4.
6Again (see note 2 ante) this is a matter of terminology. Economic instruments here refers not just to
market mechanisms, but also to the types of non-regulatory market approach I discuss in the next chapter.
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etc.) and tradeable pollution permits.' Pollution taxes tax the discharger on each unit of
pollution he emits. The assumption is that because he has to pay for his pollution, he will
cut down on his emissions to cut costs and maximise profits. Tradeable permits operate in a
similar way to existing regulation, except that firms are able to trade their permits.
Allocation of permits can be made on the basis of existing entitlements ('grandfathering') or
via an auction in which firms have to bid for their share. After allocation, permits can be
traded, which provides a similar incentive to that of charges - the incentive here being
provided by firms being able to sell any of their permits which are surplus to requirement.9
I will begin by comparing these two economic instruments in terms of the above values. I
will then look at existing charging arrangements to see how these fare in respect of the same
values.9
7.1 PURE MARKET MECHANISMS1°
7.1.1 Efficiency"
Economists have made an extremely strong case for the efficiency gains to be made from
switching to market mechanisms. For a charging scheme to be efficient (in the sense of
being cost-effective), market forces need to operate so that those who can reduce emissions
at least cost actually do so. In a charge system, a producer has an incentive to reduce
emissions until he reaches the point where it is cheaper to pay the charge; the firms with the
7There are of course many other instruments which could conceivably be covered by the term 'market
mechanism' - eg. refundable deposits and subsidies, to name but two; see further OECD, Economic
Instruments For Environmental Protection, 1989.8See further Tietenberg, 'Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation' (1990) 6(1) Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 17.9A usefiil comparison of current charging schemes with incentive schemes is made in the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), 16th Report, 'Freshwater Quality', Cm 1966, 1992, ch.
8.
101e. market mechanisms standing alone, not as an adjunct to existing forms of regulation. The effects may
be different if market mechanisms are used in parallel with existing regulation - see DOE, 'Making Markets
Work for the Environment', note 3 ante, pp.52-3.
11 There is an element to efficiency other than that discussed below in the text - and that relates to the
administrative costs of introducing and running the scheme. Implementing any new scheme will involve
start-up costs, and therefore it would be unfair to assess market mechanisms on this basis. As for running
costs, it is difficult to say whether either of the market schemes would impose greater costs than the present
regulatory system. A charging scheme would require tax collection on top of monitoring and enforcement,
but would save on calculating individual standards. A tradeable permit system could involve extra expense
in monitoring the trades which took place (necessary to avoid pollution 'hot spots'). However, even if the
costs involved were greater, the savings in overall costs achievable by market approaches may well
compensate for any differences.
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lowest control costs will reduce emissions the most, whilst those facing higher costs may
prefer to pay the charge. This produces an efficient result because the greater burden of
reducing emissions is taken-on by those who can do so at least cost. In fact, if firms face
the same charge, the marginal costs of control will automatically be equalised, which is a
condition for cost minimisation. 12 As Tietenberg comments:
"This is a rather remarkable finding. We have shown that as long as the control
authority imposes the same emission charge on all sources, the resulting allocation
automatically minimizes the costs of control. This is true in spite of the fact that the
control authority may not have any knowledge of control costs."13
As we saw in the chapter on command-and-control regulation, it is theoretically possible for
a regulator to achieve a least cost allocation of emission reductions, but in practice they do
not have easy access to the information on marginal costs. Furthermore, here, unlike there,
the least cost solution achieved via equalisation of marginal cost is achieved automatically.
The efficiency case for tradeable permits is very similar: as a permit market develops, firms
with high abatement costs will find it cheaper to buy permits than to cut back their
emissions; firms with low abatement costs will be able to make cut-backs easily and then sell
part of their permits. Because all firms have to pay the same market price for a permit,
marginal abatement costs are equalised across all firms and a cost-minimising solution will
be achieved.14
7.1.2 Equity
In discussing equity in chapters 1 and 2, I said that the precept 'treat like cases alike'
requires a decision as to when firms are alike and what sort of equal treatment is to be
regarded as legitimate. In the context of market mechanisms, one could end up with the
following:
1) All firms are alike in being firms and should be treated alike in the sense of facing
equal total pollution control costs;
2) Similar firms are alike (eg. all printworks) - and should be treated alike in the sense
of facing equal total pollution control costs (proportionate to size of manufacturing output);
i2T1is is easily demonstrated with graphical examples. For such a demonstration, see Tietenberg,
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 317. See also Baumol & Oates, The Theory of
Environmental Policy, 164.
13Tietenberg, op. cit., p.317.14Baumol & Oates, op. cit., p.177.
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3) Firms are alike in being firms and should be treated alike in the sense of facing equal
marginal control costs;
4) Only firms with similar discharges are alike l5 - and should be treated alike in the
sense of facing equal marginal control costs; because their discharges are alike this will also
necessarily lead to them paying the same total tax bill.'6
Charging schemes and tradeable permit schemes are regarded by some as equitable because
marginal control costs are the same for all firms. They would support (3) and (4) above."
Others have put forward a different interpretation of equity based on the idea of 'equal pain'
which reflects (1) or (2) above. i8 McGarity, for example suggests that charges and
tradeable permits create inequities because while marginal pollution control costs may be
equal, total control costs are not.° In other words, some firms will end up paying out more
than others, which may affect relative competitive positions; firms do not feel equal pain.20
Despite this, McGarity would not seek to exclude market approaches on equitable grounds:
he comments that, unlike a BAT approach, there is no discrimination between old and new
sources,
21
 and that the overall effect is not as bad as with BAT because a market-based
system provides firms with much greater flexibility. 22 His argument thus seems to be that
market approaches may be inequitable, but if firms have greater choice and the overall cost
of the system is less, the inequity will be less keenly felt.
15This is obviously different from (2) - similarly sized firms in the same industry will not necessarily have
similar emissions.
16This can obviously only apply to taxes; with permits, there is no 'treating' being done other than at the
initial allocation and unless the total number of permits is later reduced.
17These two, (2) and (3) are actually saying the same thing, but from different perspectives - the result is the
same.
18These two, (1) and (2) are not saying the same thing - the result of applying (1) would be that all firms
pay the same, the result of (2) that all similarly sized firms in the same industry would pay the same. (1)
stresses competition between all sectors, (2) stresses competition only within sectors.
19McGarity, 'Media-Quality, Technology, And Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies For Health and
Environmental Regulation' (1983) 46 Law and Contemporary Problems 159 at p.220.
20Leone & Jackson, 'The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity: The Case of Water Pollution
Controls' in Fromm (ed.), Studies in Public Regulation, 231 at p.264; see further Koch & Leone, 'The
Clean Water Act: Unexpected Impacts on Industry' (1979) 3 Han, Env LR 84.
21 This may or may not be true in relation to tradeable permits, depending both on the way in which permits
are initially allocated and whether they are subsequently hoarded. With initial allocation, if the permits are
`grandfathered' rather than auctioned, this may be inequitable in that existing sources gain a significant
asset while new entrants will have to buy permits before they can commence production (see DOE, 'Making
Markets Work for the Environment', note 4 ante, p.14). If hoarding subsequently occurs, this will be
inequitable because new entrants are unable to buy into the existing permit market.
22McGarity, op. cit., p.220.
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Some further observations can be made here. I have stated previously that equalising total
control costs should be seen as the ideal for equity, given the fact that I derived the rule of
law value of equity from the need to support competition. However, the ideal is not
realisable, and in any event conflicts with the goal of efficiency which requires the
equalisation of marginal and not total costs. The interesting point is that while, in theory, an
attempt to equalise marginal control costs under a command-and-control approach can be
regarded as equitable since it can be justified on efficiency grounds, market mechanisms not
only equalise marginal control costs automatically - but in doing so, they also get much
closer than a flexible command-and-control approach to the equity ideal of equal total
control costs. Kneese and Bower comment on command-and-control as follows:
'Perhaps the scheme that would strike one as most inequitable is the efficiently
programmed effluent standards approach because it emphasises waste reduction by
dischargers with low marginal waste reduction costs. In effect, it could penalize those with
low costs and present the high-cost waste discharger with a free property right to continue
his waste discharge unmodified."23
In contrast, with both charges and tradeable permits there is a much more even distribution
of costs among firms: with a flexible command-and-control approach aiming at the
equalisation of marginal costs, costs would be loaded on firms with low abatement costs;
however, with charges, the high cost abater would have to pay the charges and with a
tradeable permit system, the low cost abater would be able to sell permits and the high cost
abater would have to buy permits. 24 In other words the costs are much more evenly spread,
which is likely to be beneficial from a competition point of view.
Of course, while market mechanisms switch the question of equity from that under a
command-and-control system of whether the standards are equitable, to the question of
whether the charge or the result of permit trading is equitable, they will not affect the issue
of equity in enforcement. Unequal enforcement will have just as much, if not more of an
23Kneese & Bower, 'Standards, Charges, and Equity', ill Dorfman & Dorfman (eds.), Economics of the
Environment - Selected Readings, 159 at pp.168-9.
24For further discussion of the equity advantages of tradeable permits over 'flexible' command-and-control
regulation, see RCEP, 16th Report, note 9 ante - report 8 of the additional reports undertaken for the RCEP,
'Appraisal of the Potential Role of Market Mechanisms in Water Quality Issues' p.351, at para.6.63. As the
report notes, how equitable market mechanisms prove to be will depend on historical factors; if the only
reason why some firms have low marginal control costs is because they have had an easy ride in the past
and have not installed basic equipment that others have, it would be fair for them to bear the burden now
rather than spreading the distribution of financial costs. It will be recalled that a similar issue arose in
relation to I-IMIP regulation under IPC (pp.52-3); the issue also arises again in relation to eco-auditing in
ch. 8 (pp.220-221).
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impact on competitiveness in a system based on market mechanisms as one based on
command-and-control.
7.1.3 Accountability
Here one has to examine accountability for the setting of ambient standards as well as
accountability for the setting and enforcement of emission standards. Ackerman and
Stewart have suggested that market mechanisms might enhance ex ante accountability for
the setting of ambient standards:
"BAT focuses Congressional debate, as well as administrative and judicial proceedings,
upon arcane technological questions which rapidly exhaust the time and energy that most
politicians, let alone the larger public, are willing to spend on environmental matters. In
contrast, the marketable permit system will allow the policymaking debate to take a far
more intelligible shape. Rather than debating the difference between the "best available
control technology" and "lowest achievable emission rate", citizens may focus on a different
question when the environmental acts come up for revision: During the next n years, should
we instruct the EPA gradually to decrease (or increase) the number of pollution rights by x
percent? ,,25
What then should one make of this argument that the introduction of market mechanisms
(specifically tradeable permits) will "enhance the democratic accountability of environmental
policy decisions?" 26 Like Mintz, 27 I believe that the argument is misguided, because it is not
clear that the level of debate would be made any easier by a switch to market mechanisms.
Deciding on the appropriate ambient standards is necessary under both command-and-
control and market-based systems: just because arguments over the means would become
less technical (or rather non-existent, since decisions on means would be left to market
actors) under a tradeable permit system, it does not follow that deciding on what the end
should be (ie. to decrease or increase the number of pollution rights) will be any less
problematic than at present.28
Therefore, while I would not agree with Ackerman and Stewart that market mechanisms
might lead to an improvement in ex ante accountability in relation to the setting of ambient
25 Ackerman & Stewart, 'Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case For Market Incentives'
(1988) 13 Col Jo of Env Law 171.
26 Stewart, 'Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives' (1988) 13 Col Jo of Env Law,
153 at p.160.
27Mi	 'Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Commentary on a Recent Debate' (1991)
15(1) Harv Env LR 149 at p.160.
28Ibid..
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standards, I believe that they would affect accountability for the setting29 of emission
standards in the way set out below.
7.1.3.1 Pollution Taxes
Here, one might argue that the 'problem' of discretion in the setting of standards is solved by
removing command-and-control standard-setting and replacing it with pollution taxes.
Under a pure charge system, decision-making would be decentralised from the agency to
individual firms. In other words, companies would be free to choose their own output
levels (constrained of course by the charge). This would remove all discretion for the
setting of standards from the agencies and would therefore make the issue of accountability
irrelevant in this respect. Charges would therefore appear to lead to an increase in
accountability over a system of command-and-control regulation because they remove a
decision from the agency for which they need to be accountable (both ex ante and a fortiori,
ex post).3°
However, while taxes may remove the need for accountability for standard-setting
decisions, accountability will now be required in respect of the tax-setting decision.
Although this is obviously only one decision (which may need to be retaken occasionally) as
opposed to the many involved in standard-setting, the impact of this one decision will be so
significant that one cannot easily conclude that an accountability gain has been made.
7.1.3.2 Tradeable Permits
Under an auction system, the market would decide permit allocation, not the agency -
removing the latter's allocatory discretion. If, rather than being auctioned, permits were
'grandfathered' - in other words initial allocation was based on existing entitlement -
allocation would be based on historical agency discretion. However, once trading was
established, agency discretion in setting standards would be lost. Future allocation would
depend on the outcome of trading decisions made by the firms themselves. Thus, as with a
charging system, a system of tradeable permits might be thought to lead to an increase in
accountability over a system of command-and-control regulation because they too remove a
decision from the agency for which they need to be accountable.
29But not their enforcement - as we shall see below.30 See Rowley & Peacock. Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement, p.173.
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However, here, as there, there will be new decision areas for which an agency would have
to be made accountable. With tradeable permits, there are likely to be two of consideable
significance. First, if it was decided that the number of permits should be reduced to
improve environmental quality, there would have to be decisions on how to go about
achieving this. Secondly, controls on trading in a permit market would be needed to
prevent the build-up of 'hot-spots'. As Tietenberg notes of the existing US trading
programme:
"A lot of uncertainty is associated with emission reduction credit transactions since they
depend so heavily on administrative action. All trades must be approved by the control
authorities. If the authorities are not co-operative or at least consistent, the value of the
created emission credits could be diminished or even destroyed."31
There is a danger of over-idealising markets - thinking that the magic invisible hand will
replace the visible hand of administrative decision-making. However, markets, especially of
the type at hand, do not exist in vacuums and require careful administrative control. The
power necessary to achieve this control will still need to be subject to accountability.
Neither charges nor tradeable permits will, it is submitted, affect the accountability of
regulatory agencies for their enforcement decisions. Enforcement of market mechanisms
will still be required and hence there will continue to be decisions on enforcement for which
agencies need to be made accountable.
7.1.4 Effectiveness
Charges involve a producer paying a fee for each unit of pollution he produces, leaving him
relatively free to choose the level of emissions he desires. Tradeable permits, on the other
hand, require an initial allocation of consents, which can then be traded between firms.
Under a charging scheme, the quantity would be set by the market and the price by the
regulatory authority; with tradeable permits, the quantity would be determined by the
regulator and the price by the market. This points to one of the advantages of tradeable
permits over pure charging schemes - the quantity (the level of ambient environmental
quality) is certain. If one relies on charges alone, so-called market 'flexibility' may mean that
ambient targets are not met. The process would inevitably be one of trial and error -
adjusting charges up or down to achieve the desired quantity - and irreparable
environmental damage could result before the charge was pegged at the correct level.
31 Tietenberg, note 8 ante, p.27.
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However, while we have stated that tradeable permits enjoy an advantage over charges
because they can guarantee a given level of environmental quality (in that the number of
permits and hence the level of emissions is fixed) - this will be true only at a national level.
At a local level, unless strict controls are placed on trading, the desired level of
environmental quality may not be achieved:
"If the total numbr of permits is set to meet a single national target, it is possible that, as
a result of trading, emissions will increase in sensitive areas. It may be possible for regional
variations in environmental sensitivity to be taken into account by means of 'exchange rates'
so that one unit of emissions in a sensitive area can be traded for more units in a less
sensitive area. However, there may be problems in fully reconciling national and local
objectives. "32
In many ways, the problem is similar to that faced by the national plan for reducing acid gas
emissions under the EPA 1990. The national plan is like a tradeable permit system except
that trading is not allowed between firms. 33 One of the problems with the plan is that it aims
for an overall reduction in national emissions, and by itself is unable to tailor emissions to
meet particular local environmental quality objectives.
While market mechanisms may therefore be called into question for their effectiveness at
achieving a given ambient goal, one might be tempted to point to the current state of our
environment and conclude that command-and-control is similarly ineffective. While there is
undoubtedly an element of truth in this, it is important not to make sweeping
generalisations. For example, it would be dangerous to conclude that charges are no more
ineffective than command-and-control and can therefore completely replace them. The
important distinction is that charges are inherently ineffective, while in theory, a command-
and-control approach can be effective at achieving environmental goals. One can try to
alter command-and-control to make it live up to its potential, but it is arguably much more
difficult to make something that is theoretically flawed work in practice.
The irony is that market mechanisms can in theory also improve effectiveness by ironing out
some of the faults of the command-and-control system which contribute to its
ineffectiveness. As we shall see below, market mechanisms may for example improve
monitoring and enforcement - one of the areas which causes command-and-control to be
less than 100% effective. The answer would thus appear to be to use both command-and-
32D0E, 'Making Markets Work for the Environment', note 4 ante, p.13.
33 See DOE, 'The Potential Role of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Acid Rain', note 4 ante, at p.x-vi.
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control and market mechanisms, in the hope that one can enjoy the contributions to
effectiveness which a combination of both can bring. It should be noted that I am not
saying that using market mechanisms as a supplement to traditional regulation will lead to a
fully effective system. First, while market mechanisms may alter the structure of incentives,
they will never eliminate the many other constraints or influences on agency behaviour
identified by Hawkins and others. 34 Secondly, markets are by no means the only way to
improve the effectiveness of regulation. There are many different ways in which this might
be done (such as providing agencies with more funding, increasing the level of fines,
increasing the number of prosecutions, 35 altering the monitoring system so that the future
frequency of monitoring depends on the past level of compliance 36); all I am doing below is
pointing out how market mechanisms might logically lead to some improvements in
effectiveness.
7.1.4.1 Pollution Taxes - Monitoring and Enforcement37
Monitoring would still be necessary under a pure charging system to ensure that firms did
not exceed the levels which they had chosen. 38 However, such monitoring in a charging
system would not obviously be any more difficult than the monitoring of emission
standards. 39 If the agency is allotted a given percentage of charge revenue, charges would
provide an increased incentive for the agency to monitor output because they will be keen
to ensure that firms are not under-estimating their output levels. There will be no such
incentive if agencies are guaranteed a certain amount from central government. In addition,
under a 'pure' charge system, revenue would far exceed administrative costs and as this
revenue would probably go to national government, one would expect them to become
much more concerned about effective monitoring. Industry too, would be keen to ensure
34Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement; Richardson et al., Policing Pollution; Hutter, The Reasonable
Ann of the Law.
35 Although as Vogel points out, this does not necessarily lead to a better result than a more 'co-operative'
approach (Vogel, National Styles of Regulation).
36Russell, 'Monitoring and Enforcement', in Portney (ed.), Public Policies for Environmental Protection,
243 at p.269.37For further details on monitoring and enforcement, see Russell, op. cit..
380f course, this assumes that monitoring is intermittent and that firms or the agency do not have
continuous monitoring equipment. If continuous monitoring equipment was in use, firms would not have to
stick to one chosen level, but could vary their emissions as they wished and be charged accordingly. In
other words, they could be charged on actual output. However, such monitoring would also 'improve' the
monitoring of command-and-control regulation, so for our purposes here it is not relevant.
39OECD, 'Improving the Enforcement of Environmental Policies', Environmental Monographs No. 8, 1987,
para. 4.2; it has been suggested that BAT standards make monitoring easier - see McGarity, note 19 ante, at
p.210.
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effective monitoring and enforcement - charges would very likely make up a significant
proportion of their expenditure, and selective non-enforcement of competitors might affect
their market position. Of course, at the moment, non-enforcement enables certain firms to
avoid pollution control costs; however, under a charge system, they would be avoiding
these and the more significant cost of paying the charge on the extra units of pollution
emitted. Charges might therefore give rise to a third enforcement arm - agencies and
environmental pressure groups would be joined in monitoring activities by industry
'vigilantes'.
Commenting on a mixed incentive charges and standards approach (as opposed to the 'pure'
charging approach above), the OECD has suggested that charges may improve enforcement
because they act like an additional fine and therefore increase deterrence:
"In the absence of an effluent charge, the reward for violating a standard is the expected
gross profit of the actions, less the expected costs associated with being caught. If it is
reasonable to assume that in a combined charge and standard system, those caught
accidentally or intentionally exceeding the legal standard would have to pay fines plus
charges which vary with the unreported quantities discharged, then the charge system
reduces the expected net benefit of violating the standard."4°
One of the aims of enforcement is deterrence. To talk about 'improving enforcement' is
often then about improving deterrence. The level of deterrence is essentially dependent on
two factors: the chances of being caught and the size of the penalty if caught. Charges add
to the latter. One might add that charges may improve enforcement even where there is no
prosecution and hence no fine. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
(RCEP), in their 16th report, cite the German system where higher charges are levied if
monitoring reveals a breach of consent. This may deter infringements of consents which
might not currently be thought significant enough to attract prosecution and resembles the
concept of a civil fine which was mentioned briefly in the chapter on accountability for
enforcement decisions. Ideally, this civil fine would reflect the actual quantities dicharged in
breach of consent, but they would have a similar effect even if levied as a flat-rate. The
RCEP refers to this as being a "powerful reinforcement of consents."'"
Although the OECD and RCEP above are commenting on a mixed standard/charge
approach, the same will be true of a pure charging scheme - a company should expect to be
41 RCEP, 16th report, note 9 ante, paras. 8.45 - 8.48.
40OECD Mon. 8, op. cit., para. 4.2.
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fined for exceeding the level it had 'chosen' and charged on this extra amount as well as on
its chosen amount. In other words, the charge would probably be levied in line with output
figures supplied by the firm; if, after monitoring, it was found that the firm was emitting in
excess of these figures, the sum levied would be adjusted accordingly.
Finally, Beckerman has implicitly suggested that a charging system would improve
enforcement because while standards may be selectively enforced, taxes are collected. He
states that:
"The collection of the charge or tax is then a routine matter unaffected by changes in the
winds of fashion or local pressures. Tax collectors collect their taxes year in, year out, and
in the same way from one part of the country to another."42
While this argument is superficially attractive, it is wrong for the simple reason that taxes
can also be selectively enforced. The forces which lead to non-enforcement of pollution
standards may simply be transferred into non-collection of pollution taxes.
7.1.4.2 Tradeable Permits - Monitoring and Enforcement
Monitoring under a tradeable permit system would be no different to monitoring of
emission standards - the agency would still have to check emissions to make sure that
companies were not exceeding their entitlement. As for improved enforcement incentives,
firms with credits are likely to be keen on effective monitoring and enforcement, lest
cheating companies drive down their value. 43 The agency will therefore be under some
pressure to take a strong enforcement line. Companies may also be more inclined to
monitor their competitors themselves if trading prices are very high, because cheating may
confer considerable competitive advantage.
The OECD monograph comments that emissions trading does not contain the same
'automatic sanctions' described above in relation to a charging system. For this reason, it
concludes that a trading system will require the same range of sanctions as traditional
regulatory schemes."
42Beckerman, Pricing for Pollution, p.56.
°Ackerman & Stewart, 'Reforming Environmental Law' (1985) 37 Stanf LR 1333 at p.1346.44-Note 39 ante, para. 4.3.
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Are there any other ways in which tradeable permits might improve enforcement? Firms
which were 'let off when in breach of their consent under the standard system because of
financial difficulties in complying (to comply, the firm might have had to close down, with
consequent effects on local employment) 45 may now be forced to comply - because they can
afford to by selling the pollution credits acquired by reducing pollution below the level
specified in their consent. 46
 However, this rather assumes that their control costs are low -
and if they were so low, then it may be the case that they could have complied without too
much trouble in the first place. Nevertheless, even if a firm facing bankruptcy could not
now afford to comply by selling credits, it may be that a tradeable permit scheme would still
improve enforcement. Stewart, for example, has suggested that:
"The use of a permit system would not eliminate concerns over plant shutdowns and
unemployment resulting from pollution control policies. But such shutdowns as might
occur could be more readily seen as the product of impersonal market forces rather than a
particular government decision."47
However, while this may be true at a macro level, it is unlikely to affect enforcement
decisions at a micro level. If fear of creating unemployment is one of the reasons for non-
enforcement of command-and-control regulation, then it seems unlikely that enforcement
officers would feel any differently disposed towards enforcing a tradeable permit (ie. by
penalising anyone who does not have sufficient permits to cover their emisssions). It could
however become an excuse when they do feel compelled to enforce. Rather than blaming
'the law' in a `job's-worth' manner, they would now have the opportunity to blame 'the
market'.
Finally, if as Breyer suggests, current enforcement is primarily targeted at large firms and
leaves smaller firms free to continue with their non-compliance," could one say that either a
charge system or a system of marketable rights would improve enforcement because all
firms, large and small, would have to pay the tax or buy permits? The answer, as Breyer
implicitly recognises is no, because selective enforcement is just as much a feature of
revenue laws as it is of pollution standards. Just as, as we saw above, impecuniosity and the
risk of unemployment may lead to the non-enforcement not just of standards but also
45The authorities on the sociology of enforcement suggest that one reason why officers fail to enforce is
because they wish to avoid the consequences on local employment. Of course, this may be used as a threat
by a firm when it can in fact comply.
46See Tietenberg, note 8 ante, pp.28-9.
47Stewart, 'Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control' 9 Harv Env LR 1 at p.15.
48Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform, pp.277 and 280; cf. Yeager, The Limits of Law.
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tradeable permits - so small firms may be pressured less for payment of their charges or to
buy more permits.
7.1.5 Certainty
In relation to pollution taxes, the uncertainty in a command-and-control system which
resulted from discretion in the setting of standards and their subsequent variation will be
replaced by uncertainty as to the initial level of the charge and any subsequent increases
needed to cope with new entrants or growth. In other words, there will be little to choose
between the two systems in terms of the uncertainty they create for firms.
As for tradeable permits, firms will be faced with uncertainty if the initial allocation of
standards proceeds by way of auction. Grandfathering will produce a greater level of
certainty. As with any other system, increasing public expectations of environmnetal quality
may produce a need to reduce the number of permits. Depending on how and how often
this was done, such a procedure could create uncertainty for firms. However, unlike a
command-and-control or a charges system, a tradeable permit system will respond
automatically to new entrants and growth via the market; there will be no need for an
agency to adjust standards or charges. This will mean less uncertainty for existing firms
because their allocation will remain the same unless they decide to sell their permits.
7.2 PRESENT CHARGING ARRANGEMENTS
All of the current charging schemes which will be examined are built into the existing
regulatory structure (and are therefore not 'pure' market mechanisms) and are aimed at
recovering the administrative costs of regulating the consent, licence or authorisation.
There are two factors which prevent these charges from acting as pollution taxes - their
structure and their size.° Because they are cost-recovery schemes, they are typically
structured to reflect administrative costs and not to act as an incentive to reduce pollution -
although, as we shall see, some may incidentally have such an incentive effect. As for their
size, this again reflects administrative costs and will often (but not always) 5° be too low to
provide any significant incentive effect.
"See the EC 5th Environmental Action Programme, note 4 ante, which recommends that existing charge
schemes should, in line with the polluter-pays principle, "be progressively reoriented towards discouraging
pollution at source and encouraging clean production processes, through market signals." (OJ p.71).
For example in relation to some NRA charges, as we shall see.
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So do the existing charging schemes have the effects which were noted in relation to pure
pollution taxes? Do they bring benefits in terms of efficiency, equity, and some possible
benefits in relation to accountability, but problems in relation to effectiveness? And what of
certainty here?
In relation to equity, 51 with exisiting charging schemes, the charges are typically based on
the amount of effort likely to be involved for the regulator. Firms which present a similar
workload to the agencies will face similar charges. For example, as we shall see, the NRA
charge is based on the volume and content of the discharge and its receiving water - all of
which reflect the NRA's effort in regulating that discharge. As the consultation paper
states, "similar discharges to similar receiving waters will bear the same charge," 52 which
will be equitable because there will be a relevant justification for those paying a different
charge - the fact that the discharge places a different burden on the regulator. As the
consultation paper also states, the aim of the scheme is "to demonstrate that the costs will
be recovered equitably from dischargers in relation to their demands on NRA resources"
and "not to show undue discrimination or undue preference."53
As for certainty, charges under the existing charging schemes are revised annually. The
charges are generally, probably not sufficiently high to make the issue of how often they are
changed a significant one from the point of view of corporate planning. The higher they
become, the more there will be a need for safeguards of the kind contained in some of the
command-and-control legislation (eg. the NRA - who, as we saw, can usually only alter
consents after two years). Constant change is inimical to the certainty and stability which is
required for investment planning.
In relation to accountability, assuming that the charge does have some incentive effect,
pollution control is effectively shared between two forces - the force of administrative
regulation and the market forces associated with the charge. Pointing to where the effect of
one ends and the other begins is obviously difficult, but it has to be true to say that the
agency has no control over any reductions in emissions which the charge achieves. In this
51 Equity is being used here in the sense defined for the rule of law; of course, the cost-recovery charging
schemes are equitable in another sense in that they ensure that the polluter pays (to an extent at least) for
regulatory costs rather than the taxpayer. As has been noted, the polluter pays principle is an equitable
principle which reflects a judgment on the appropriate allocation of pollution control costs.
52NRA, 'Proposed Scheme of Charges in Respect of Discharges to Controlled Waters', 1991, p.12.
53/b1d., p.9.
198
respect, its standard-setting discretion is partially eclipsed. Furthermore, the larger the
charge, the more insignificant the agencies' power to set emissions standards would become.
Insofar as its power to set emission standards becomes less significant, a charging scheme
may be thought of as an improvement in terms of accountability over a straight command-
and-control system. However, in reality, as we saw earlier in relation to pure charges, a
decrease in the power in setting emission standards will see an increase in the charge-setting
power for which the agency will still need to be held accountable. In other words, the need
for accountability is simply transferred.
The values of efficiency and effectiveness are slightly more difficult. We saw that efficiency
has two aspects - the equalisation of marginal control costs, and the effective use of
location. In relation to marginal cost, under an incentive charging scheme, a producer has
an incentive to reduce emissions until he reaches the point where it is cheaper to pay the
charge; the firms with the lowest marginal abatement costs will reduce emissions the most,
whilst those facing higher costs may prefer to pay the charge. This produces an efficient
result because the greater burden of reducing emissions is taken-on by those who can do so
at least cost. Assuming they do produce an incentive effect, the existing charging schemes
will typically be efficient in the marginal cost sense because they will encourage firms which
can abate at low cost to cut their emissions more than firms faced with high marginal
abatement costs. However, as we shall see, not all the charging schemes are locationally
efficient in relation to pollution control. As for effectiveness, it does not make sense to look
at whether the existing schemes would guarantee a given level of ambient quality, because
that is not their aim. If it were their aim, they would in practice be pure charges and would
face the same problem which pure charges face - the fact that the achievement of ambient
goals will be a trial-and-error process. Effectiveness here is in fact prior to this fine-tuning
use of the word, in that there are questions as to whether the charging schemes are effective
at reducing pollution at all - let alone whether they might guarantee a particular target.
Many of the schemes are totally ineffective at reducing pollution because they are not
structured in such a way to act as pollution taxes. It is this issue which will be the primary
concern when examining each of the schemes below.
While on the subject of effectiveness, it is worth mentioning that a charging scheme which,
like the existing schemes, is added on to a command-and-control regulatory system can help
to improve the effectiveness of the command-and-control system. When looking at pure
charges earlier, I noted OECD and RCEP reports which suggested that a charging scheme
designed as a pollution tax might improve the enforcement of existing regulatory controls
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and hence the effectiveness of the system. The same may be true of cost-recovery schemes
which are not designed as pollution taxes as such. Richardson et al., for example, state that
officers believed that the introduction of trade effluent charges had led to their demands
being taken more seriously; had enabled them to present themselves as advisers who could
recommend ways of reducing the amount paid out; and enabled them to use the charges as
an effective enforcement device against the 'amoral calculator'. 54 However, they also
present some evidence that charging had led some traders to adopt "the attitude that
substantial payments entitled them to discharge as they wished." 55 This would point
towards a decrease in effectiveness.
Trade effluent charges are rather unusual in that they are based on expected treatment
costs. As we shall see, most of the existing charging schemes are based not on this, or on
pollution, but on the amount of time the agency expects to spend in monitoring the permit.
It has been suggested that cost-recovery schemes such as those operated by the River
Purification Boards in Scotland and the one for radioactive substances - which are based on
the actual amount of time spent in monitoring - may also lead to improved enforcement
and hence the effectiveness of existing regulation. 56 The argument is that these could
improve enforcement because if a firm is non-compliant, it knows that it will attract more
monitoring thereafter and hence attract a higher charge. This will make it think twice about
breaching its consent.57
7.2.1 The NRA Charging Scheme58
The NRA charging scheme is a cost-recovery charging scheme introduced under section
131 WRA 1991. It is designed to cover the NRA's routine costs in processing, issuing and
monitoring consents, although charges will be made on the basis of bands rather than the
actual time and effort the NRA have spent on a particular consent. 59 It is not meant to
54Richardson et al., Policing Pollution, pp.146-9. An 'amoral calculator' is a discharger for whom non-
compliance is a calculated and deliberate act.
55Ibid., p.145.56The system of charging for discharges to water in Scotland and that for radioactive substances consents
are thus 'actual cost' cost-recovery charging schemes (see respectively, 'Scheme of Charges for Discharges
to Controlled Waters' - reported in (1992) 3(5) Water Law 137 and DOE Environment News Release, 204,
1991).
570ne Scottish river purification board (RPB) at least, seems to be aware of this - see 'North East River
Purification Board: Charges For Discharges - Proposed Cost Recovery Scheme - An Explanatory Leaflet'.
Cf: the text at note 55 ante.58NRA, 'The NRA Scheme of Charges in Respect of Applications and Consents for Discharges to
Controlled Waters'.
591e. it is forecast across all consents rather than reflecting the actual cost of dealing with each consent.
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cover the NRA's costs of general water quality monitoring, administration, pollution
prevention and control work which is not directly related to discharges; these costs will
continue to be met by government grant. There is a charge for applications for consent and
an annual subsistence charge. The annual element of the charge is based on the (consented
rather than the actual) content and volume of the effluent and on the type of receiving
water. Each of these are split up into bands which reflect the difficulty the NRA faces in
monitoring; each band then has a numerical factor associated with it: volume is divided into
8 bands, and the factors increase with volume; content is divided into 7 bands, with
substances which are the most difficult to monitor in the band attracting the highest factor;
and finally, receiving waters are split up into 4 bands, the highest factor going to the band
which is most difficult to monitor. The numbers associated with each band are then
multiplied together with a 'financial factor' to produce the final charge. Thus, for example,
a discharge of up to and including 5 cubic metres, containing site drainage, to coastal waters
would attract a factor of 0.4, 1 and 0.8 respectively. These would then be multiplied
together with the financial factor, which for 1993/4 was £389, so that 0.4 x 1 x 0.8 x 389 =
£124.48. By way of contrast, a discharge of more than 150,000 cubic metres which
included herbicides and was released to an estuary, would attract a charge of 14 x 15 x 1.5
x 389 = £122,535.
While the scheme is not intended to act as a pollution tax, it may have an incentive effect.
As Litterick points out:
"Firstly, dischargers are able to look at whether they need a consent at all; for if there is
no consent there is no charge. Secondly, they can look to see whether they can reduce the
consented volume; and thirdly they can see whether they can reduce the content and
weighting factors by taking out of their discharge those materials that are expensive to
monitor and result in a higher weighting.,160
Nevertheless, the criteria by which the charge is assessed prevent the charge from acting as
afidly effective pollution tax. 61
 As we have seen, the charge is based on the volume and
content of the discharge and the type of water into which it is received. Beginning with
volume and content, the bands set for these reflect the effort involved for the NRA in
monitoring. Now while this will be a fairly good indication of pollution potential where
volume is concerned - the larger the volume of the discharge, not only the bigger the
monitoring effort required, but also the greater the likely pollution - the same will not
61 See also the RCEP's 16th Report, note 9 ante.
60Li 	 'Charging for Disharging to Controlled Waters' (1990) 5 1E112 at p.4.
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necessarily be true of the content component. Band A for example carries by far the largest
factor (15) because it contains a list of substances such as PCBs, herbicides, fungicides and
pesticides, which are all very expensive to monitor. Band B, which carries a much smaller
factor of 5, contains a list including metals, metalloids and cyanides. While these band B
substances may be easier to monitor than band A substances, which is why they attract a
lower factor, from a pollution point of view one would want dischargers to reduce
emissions of band B substances such as metals just as much as the substances in band A.
Thus, a pollution rather than a monitoring charge would indicate a similar factor for both
sets of substances. However, while the charge is not a precision pollution tax, it will act as
a pollution tax because there is still an incentive for dischargers of band B substances to
eradicate discharges of band B substances and move into band C (factor 3) and so on. This
points to the second problem with the charge: one has to eradicate one's use of the
substance to move out of the band. Simply reducing the amount would lower the volume
factor, but one would still be faced with the same contents banding. This could produce
bizarre results. For example, one might be emitting a relatively small amount of herbicide in
amongst a large volume of mostly harmless waste water. Reducing the amount of herbicide
to a smaller level would be desirable from a pollution point of view, but the charge does not
provide an incentive to do this: reducing the amount of herbicide without eradicating it
altogether would make little difference to the volume of the discharge and would not take
the discharger out of band A. Thus, while the charge might be effective at reducing
emissions, it will not be as effective as it might be at reducing pollution.
Secondly, the types of receiving water (ground, coastal, surface or estuarial) are put into
bands with a factor attached to each band which again reflects the NRA's monitoring costs
(0.5, 0.8, 1.0 and 1.5 respectively). As Litterick states:
"The factors reflect the costs incurred by the NRA. One of the early suggestions was to
use the 'criticality' of the receiving water as a factor but this is not necessarily a good proxy
for the costs and effort involved. For example as much cost and effort may be incurred on
monitoring discharges into class 4 rivers in heavily industrialized areas as into class 1 trout
streams elsewhere. "62
Thus groundwater ends up with the lowest charge and estuarial waters the highest, because
the latter carry far greater monitoring costs than the former. 63 However, this is almost
entirely the wrong way around as far as pollution is concerned because estuaries can
63Because of the complex mixing effects which take place in estuaries.
62Litterick, op. cit., p.4.
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assimilate pollution far better than groundwater. While the charge may be effective at
reducing pollution when each type of receiving water is viewed separately, when viewed as
a whole, the scheme would, in theory, provide firms with an incentive to move to discharge
into waters where their pollution damage would be felt most critically. The only way of
avoiding this would be to alter the differentials in favour of the most critical receiving
environment.
As for the locational aspect of efficiency, although the charge is based not only on content
and volume, but also on the type of receiving water, it will not produce an efficient
outcome. This is because the factors attached to the four locational bands - ground,
coastal, surface and estuarial waters - are not related to the capacity of that class of water to
assimilate pollution. If they had been structured according to assimilative capacity, one
might have expected ground and surface waters to have a higher factor (and hence a higher
charge) than estuaries." Thus, the charges are not efficient in the locational sense: from a
pollution point of view a person discharging to an estuary is presented with a cost greater
than necessary for the purposes of environmental improvement.
7.2.2 The HMIP Charging Scheme65
The 1-11VIIP charging scheme was introduced under section 8 EPA 1990, again on a cost-
recovery basis. The scheme aims to recover the costs of considering and issuing
authorisations, compliance monitoring, enforcement, sampling and analysis of releases,
maintaining the public register and associated administrative costs, but not wider policy
work. Unlike the NRA charging structure, the 1-11MIP charge will not be effective in
reducing emissions because it is not based directly on the volume and content of emissions.
With the HMIP scheme, the charge is not based on a unit of pollution, but rather on the
number of defined components which the process contains. 66 The more components, the
higher the charge. Again, this broadly reflects the expense involved for BMW in dealing
with the process. While it is true that pollution levels will to some extent depend on the
number of components, such a charge is an extremely blunt instrument and is unlikely to
64Even that would not reflect differences in assimilative capacity within classes, because rivers, for
example, vary considerably in their ability to cope with pollution; cl the RCEP who favour altering the
perverse incentive of the current charge, but who do not advocate varying the charge according to location -
note 9 ante, para. 8.47.65HMIP, 'The MEP Integrated Pollution Control Fees and Charges Scheme (England and Wales)'.
66This is the 'subsistence' charge. There is also an application fee and a substantial variation fee - but
needless to say that, as once only payments, these will not provide an incentive effect (except perhaps at the
design stage, but since they are based on the number of components, they suffer from the same problems as
I am about to describe for subsistence charges).
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provide an incentive to change: it is one thing to control the amount of pollution from a
particular process, but quite another to reduce the number of components necessary for a
process. Furthermore, even if such a reduction could be achieved, it wouldn't necessarily
lead to a cut in emissions and hence pollution because it is quite possible for a factory with
relatively few components to be a sizeable polluter. A final point to make here is that if the
Government decide to replace or augment BATNEEC standards with a proper incentive-
based market mechanism, the first ones are likely to be used for the reduction of acid rain
and are likely to be of the tradeable permit kind rather than charges.°
7.2.3 The APC Charging Scheme68
The local authority scheme is similar to HMIP's, only it will lack any incentive effect
because the charge is not even related to the number of components. The rationale for this
is given in the Government's response to consultation on the various charging schemes:
"It is intended to adopt the same basic charging structure for local authority air pollution
control as for integrated pollution control: that is to say there will be an application fee to
cover the costs of determining applications, and an annual charge payable as soon as the
authorisation is issued in respect of compliance monitoring and enforcement costs
(including sampling and analysis of emissions). However, it is not proposed that local
authority controlled processes should be sub-divided into components. Such sub-division
for processes coming under integrated pollution control is necessary because of the widely
differing demands these processes will place on HMIP's resources. But the 'Part B'
processes identified for local authority control are much less varied and generally of smaller
scale and complexity."69
7.2.4 Charges for Discharges to Sewers
A charging scheme may be made under section 143 WIA 1991. Sewerage undertakers
currently charge for trade effluent discharges using the `Mogden Formula', which calculates
the charge on the basis of, inter alia, the volume and load of the effluent and its strength as
measured by the chemical oxygen demand (COD) and the level of suspended solids
present. 70
 There are no charges specifically relating to toxic substances, as it is stated that
these are to be limited solely by way of consent conditions. Again the charges are of a cost-
67See the London Economies report, note 4 ante.68D0E, 'The Local Enforcing Authorities Air Pollution Fees and Charges Scheme (England and Wales)'.
70For details, see the Water Authorities Association, 'Trade Effluent Discharged to the Sewer:
Recommended Guidelines for Control and Charging', 1986.
69D0E, 'Pollution Regulation: Cost Recovery Charges', 1990, paras. 32-3.
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recovery nature; they are intended to recover the costs of treating and disposing of the
effluent via the sewage works on the basis of estimates of relevant expenditure.
Based as they are on volume and COD/solids, the charges may provide an incentive effect
to reduce potentially71 polluting emissions. However, empirical studies of trade effluent
charges have shown that firms do not necessarily react to them - even when cutting
emissions could save them reasonable sums of money. 72 Nevertheless, if set at a high
enough level so that considerable sums could be saved, they probably would achieve an
incentive effect. While the charges may thus be effective at reducing pollution, it is worth
noting briefly the effectiveness problem we discussed in relation to pure charges - the trial-
and-error nature of achieving ambient targets. Here, if the charge was to replace command-
and-control regulation immediately, it would be a gamble as to whether it had been set at
the right level; if it was set at too low a level, the sewage works could suffer significant
damage. However, it might be said that given that the sewage works operates as a partial
`failsafe', sewers would be the best place to begin a trial-run of incentive charges gradually
replacing traditional regulation. A gradual replacement would alleviate some of the
effectiveness problems associated with an immediate replacement, and while remaining
difficulties might still be critical to, for example, a river, a sewage works may have a larger
threshold to cope.
Also worth noting is that sewerage undertakers may charge on a different basis for trade
effluents which undergo only preliminary treatment and are disposed of through a sea
outfall belonging to and maintained by the undertaker. 73 These charges are likely to be less
than those for discharges to sewers which connect with sewage treatment works, because
there is less treatment involved. Because the sea has a high assimilative capacity, the lower
level of such charges can be regarded as efficient in the locational sense.
7.2.5 Waste Charging
Before examining WRA charging, it is worth considering for a moment the possibility of a
pure charge being applied to the production of waste which is sent by a plant for external
71 Because today, most emissions will be processed by the sewage works. However, sewage works have a
limited capacity, so it does make sense to talk of a pollution tax here: if trade effluent emissions are not
sufficiently controlled, pollution will result at the sewage work's discharge.
72 See eg. Webb and Woodfield, Stand. 	and Charges in the Control of Trade Effluent Discharges to
Public Sewers, cited in RCEP 16th Report, note 7 ante at para. 8.40. See also Pearson & Smith, 'Taxation
and Environmental Policy: Some Initial Evidence' (1990) IFS commentary no. 19, p.37.
73 See note 70 ante, p.6.
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disposal. If a producer is operating a prescribed process within the IPC contols, he is under
a duty to select the best practicable environmental option (BPEO) and if this turns out to be
land disposal or incineration, he will have to use BATNEEC (best available techniques not
entailing excessive cost) to prevent or minimise the production of his wastes. If a producer
comes within IPC and the BATNEEC provisions are rigorously applied to 'outside' disposal,
it is possible that market mechanisms would represent a more constitutionally legitimate
alternative. 74 Rather than telling a producer what he has to do to reduce these emissions, or
by how much he has to reduce them, one could for example set a tax per tonne which
would then provide an economic incentive to reduce the waste over and above the current
incentive provided by the market cost of disposal. The administrative costs of applying
such a 'waste-end' tax to each producer would not be great because documentation and
monitoring is already required under the duty of care provisions of the EPA 1990. Such a
tax would remove the discretion of HMIP in this area (although again, the discretion would
be shifted to tax-setting); it would also arguably be more equitable (each producer would
face the same tax rate), more effective 75 and more efficient.76
In relation to landfill sites themselves, there can be no question of pure market mechanisms
replacing landfill site licences and their associated conditions and thus no question of them
leading to an improvement in rule of law values. While market mechanisms could
conceivably replace standard-setting for some types of emission to air and water made by
producers, landfill sites are like highly toxic substance releases to these media - one wants
zero emissions and it seems more sensible to ban leachates than to pretend that one could
set a tax to achieve the same objective. Methane gas could be taxed, but there would have
to be some guarantee that dangerous, explosive levels were not reached. However, while it
is not possible to replace licensing with taxes, it is possible to supplement licensing with a
tax on waste disposal operators according to the categories of waste they receive - the cost
of which would then be passed on to producers in the form of higher disposal costs. This
extra cost would provide a greater incentive to reduce waste arisings than exists at present
(the present incentives include increasing disposal costs because of tighter regulation).
Waste charging, in other words may have the capacity to increase the effectiveness of the
74If the producer does not come within IPC, there will be no regulatory control on the sending of waste for
outside disposal.
75Although see the comments in the text below on landfill charges and their effect on flytipping; the same
could happen with waste-end taxes.
76Although it may be cheaper in administrative terms to tax a small number of landfill site operators, as
described in the text below, rather than a large number of producers as with a 'waste-end' tax - especially as
the effect would be the same (an increase in the price of disposal).
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regulation of production of waste arisings. On the other hand, waste charging may lead to a
decrease in the effectiveness of waste regulation in that it may also increase the incentive to
fly-tip or to establish unlicensed landfill sites. 77 In Denmark, for example, the introduction
of a landfill charge led to a higher incidence of flytipping to avoid the levy.78
As with other areas, there is in fact a system of waste charging in place, under section 41
EPA 1990 . 79 However, as with other areas, the charging scheme is aimed at cost-recovery
rather than at creating incentives to reduce waste. An application charge covers the cost of
processing and issuing waste management licences. A subsistence charge (the element of
the charge payable annually and therefore arguably the most significant aspect of the
scheme) then seeks to recover WRA costs of supervising licences (the 'standard'
component), and the liaison costs of the NRA" (the 'consultation component ) . 81 The
standard component of the subsistence charge is connected to the pollution potential of
sites, by using specified bands based on the quantities and types of waste disposed.
Whatever the structure of the charge, if it was raised high enough, it would have the
potential to act as an incentive on producers to reduce waste arisings because the cost of
the charge would be passed on to them in the form of higher disposal costs. The charge is
unlikely to act as an incentive on landfill operators to reduce pollution on site. If the
structure remains as at present and the charge is raised significantly, it would also create a
more marked incentive for producers of special waste 82 to reduce their waste arisings: if a
producer wishes to dispose of special waste, he will have to pay a higher charge to dispose
of it, because landfills accepting such waste will attract a higher charge. Because large
landfill sites attract higher charges, it may also have the curious effect that producers would
have an incentive to send their waste to small landfill sites. 83 At present this will not of
course occur because the charge is not sufficiently large for it to make much if any
difference to the cost to the customer.
77See the Coopers & Lybrand report, note 4 ante, at p.50.
79D0E, 'Waste Management Licensing (Fees and Charges) Scheme'.
80If consulted under s.41(5) EPA 1990.
8I Enforcement and other costs not directly associated with the consideration of applications or the
subsistence of licensed activities are not covered by the charging scheme.
82 See The Control of Pollution (Special Waste) Regulations 1980 (SI 1980 No. 1709).
83Although, given economies of scale, the larger sites may be able to internalise the charges more easily.
CHAPTER 8
Market Control of Corporate Pollution
This chapter is concerned with the control of corporate pollution via market means. By
market means, I mean those non-regulatory means of controlling pollution which make use
of market processes, incentives and signals such as prices. Green consumerism,
environmental management and auditing schemes, civil liability and green investment are
just some examples of such market approaches. They are non-regulatory and should not be
confused with what I term market mechanisms or economic incentive approaches to
environmental regulation such as pollution taxes and tradeable permit schemes, which were
examined in the previous chapter. Market mechanisms of environmental regulation are, like
command-and-control techniques, a form of regulation. They involve a regulator exerting
preventative control on companies, whether via initial allocation and follow-up monitoring
and enforcement (tradeable permits) or via the power to set charges (pollution taxes) with
similar follow-up. In contrast, market approaches, are generally characterised by their lack
of a regulator. Pollution control is achieved via market signals and processes but, unlike
with market mechanisms of environmental regulation, these are not used by a regulator to
try to achieve a specific regulatory goal. Occasionally, as we shall see with environmental
management and auditing and eco-labelling, there may be a quasi-regulator, where the body
concerned is typically responsible for processing voluntary applications on the basis of
already established criteria, but this is some degree removed from regulation proper where
control is of a compulsory and discretionary nature, and is backed by positive sanctions. I
also include civil liability in this chapter as a market approach because damages awards act
as a market signal to others to take action to avoid similar liability. Some might see judges
applying the civil law as regulators of sorts, but their role is essentially reactive rather than
preventative and it is difficult to see them as aiming towards a particular regulatory goal.
We can expect to see an increasing emphasis on market approaches in the future. The EC
5th Environmental Action Programme, for example, encourages voluntary agreements and
self-regulation as part of a concept of 'shared responsibility' between all of the relevant
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actors in the environmental sphere.' It stresses a 'bottom-up' approach rather than a 'top-
down approach, 2 stating that:
"Whereas previous environmental measures tended to be proscriptive in character with
an emphasis on the 'thou-shalt not' approach, the new strategy leans more towards a 'let's
work together' approach."3
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to assess the constitutional legitimacy of these
market means - where legitimacy is measured by reference to the rule of law values of
accountability, effectiveness, certainty, equity and efficiency. The legitimacy of
corporations themselves will not be the subject of detailed scrutiny. In any event, one could
not do so by examining the constitutionality of the exercise of their power, because, as non-
state actors, they do not come within the reach of public constitutional analysis. 4 The
means used to control them do come within the terms of that analysis because even a
market-based, voluntary approach to pollution control is still a public policy choice which
must be assessed for its compliance with the rule of law.
The question is how the rule of law values ought to be applied to market control? Should
they be applied to market approaches as an addition to a system of regulation or to a stand-
alone system? I am interested in applying rule of law values to both. The idea is to see how
market approaches - existing as they do at present alongside a system of regulation - fare in
terms of values such as equity and effectiveness and then to see how these values might
apply to a stand-alone market-based system. There are two reasons for exploring the latter
as well as the former: first, with a ceteris paribus approach, one may achieve a clearer
picture of the match with rule of law values; and secondly, because many in the business
world have come close to advocating a wholly market-based approach. The idea of the
chapter is as much to demonstrate what such a system would look like as it is to
demonstrate how it would fare in terms of rule of law values.
1 The 5th Environmental Action Programme, 'Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme
of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development', chs. 3, 4 and 8, OJ
1993, C138/5.
2Ibid, executive summary, para. 34. p.17.
3.1bid, para. 19, p.14.
4This does not mean that one cannot question the legitimacy of corporations in a non-constitutional sense -
see further note 9 post.
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Figure 2 below sets out the contrast between how the rule of law might be applied to
market approaches, and their application to regulation proper which was examined in
previous chapters. The aim of figure 2 is to act as a starting and a reference point to the
question of whether one can apply the rule of law values to market approaches, stand-alone
or otherwise. I will begin by examining this question at a general level before looking at
specific market approaches in detail.
Figure 2
Legitimacy of Market Approaches
(Corporate responsibility and
accountability mechanisms - eg. eco-
auditing, green consumerism, tort etc.)
Legitimacy of Regulation
Efficiency Efficiency
Equity? Equity
Effectiveness Effectiveness
Certainty? Certainty
, Accountability? Accountability
Effectiveness at achieving a desired level of environmental quality can be applied fairly
straightforwardly to market approaches. In fact, the issue of effectiveness helps to highlight
the point made above about the difference between market approaches existing on their
own and their existing alongside a regulatory structure. In the present system where market
approaches exist alongside regulation, most market approaches have some problems which
are likely to limit their effectiveness. Nevertheless, despite these problems they are likely
either to add to the effectiveness of the regulatory system as a whole, or rather to produce
an effective joint system of pollution control.' However, as we shall see, most market
controls would be relatively ineffective without any regulation. Efficiency in relation to
market approaches - stand-alone or otherwise - is also reasonably unproblematic: leaving
decisions in the hands of market actors is typically more efficient than having regulators
impose solutions.
As for equity, it only makes sense to talk about equity where an external state body, such as
a regulator, is affecting companies. Where nobody is doing any 'treating' (as in 'treat like
5 As we saw in the previous chapter, the same is true of market mechanisms of regulation: on their own,
there are doubts about their effectiveness, but they may improve the effectiveness of a command-and-control
system.
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cases alike'), the issue of equity does not arise. 6 The same will be true of certainty: markets
are far from certain environments, but certainty is only relevant if a state body is acting in
some way.7
The same may also be true of accountability, although the issue is arguably more difficult.
Do we mean the accountability of regulatory agencies under a market approach? If so
because a market approach does not involve regulation (and a pure market approach would
involve deregulation), the problem of holding agencies to account does not arise (or is
solved by abandoning them). There will however be some areas where market approaches
rely on quasi-regulators and there may then be questions as to their accountability (eg. in
relation to eco-labelling and, perhaps to a lesser degree, eco-auditing - both of which are
discussed further below). 8 Or, perhaps when we speak of accountability we mean corporate
accountability? If we do mean corporate accountability rather than agency accountability,
the chapters are not comparing like with like: with regulation one can for example consider
various mechanisms for holding an agency to account for use of their existing regulatory
means of controlling pollution (typically command-and-control regulation) and then
compare this with an alternative regulatory means (such as market mechanisms) to see
whether the latter adds anything to the accountability 'budget'. With market control on the
other hand, different forms of corporate accountability are different means and hence the
idea of comparing them in terms of accountability is virtually tautologous.9
6Although, as NNe shall see, equity in other, non-rule of law senses may arise - eg. in relation to green
consumerism.
7Eg. in relation to eco-labelling, hiCh will be discussed later, companies will face uncertainty if the criteria
for product assessment are changed too frequently.
8And possibly also concerns about equity (both eco-labelling and eco-auditing) and certainty (eco-labelling).
9The key to understanding this may lie in what I said earlier - we are concerned here with the constitutional
legitimacy of the rneans used to control pollution, not with the non-constitutional, political legitimacy of
corporations or agencies themselves. Corporations have been diagnosed as suffering from a crisis of
political legitimacy, as have agencies (see respectively, Vogel, 'The Corporation as Government' (1975) 8(1)
Polity 5 and Jones, 'Administrative Law, Regulation and Legitimacy' (1989) 16 Jo of Law & Soc 410); and
accountability has been prescribed as a cure for the legitimation defects of both types of body (on the
corporate side, see Craig Smith, Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate
Accountability, pp.50-52). As Vogel points out, the crisis in corporate legitimacy may stem from two
sources: first, their democratic deficit (the idea being that corporations - as public, political institutions -
should be democratically restructured); and secondly their poor performance (in this context, their poor
environmental performance). As Craig Smith establishes, corporate responsibility and accountability
mechanisms (ranging from green consumerism to regulation) can help to restore corporate legitimacy.
Regulatory agencies similarly suffer legitimacy problems - only these are almost exclusively associated with
their democratic deficit; accountability mechanisms here are all about trying to replace or maintain the link
with democracy.
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While, for the above reasons, I will not be considering corporate accountability directly, I
will be using the distinction between corporate responsibility mechanisms and corporate
accountability mechanisms as a way of structuring the chapter's discussion of market
approaches (although, as we shall see, the distinction between responsibility and
accountability mechanisms cannot always easily be maintained). This is purely for
expositional purposes. Corporate responsibility is synonymous with a 'voluntary' approach,
where firms control their own pollution without any outside prompting. Under this
heading, I would place environmental management and auditing. Corporate accountability
on the other hand connotes external pressure of some kind. 10 Under this heading, I would
place green consumerism and eco-labelling, green investment (aided by environmental
reporting and accounting), boycotts, direct action, civil liability and regulation. As we shall
see, 'voluntary' agreements between government and industry could be said to lie
somewhere between corporate responsibility and accountability.
8.1 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
With corporate responsibility, companies perform well on their own initiative. There are a
number of reasons why one might expect them to take environmental action without outside
prompting. First, company officials are themselves members of the wider public and will
therefore, to some extent, share public concern about environmental issues. The extent to
which personal views play a part is however limited by the need to make a profit in
competitive markets. Fortunately, increased profit is often another good reason why
companies will take action without external pressure: there may be marketing advantages in
producing greener products and firms may be able to decrease raw material costs and waste
disposal costs by altering processes and cutting back on waste.
The important question is how do companies ensure that such advantages are spotted and
acted upon? The answer to this lies in environmental management systems (as part of
which one might consider the restructuring of boards of directors to include some
environmental input - perhaps in the form of environmental advisory boards)" and
environmental audits.
°Craig Smith, op. cit., p.78.
11 The main problem with, for example, environmental advisory boards will be where a conflict of interest
occurs. Management ma) listen to their advice when it suits them, but it is hard to imagine such boards
having an influence oNer matters of strategic importance: "There might be some exceptions, but most
companies see their advisor) boards neither as NI, atchdogs nor as ombudsmen. The businesses want to be
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8.1.1 Environmental Management and Auditing 12
 and Voluntary Action
There are two principal schemes on environmental management and auditing." The first is
organised by the British Standards Institution and is known as the British Standard on
Environmental Management Systems - BS 7750. This is not to be confused with BS 5750
on quality management, which is a non-environmental, quality management system. The
second is the EC Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) introduced by Council
Regulation 1836/93." The Regulation was agreed in 1993, and came into force in 1994,
but will not apply until 1995. Since Regulations are directly applicable in member states,
there is no need for national implementing legislation to be passed and the scheme will
therefore automatically become a part of UK law. With BS 7750, there was some delay
caused by the need to ensure compatibility with the EMAS scheme, but the standard was
issued in its final form at the beginning of 1994 and should soon be fully operational." The
kept abreast of environmental issues so that they can plan for shifts in the market. And some companies,
such as Shanks, want the board merely to comment on main board decisions. Although some companies
say they use their boards to help formulate strategy, they only mean this in the most abstract sense. Hewitt,
for example, sees no role for the advisory board in helping to decide company strategy. When Shanks
recently bought Rechem, the high-temperature incinerator operator, the board was only told after the event"
(Knight, 'Advice to turn a director green', Financial Times, 22 January, 1992, p.9). In addition, the
advisory board has to be provided with information before it is in a position to offer any advice; such
information may not alw s be forthcoming and, in any case, there is no guarantee that their advice will be
acted upon.
I2Environmental management and auditing can be seen as examples of what Teubner has called 'reflexive'
law. Teubner places considerable emphasis on the potential for law as "external mobilization of internal
self-control resources" (Teubner, 'Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries: A Functional
Approach to the Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility', in Hopt & Teubner (eds.),
Corporate Governance and Directors' Liabilities, 149 at p.160). According to Teubner, modernist,
regulatory law, which seeks to achieve definite social results, has not succeeded because it fails to recognise
that "the complexity of socio-economic processes cannot be directed" (Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive
Elements In Modern Law' (1983) 17(2) Law & Soc Rev 239 at p.268). In other words, it is faced with what
Habennas has called a 'sy stem' or 'rationality' crisis. Teubner contrasts this form of law with a more
postmodern, 'reflexive' law, which aims "to structure and restructure semi-autonomous social systems, by
shaping both their procedures of internal discourse and their methods of coordination with other social
systems" (Ibid., p.255). Reflexive rationality recognises that intervention is necessary, but "retreats from
taking full responsibility for substantive outcomes" (Ibid., p.254). Reflexive or 'soft' law thus aims for
'regulated autonomy', the logic of w hich is that companies regulate themselves and the state's role becomes
that of an auditor of the various self-regulatory systems (Birkinshaw et al., Government By Moonlight,
pp.183-4).
I3The chemical industry has established its own industry-specific initiative called 'Responsible Care' - see
further 222 ENDS Report (1993) 14 and 233 ENDS Report (1994) 16.
I4Council Regulation 1836/93 Allowing Voluntary Participation by Companies in the Industrial Sector in a
Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, OJ 1993, L168/1.
15The final issue which needs to be tackled before the scheme can become fully operational is the
accreditation of the certifiers who will themselves assess whether a company has complied with BS 7750's
requirements.
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two schemes are now broadly compatible - the main, significant point of difference being
that the Regulation requires the publication of a verified environmental statement.
Both are voluntary schemes; firms are not compelled to participate. For those that do so,
there are three likely benefits. First, there are cost savings which may arise from identifying
and hence avoiding potential legal liabilities i6 and from identifying waste-minimisation
opportunities - savings which might not have arisen without an environmental management
and audit system. Secondly, firms will be able to cite the British standard or sport the
Community 'graphic' or logo on their corporate notepaper, brochures, environmental
publicity and corporate advertising (although not on the products themselves or their
packaging, or in their product advertising - because this would create confusion with the
eco-labelling scheme)." Thirdly, and related to the last point, firms will be able to cite the
standard or compliance with the Regulation to their industry purchasers - who have become
increasingly concerned about the environmental performance of their supply chain." In the
future, many large companies will probably simply not deal with suppliers who are not
certified under one of the schemes.° (Involving as it does external pressure, this aspect of
environmental management systems is an obvious form of accountability mechanism.)
Finally, I-IMIP for example, have suggested that registered firms can expect to receive fewer
monitoring visits and, as a result, may in the future end up paying lower charges under their
charging scheme.2°
These then are some of the advantages of participating in a scheme, but what do the
schemes actually require? With EMAS, registration under the scheme will be on a site-by-
site basis. 2 ' Under the Regulation, companies must adopt a company environmental policy
which must include commitments aimed at the reasonable continuous improvement of
16Although there is also some concern that publication of environmental statements may create liabilities -
see eg. 231 ENDS Report (1994) 25.
I7See eg. Regulation 1836/93, Art. 10(3). Under the Regulation, the logo must be accompanied by a
'statement of participation' which explains the significance of the logo.
I8B&Q, BT, and British Gas are just three examples of firms who have taken steps to check the
environmental credentials of their suppliers. See eg. 239 ENDS Report (1994) 23.
19If lenders and insurers start to require registration, then another advantage besides winning tenders will
be the ability to secure loans and insurance. With insurance, even if registration is not made a compulsory
feature of cover, insurers are likely to offer reduced premiums to registered firms or sites.
20See 231 ENDS Report (1994) 23. The HMIP charging scheme was discussed in ch. 7.
21 Although the environmental policy must be company-wide and not just site-based - Annex I, section A,
para. 1; cf. BS 7750, where it is not yet clear if the standard must apply to a whole company or whether a
part may be sufficient (see Hill, 'The implementation of EMAS and BS 7750' (1994) 30 lEA1 7 at p.8).
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environmental performance over defined timescales, 22 with a view to reducing
environmental impacts to levels not exceeding those corresponding to economically viable
application of best available technology - EVABAT (the acronym is formed by the initial
letters from the final seven words); 23 these commitments or objectives must be quantified
wherever practicable. 24 They must conduct an environmental review of the site and, in the
light of that review, introduce first an environmental programme aimed at achieving the
commitments towards continuous improvements made in the environmental policy and
second an environmental management system for the site. From then on, they must carry
out periodic environmental audits of the site and in the light of these audits, make revisions
to the environmental programme. They are further required to publish environmental
statements and finally, to have all of the above verified to ensure that the requirements of
the Regulation have been met. 25
 Once the member state's competent body has received a
validated statement and is satisfied that the site complies with the Regulation, and once any
registration fee has been paid, the site will be registered under Article 8.
BS 7750 is very similar: firms must conduct a preliminary environmental review, establish a
register of environmental impacts, create a corporate environmental policy, implement an
environmental management system and arrange an environmental auditing plan. To reflect
the Community Regulation, the scheme requires firms to include as part of their policy a
commitment to continuous improvement of environmental performance, year-on-year, with
a view to reducing adverse environmental effects to levels not exceeding those
corresponding to economically viable application of best available technology. The rate at
which firms must move towards this goal is stated to depend on economic considerations
and the degree of environmental impact and risk involved. The only significant point of
difference to EMAS is that firms are not obliged to publish an independently verifed
environmental statement, although firms who wish to secure dual registration will obviously
have to produce one of these.
22The defined timescales part comes from Annex I, section A, para. 4.
23 Cf. the EPA 1990 s.7 where the term 'techniques' is used. The EPA term might be thought even more
appropriate for a management standard. Cr also Annex I, section D, of the Regulation, which states that
the company's environmental policy must be consistent with the following principle of action: "Measures
necessary to prevent or eliminate pollution, and where this is not feasible, to reduce pollutant emissions and
waste generation to the minimum and to conserve resources shall be taken, taking account of possible clean
technologies" (para. 4). If this principle is seen as a requirement and is read literally, it would seem to
require the minimisation of pollution emissions and waste without any reference to economic feasibility or
viability.
24Annex I, section A, para. 4.
25The requirements set out in this paragraph are mostly contained within Article 3 of the Regulation.
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8.1.1.1 Effectiveness
I will begin by examining some of the specific effectiveness problems of eco-management
and audit schemes, before moving on to consider the pervasive effectiveness problems of
voluntary measures as a whole. Both EMAS and BS 7750 require firms to comply with
existing regulatory standards. Under Article 8(4) of the EC Regulation for example, if a
competent body is informed by the competent enforcement authority of a breach of relevant
regulatory requirements, it must refuse or suspend registration of the site, and is only
required to reinstate it if satisfied that the breach has been rectified and that suitable
arrangements are in place to prevent a recurrence. 26
 Thus, compliance with regulatory
standards is a minimum requirement.
Beyond this, both schemes now require firms to have a commitment both to continuous
improvement in environmental performance and to EVABAT. 27
 However, in both schemes,
the wording surrounding this requirement is exceptionally vague and it remains to be seen
how it will be interpreted in practice. 28
 With EMAS for example, as we have already
mentioned, firms must make commitments in their company policy aimed at the reasonable
continuous improvement of environmental performance, with a view to reducing
environmental impacts to levels not exceeding those corresponding to economically viable
application of best available technology. This could have a number of different implications.
First, it could mean that whilst firms must have written commitments in their policy aimed at
reasonable continuous improvement and EVABAT, the programme need literally only be
aimed at achieving these; it does not actually have to achieve any substantive improvement
in environmental performance - still less achieve its policy targets. 29
 Secondly, it could
26As Hill notes, the way this is handled in practice will have an important bearing on the credibility of the
schemes: on the one hand, one doesn't want a situation where firms have gone through all the trouble of
registering "only to lose the badge at the merest mishap;" on the other hand, to maintain public confidence
in the schemes, firms who break the niles must be seen to be sanctioned in some way (Hill, note 21 ante, at
119).
27Firms which are subject to Part I of the EPA 1990 will be forced by stick to achieve BATNEEC. As the
Electricity Association has stated, one cannot expect them to improve beyond BATNEEC because, a
fortiori, improvement beyond compliance with this regulatory standard would come at an excessive cost
(231 ENDS Report (1994) 24). Firms which are not subject to EPA Part I control will, in contrast, be
enticed by carrot to achieve EVABAT. Time will tell if EVABAT is a less stringent standard than
BATNEEC, but as I argue in the text between notes 32 and 33, it may need to be less stringent if the
schemes are to have any impact.
281n principle of course, the Regulation will be for the ECJ to interpret, and if the British Standards
Institution (BSI) wishes to stick with the idea of dual registration, BS 7750 will have to follow the EC
interpretation.
29This interpretation could be inferred from the requirement in Annex I, section D, that a company's
environmental policy should contain "Procedures and actions to be pursued in the event of detection of non-
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mean that whilst firms do not have to achieve the targets set in their policy, they must
nevertheless achieve a reasonable substantive improvement (with EVABAT literally in view,
although perhaps a long way in the future). Thirdly, it could mean that firms must achieve
the reasonable improvement targets they have set themselves in their policy. Fourthly, it
could mean that firms must achieve EVABAT. Fifthly, it could mean that firms must
achieve the EVABAT target set by them in their policy. Things begin to get rather
complicated at this point. One might ask whether there is any difference in effect between
the second and third, or between the fourth and fifth interpretations above? The answer is
that there may or may not be, depending on the method of assessment used by the verifier in
the second and fourth of the above approaches.
For example, if the second of the above interpretations is adopted, the verifier will need to
decide whether a reasonable improvement has taken place; this could either be a subjective
assessment by the verifier, or he could refer to sector application guides (SAGs). 3° SAGs
would set out quantitative improvement targets for each class of industry. They could be
drawn up by a regulator, as with IPC guidance notes, or they could, as under the BS 7750
pilot programme, be drawn up by trade associations. If the verifier was making a subjective
assessment without reference to SAGs, he may decide that there has been a reasonable
improvement, even though this falls short of the target set out in the policy. If, however,
the verifier relies on a SAG, then that SAG will typically have been used by the company to
set its target, so there will be no difference between the second and third approach above.3'
The same is true if EVABAT is held to be the requirement: a verifier may be satisfied that a
company has achieved EVABAT, albeit not the EVABAT target set out in the policy (this
would of course require verifiers to be expert in technology assessment); however, if a SAG
is used by the verifier to assess what EVABAT requires, the company itself is likely to have
used that same SAG as the basis for its target. In other words, there will be no difference
between the fourth and fifth approaches if a SAG is used by the verifier in his assessment.
compliance with its environmental policy, objectives or targets" (para. 7). Why would a firm need this if
non-compliance led to deregistration?
30See 218 ENDS Report (1993) 20.
31 0f course, with the third approach, the verifier must still assess the policy targets to judge whether they
have aimed at a reasonable improvement and this too will either be a subjective judgment or one made with
the aid of a SAG. The important point is that a company may have set itself a stricter target than one
regarded as reasonable by the verifier on a subjective basis; this is why the second approach in the text is
potentially less stringent than the third approach.
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Having decided which of the five interpretations is to apply, the next matter of importance
will come in deciding how stringent the relevant requirements of 'reasonable' improvement
or EVABAT are to be. If subjective assessments are to be made by verifiers, it is hard to
tell whether they would take a strict or a relaxed approach; indeed, different verifiers might
adopt different stances. If SAGs are used and are provided by trade associations, the
phrases are likely to be interpreted generously, because as ENDS notes, trade associations
are apt to operate at the level of the lowest common denominator of their members.32
Both which of the five approaches is adopted and then how stringent the relevant phrases
are interpreted will have major implications for the effectiveness of the schemes. If, for
example the fifth approach is adopted and a strict EVABAT standard tantamount to
BATNEEC is applied, then few firms are likely to qualify for registration and the scheme
will have very little support and hence little impact. If, at the other extreme, the first
approach is adopted companies will have to achieve nothing in concrete terms, but more of
them are likely to participate and some of them will achieve something. In other words, at
first sight, the fifth, strict BATNEEC approach might appear to be the one which would
create a greater cutback in emissions because it imposes more stringent requirements.
However, this assumes that firms not covered by Part I of the EPA 1990 would be tempted
to adopt stringent BATNEEC requirements by the enticement of the logo. 33 One might
argue that the less strict interpretations would give rise to just as much if not more of an
improvement in pollution control because while the measures taken by firms will be smaller,
many more firms are likely to think that the benefit of the carrot outweighs the cost of
achieving it.
What about the effectiveness of the EMAS and BSI schemes if they stood alone without an
existing framework of regulation? Such schemes would be very much like our present
system of regulation only with all carrots (and not terribly big ones - the ability to sport a
logo) and no sticks - total 'entice-and-control' perhaps, rather than 'command-and-control'.
Because we are assuming a stand-alone scheme, it follows that firms would not have any
regulatory standards to meet as a minimum requirement; from a baseline of zero control,
they would have to demonstrate the same commitment to continuous improvement and
EVABAT (whatever these prove to be) to be awarded the logo. Needless to say, an
inadequate level of environmental quality would be achieved. Some firms might be tempted
32Note 30 ante.
33It has already been noted that it could not improve effectiveness in respect of a firm already subject to
EPA Part I control, because it must achieve BATNEEC in any event.
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to comply with the standard if the benefit of the logo outweighed the cost of compliance,
but many would not. While this sort of take-it-or-leave-it approach may be suited to an
attempt to carry firms beyond existing regulatory requirements, it cannot work on its own.
The effectiveness problem of a stand-alone eco-management and audit scheme is one which
would face any attempt to replace regulation with a voluntary approach. It is somewhat
optimistic to expect firms which are constrained by the need to make a profit to attend to
expensive environmental problems, when doing so would inevitably affect their
competitiveness. Firms will only take expensive environmental measures if there is some
profit in it for them; they are unwilling to take unilateral loss-making action for fear of the
effect on their competitive position. And a satisfactory level of environmental quality
cannot be achieved without some loss-making action on the part of firms. Expensive,
unilateral action is therefore unlikely to occur in a market-based system - hence the need for
regulation, which solves the 'prisoners' dilemma' 34
 by imposing constraints multilaterally.
Regulation makes loss-making action easier to swallow because everyone is subject to it
and thus competition is less of an issue. In any event, even if firms did unilaterally adopt
expensive pollution control techniques, there would still be the problem of co-ordination:
only a regulatory agency can stop firms congregating in one area. This would only cease to
be a problem if such firms reached near zero emission levels - an unlikely prospect under
any system.
8.1.1.2 Efficiency
There can be little doubt about the efficiency of a voluntary approach. Each company
knows its own costs and processes and is in the best position to find the cheapest way of
controlling pollution. 35
 Regulators, lacking such information, are unlikely to apply the
least-cost method. One top chemical industry executive has been quoted as saying: "We
must move from a command and control phase to a voluntary phase;" another, that "Self-
regulation is best because each company knows its own processes and the most effective
way of reducing emissions ... That is the most practical approach and the least costly to
business. That means the consumer will not have to pay more and more for stupid
legislation. We have to prove to society that the best way to solve a problem is before it
34See Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation.
35 See eg. Abrahams, 'Stark choice - clean up or be wiped out', Financial Times, 18 June, 1993, p.1 of a
survey section entitled 'Chemicals And The Environment'. Of course, in relation to the second quote in the
text, one might respond that only large companies are likely to possess detailed knowledge of the range of
options open to them for reducing emissions.
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hits the table of the bureaucrats." 36 However, while the efficiency argument for a voluntary
approach is undoubtedly a strong one, here as elsewhere, the crucial point is that efficiency
cannot be isolated from other key values. And the other key value to be considered here is
obviously effectiveness. Thus, a voluntary, market-based approach may be efficient but as
we have seen, there must be question marks about its effectiveness, by itself, at controlling
pollution.
8.1.1.3 Equity
Equity is not an issue if firms are acting independently in the market. Equity is only an issue
if there is an external, official body doing some 'treating' (as in 'treat like cases alike').
However, the important point to note is that 'treatment' can just as well involve carrots
(dominium) as the more familiar sticks (imperium) of regulation. The EMAS and BSI
schemes both supply carrots in the form of an eco-logo and the ability to cite the standard
respectively, and hence equity is a legitimate concern.
As we have seen, both schemes require a commitment to continuous environmental
improvement and EVABAT before the logo or standard can be used. When discussing the
effectivness of the schemes, I said that there were five ways in which these requirements
could be interpreted. First, it could mean that whilst firms must have written commitments
in their policy aimed at reasonable continuous improvement and EVABAT, the programme
need literally only be aimed at achieving these; it does not actually have to achieve any
substantive improvement in environmental performance - still less achieve its policy targets.
Secondly, it could mean that whilst firms do not have to achieve the targets set in their
policy, they must nevertheless achieve a reasonable substantive improvement (with
EVABAT literally in view, although perhaps a long way in the future). Thirdly, it could
mean that firms must achieve the reasonable improvement targets they have set themselves
in their policy. Fourthly, it could mean that firms must achieve EVABAT. Fifthly, it could
mean that firms must achieve the EVABAT target set by them in their policy.
With the first interpretation, having put in place the various procedures, all firms would be
entitled to registration without the need to achieve anything substantive. This might be
considered to raise obvious equity issues because a firm which had made no substantive
improvement would gain the carrot as easily as one which had achieved considerable
results. However, if one relates equity to the purpose of the scheme and this is - as it is in
36Ibid..
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the first interpretation - regarded as procedural rather than substantive, then a disparity in
substantive results may be regarded as posing fewer dilemmas in terms of equity.
If any of the other four approaches above were taken, it would be crucial to equity whether
the verifier made his assessment on a subjective basis or by reference to SAGs. For
example, if the second interpretation was adopted, there are two ways of checking on
continuous improvement. First, the verifier could make a subjective assessment of whether
a firm had made a reasonable improvement. The trouble with this approach is that verifiers
may find it difficult to be consistent between different types of firm and there may also be
differences between verifiers in relation to similar types of firm. Thus, a situation might
arise where there are widely differering standards of improvement between two firms and
yet both firms have qualified for the carrot. This method of assessment could pose equity
problems both beween and within industries. The second way of checking on continuous
improvement would involve verifiers referring to SAGs setting out quantitative
environmental performance targets for different industrial sectors. This would avoid the
concern of some firms improving more than others, because all firms in a sector would be
required to reach the same target. However, this approach has another problem - as the
ENDS Report notes, "There is also a clear potential for the SAG for one sector to be more
demanding on companies than SAGs for others. The implication that certification could
mean much less in some sectors than in others also raises credibility problems."37
 In other
words, while SAGs would ensure equity within industrial sectors, they would not ensure
equity between sectors.
Similar issues would be raised in the fourth interpretation was adopted. Verifiers would
either need to be expert in technology assessment or they would have to refer to SAGs.
Again, this would raise equity issues whatever the method of assessment: if verifiers
assessed EVABAT themselves, there would be a subjective judgment involved, and the
judgment applied to one firm could be different to that applied to another similar firm; if
SAGs were used to assess EVABAT, there may be questions as to whether EVABAT for
one industry is unfair in relation to the standards for another industry (which may be the
case, if for example, one industry has historically put a great deal of effort into developing
pollution control technology, while another has done very little). As we have seen, similar
37218 ENDS Report (1993) 20. Particularly, if trade associations drew-up the SAGs (unless all industry
sectors adopted their lowest common denominator). If a regulator drew them up, inter-industry equity
might be greater, because there would be less danger of one industry pulling its weight while another lagged
behind.
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issues arose in relation to the system of regulation under integrated pollution control ([PC)
where, instead of SAGs, one has the Chief Inspector's guidance notes."
8.1.1.4 Accountability
As a public scheme, the accountability of the competent body established for the purpose of
registering sites under the EMAS Regulation is of some importance. However,
accountability is of much less significance here than with regulatory bodies proper, because
it is a voluntary scheme and because the range of functions performed, and powers
possessed, by the competent body, is very narrow. Nevertheless, there are some
accountability requirements built into the Regulation. Under Article 18(2), the body must
have procedures for considering observations from interested parties concerning registered
sites. And, if it proposes to delete a site from the register under Article 8, the body must
inform the site management.
8.1.2 Government-Industry Bargaining
Midway between corporate responsibility and accountability lie agreements between
government and industry. Here, companies do not perform entirely on their own initiative,
and there is no carrot - only the possible latent threat of the stick (regulation) if a 'voluntary'
approach cannot be made to achieve the desired target. A good example of this in a UK
context would be the agreement between the Government and the newspaper industry to
use at least 40% recycled fibre by the year 2000. 39
 Another would be the recommendation
by the Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment (ACBE), a group of high-
level business executives established in May 1991, that voluntary targets for energy
efficiency be agreed between government and all sectors of industry. 40 The Government is
currently considering the scope for further such voluntary agreements between government
and industry sectors.4'
38See p.53, n.58; see also p.187, n.24 for a similar problem in relation to market mechanisms.
39200 ENDS Report (1991) 13.
40201 ENDS Report (1991) 3. The Government has not taken-up the idea and ACBE's own attempts to
secure the agreement of industry to such energy efficiency targets have failed - see 223 ENDS Report
(1993) 4.
41 See DOE, 'Improving Air Quality', 1994, para. 4.17. One of the factors giving the Government pause for
thought is the legal status of such agreements and their enforceability - on this and other problems of
implementing voluntary agreements in a UK context, see 224 ENDS Report (1993) 3.
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Voluntary agreements form an integral part of pollution control in the Netherlands. 42 The
Environment Ministry sets targets for particular sectors on matters ranging from energy
efficiency to waste reduction which are then translated into primary sectoral covenants.
Homogeneous sectors (firms with similar processes) come up with uniform measures to
achieve their targets which are incorporated in a second covenant. In the 'heterogeneous'
sectors (principally the basic metal and chemical industries), it is up to each firm to produce
a plan of environmental improvement. The Environment Ministry then aggregates these
individual plans to see whether they will lead to the sector target being reached; if this
seems unlikely, the plans are returned to the companies for improvement.
What of the rule of law values here? First, voluntary environmental agreements are
equitable in that for homogenous sectors, the covenants will ensure that all firms face
similar standards. 43 Second, and perhaps most significantly, they are efficient (in the sense
that they are likely to achieve an environmental objective at less cost than traditional
command-and-control regulation): companies are able to choose the most appropriate time
at which to introduce improvements since the target approach provides them with
reasonable lead-times; and rather than regulatory agencies imposing costly solutions without
first-hand experience, the system relies upon industry knowledge. Accountability of
regulatory agencies is obviously less of an issue because there are no detailed
emission/process standard-setting decisions for which they need to be held accountable.
Nevertheless, it will become crucially important to hold the Environment Ministry
accountable for the decisions it makes when making agreements with industry.
Significantly, Dutch environmental groups have complained about being left-out of the
target-setting process. 44 As for effectiveness, it is as yet too early to judge the effectiveness
of the Dutch approach. The next 5-10 years should be enough to see whether the scheme
has been a success. However, from a theoretical point of view, there is nothing inherent in
the approach to limit its effectiveness in achieving desired environmental objectives.
Indeed, in relation to certain areas (such as transport, energy conservation and production
waste arisings which are sent for outside disposal) which are difficult to regulate via
traditional regulation, it seems likely that voluntary agreements will prove more effective
than such regulation.45
42The following passage is largely based on material in 205 ENDS Report (1992) 18.
43As we have seen in previous chapters, the same is not true of all forms of traditional regulation.
44224 ENDS Report (1993) 3 at p.5.
45Potier, 'Agreement on the Environment' (1994) 189 The OECD Observer 8 at p.11.
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8.2 CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
8.2.1 Green Consumerism and Eco-Labelling
In contrast to corporate responsibility, where companies effectively control themselves,
corporate accountability entails external pressure - in this case, private, typically market
pressure. Green consumerism - perhaps the best example of such an accountability
mechanism - involves consumers changing their consumption behaviour in the direction of
less-polluting products. 46 The idea is that producers will therefore have an incentive to
switch to more 'environmentally friendly' production methods: if they do not, they will lose
customers and therefore, profits.47
8.2.1.1 Effectiveness
There are however, various barriers which limit the effectiveness of green consumerism.
The first of these is information: at the moment, consumers are provided with environmental
information on only a limited number of products (eg. aerosols, washing powders, tissues),
and even then, this information does not provide a full picture of the polluting potential of
the product or the company. Washing powders, for example, may display information on
matters which are important for disposal - such as biodegradability and phosphate content -
but they do not give details of pollution caused by production.
However, the need for detailed 'life-cycle' analysis (LCA) of a large range of products -
examining the pollution associated with a product from 'cradle to grave' - has now been
addressed by the introduction of the Community eco-labelling scheme under Council
Regulation 880/92. 48
 The scheme operates "by identifying for consumers those products
which are significantly less damaging to the environment than alternatives which serve the
same purpose." 49 Products are divided into product groups (eg. washing machines,
46For a good account of some of the issues surrounding green consumerism, see Irvine, Beyond Green
Consumerism.
470f course, while green consumerism usually conjures up thoughts of retail consumers, 'greening the
supply chain' is a form of green consumerism too. Firms checking the environmental credentials of their
suppliers are likely to be aided not by the eco-label, which is described below in the text, but by EMAS or
BS 7750 registration.
48Council Regulation 880/92 on a Community Eco-Label Award Scheme, OJ 1992, L99/1. On eco-
labelling in general, see further DOE, 'Giving Guidance To The Green Consumer - Progress On An Eco-
Labelling Scheme For The UK', 1991; HC Environment Committee, 8th Report, 'Eco-Labelling', HC474-I,
session 1990-91; the Government's response, Cm 1720, 1991 .
 and 203 ENDS Report (1991) 18.
49D0E, note 48 ante, para. 3.1.
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detergents) and specific criteria are set for each group which a product must meet if it is to
be awarded a label. The criteria reflect a cradle-to-grave, life-cycle assessment and include
such factors as the choice of raw materials, distribution, consumption and use of the
product and disposal after use. Under Article 5, either the Commission or the competent
body of the member state (in the UK, the Eco-labelling Board) can take responsibility for
developing the product assessment criteria. However, so far, the criteria have mostly been
developed at national level by competent bodies, with different member states having
responsibility for different product groups. The UK, for example, were responsible for
developing the product assessment conditions for washing machines; Germany for laundry
detergents. Once the criteria have been developed and consultation and agreement have
taken place at national level, consultation must occur at EC level. Under Article 6, the
Commission must consult a consultation forum made up of up to three Community-level
representatives from each of industry, commerce, consumer organisations and
environmental organisations. Finally, the criteria must be agreed upon at EC level by a
committee composed of representatives of member states. If the committee accepts the
criteria, the Commission will adopt them. If it rejects them or if no decision is reached, the
measures are submitted to the Council.
Applications for a label are made to the competent body of the member state in which the
product is manufactured, or first marketed or imported from a third country. A fee for
applications is payable to the competent body to cover administrative costs (currently £
500). In the UK, testing to see whether the product satisfies the criteria can be done either
by an independent, accredited laboratory, or by the firm itself as long as their test results are
externally verified." The competent body then decides whether to award a label after
consultation with the Commission. 5 ' Products awarded a label are entitled to sport a logo
on the product concerned (and only that one) 52
 or its packaging, and an annual fee is
payable for this privilege (0.15% of sales). Although the Regulation is in force, criteria
have been agreed at EC level for just four product groups - dishwashers, washing machines,
soil improvers, and toilet paper and kitchen rolls - and only one eco-label has so far been
awarded (to Hoover, for a range of their washing machines) and appeared in the shops.53
5°223 ENDS Report (1993) 24.
51 11 the Commission or any other competent body objects, then the matter may be referred to the committee
of national representatives (the same committee which is responsible for agreeing product criteria).
52Art. 16.
53Although the UK Eco-labelling Board are under a duty to explain and advertise the scheme under Art. 15,
they apparently cannot spend their advertising budget until another label is awarded (see 234 ENDS Report
(1994) 27). This may be one reason why the scheme has got off to such a slow start.
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The publication of other criteria has been delayed by disagreements over their validity and
the scope of consultation. With washing machines, where criteria have been agreed and
published by the Commission, only one company has applied for a label (which it was
awarded) because, it seems, other firms are either waiting to see what effect the eco-label
has on their sales, or think that the cost of securing the eco-label would outweigh any
economic benefits it might bring. 54
 In fact, the very future of the eco-labelling scheme is
now in some doubt."
In any event, there are inevitable limitations to the environmental effectiveness of the
scheme, which various reports highlight. The first of these is that it merely seeks to rank
alternatives within the same product category: so, for example, cars would be compared
with other cars rather than bicycles - which are an alternative form of transport - and
batteries with batteries as opposed to mains electricity. 56
 Choosing a less polluting car will,
admittedly, make some difference, but choosing a bike would have a much greater impact
on environmental quality. Secondly, labels are awarded on the basis of a straight pass or
fail, because "Grading performance was judged likely to lead to confusion among
consumers by presenting them with over elaborate information; it would also in practice be
extremely hard to arrive at defensible grades, especially in the early stages of the scheme,
because of the complexities of the environmental assessment likely to be involved."57
Although there is inevitably a trade-off between ideal information supply and
54234 ENDS Report (1994) 27. Many manufacturers seem to think that consumers will be happy enough
with their own, unofficial environmental information and that the expense of the scheme is therefore
unnecessary (ibid.).
55 See 235 ENDS Report (1994) 25; 236 ENDS Report (1994) 27 and 237 ENDS Report (1994) 24.
56Ibid., pp.6-8. However, to an extent this may be taken into account by excluding certain product groups
altogether - eg. in Germany air fresheners are not considered for their national version of an eco-label
because opening the window is seen as more environmentally friendly (HC 4744, note 48 ante, p.xvii). Not
surprisingly our Government does not approve of this German concept of 'utility', stating that "it would be
inconsistent with the objective to debar products with consumer appeal for the scheme because of a value
judgment that consumers should not buy any products in that group, but change their lifestyle instead" (Cm
1720, note 48 ante, p.3). However, this is followed by a comment that some product groups which are not
worthy of serious attention under the scheme (eg. confetti), may be excluded as a "matter of commonsense".
As ever, when it is a decision made by the Government it is classed as commonsense, but when it is a
decision of which they disapprove, it becomes an authoritarian value judgment.
57D0E (op. cit.), para. 2.2; see also HC 474-1 (op. cit.), p.xxii which notes the problem with a graded
scheme that companies wouldn't want a label which told the world that they had just scraped through as
opposed to passing with honours. That is the advantage of a pass/fail approach compared to a graded
approach. The advantage of the pass/fail approach over the present state of affairs is, of course, that
consumers receive the benefit of more information than at present (life-cycle analysis or LCA rather than,
eg., only disposal information), but in a more manageable and comparable form (pass/fail rather than, at
present, occasionally complex environmental information which is non-uniform and therefore difficult to
use for the purpose of comparing one product with another).
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practicality/workability, the straight pass/fail approach may make eco-labelling into
something of a blunt instrument: if too many products pass, the scheme is virtually
meaningless; on the other hand, if too many fail, the scheme is unlikely to secure the
backing of industry - a crucial issue if the scheme is to remain voluntary."
Next, a green consumer may be unwilling to buy an apparently environmentally friendly
product from a company with say, a poor record in relation to accidental pollution incidents
and environmental prosecutions. This type of information is not likely to be taken into
account in an eco-label lifecycle analysis, which is based on 'consented' rather than actual
emissions and effects. Environmental reporting, (whether as part of an eco-management
and audit system or not) may provide the consumer with information on such matters.
There are, however, two major obstacles. The first is that comparatively few companies
produce environmental reports, and most of those that have been produced have been
criticised as being simply glossy, PR exercises (although of course, this will change for
those companies who wish to register under the Community Regulation on Eco-
Management and Audit, since this requires publication of detailed environmental
statements). The second obstacle is that if companies were to produce detailed reports
containing information on matters such as emission levels and pollution prosecutions, few
consumers would be likely to take the trouble to read them. Unfortunately, a Catch 22
situation prevails.
Another barrier in the way of green consumerism - which is also informational - is price.59
As long as environmentally friendly products often still cost more than those which are
relatively unfriendly, and as long as products generally fail to reflect the full environmental
costs of their production, use and disposal, prices will convey the wrong information to
consumers, leaving little hope for meaningful consumer pressure. Increases in the
stringency of regulation and the introduction of market mechanisms such as pollution taxes
would make more and more products reflect their full environmental cost.6°
Even if price differentials disappeared - and they have certainly lessened in many product
areas without the introduction of taxes in their favour - green consumerism can still only
play a part in solving our environmental problems; by itself, it would not be effective at
58There is apparently an unofficial target that 10-20% of the market share in a product group should pass -
see 227 ENDS Report (1993) 26.
59The 5th Environmental Action Programme, note 1 ante, ch. 3, p.27.
°Ibid., ch. 7, p.71.
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reducing pollution. There are various reasons for this. First, consumers cannot be obliged
to make consumption decisions on the basis of environmental performance. There will
always be room for those "who neither know nor care about the impact of what they
choose" to continue to buy more polluting products "and thereby perpetuate waste and
pollution." 61 Another reason is that green consumerism alone could not guarantee that
environmental quality objectives would be met: even if everyone purchased the least
polluting products, green consumerism could not prevent the industries making these
products from congregating in one area. Of course, one might think that if this were the
case and massive pollution resulted, then this pollution would be reflected in the eco-labels.
However, this would not occur under the present system, because eco-label life-cycle
analysis is based on consented emissions - not on the effect actual emissions have on
ambient quality. A labelling scheme which reflected local quality would involve a
considerable regulatory bureaucracy and would resemble regulation more closely than a
market approach. However, perhaps the most important reason is again that manufacturers
cannot afford to proceed too far unilaterally: environmental measures are often expensive
and over-expenditure may price a product out of the market. Some unilateral expenditure
may be justified to attract green consumers and to establish a market position, but a
producer will have to balance this carefully with the effect on price.
8.2.1.2 Equity
Just as with the eco-management and auditing regime there may be a question of equity
between industries, raised by the ability of industries with differing improvement levels to
secure registration, a similar issue may arise with eco-labels if labels for some product
groups are much more stringent than others - perhaps reflecting an already significant head-
start in terms of effort on the part of the industry.62
Of course, unlike eco-management and auditing where (depending on the approach taken to
continuous improvement) equity within an industry is only likely to be achieved if sector
application guides (SAGs) are drawn up for that industry, with eco-labels the arrangement
of products into groups would appear, at first sight, to guarantee equity within an industry
sector. However, this is not the case. The main reason for this lies in the imprecise nature
61 Irvine, note 46 ante, p.14.
620f course green consumerism and eco-labelling also have equity implications in the political sense in that
green products are often more expensive which means the poor cannot afford them. This should become
less of a problem as increased regulation and taxes make more and more products reflect their full
environmental cost (unless of course there is no environmentally friendly alternative - eg. VAT on fuel).
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of life-cycle analysis (LCA). 63
 For example, the greater weighting of one factor rather than
another in the LCA (eg. with washing machines - weighting electricity consumption rather
than powder usage) may be seen as unfair on the part of a manufacturer whose product fails
to get a label because of that weighting, but who would have got one if the weighting was
slightly different. One cannot level the same accusations at regulatory orders to install
pollution control equipment, because, unlike LCA, that is at least a reasonably precise
science. At worst, the skewing of eco-labelling product assessment criteria may be
deliberate rather than simply a natural result of LCA's impreciseness. Because responsibility
for the development of assessment criteria has been shared out amongst different member
states, there is a danger that a member state may put a greater weighting on criteria which
favour their national products in that group." However, the need for final agreement on
the criteria at EC level by a committee comprising representatives from all member states
should prevent most such deliberate manipulations.
8.2.1.3 Efficiency
Again, insofar as green consumerism leaves decisions in the hands of firms (they after all
can choose what process and product changes to make to woo the green consumer), it is
likely to be more efficient than a regulatory approach. The least-cost solution is more likely
to be chosen by the firm itself than by a regulator who lacks the detailed information on cost
which the firm possesses.
8.2.1.4 Accountability and Certainty
It was mentioned earlier that there will typically be two levels of consultation on product
criteria. If the criteria have been developed at national level, then there must first be
consultation at that level. In relation to this ex ante accountability in the UK, both
industry65
 and environmental groups have complained of a lack of consultation, although
63This may be another reason for a lack of equity between product groups - if, for example, the member
states drawing-up the assessment criteria are relying on different approaches to LCA. This is one reason for
concern over the fact that the Commission had not commissioned a LCA expert to draw up a common LCA
methodology until recently (see 225 ENDS Report (1993) 26, and 227 ENDS Report (1993) 26).
64Intended or not, the effect of the proposed criteria for paper drawn up by Denmark would be to favour
Scandinavian mills. For example, the criteria include CO2 and SO2 emissions from energy usage. British
paper manufacturers, who use high sulphur content British coal to generate in-house energy, would
therefore be placed at a disadvantage compared to Scandinavian mills who use biomass, with its lower CO2
and SO2 emissions (see 219 ENDS Report (1993) 24 at p.25).
65 See eg. 234 ENDS Report (1994) 27.
229
some complaints by the former appear unfounded," and the UK Eco-labelling Board claims
that it has invited the latter to meetings which they have chosen not to attend.° Then, in all
cases, before conditions are agreed for a product group, Article 6 of the Regulation requires
consultation with interest groups to take place at Community level. These consultation
procedures have also implicitly been criticised for failing to ensure that industry's views are
taken into account. 68 Some of these concerns over consultation were due to be addressed
in a review of the eco-labelling scheme by the European Commisssion in 1993.69
Also of note in relation to accountability is Article 10(9), which requires a register of all
applications70 to be held by the Commission. For reasons of commercial confidentiality, this
register will only be open to the competent bodies of the member states. However, Article
14 does require the Commission to publish in the Official Journal the product groups and
associated criteria, a list of products which have been awarded an eco-label, and names of
the manufacturers or importers. Finally, another important accountability requirement is
contained in Article 10(7) which states that, where an application for the award of a label is
rejected, the competent body has to inform the Commission immediately and must give
reasons for the rejection to the applicant.
As for certainty, the speed at which the product criteria are reviewed or tightened will have
a considerable bearing on a manufacturer's ability to plan. At present, once agreed, the
criteria will typically be valid for a period of three years before they are reviewed.71
8.2.2 Green Investment
There are two different types of green investor - individual and institutional. An individual
investor may himself purchase shares in green companies. Alternatively, he may choose to
place his money with an institutional investor such as a bank (eg. the Cooperative Bank,
which claims green credentials), or an ethical/green find who will manage a share portfolio
66see eg. 234 ENDS Report (1994) 27, where ENDS reports that, although Zanussi claimed to have no
record of any contact with the UK Eco-labelling Board, the industry trade association as closely involved
in the development of the cnteria for washing machines.
67See 221 ENDS Report (1993) 26.
68See 235 ENDS Report (1994) 25.
69See 227 ENDS Report (1993) 26.
70Made to the competent body - in the UK, the Eco-labelling Board.
7I See Art.5(5). See further 223 ENDS Report (1993) 24 at p 25, and also 219 ENDS Report (1993) 24 at
p.25, where ENDS notes that the Bntish paper industry "with its long investment lead-times, is also arguing
that the period for reviewing - and almost certainly tightening - the initial criteria should be extended to
"substantially in excess of the three years presently envisaged."."
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on his behalf (eg. the MPI Global Care Fund). Unlike green consumerism, where
consumers typically rely on 'exit' rather than 'voice', green investment may involve both
strategies. 72 Investors can avoid environmentally unsound companies or funds and can also
raise matters concerning corporate environmental performance at shareholder meetings.
Historically, it has been very rare for shareholders to apply the latter form of pressure on
any issue, 73 let alone the environment, but there are signs that green and ethical investment
funds may be moving towards this strategy.
8.2.2. I Effectiveness
Just as eco-labelling is central to increasing the effectiveness of green consumerism, so
environmental reporting and accounting 74 are the key to increasing the effectiveness of
green investment. Environmental reporting was mentioned briefly in relation to green
consumerism, but it is undoubtedly of much greater significance in the investment sphere.
While eco-labels can only realistically be based on consented emissions and green
consumers are unlikely to read company environmental reports before making purchases,
environmental investment does have the capacity to be guided by actual company
performance. Investors, who are used to reading company financial reports and accounts
may read the environmental equivalents. Alternatively, they may read reports on corporate
environmental performance drawn up by others. The Ethical Investment Research and
Information Service (EIRIS) for example, used the public registers to produce a report for
investors detailing all breaches of consents and prosecutions brought by the water pollution
regulators in England and Scotland. 75 However, as ENDS notes, ElRIS's approach was not
without its problems. The report not only failed to stress sufficiently the difference between
a company which had had a one-off and trivial breach, and a regular and serious polluter; it
was also biased towards non-manufacturing (and therefore non-directly polluting) financial
and retail businesses. As ENDS points out, the unfortunate result of the list may have been
72Note that green consumers could employ 'voice' tactics by writing letters of complaint to polluters - indeed
this is preferable because otherwise the polluter cannot be sure that sales have slipped away for
environmental reasons, unless market research covers this aspect. However, such activity is probably rare,
and the pressure that one consumer can apply cannot match the power of, for example, the institutional
investor. Note also that 'entrance' ought really to be added to 'exit' for both green consumerism and
investment - a conscious decision to support a product or shares/fund is the other side of the coin to exit.
The distinction between exit and voice comes from Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty.
73 Although see eg. Laurance, 'Leader of the new militant tendency', The Guardian, 11 July 1991, p.15.
740n environmental accounting, see eg. Gray, The Greening of Accountancy: The Profession After Pearce
and Quirke, 'Accounting for the Environment: Current Issues' (1991) 1(5) European Env 19.
75205 ENDS Report (1992) 9.
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to make investors shy away from a manufacturing company with a sound environmental
policy but with a single instance of non-compliance against it, to choose instead a non-
manufacturing company with no direct emissions but with other environmental skeletons in
its closet.76
There has also been some confusion over exactly what constitutes a 'green' investment: the
'Body Shop' and companies in the waste disposal industry feature in some lists but many
have questioned whether these are particularly 'green' companies. The fact is that they are
both highly profitable. The true 'green' investment would more likely be in companies with
zero emissions and/or perhaps only in companies which produce what is seen by the
investor as a socially necessary product (many of the Body Shop's products for example
could be said not to be socially necessary). In many ways, this problem is similar to the one
of 'utility' in relation to green consumerism, where the question of whether air fresheners
deserve to be considered for an eco-label was discussed.
While green investment is still very much in its infancy, its future impact is likely to be
limited - whatever the improvements in corporate environmental reporting. This is because
investment is largely concerned with making profits and the true 'greening' of production
involves considerable financial outlay, which can only lessen these profits. It may simply be
too much to expect many people voluntarily to forgo a greater return on their investments.
Thus, green investment is unlikely to lead companies to move much beyond what is required
by regulations. Green investment (like green consumerism), must strike a balance: if
companies spend too much on environmental controls, the absence of profits (or, for
consumers, the increase in price) will drive shareholders (or consumers) away; instead they
may need to spend just enough to make themselves stand-out as the green alternative.
8.2.3 Direct Action and Boycotts
Other activities which seek to achieve environmental goals include boycotts and 'direct
action'. While green consumerism might be thought of as a 'primary' boycott, what most of
us would recognise as a boycott is a 'secondary' boycott 77 - with pressure groups
encouraging people to avoid specific products (eg. peat, aerosols containing CFCs,
unsustainable timber). Direct action may comprise individuals, loose coalitions (eg. road
protestors) or pressure groups (Greenpeace, Earth First!) taking real action on the ground
761bid..
77See Craig Smith, note 9 ante, at p.148.
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to prevent environmentally offensive behaviour. With this form of direct action, the action
itself is directly instrumental in achieving the goal. Alternatively, direct action may involve
pressure groups (notably Greenpeace) arranging spectacular events which will attract media
attention. In the past, this has involved such diverse activities as scaling chimney stacks,
attaching banners to toxic waste ships, and blocking highly-polluting outfall pipes to create
a fountain effect. With this type of direct action, the action itself is symbolic; the hope is
that the media coverage that these events attract will either compel the firm to clean up its
act for fear of further bad publicity, or create public pressure for state action. All forms of
direct action are now under threat because of the provisions on criminal trespass in the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Depending on the reaction to the Act - both
by activists and by the police - we may see the loss of a considerable means of holding not
only companies but also the Government to account for their decisions and actions affecting
the environment. It used to be the case that direct action took off from where
environmental law ended or was of no further use. Now, it appears that where
environmental law of one sort ends, environmental law of a different order may begin.
8.2.4 Tort
As I mentioned briefly at the beginning of the chapter, tort should be seeen as a market
approach and not as a form of regulation. After all, it relies on private actors and may
provide an incentive effect." On the other hand, it is enforced by the judiciary, who
constitute an organ of the state. Nevertheless, it would, I believe, be wrong to describe tort
as regulatory because, unlike most regulators, the judges act only in a reactive manner when
cases are brought to court (although, as will be seen below, like regulation, tort may have a
preventative effect).
8.2.4.1 Efficiency
The best-known exponent of the efficiency of tort law is probably Posner. 79 While I do not
intend to concentrate on the details of Posner's theory or the criticisms which have been
levelled against it, 80 its central thesis needs outlining here. Posner's theory has both a
positive or descriptive component and a normative component s ' The normative
component suggests that laws should be measured against the value of efficiency and,
78The European Commission regard civil liability as an economic instrument - see the Green Paper on
Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47.
79 See eg. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Lmv, and his The Economics of Justice.
80See eg. Rizzo, 'The Mirage of Efficiency' (1980) 8 Hofstra LR 487.
81 See Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law, pp.17-19.
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assuming there is no conflict with other key social values, reformed if they are inefficient.
The essence of the positive component is that there is in common law judicial decision-
making, as in the market, an invisible hand guiding judges towards the creation of efficient
legal rules. In other words, judges may not know it, but many of their judgments achieve an
efficient solution. However, Posner uses efficiency in a sense different from that of 'least-
cost' efficiency. Efficiency for Posner is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency - a variant of Pareto
efficiency. 82 In economic theory, markets are efficient, but where there are 'market failures'
such as externalities, they will not be so. An externality exists where a firm imposes
external social costs on others which it does not have to pay for. To correct this source of
market failure and restore efficiency, these external costs have to be 'internalised' so that the
firm is forced to take them into account in its decision-making. Pollution is a classic
externality and tort law is one way of internalising the external costs which pollution places
on the local population.
Assuming the local population has an absolute entitlement" to be free from pollution, there
are two ways in which a court could protect this entitlement in a civil action. First, a court
could impose a 'property rule' - granting local residents an injunction to protect their
entitlement to be free from pollution. This will only be efficient if the benefit to the local
community of being free from pollution (as measured by CBA) is greater than the cost to
the firm of not polluting." On the other hand, a court may proceed by way of 'liability rules'
rather than property rules. 85 In other words, rather than protecting the local residents'
entitlement by way of an injunction, the court may require the factory to pay damages. If
the common law is to achieve efficiency, these damages would have to be awarded at the
82See Posner, The Economics ofJustice, pp.91-2. On Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see further p.28
of this thesis, n.81.
83For the sake of simplicity, I am assuming here that their entitlement is an 'absolute' one - ie. a right to be
completely free from pollution. In reality, a court may also grant an 'intermediate' entitlement - ie. a right
to be free of pollution above a given level. This intermediate entitlement could similarly be protected by
way of a property rule (injunction) or a liability rule (damages). On this, see further Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law And Economics, p.19.
84The 'Coase theorem', which is considered later in the text, suggests that, in the absence of transaction
costs (barriers to bargaining), an efficient result will be reached whatever entitlement or remedy is imposed
by the courts because the sides will bargain around the legal allocation. However, while this means that an
efficient solution will be reached if there are no transaction costs (and that is a big 'if), it does not mean that
tort law itself is efficient: tort law will only be efficient if the courts grant injunctions where benefits
outweigh costs. If they grant an injunction to local residents where the value to the firm of polluting is
greater than the value to the residents of being free from pollution, then while the parties may bargain
around this to achieve an efficient solution, tort law itself is not efficient.
85The terms 'property rules' and 'liability rules' derive from Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, And Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral' (1972) 85 Han, LR 1089.
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level which reflected the social cost of the pollution to the local population. 86 A Pigouvian
pollution tax would be set on much the same basis."
Saying that the common law is efficient in the above sense 88 is a far cry from our least-cost
version of efficiency. In many ways it does not make sense to talk about the common law
achieving a level of ambient environmental quality at least cost, because tort law does not
aim at achieving a predetermined level of quality."
8.2.4.2 Effectiveness
It has long been claimed that tort is relatively ineffective as a means of pollution control.
The reasons given for this have been well documented elsewhere, 9° so I will list them only
briefly. It should come as no surprise to find that many of the reasons are similar to those
given above for the ineffectiveness of other forms of market solution. First, the victim of
pollution is under no obligation to take action - and indeed is likely to be put-off by the
delay, expense and uncertainty of going to court. Second, there is often a difficulty in
establishing causation, especially where there are a number of possible sources in the same
area. Other problems include: the need to bring an action within the appropriate limitation
period; the need to establish fault in many cases; and the need to establish that personal or
proprietary rights have been interfered with (specifically 'environmental' rights are as yet,
non-existent, which means that environmental groups are usually unable to bring tort
actions).
86Damages under the US Oil Pollution Act introduced in the wake of the Exxon-Valdez Alaskan oil spill
are apparently to be calculated on the basis of CBA (The Economist, 18 June 1994, p.20; The Economist
disapproves of this method of establishing legal damages because it makes the costs of doing business
incalculable and uninsurable). NB. also note 84 ante - the same is true if the courts choose a damages
approach.
87Pigouvian taxes will be discussed further below in the section on Coaseian bargaining.
88Posner appears to be claiming that the law of tort is efficient. Of course it seems unlikely that the courts
will always achieve an efficient outcome. If they grant an injunction, to achieve efficiency they would have
to have information of the firm's abatement control costs and the residents' damage costs. Historically, they
have lacked both sets of information, except perhaps at an intuitive level. If they award damages, they need
to know the residents' damage costs, which would involve CBA.
89Although, as I have stated before, one might argue that a nuisance standard is a form of quality standard,
albeit 'predetermined' only in a very general sense.
"See, for example, Ball & Bell, Environmental Law, pp. 142-5; Baram, Alternatives to Regulation:
Managing Risks to Health, Safety and the Environment; McLaren, 'Nuisance Law and the Industrial
Revolution - Some Lessons from Social History' (1983) 3 OJLS 155; Brenner, 'Nuisance Law And The
Industrial Revolution (1974) 3(2) Jo of Legal Studies 403.
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These then, are some of the reasons which are usually offered as an explanation for the poor
performance of tort in pollution control. However, I believe that they are potentially
misleading because they conflate the alternative roles which tort plays. It has long been said
that tort plays (at least) a dual role: the first role is preventative or incentive based, in that
the risk of a civil action encourages people to adapt their behaviour; the second role is
restorative or reparative - whence the maxim 'restitutio in integrum' which is the professed
aim of damages in tort. It is undoubtedly true that a number of the aforementioned
'problems', such as causation and the proprietary basis of civil actions, serve to reduce the
reparative effectiveness of tort. This explains why, for example, statutory clean-up powers
have been introduced" and why further reforms such as the introduction of strict liability
have been canvassed, with the aim of cleaning up contaminated land. 92
 However, it would
be wrong to say that these problems have a similarly marked impact on tort's deterrent or
incentive effect in the environmental field. Despite tort's weaknesses, it appears that the
threat of civil liability does influence corporate environmental performance (particularly as
long-term pollution damage is practically uninsurable)." Thus, what I am claiming is that
the above obstacles have a more significant impact on the reparative effectiveness of tort
than on its power as an incentive.
One must then ask what incentive effect tort has? The answer to this is that it is likely to
make firms keep within the regulations, because these will often (but not necessarily)
provide a defence to any civil claim. 94 Of course, this very much assumes that tort exists
alongside a system of administrative regulation; we are also interested in what effect it
would have without such a system in place. After all, we want to know not only how
effective tort is under present arrangements, but also how effective a stand-alone system
would be at controlling pollution. An idea of how such a stand-alone system might operate
can be gleaned from thinking back to the operation of tort law during the industrial
revolution, before most pollution legislation and regulation was introduced. At the same
time however, one must bear in mind that expectations of environmental quality have
radically changed since that period. What this lesson from history tells us is that while tort
91 Eg. s.161 WRA 1991 and ss. 27, 59 and 61 EPA 1990.
92Eg. the draft Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, COM (89) 282 - now overtaken by
the EC Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, note 78 ante; the Council of Europe
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting From Activities Dangerous to the Environment
(Council of Europe, European Treaty Series 150, Lugano, 21 June 1993) contains strict liability provisions,
but the UK is not a signatory.
93M. Forster, lecture, IALS, Law & Development Forum, 19 February 1992.
94See the EC Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, note 78 ante.
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may have an effective deterrent effect as part of the current system of regulation, if tort was
to stand alone, it would find it very difficult to act as an effective controller of pollution. In
fact, as we shall see, the sorts of changes to our system of tort law that would be necessary
to make it effective at controlling pollution as a stand-alone system, would make it cease to
look like a part of the common law at all.
Courts can award two different remedies in civil cases - damages or an injunction.
Beginning with damages, if the aim was not only to compensate the individual who had
brought the action, but also to manipulate the remedies to achieve a given level of
environmental quality, the judge would have to award an enormous sum in damages to
produce a deterrent effect on other producers. If damages were set at purely 'compensation'
levels, they would not produce a general reduction in emissions; McLaren for example
speaks of a land agent at the time of the industrial revolution, who "evinced no doubt that
the manufacturers were capable of paying the levels of damages assessed, and asserted that
the payment of damages did nothing to reduce the nuisance." 95 Furthermore, the chances of
a judge setting damages at the correct level to achieve an overall desired level of ambient
quality - if indeed an effective level which did not bankrupt the firm could be set - would be
remote.
The alternative remedy - an injunction - would bring similar problems. In this context, a
court could not realistically ban companies from making any emissions; in a system with
only civil liability as its means of pollution control, there would be far too many of them and
the economy would be paralysed. Rather, a judge would have to impose emission
reductions or order the introduction of abatement equipment in the manner of a regulator.
Effectively, the judge would be setting standards like an agency, but with incomplete
knowledge about pollution technology and the effects of emissions on the ambient
environment.
It can be seen from the above discussion that the structure of a stand-alone system of tort
law that was concerned to prevent pollution would be radically different from current and
historical forms (although the latter can help one to conduct a thought experiment to
envisage a preventative scheme), which have been concerned primarily with reparation. The
efficacy of a court-based preventative scheme is open to question: either it would be so
95McLaren, note 90 ante, at p.195.
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much like regulation that the difference would be purely semantic, or it would fail due to
lack of information on the part of the judges.96
8.2.4.3 Equity97
As a recent report issued by the DOE has commented, "People may see a liability regime as
fair because polluters compensate individuals or society for the damage caused to them. On
the other hand, it is unlikely that every polluter will be pursued through the Courts to the
same extent." 98 While successful civil actions may be equitable in a non-rule of law sense in
that they uphold the polluter pays principle, they are inequitable from a rule of law point of
view: because tort is highly selective, both in who is able to sue and who is sued, it presents
considerable problems concerning equity between firms.
8.2.5 Coaseian bargaining99
A study of market approaches to environmental problems would not be complete without
examining Coaseian bargaining. By this, I mean the possibility of a bargain being struck
between polluter and polluted (as opposed to government-industry bargaining which was
examined earlier - where the agreement is made between polluter and government).i oo Is
this a form of corporate responsibility or accountability? The issue is again problematic, but
I include it within this section on corporate accountability because the polluted may be
putting some form of pressure on the polluted to come to an agreement.
96However, whilst it appears that regulation is necessary to implement a preventative approach, the same is
not necessarily true of reparation. Regulation has been introduced to reinforce this area - in the shape of
statutory clean-up powers (eg. s.161 WRA 1991) - but tort could possibly come close to coping on its own,
especially if reforms were brought in to iron out some of the problems associated with bringing a civil
claim.
97Civil liability raises two other equity issues beyond the rule of law version described below in the text.
First, civil liability regimes fulfil the polluter pays principle (PPP) because the polluter pays for the cost of
pollution he has caused. As I stated in chapter 1, the PPP is an equitable principle because it determines the
distribution of pollution control costs between polluter and polluted. Second, civil liability is potentially a
regressive means of pollution control since the poor are less able to bring actions (although the very poor
may have access to legal aid in some cases).
98D0E, 'Making Markets Work for the Environment', 1993, p.18.
99 See Coase, 'The Problem of Social Costs' (1960) 3 Jo of Law & Econs 1.
1 °°Of course, this contractual approach to pollution problems does not represent the totality of the 'Coase
theorem' - the theorem has a multiplicity of meanings and uses. By referring to a bargaining approach to
pollution control as 'Coaseian bargaining', I am simply identifying the origins of this way of thinking about
tackling pollution.
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8.2.5.1 Equity
As with tort, a bargaining approach would raise the issue of equity between polluters
themselves. 101
 Those companies operating in densely inhabited areas would, for example,
be at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis their counterparts in the open countryside.
8.2.5.2 Efficiency
Efficiency in this context can only mean Pareto efficiency (or a variant thereof), because a
bargained solution rules out a predetermined ambient goal which can be reached at least
cost. An outcome is said to be Pareto efficient when nobody can be made better off
without someone else being made worse off. Welfare economics views pollution as an
externality - the social cost of pollution is not taken into account by companies. The
Pigouvian 102
 solution is a tax or charge on each unit of pollution; by paying this tax,
companies are made to internalise this external cost. If the level of the tax is based on a
cost-benefit analysis (CBA), then the Pigouvian approach will be Pareto efficient, because
the tax will be set at the level where the social costs of pollution are equal to the benefits.
The Coaseian approach suggests that a Pigouvian tax is not necessary to achieve the
economists' ideal of Pareto efficiency - all that is required is a bargained solution. Pigou
would have government intervene in the market to correct market failure - albeit that such
regulation would be modelled on market principles (the price mechanism of a tax or
charge); Coase is a true free marketeer, who believes that an efficient solution can be found
without the need for government intervention of any kind. Coase's insight was that the
matter of costs was reciprocal: the polluter could be seen as imposing external costs on the
victim; on the other hand, should the polluter have to reduce emissions, the victim could be
regarded as imposing costs on the polluter. Thus, it makes no difference from the point of
view of efficiency whether the victim bargains with the polluter to make cutbacks, or
whether the polluter compensates the victim. 103
 The outcome of the Coaseian bargain will
be Pareto efficient because contracts are, by their nature, efficient: if it was possible for
101 There are two other equity issues raised by a bargaining approach beyond this rule of law version. First,
a bargaining approach would not necessarily be in accordance with the polluter pays principle. Under a
bargaining approach, the polluter may pay, but payment may equally be made by those suffering the
pollution. Secondly, a bargaining approach would have regressive implications - it is generally the poor
who currently live nearest pollution, and yet they have less money with which to 'bribe' the polluters.
102pigou, The Economics of Welfare.
103 Although it will make a difference to equity and the polluter pays principle. In the eyes of neo-classical
economists, the Pigouvian approach commits the fatal error of confusing distributional issues with
efficiency.
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either party to be made better off without making the other worse off, the bargain would
have been struck differently.
8.2.5.3 Effectiveness
One must then consider how effective a bargaining approach would be? Of course, that
raises the issue - 'effective at what?' - and for our purposes, the answer has been
'effectiveness at protecting the environment to a desired level.' The result is that where
bargaining can take place, then if one takes the bargain at face value, such an approach is
very effective at protecting the environment to a desired level. After all, the parties have
agreed to that level.
Of course, one might point out that the agreed level is only desired by the contractors and
that others arguably have a legitimate interest in the matter. One might also question
whether the agreed level is truly desired by the contractors themselves. However, these
issues are relatively insignificant compared with the major problem, which is that bargaining
cannot always take place. The Coaseian approach is all very well if one takes the usual
examples such as soot affecting a neighbour's washing, cows trampling crops, or trains
creating sparks which set alight farmland. However, it has long been pointed out that the
theorem falls down where large numbers are involved and where bargaining cannot
therefore take place without considerable transaction costs. 104 Most modern pollution
problems involve large numbers, which means that a bargaining approach would, for the
most part, be totally ineffective at controlling pollution.
8.2.6 Regulation
The final form of corporate accountability is regulation, which may be of the traditional
command-and-control type, or which may come in the form of market mechanisms such as
pollution taxes or tradeable permit schemes. The application of the rule of law values to
both of these types of regulation was dealt with in previous chapters.
104See Helm & Pearce, 'Assessment: Economic Policy Towards the Environment', (1990) 6(1) Oxford
Review of EC0110111iC Policy 1 at pp.6-7.
CONCLUSION
At the end of chapter 1, I stated that there were a number of ways in which the rule of law
might be used or operationalised (as opposed to enforced). First, and most stringently, one
might take each rule of law value separately and if a system of pollution control failed any
one of the values, it would be judged to be in breach of the rule of law. This was very much
Hayek's approach. Secondly, one might compare a pollution control system with each of
the values in turn and then assess, across the whole range of values, whether that system
was in accordance with the rule of law. Thirdly, one might use the values to assess whether
one system could be said to be more in accordance with the rule of law than an alternative
system. Finally, and least stringently, one might merely require that those designing a
system of pollution control had checked the system against each of the values. In other
words, in this last case, the rule of law would take the form of a procedural policy-design
framework and a system of pollution control would satisfy the rule of law if it had been
assessed by reference to that framework.
At the end of chapter one, I also stated two theses. The first was that the rule of law could
be used in either the first or the second of the above ways. In other words, that the
legitimacy of pollution control instruments could be assessed using rule of law values. The
second thesis, which is to an extent dependent on the first, was that market mechanisms of
regulation (examined in chapter 7) and market approaches to pollution control (examined in
chapter 8) represented a more constitutionally legitimate system of pollution control than
command-and-control regulation (examined principally in chapter 2, with the accountability
value further taking up chapters 3-6). The presupposition of this second thesis was that the
rule of law could further be used in the third way described in the previous paragraph. As I
said then, if these theses and any presuppositions have not been proved, we may be left with
the final possible application of the rule of law - the policy-design framework.
Having now examined the various pollution control instruments or programmes (market
approaches, command-and-control regulation and market mechanisms) in terms of the
values of equity, accountability, efficiency, certainty and effectiveness, our conclusion must
be that the above two theses and any associated presuppositions cannot be proved.
Beginning with the first thesis; while one can usually apply the rule of law values to the
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various forms of pollution control,' one cannot use them to judge the legitimacy of
regulatory2
 policy. This is true of both the single value pass/fail approach favoured by
Hayek, and the range of values approach. The reason for this is that the values which form
the rule of law are at once broad, slippery and incommensurable. One certainly cannot take
one value such as equity and, having assessed that a policy leaves a lot to be desired in that
department, conclude that the policy is in breach of the rule of law. Neither, without a
complex system of weighting, can one assess policies in the round for their compliance with
the rule of law.
The second thesis was that market approaches of pollution control and market mechanisms
of regulation represented a more constitutionally legitimate system of pollution control than
command-and-control regulation. Since the first thesis has been disproved and the second
thesis is arguably dependent on the first, it follows that the second thesis is also likely to
face difficulties. 3 Looking back, one can see that market mechanisms may appear to win on
the accountability front because they remove discretion, but on closer inspection, the need
for accountability is simply shifted to another type of decision. In any event, can one really
say that 'removing' discretion is better than structuring, controlling or checking it under a
command-and-control approach? Only someone with a complete aversion to discretion
could reach such a conclusion. Market mechanisms may also come out on top in relation to
efficiency and possibly equity (depending on which view of equity is taken and which
command-and-control regime they are compared with), but charges fall down when it
comes to arguably the most important value - effectiveness. Tradeable permits may also
share this failing unless strict controls are placed on trading; these controls may then lead to
other problems such as market thinness which will reduce their whole rationale - efficiency.
l Although there was considerable difficulty in doing so in relation to non-regulatory market approaches
since the values of certainty and equity only come into play when there is some kind of state involvement,
and accountability can conceivably be used either in the sense of the accountability of a state agency (if - as
with equity - one is involved) or in the sense of corporate accountability.
2Using the word in the broad sense to include non-regulatory programmes or instruments.
3There is a difference however. While one might not be able to look at, for example command-and-control
regulation and say whether it is or is not in accordance with the rule of law because there is no obvious
place to draw the line in a set of unstable values; with a comparison of say command-and-control with
market mechanisms (or indeed a comparison of different command-and-control regimes themselves), there
is no need to draw such a line of legitimacy - one simply has to judge if one performs better than the other.
Of course, the latter is only a realistic possibility if all other things remain equal, and they seldom will: if
for example market mechanisms were similar to command-and-control in relation to all the values but
brought an improvement in relation to say accountability, one might conceivably conclude that market
mechanisms were more legitimate; if however, their introduction would see an improvement in
accountability but a fall in equity, one could not come to this conclusion without a complex weighting
system to act as a guide.
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If very little trading actually occurs, a tradeable permit system is really no different to
traditional command-and-control regulation. The same is true of market approaches to
pollution control. While they may produce an apparent improvement over command-and-
control in relation to one value (such as efficiency, the value usually cited by industry
supporters of market approaches), this may come at the expense of other values such as
effectiveness. Given these general observations about market approaches and regulatory
market mechanisms,4
 one is forced to conclude not simply that they do not represent a more
legitimate form of regulation, but that the constitutional values of the rule of law cannot be
used to come to conclusive judgments of this sort - at least not without a complex
weighting system. Thus, the second thesis and its presupposition have also been disproved.
It may then be asked whether the rule of law has any valuable role to play in the regulatory
context: if the promise of the rule of law as a litmus test for regulatory legitimacy has turned
out to be an empty one, what is its role?
As suggested earlier, having dismissed my two starting theses, the only role left that allows
the rule of law a practical and workable realisation is that of a policy-design framework.
The rule of law would continue to provide a test of regulatory legitimacy, albeit a rather less
strict one than originally envisaged. A policy would only be in breach of the rule of law if
the policy makers had not assessed it in terms of all the rule of law values. In other words,
the rule of law would act in a relatively weak, procedural manner rather than in a strong,
substantive one. It would be concerned not that policies met given, concrete substantive
ideals, but rather that a procedure was in place to ensure that substantive ideals were
assessed, discussed and weighed against each other.
As for the enforcement of the rule of law: either policy makers could be entrusted to police
themselves - in other words to make sure for themselves that they do indeed use the rule of
law as a framework for environmental policy design; or, alternatively, the rule of law could
be subject to enforcement by the courts. With enforcement by the courts, a policy would be
struck out as unconstitutional if the policy-makers had not performed the appropriate
procedural task of passing the policy through the framework.
Finally, the question was posed above whether the rule of law has any valuable role to play
in the regulatory context if the promise of the rule of law as a litmus test for regulatory
4And the same goes for our existing charging schemes - they add elements of some of the rule of law values,
but lack others.
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legitimacy has turned out to be a rather hollow one? Having concluded that the rule of law
can still have a role (as a framework) and that it can still provide a test of regulatory
legitimacy (albeit a weak, procedural one), the question remains as to whether it has a
valuable role to play? If it is simply to make sure that the values of certainty,
accountability, effectiveness, equity and efficiency are considered by policy-makers, there
are surely many other ways of doing this than by dressing them up in constitutional apparel.
Besides which, there are many other values, such as the political/distributive aspect of
equity and the way in which different policies provide an incentive to innovate, which
deserve equal consideration when assessing environmental regulatory policy. 5
 These are
difficult points to refute. However, the rule of law has been used, at an abstract level, by
others such as Hayek and Harden and Lewis to judge the legitimacy of policy. My thesis
has simply attempted to follow through the logic of these writings - to apply the rule of law
in a practical regulatory context to see whether it can be used in this way. The value of the
exercise perhaps lies less in providing a practical blueprint for public policy-makers than in
making theoretical sense of the rule of law in the modern regulatory state.
5 See eg. DOE, 'Making Markets Work for the Environment', 1993. This guide assesses instruments, as I
have done (other than accountability, which it does not consider), on the basis of environmental
effectiveness, efficiency (resource costs and administrative costs), fairness - and also on the basis of revenue
brought in, innovation, and competition. Interestingly, the guide also assesses civil liability in terms of
these values - as I did in the chapter on market approaches. Of course, as I mentioned in chapter 1, one
could introduce all of the missing considerations into the value of effectiveness; effectiveness presupposes a
particular goal (ie. effectiveness at what?) and this goal might become that of providing a continuous
incentive to innovate, political equity etc..
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerman, B.A., Rose-Ackerman, S., Sawyer Jr., J.W. & Henderson, D.W., The Uncertain
Search for Environmental Quality, Free Press, New York, 1974.
Ackerman, B.A. & Stewart, R.B., 'Reforming Environmental Law' (1985) 37 S'tanf LR
1333.
Ackerman, B.A. & Stewart, R.B., 'Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case
For Market Incentives' (1988) 13 Col Jo of Env Law 171.
Arnull, A., 'Owning up to Fallibility: Precedent in the Court of Justice' (1993) 30 CML Rev
247.
Ashworth, A., 'The 'Public Interest' Element in Prosecutions' [1987] Crim LR 595.
Axelrod, R., The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 1984.
Baker, J.H., 'Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary Intention' (1993) 52 CLJ353.
Baldwin, R., Regulating the Airlines, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985.
Baldwin, R., 'Accounting for Discretion' (1990) 10 OJLS 422.
Baldwin, R. & McCrudden, C., Regulation and Public Law, Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
London, 1987.
Ball, S. & Bell, S., Environmental Law, 2nd ed., Blackstone Press, London, 1994.
Baram, M.S., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking' (1980) 8 Ecology Law Qu 473.
Baram, M.S., Alternatives to Regulation: Managing Risks to Health, Safety and the
Environment, Lexington Books, Lexington, Ma., 1982.
Bardach E. & Kagan, R.A., Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory
Unreasonableness, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1982.
Barnes, P., 'Industrial Competitiveness and the Environment: The Need for EU Policy
Integration' (1993) 3(6) Eur Env 11.
Barron A. & Scott C., 'The Citizen's Charter Programme' (1992) 55 MLR 526.
Baumol, W.J. and Oates, W.E., Economics, Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1979.
Baumol W.J. & Oates, W.E., The Theory of Environmental Policy, 2nd ed., CUP,
Cambridge, 1988.
Beckerman, W., Pricing for Pollution, 2nd ed., TEA, London, 1990.
Benhabib, S., 'Modernity and the Aporias of Critical Theory' (1981) 49 Telos 39.
Bennett, B., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Market, and Political Legitimacy' (1988) 23 Univ of
San Fran LR 23.
Berger, M., 'The Right of Environmental Organisations in Germany to Bring Suit', paper at
IALS conference entitled "Environmentalist Law - Myth or Reality?", 21 October 1993.
Berlin, I., Four Essays on Liberty, OUP, Oxford, 1969.
Birkinshaw, P., Harden, I. & Lewis, N., Government By Moonlight, Unwin Hyman,
London, 1990.
Brazier, R., 'The Non-Legal Constitution: Thoughts On Convention, Practice And Principle'
(1992) 43(3) NILO 262.
Brenner, J.F., 'Nuisance Law And The Industrial Revolution' (1974) 3(2) Jo of Legal
Studies 403.
Breyer, S., Regulation and its Reform, Harvard University Press, London, 1982.
Brittan, Y., The Impact of Water Pollution Control on Industry: A Case Study of Fifty
Dischargers, Oxford Centre for Socio-legal Studies, Oxford, 1984.
Buchanan, J.M., Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political
Economist, Texas A&M University Press, London, 1977.
Buchanan, J.M., The Power To Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution,
CUP, Cambridge, 1980.
Buchanan, J.M., Liberty, Market and State: Political Economy in the 1980's, Wheatsheaf
Books, Brighton, 1986.
Burton, T.P., 'Access to Environmental Information - The UK Experience of Water
Registers' (1989) 1(2) JEL 192.
Calabresi, G. & Melamed, A.D., 'Property Rules, Liability Rules, And Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral' (1972) 85 Harv LR 1089.
Campen, J.T., Benefit, Cost, And Beyond: The Political Economy of Benefit Cost Analysis,
Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Ma., 1986.
Cane, P., 'The Function of Standing Rules in Administrative Law' [1980] Public Law 303.
Cane, P., 'Ultra Vires Breach of Statutory Duty' [1981] Public Law 11.
Cane, P., 'Statutes, Standing and Representation' [1990] Public Law 307.
Carnwath, R., 'Environmental Enforcement - The Need for a Specialist Court' [1992] JPEL
799.
Carson, W.G., 'Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement of
Factory Legislation' (1970) 33 MLR 396.
Coase, R.H., 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 Jo of Law & Econ 1.
Coopers & Lybrand, 'Landfill Costs and Prices: Correcting Possible Market Distortions',
HMSO, London, 1993.
Cosgrove, R.A., The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Jurist, Macmillan,
London, 1980.
Craig, P.P., Administrative Law, 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1989.
Craig Smith, N., Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate
Accountability, Routledge, London, 1990.
CSERGE, Warren Spring & EFTEC, 'Externalities from Landfill and Incineration', HMSO,
London, 1993.
Daintith, T., 'Political Programmes and The Content of the Constitution' in W. Finnie, C.
Himsworth and N. Walker (eds.), Edinburgh Essays In Public Law, Edinburgh University
Press, Edinburgh, 1991.
Davis, K.C., Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, Louisiana State University
Press, Baton Rouge, 1969.
Day, M. & Pugh, C., Toxic Torts, Cameron May, London, 1992.
Day, P. & Klein, R., Accountabilities: Five Public Services, Tavistock, London, 1987.
Dicey, AV., Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution, 10th ed.,
Macmillan, London, 1959.
DOE, 'Inputs of Dangerous Substances To Water: Proposals For A Unified System Of
Control', DOE, July 1988.
DOE, 'Water And The Environment', DOE Circular 7/89.
DOE, 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', DOE, 1990.
DOE, 'Pollution Regulation: Cost Recovery Charges', DOE, 1990.
DOE, 'The United Kingdom's Programme and National Plan for Reducing Emissions of
Sulphur Dioxide and Oxides of Nitrogen from Existing Large Combustion Plants', DOE,
1990.
DOE, 'Giving Guidance To The Green Consumer - Progress On An Eco-Labelling Scheme
For The UK', DOE, 1991.
DOE, 'Green Rights and Responsibilities: A Citizen's Guide to the Environment', DOE,
1991.
DOE, 'River Quality, The Government's Proposals: A Consultation Paper', DOE, December
1992.
DOE, 'Integrated Pollution Control: A Practical Guide', HMSO, London, 1993.
DOE, 'UK Landfill Practice: Co-Disposal - Using Nature's Techniques to Treat Difficult
Waste', DOE, 1993.
DOE, 'Your Council and the Environment: The Model Local Environment Charter', DOE,
1993.
DOE, 'A Charter Guide - Development Control', DOE, 1993.
DOE, 'Making Markets Work for the Environment', HMSO, London, 1993.
DOE, 'Improving Air Quality, DOE, 1994.
DOE, 'Environmental Appraisal in Government Departments', HMSO, London, June 1994.
Drewry, G., 'Mr Major's Charter: Empowering the Customer' [1993] Public Law 248.
Dryzeck, J.S., Rational Ecology, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
Dryzek, J.S., 'Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the
Administrative State' (1992) 3(2) Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 18.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1987.
Dworkin, R., Law's Empire, Fontana Press, London, 1986.
Eckersley, R., Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach,
UCL Press, London, 1992.
Emery, C.T. & Smythe, B., Judicial Review, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1986.
ENDS, Dangerous Substances in Water: A Practical Guide, ENDS, London, 1992.
Ewing, K., 'Trade Unions and the Constitution: The Impact of the New Conservatives', in
C. Graham and T. Prosser (eds.), Waiving The Rules: The Constitution under Thatcherism,
Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1988.
Feldman, D., 'Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory in Comparative
Perspective' (1992) 55 MLR 44.
Forester, J. (ed.), Critical Theory and Public Life, MIT Press, London, 1985.
Freund, E., Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1928.
Funk, W., 'When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest
- EPA's Woodstove Standards' (1987) 18 Env Law 55.
Galligan, D.J., Discretionary Powers - A Legal Study of Official Discretion, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1990.
Geddes, A., 'Locus Standi and EEC Environmental Measures' (1992) 4(1) JEL 29.
Gee, D., McLaren D. & Crabtree, T., Beyond Rhetoric: An Economic Framework for
Environmental Policy Development in the 1990's, FOE Discussion Paper No.2, London,
1991
Gibson, J. 'The Integration of Pollution Control' (1991) 18 Jo of Law & Soc 18.
Goldfarb, W., Water Law, 2nd ed., Lewis Publishers, Chelsea, Mich., 1989.
Grant, M., 'Central-Local Relations: The Balance of Power', in J. Jowell and D. Oliver
(eds.), The Changing Constitution, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
Gray, J., The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions, IEA Health and Welfare Unit,
London, 1992.
Gray, R.H., The Greening of Accountancy: The Profession After Pearce, Certified
Accountants Publications, London, 1990.
Green, H.P., 'The Risk-Benefit Calculus In Safety Determinations' (1975) 43 Geo Wash LR
791.
Griffith, J.A.G., 'The Political Constitution' (1979) 42 MLR 1.
Haigh, N., EEC Environmental Policy and Britain, 2nd, revised ed., Longman, Harlow,
1990.
Harden, I. & Lewis, N., The Noble Lie: The Britsh Constitution and the Rule of Law,
Hutchinson, London, 1988.
Harden, I., & Lewis, N., 'The Noble Lie: A Rejoinder' (1988) 52 MLR 812.
Harden, I., 'The Constitution and its Discontents' (1991) 21 Br Jo of Pol Science 489.
Harlow, C., & Rawlings, R., Law & Administration, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London,
1984.
Harlow, C. & Rawlings, R., Pressure Through Law, Routledge, London 1992.
Harris, R., 'Integrated Pollution Control In Practice' [1992] JPEL 611.
Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
Harter, P., 'Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise' (1982) 71 Georgetown LJ 1.
Hawkins, K., Environment and Enforcement - Regulation and the Social Definition of
Pollution, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.
Hayek, F.A., The Road To Serfdom, RKP, London, 1979.
Hayek, F.A., The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, London, 1990.
Hayek, F.A., Law, Legislation and Liberty - A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of
Justice and Political Economy, RI(13, London, 1982.
Held, D., Introduction to Critical Theory - Horkheimer to Habermas, Hutchinson, London,
1980.
Helm, D. & Pearce, D., 'The Assessment: Economic Policy towards the Environment'
(1990) 6(1) Oxf Rev of Econ Policy 1.
Helm, D., 'The Assessment: Reforming Environmental Regulation in the UK' (1993) 9(4)
Oxf Rev of Econ Policy 1.
Hill, J., 'The implementation of EMAS and BS 7750' (1994) 30 IEM 7 .
Hilson, C.J., 'Discretion to Prosecute and Judicial Review' [1993] Crim LR 739.
Hirschman, A.O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard Univeristy Press, Cambridge, Ma.,
1984.
HMIP, IPC Manual, London, 1991.
HIVIIP, 'Pollution Prevention: our common concern - a code for the 1990's', DOE, March
1994.
Hobhouse, L.T., The Metaphysical Theory Of The State: a Criticism, G. Allen & Unwin,
London, 1918.
Holder J. & Elworthy, S., casenote of case C-237/90 Commission v Germany & case C-
337/89 Commission v UK, (1994) 31(1) CML Rev 123.
Howarth, W., 'Water Pollution: Improving the Legal Controls' (1989) 1 JEL 33.
Hutter, B., The Reasonable Arm of the Law: The Law Enforcement Procedures of
Environmental Health Officers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
Irvine, S., Beyond Green Consumerism, Friends of the Earth, London, 1989.
Jacobs, M., The Green Economy, Pluto Press, London, 1991.
Jaffe, L.L., Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Little Brown, Boston, 1965.
Jennings, I., The Law And The Constitution, 5th ed., University of London Press, London,
1959.
Jewell, T., 'Agricultural Water Pollution Issues and NRA Enforcement Policy' (1991) 4(3)
LIVIELR 110.
Jones, H.W., 'The Rule of Law and the Welfare State' (1958) 58 Columbia LR 143.
Jones, T.H., 'Administrative Law, Regulation and Legitimacy' (1989) 16 Jo of Law & Soc
410.
Jones, T.H., 'Mistake of Fact in Aministrative Law' [1990] Public Law 507.
Jones, T.H., 'Regulatory Policy and Rule-Making' (1991) 20(2) Anglo-American LR 131.
Jones, T.H., 'Judicial Review Of The Independent Television Commission' [1992] Public
Law 372.
Jowell, J., 'The Rule of Law Today', in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing
Constitution, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
Kamenka, E. & Tay, A.E.S., 'Beyond Bourgeois Individualism - The Contemporary Crisis
in Law and Legal Ideology' in E. Kamenka & R.S. Neale (eds.), Feudalism, Capitalism And
Beyond, Edward Arnold, London, 1975.
Kerry Turner, R., Pearce, D. & Bateman, I., Environmental Economics - An Elementary
Introduction, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1994.
Kneese, A.V. & Bower, B.T., 'Standards, Charges, and Equity', in R. Doi
	 man & N.S.
Dorfman (eds.), Economics of the Environment - Selected Readings, W.W. Norton & Co
Inc, New York, 1972.
Koch C.J. & Leone, R.A., 'The Clean Water Act: Unexpected Impacts on Industry' (1979)
3 Harv Env LR 84.
Kolstad, C.D., 'Uniformity versus Differentiation in Regulating Externalities' (1987) 14 Jo
of Env Economics and Management 386.
Kramer, L., 'The Implementation of Community Environmental Directives Within Member
States: Some Implications of the Direct Effect Doctrine' (1991) 3(1) JEL 39.
Kramer, L., Focus on European Environmental Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1992.
Kramer, L., European Environmental Law Casebook, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993.
Kukathas, C., Hayek and Modern Liberalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
Lehner, P.H.A., 'Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction' (1983) 83 Columbia LR 627.
Leone R.A. & Jackson J.F., 'The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity: The
Case of Water Pollution Controls' in G. Fromm (ed.), Studies in Public Regulation, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Ma., 1981.
Lewis, C., Judicial Remedies in Public Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1992.
Lewis, C., 'The Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies in Administrative Law' (1992) 51 CLJ
138.
Lewis, N., 'Public Law and Legal Theory', in W. Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and the
Common Law, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.
Lewis, N. & Longley, D., 'Accountability in Education, Social Services and Health', in
Accountability to the Public, European Policy Forum, London, 1992.
Lewis, N. & Birkinshaw, P., When Citizens Complain: Reforming Justice and
Administration, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993.
Litterick, G., 'Charging for Disharging to Controlled Waters' (1990) 5 IEM 2.
Lomas, 0., 'Environmental Liability: Nightmare of the Nineties?' (1992) Sol Jo 1160.
London Economics, 'The Potential Role of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Acid
Rain', HMSO, London, 1992.
Loughlin, M., 'Tinkering With The Constitution' (1988) 51 MLR 531.
Loughlin, M., Public Law and Political Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.
Lyons, D., Ethics and the Rule of Law, CUP, Cambridge, 1984.
Macauley, S., Non-contractual Relations in Business' (1963) 28 American Soc Rev 55.
MacCormick, N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978.
Macrory, R., 'The Privatization and Regulation of the Water Industry' (1990) 53 MLR 78.
Macrory, R., 'Environmental Law: Shifting Discretions and the New Formalism', in 0.
Lomas (ed.), Frontiers of Environmental Law, Chancery, London, 1991.
Macrory, R., 'Environmental Assessment and Community Law' (1992) 4(2) JEL 273.
Macrory, R., 'The Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical Issues'
(1992) 29 CML Rev 347.
Marshall, G. (ed.), Ministerial Responsibility, OUP, Oxford, 1989.
Mashaw, J., 'Imagining The Past, Remembering The Future' [1991] Duke LJ 711.
McAuslan, P. & McEldowney, J.F., 'Legitimacy and the Constitution: the Dissonance
Between Theory and Practice', in P. McAuslan & J.F. McEldowney (eds.), Law, Legitimacy
and the Constitution, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1985.
McAuslan, P., 'The Role of Courts and Other Judicial Type Bodies in Environmental
Management' (1991) 3 JEL 195.
McEldowney, J.F., 'Dicey in Historical Perspective - a Review Essay', in P. McAuslan &
J.F. McEldowney (eds.), Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 1985.
McGarity, TO., 'Media Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies For
Health and Environmental Regulation' (1983) 46 Law and Contemporary Problems 159.
McLaren, J.P.S., 'Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution - Some Lessons from Social
History' (1983) 3 OJLS 155.
Michelman, F., 'Law's Republic' (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1493.
Mintz, J.A., 'Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Commentary on a
Recent Debate' (1991) 15(1) Han, Env LR 149.
Mulberg, J., 'Who Rules the Market? Green versus Ecosocialist Economic Programmes: a
Response
to Eckersley' [1992] Political Studies 334.
Murdie, A., Environmental Law and Citizen Action, Earthscan, London, 1993.
NAO, 'Control and Monitoring of Pollution: Review of the Pollution Inspectorate', HMSO,
London, July 1991.
Nonet, P. & Selznick D., Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law, Harper
and Row, New York, 1978.
Note, '"Ask a Silly Question ...": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages'
(1992) 105(8) Han, LR 1981.
NRA, 'Discharge Consent and Compliance Policy: A Blueprint for the Future' (aka. The
Kinnersley Report), NRA, Bristol, July 1990.
NRA, 'Proposals For Statutory Water Quality Objectives', NRA, Bristol, December 1991.
NRA, 'The Quality of Rivers, Canals and Estuaries in England and Wales: Report of the
1990 Survey', NRA, Bristol, December 1991.
NRA, 'Water Pollution Incidents in England and Wales', NRA, Bristol, January 1992.
NRA, 'Recommendations For a Scheme of Water Quality Classification For Setting
Statutory Water Quality Objectives', NRA, Bristol, October 1992.
NRA, 'NRA Customer Charter: Our Statement of Service Standards', NRA, Bristol,
January 1994.
NRA, 'Discharge Consent and Compliance: The NRA's Approach to Control of Discharges
to Water', HMSO, London, March 1994.
NRA, 'Water: Nature's Precious Resource - An Environmentally Sustainable Water
Resources Strategy for England and Wales', HMSO, London, March 1994.
OECD, 'Improving the Enforcement of Environmental Policies', Environmental
Monographs
No. 8, OECD, Paris, 1987.
OECD, Economic Instruments For Environmental Protection, OECD, Paris, 1989.
OFWAT, 'Trade Effluent Appeals', OFWAT Information note 21.
Oliver, D., 'Pepper v Hart: A Suitable Case for Reference to Hansard?' [1993] Public Law
5.
Ophuls, W., Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: A Prologue to a Political Theory of the
Steady State, WH Freeman & Co, San Francisco, 1977.
Osborne, P., 'Judicial Review Of Prosecutors' Discretion: The Ascent To Full Reviewability'
(1992) 43(2) NILO 178.
Paehlke, R., 'Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Environmentalism' (1988) 10 Env Ethics 305.
Pearce, D., 'Toward the Sustainable Economy: Environment and Economics' (1991) 172
The Royal Bank of Scotland Rev 3.
Pearce, D., 'Green Economics' (1992) 1(1) Env Values 3.
Pearce, D., Economic Values and the Natural World, Earthscan, London, 1993.
Pearce, D., Blueprint 3 - Measuring Sustainable Development, Earthscan, London, 1993.
Pearce D. & Brisson I., `BATNEEC: The Economics of Technology-based Environmental
Standards, With a UK Case Illustration' (1993) 9(4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24.
Pearson, M. & Smith, S., 'Taxation and Environmental Policy: Some Initial Evidence'
(1990) IFS commentary no. 19.
Pezzey, J., 'Market Mechanisms of Pollution Control: 'Polluter Pays', Economic and
Practical Aspects' in R. Kerry Turner (ed.), Sustainable Environmental Management:
Principles and Practice, Belhaven Press, London, 1988.
Pigou, A., The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1920.
Pitt-Payne, T., 'Standing in Judicial Review Proceedings', in Judicial Review, M.
Supperstone and J. Goudie (eds.), Butterworths, London, 1992.
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law And Economics, 2nd ed., Little Brown & Co, Boston,
1989.
Porter M. & Butt Philip, A., 'The Role of Interest Groups in EU Environmental Policy
Formulation: A Case Study of the Draft Packaging Directive' (1993) 3(6) European Env
16.
Posner, R.A., The Economics of Justice, Harvard University Press, London, 1981.
Posner, R.A., Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd ed., Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1977.
Potier, M., 'Agreement on the Environment' (1994) 189 The OECD Observer 8.
Prosser, T. 'Towards a Critical Public Law' (1982) 9(1) Jo of Law & Soc 1.
Purdue, M., 'Integrated Pollution Control in the Environmental Protection Act 1990: A
Coming of Age of Environmental Law?' (1991) 54 MLR 534.
Quirke, B., 'Accounting for the Environment: Current Issues' (1991) 1(5) Eur Env 19.
Ramchandani, R. & Gourlay D., 'Alternative Approaches to Setting Effluent Quality
Standards' (1992) 11 IEIVI 10.
Raz, J., 'The Rule of Law and its Virtue', in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law
and Morality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979.
Redclift, M., 'Sustainable Development: Needs, Values, Rights' (1993) 2(1) Env Values 3.
Reich, R.B., 'Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay' (1985)
94 Yale LJ 1617.
Richardson, G.M. & Ogus Al.,. 'The Regulatory Approach To Environmental Control'
(1979) 2 Urban Law & Policy 337.
Richardson, G.M., Ogus, A.I. & Burrows, P., Policing Pollution - A Study of Regulation
and Enforcement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
Rizzo, M.J., 'The Mirage of Efficiency' (1980) 8 Hofstra LR 487.
Rodgers, Jr., W.H., 'Benefits, Costs, And Risks: Oversight Of Health And Environmental
Decisionmaking' (1980) 4 Hari, Env LR (1980) 191.
Rose, C.M., 'Environmental Faust Succumbs To Temptations Of Economic
Mephistopheles, Or, Value by Any Other Name Is Preference' (1989) 87 Michigan LR
1631.
Rowley, C.K. & Peacock, A.T., Welfare Economics.: A Liberal Restatement, Martin-
Robertson, London, 1975.
Russell, C.S., 'Monitoring and Enforcement', in Public Policies for Environmental
Protection, P. Portney ed., Resources for the Future, Washington DC, 1990.
Sagoff, M., The Economy of the Earth, CUP, Cambridge, 1988.
San Juan, E.A., book review of The Economy of The Earth, (1991) 15 Harv Env LR 307.
Seidenfeld, M., 'A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State' (1992) 105
Harv LR 1511.
Smith D. & Elliott P., 'Hazardous Waste and Technological Risk: The Limits of Science in
Decision-Making' (1992) 2(1) Eur Env 1.
Somsen, H. & Bovis, C., 'Enforcement of EC Environmental Law and the Implications of
the Francovich Judgement' (1992) 3(6) Water Lcrw 84.
Sorabjee, S., 'Obliging Government to Control Itself: Recent Developments in Indian
Administrative Law' [1994] Public Law 39.
Steiner, J., Textbook on EEC Law, 4th ed., Blackstone Press, 1994.
Stewart, J., 'The Rebuilding of Public Accountability', in Accountability to the Public,
European Policy Forum, London, 1992.
Stewart, R.B., 'The Reformation of American Administrative Law' (1975) 88 Hari) LR
1669.
Stewart, R.B., 'Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework'
(1981) 69 Cal LR 1256.
Stewart, R.B., 'The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative
Regulation' [1985] Wisconsin LR 655.
Stewart, R.B., 'Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control' (1985) 9 Nary
Env LR 1.
Stewart, R.B., 'Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives' (1988) 13
Col Jo of Env Lctw 153.
Stewart, R.B., 'Antidotes for the "American Disease" '(1993) 20(1) Ecology Law Qu 85.
Sunkin, M., Bridges, L. & Meszaros, G., Judicial Review in Perspective: An Investigation
of Trends in the Use and Operation of the Judicial Review Procedure in England and
Wales, The Public Law Project, London, 1993.
Sunstein, C., 'Interest Groups In American Public Law' (1985) 38 Stanf LR 29.
Sunstein, C., 'Beyond the Republican Revival' (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1539.
Szyszczak, E., 'European Community Law: New Remedies, New Directions?' (1992) 55
MLR 690.
Teubner, G., 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements In Modern Law' (1983) 17 Law & Soc
Rev 239.
Teubner, G., 'Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to
the Legal Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility' in Corporate Governance and
Directors' Liabilities, K.J. Hopt & G. Teubner (eds.), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1985.
Thomas, R.M., 'Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CM v Young and
the Aflatoxin Dance' (1992) 44(1) Admin Law Rev 131.
Thompson, B., Textbook on Constitutional and Administrative Law, Blackstone Press,
London, 1993.
Tietenberg, T.H., Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 2nd ed., Scott,
Foresman & Co, London, 1988.
Tietenberg, T.H., 'Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation' (1990) 6(1)
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17.
Tribe, L.H., 'Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law' (1974) 83 Yale LJ 1315.
Trubatch, S.L., 'Informed Judicial Decision-making; A Suggestion for a Judicial Office for
Understanding Science and Technology' (1985) 10 Col Jo of Env Law 255.
Turpin, C., 'Ministerial Responsibility: Myth or Reality', in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.),
The Changing Constitution, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
Uglow, S., 'Defrauding the Public Purse: Prosecuting in Social Security, Revenue and
Excise Cases' [1984] Crim LR 128.
Vaughn, K.I., 'Constitutional Economics: Themes and Reflections', in R. Mackenzie (ed.),
Constitutional Economics, Lexington Books, Lexington, Ma., 1984.
Vennard, J., 'Decisions to Prosecute: Screening Policies and Practices in the United States'
[1985] Crim LR 20.
Vining, J., Legal Identity: The Corning of Age of Public Law, Yale University Press,
London, 1978.
Vogel, D., 'The Corporation as Government' (1975) 8(1) Polity 5.
Vogel, D., National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the
United States, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986.
Wade, E.C.S. & Bradley, A.W., Constitutional and Administrative Law, 10th ed.,
Longman, London, 1985.
Wade, H.W.R., Administrative Law, 6th ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
Waite, A., 'Criminal and Administrative Sanctions in English Environmental Law (1989) 1
LiVIELR 38 and 74.
Wald, P., 'Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?' (1985) 10
Col Jo Env Law 1.
Ward, A., 'The Right to an Effective Remedy in European Community Law and
Environmental Protection: A Case Study of United Kingdom Judicial Decisions Concerning
the Environmental Assessment Directive' (1993) 5(2) JEL 221.
Water Authorities Association, 'Trade Effluent Discharged to the Sewer: Recommended
Guidelines for Control and Charging', 1986.
Webb, R. & Woodfield, L., Standards and Charges in the Control of Trade Effluent
Discharges to Public Sewers, Discussion Paper 43, Institute of Social and Economic
Research, University of York.
Woolf, Sir H., 'Judicial Review: A Possible Programme for Reform' [1992] Public Law 221.
Woolf, Sir H., 'Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?' (1992) 4 JEL 1.
Yeager, P., The Limits of Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution, CUP,
Cambridge 1991.
Young, S.C., book review of Valuing the Earth: Six Case Studies, (1992) 1(2) Env Politics
307.
EC PUBLICATIONS
EC, 5th Environmental Action Programme, 'Towards Sustainability: A European
Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable
development', OJ 1993, C138/5.
EC, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47.
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS AND COMMAND PAPERS
HC 216, 'Financial Management and Control in the National Rivers Authority', 23rd Report,
Committee of Public Accounts, session 1991-2.
HC 474-I, 'Eco-Labelling', 8th Report, Environment Committee, session 1990-91.
HL 53, 'Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Legislation', 9th Report, HOL
Select Committee on the European Communities, session 1991-2.
Cmnd 8822, 'Report of Committee on Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments',
1983.
Cm 1200, 'This Common Inheritance - Britain's Environmental Strategy', 1990.
Cm 1720, 'The Government's Response to the 8th Report from the House of Commons
select committee on the environment, 'Eco-Labelling", 1991.
Cm 1599, 'The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standard', 1991.
Cm 2068, 'This Common Inheritance: The Second Year Report', 1992.
Cm 1966, 'Freshwater Quality', 16th Report, Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, 1992.
Cm 2540, 'The Citizen's Charter Second Report: 1994', 1994.
